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Abstract 
The city of Geelong, in Victoria, Australia, was, for much of the 20th century, a booming regional 
centre, boasting an array of industrial manufacturing operations that included oil refining, aluminium 
smelting, car manufacturing and glass making, as well as a significant textile and clothing industry 
(Johnson 2009a). This strong industrial economic base afforded high rates of participation across the 
age ranges in a labour market that became more ethnically diverse with waves of migration, even as it 
remained gender segregated. In the post war period, dominant social narratives promised that 
employees of Geelong’s major industries, such as the Ford Motor Company and International 
Harvester, could expect a ‘job for life’. However, through the late 20th century, the impacts of 
successive economic recessions and industry restructuring policies fell heavily on Australia’s 
industrial towns and cities, and their counterparts across the OECD and European Union. As de-
industrialisation accelerated through the 1980s and 1990s, many of Australia’s industrial towns and 
cities were transformed into unemployment blackspots, with rates of youth unemployment peaking at 
levels not seen since the Great Depression of the 1920s and 1930s. In the 21st century, de-
industrialisation, ‘neoliberal’ globalisation, and emergent, algorithmically energised circuits of 
capitalist accumulation are among a complex array of forces and developments shaping the future of 
work for young people in ‘Rust Belt’ places such as Geelong. Entrepreneurialism, innovation and 
creativity are increasingly understood as critical factors in the economic recovery of ‘Rust Belt’ cities, 
and in the employment futures of the young people who live in these places.  
This research project adopts a genealogical ethos that seeks to problematise the concepts of 
‘employability skills’, ‘innovation’ and ‘enterprise’, and to ask how these complex, contested, often 
ambiguous concepts have emerged, at different moments since the 1980s, as promising a ‘solution’ to 
the problem of youth unemployment. Genealogy is a method of historical inquiry informed by the 
work of French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault. It is a practice of ‘critical and effective 
history’ (Dean 1994) that attempts to problematise and unsettle the taken-for-granted components of 
our present social reality, and to uncover the multiple, diverse, often non-linear trajectories that 
comprise the ‘history of the present’. The genealogical ethos that I adopt in this project allows me to 
identify and analyse some of the key ‘episodes’, ‘events’, and ‘moments’ (Vucetic 2011) that have 
shaped understandings of young people’s employability skills, innovation and enterprise, and the 
ways in which these ‘capabilities’ have promised – at different times and in different, but also similar 
ways - to promote young people’s participation in changing labour markets.  
 
This analysis is presented in a series of chapters that focus close attention on ‘figures’ such as the 
Finn, Mayer and Carmichael reports and the ways in which the concept of ‘employability skills’ came 
to figure prominently in the restructuring of Australian education (general and vocational) at the start 
of the 1990s; the early 2000s attempt by groups in Geelong to attract a Guggenheim Museum as part 
of a place-based ‘innovation’ agenda that echoed more regional, national and international 
trajectories; the Foundation for Young Australians’ New Work Order series that, over the last five 
years, has ‘invested’ heavily in the idea of young people’s ‘enterprise skills’ in a time of digital 
disruption; and, finally, the gendered, aestheticised ways in which young people’s employability 
skills, innovation and enterprise are represented in a prominent ‘lifestyle’ publication in the ‘Rust 
Belt’ city of Geelong.  
 
The thesis argues that, across the last 40 years, the discourses around young people’s participation in 
education, training and the labour market have been powerfully reshaped by concerns to develop 
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young people’s ‘human capital’. In Australia, in the context of the ‘Accord’ politics advocated by the 
Hawke Labor Government in the 1980s, a consensus emerged among policymakers that reform of 
education and training systems should be harnessed much more firmly to the imperatives of national 
economic recovery and reconstruction. However, my analysis reveals that, these discourses are 
powerfully shaped by assumptions about the type of young person who is ideally positioned to acquire 
the kinds of human capital that it is thought will provide them with a degree of ‘insurance’ against 
unemployment and underemployment, and that will allow them to navigate future working lives that, 
it is claimed, will be characterised by almost constant churn and change. The ‘ideal subject’ that 
emerges in, and through, these ‘human capital’ discourses is a young person unencumbered by 
disadvantage or disability, apparently existing apart from, or outside of, the structures of gender, class, 
and race. These discourses of young people’s employability skills, innovation and enterprise display a 
tendency to view ‘young people’ in the abstract: as disembodied, of no particular gender or 
socioeconomic background, and from no particular place. What this thesis argues is that bodies, 
gender, class and place continue to matter for how it is that youth studies should continue to work 
with, and through, the challenges and opportunities that structure young people’s increasingly 
precarious engagements with education, training and work – in the present and the future. 
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Preface 
One of the central motivations of sociological endeavour, as in many other kinds of critical and 
creative enterprise, is a desire to ‘make the familiar strange’ (and perhaps also to ‘make the strange 
familiar’). Geelong, a regional Victorian city situated on Corio Bay, is the geographical anchor of this 
research project. As someone who was born, grew up, and currently resides in Geelong, I bring 
‘insider’ knowledge and perspectives to the study of this place. However, there are fresh and 
insightful perspectives to be gained in ‘making Geelong strange’. Those researchers who bear a 
personal connection to the things they study are, in the words of anthropologist Ruth Behar (1996), 
‘vulnerable observers’. Our subjective and personal insights are of immense value, but we must 
situate these in relation to wider processes and structures. As C. Wright Mills (2000, p.6) suggests in 
his landmark thesis, originally published in 1959, it is in those moments when we ‘grasp history and 
biography and the relations between the two within society’ that we exercise the sociological 
imagination.  
It is with these imperatives in mind that I begin in the suburb of Geelong that I call home, a suburb of 
working class people and modest, yet durable, homes. Newcomb, as one of the few Geelong suburbs 
untouched by rampant property speculation, retains much of its original character and many of its 
original residents. It is an intriguing vantage point from which to survey the rise and fall, ebb and flow 
of the city’s transformations. As I began to explore the history of this suburb, a history that is 
intertwined with the industrial heritage of this regional city, I came to appreciate the perceptiveness of 
historian Mark Peel’s (1995, p.6) observation that ‘class is the daily experience of your “place”’.  
Newcomb is bordered to its east by the low-density acreages of Moolap, which, prior to the 
acceleration of suburban sprawl, once formed the easternmost limits of the city, and the gateway to 
the small coastal towns of the Bellarine Peninsula. Along Newcomb’s western boundary lies East 
Geelong, the suburb in which I grew up. The humble origins of East Geelong’s workers’ cottages and 
Californian bungalows are belied by their not-so-humble price tags. The Bellarine Highway dissects 
Newcomb from its neighbour to the south, Whittington. Though there is little to distinguish the two 
suburbs demographically, Newcomb has perhaps always been the ‘working’ counterpoint to 
‘workless’ Whittington and the aura of disadvantage and stigma that persists there. And finally, at 
Newcomb’s northern, littoral boundary are the faint echoes of a once-thriving industrial area, where 
the flatlands of the former saltworks, and decommissioned smelter at Point Henry, give onto Corio 
Bay.  
The rise of industrialism in 20th century Australia was instrumental in the creation of distinctive 
physical and social landscapes, historian Erik Eklund (2002, p.2) writes in his study of the steel town 
of Port Kembla. As the urban development agenda was harnessed to the new regime of production, 
the muddy paddocks and outlying market gardens, the ‘raw, unmade environments’ (Murphy & 
Probert 2004, p.278) that characterised the nascent suburbs of post-World War II Australia, were 
swiftly transformed.  
In the mid-20th century, Geelong’s manufacturing workforce swelled, and it was at this time that 
Newcomb was consolidated as a suburb. Like many other Australian suburbs, Newcomb is a product 
of a time when governments took a much more interventionist role in providing for the elemental 
needs of working class people, as did some of the corporations for whom they were employed. In the 
towns of Morwell and Moe in Victoria’s Latrobe Valley, most of the housing for the extension of coal 
mining and electricity manufacture was provided by the Housing Commission (Howe 1988, p.60). In 
the northern suburbs of Geelong, where the city’s heavy industries flourished, it was the Housing 
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Commission, not the private property market, that met the rapidly expanding demand for housing with 
the influx of migrants and families after World War II. In Newcomb, among the brick veneer 
Commission-built homes, there stand a smaller number of aluminium-clad homes, and it is the latter 
which have a particularly curious genealogy. In 1964 Alcoa engaged local firm AV Jennings to build 
cladding houses in Newcomb for sale or rent to employees, on easy terms and low interest (Lannen 
2014, p.3). With exterior walls and window frames featuring Alcoa’s signature product, aluminium, 
these homes formed part of an employment and housing package with which Alcoa hoped to lure men 
and their families, some from interstate, with the promise of steady work at the company’s nearby, 
growing Point Henry aluminium works (Lannen 2014, p.3).  
A long-time resident of Newcomb reflects, ‘they were all Alcoa people around here, next door ... next 
door’ (Lannen 2014, p.3). After a 50-year tenure, Alcoa ceased production of aluminium at Point 
Henry in 2014. And the residents of suburbs like Newcomb will, perhaps, never again share such 
perceptions of sameness and commonality, as the lives and experiences contained within these locales 
change, disperse, fragment.  
It gives pause to reflect on the deep and complex interconnections of this place with the imperatives 
of industrialism and 20th century urban and regional development, with the reverberations of global 
political-economic trends and forces, and how they shaped the forms of community, the subjectivities 
and life chances, and sense of place, belonging, connection, of the people who lived, migrated to, and 
worked in this regional city. Although the story of this place is a rich and fascinating one, the primary 
aim of this thesis is not to tell a story about Geelong, for that task has been accomplished, and to a 
high level of detail and sophistication, by other people (see for example, Regan 2015; Wynd 1981; 
Wynd 1986; Wynd 1988). 
Recounting the history of Geelong’s industrialisation and subsequent de-industrialisation is one part 
of a much larger aim, to identify and analyse what the shifting social, cultural, political and economic 
landscapes of the 20th and 21st centuries mean for the labour market experiences of young people, and 
for how the problem of youth unemployment is conceptualised and understood. My aim is to probe 
the origins and evolution of discourses which understand young people in these de-industrialising 
locales as the architects of their own opportunity structures, and to map the ‘conditions of possibility’ 
which enable these discourses to emerge. This thesis must therefore move within and across multiple 
levels – local, state, national, global. Geelong, in all this, is my point of departure, and the place where 
I come back to. A major concern is to examine how discussions, debates and decisions among key 
stakeholders at the ‘macro’ level reverberate at the ‘micro’ level and shape the lives of young people 
as they seek out opportunities in globalised, de-industrialised, precarious labour markets. 
The seeds of this project were planted at a time when many of the stalwarts of Geelong’s 
manufacturing sector were finally reaching the end of the line. Although the trends and developments 
that had delivered places like Geelong and Broadmeadows to this point were a long time in the 
making, in the years between 2014 and 2016 especially, these places were the subject of intense 
commentary and reflection, becoming bywords for job losses and the retreat of heavy industry. The 
economic future of Geelong, and the people within it, faced a great many uncertainties. A series of 
questions stirred and unsettled my mind. Would Geelong be successful as it attempted to position 
itself as a node in the globalised, technologised, ‘knowledge’ economy? What would the possibilities, 
opportunities and challenges be for young people in this space? Other questions crystallised in 
discussions with my supervisors, and presented themselves as avenues for investigation. Against a 
background of sweeping structural changes, why were young people, more than ever, understood as 
those who should carry the responsibility for their own labour market outcomes? Why, when young 
5 
 
people were spoken about in education, training and labour market discourses, were ‘employability 
skills’ ‘innovation’ and ‘enterprise’ invariably the parameters of the discussion? How did we come to 
this point?  
Whether the chosen research methods involve interviewing, ethnography, or, in the case of this 
project, a genealogical analysis of historical and contemporary texts, a range of ethical, 
methodological, and theoretical dilemmas inhere in the practice of research. For example, a project 
such as this one, grounded as it is in a particular geographical context that is undergoing 
transformation, confronts the fundamental theoretical dilemma of how to define a ‘place’ such as 
Geelong, in a world in which the boundaries and borders of space are increasingly porous? Some 
dilemmas are more problematic than others, however. While the use of interview methods, for 
example, can offer a rich and detailed account of lived experience, it confronts the dilemma of which 
young people should the researcher give voice to, and why? Should they interview marginalised 
young people, and risk further entrenching them as marginalised? Equally, the decision to interview 
privileged young people may inadvertently reinforce the marginalisation of the less-privileged. It is a 
consideration of the balance of risks and benefits inherent in each of the major methodological 
approaches, as well as a desire to provide a much-needed critical, historical perspective on 
contemporary, taken-for-granted practices and assumptions, that has informed my decision to pursue a 
genealogical approach to this topic. What drives this project is an abiding concern to interrogate those 
concepts which function as ‘truths’ for how we understand the problem of youth employment and 
unemployment in de-industrialising places such as Geelong.  
For a portion of my candidature I was engaged as a ‘Researcher in Residence’ at the Geelong Region 
Local Learning and Employment Network (abbreviated as Geelong Region LLEN or GRLLEN). The 
project is also informed significantly by the conversations and experiences I had as part of this role. In 
2017, as a member of the ‘Expansive Learning Network’ project team, I contributed significantly to 
the design and delivery of a series of public forums on the ‘Gig Economy’. My position as a 
Researcher in Residence at the GRLLEN provided a window through which to view the operation of 
the network of local agencies and broader array of stakeholders that the GRLLEN connects with as it 
pursues the strategic imperative of preparing Geelong’s young people to participate in labour markets 
that are increasingly characterised as a ‘gig economy’. This allowed me to gain valuable insights into 
the ways in which discourses of young people’s ‘employability skills’, ‘innovation’ and ‘enterprise’ 
operate in the local Geelong context.   
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Introduction 
Employability Skills, Innovation and Enterprise: The Solution to the 
Problem of Youth Unemployment? 
 
 
When, in a city of 100,000, only one man [sic] is unemployed, that is his personal trouble, and 
for its relief we properly look to the character of the man, his skills, and his immediate 
opportunities. But when in a nation of 50 million employees, 15 million men are unemployed, 
that is an issue, and we may not hope to find its solution within the range of opportunities open 
to any one individual. The very structure of opportunities has collapsed. Both the correct 
statement of the problem and the range of possible solutions require us to consider the economic 
and political institutions of the society, and not merely the personal situation and character of a 
scatter of individuals.   
C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (2000, p.9), originally published in 1959 
The Coalition has always stood by the belief that the best form of welfare is a job, and the PaTH 
program is delivering opportunities for young Australians to gain the skills and experience they 
need to move off welfare and into work. 
 Michaelia Cash, Federal Minister for Employment, 2017 
The Australian conservative Coalition (Liberal-National) Government’s Youth Jobs PaTH internship 
scheme, announced in 2016, has brought into the spotlight a range of contemporary concerns about 
young people in the labour market. Michaelia Cash, Minister for Employment in the Turnbull 
Coalition Government from 2015 to 2017, understands ‘the correct statement of the problem’ and ‘the 
range of possible solutions’ to youth unemployment in precisely the narrow, individualistic terms that 
C. Wright Mills warns against. In other words, the problem of youth unemployment, almost self-
evidently, resides in the ‘personal situation and character’ of the individual: the deficient skills, 
attitudes and experience of the young job-seeker. The Youth Jobs PaTH scheme can be understood as 
a recent, prominent manifestation of the ‘workfare’ policy regimes that predominate in many of the 
industrialised, liberal democracies (and at a later point I will examine, in more detail, criticisms of 
programs such as the Youth Jobs PaTH scheme). However, as political leaders such as Michaelia 
Cash seek to describe and justify the scope and aims of such programs, they reveal something of the 
essence of contemporary attitudes to, and preoccupations with, the young unemployed.  
Since the collapse of Australia’s full-time youth labour market in the 1970s and 1980s (Denny & 
Churchill 2016, p.7), youth unemployment has persisted as a seemingly intractable problem. And 
while it is possible to trace the emergence of this problem to major shifts in economic, social and 
political institutions, the framing of the problem, and the range of possible solutions proposed by 
political leaders, policymakers and others working with, and on, sometimes for, young people, 
typically remain focused on the individual as the locus of concern. Academic and policy literatures 
demonstrate a concern for the moral fibre and wellbeing of the out of work young person, as they seek 
to define and describe the alarming consequences and deleterious effects of long-term unemployment 
on the young, including: ‘wage scarring’ – in other words, a decreased lifetime earning potential – as 
well as an increased risk of criminal behaviour and delinquency (Sissons & Jones 2012, p.10); ‘long-
term ramifications for future employability’ and poor physical and mental health outcomes (Cessnock 
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City Council 2015, p.1); and the risk that unemployed youth will be ‘“becalmed” in education and 
training that may have no use to their future job prospects’ (Burrows 2013, p.12).  
In September 2016, the Sydney newspaper The Daily Telegraph invited its readers to cast moral 
opprobrium on the young ‘NEETs’ (not in employment, education or training) that it suggested were 
wilfully unemployed (Bita & Houghton 2016; The Daily Telegraph 2016). This sensationalist media 
reporting suggested that ‘an army of young Australians “unwilling to work” spends the day sleeping, 
watching TV or playing computer games’ (Bita & Houghton 2016). The report featured two young 
women from the Sydney suburb of Mt Druitt who, it was claimed, ‘would rather spend their days 
“chilling at maccas” and taking their old Holden Barina on “off-road tracks” than look for a job’ (Bita 
& Houghton 2016).1 
From the late 20th through the early 21st centuries, however, the story of youth unemployment has 
increasingly become entwined with those of de-industrialisation and ‘neoliberal’ globalisation, the 
key dynamics shaping labour market change. In Australia, the effects of these processes have been felt 
keenly in those regional areas such as the Illawarra and Hunter regions of New South Wales, Whyalla 
in South Australia, and the communities of Geelong and Morwell in Victoria, which have traditionally 
featured a high proportion of industrial employment (Promfret et al. 2008; Cessnock City Council 
2015; ABC News 2016a; Kenway, Kraack & Hickey-Moody 2006, pp.67-69). In Newcastle, a centre 
for coal mining and steel production in the New South Wales Hunter region, youth unemployment 
exceeded 40 percent in the early 1990s, as the local economy struggled ‘after several rounds of layoffs 
at BHP [steelworks], an earthquake, the loss of major industries like shipbuilding, and recessions 
large and small’ (Westbury 2015, pp.18-19). At that time, youth employment was also in crisis in a 
number of other de-industrialising locales, such as the former car manufacturing hub of Elizabeth, on 
Adelaide’s (South Australia) northern fringe, where youth unemployment soared well above 50 
percent (Peel 1995, p.201). 
In the new millennium, high rates of youth unemployment are again making headlines, and 
preoccupying policymakers and researchers. Throughout much of 2014 and 2015, Geelong’s youth 
(15-24) unemployment rate hovered above 17 percent (Enterprise Geelong 2017). The Brotherhood of 
St Laurence identified Geelong as one of 20 national youth unemployment ‘hotspots’ in both 2015 
and 2016 (Brotherhood of St Laurence 2016, p.3). The twelve-month average of Geelong’s youth 
unemployment rate to August 2018 was 12.4 percent, a rate roughly commensurate with the Victorian 
and national averages (City of Greater Geelong [COGG] 2018a). However, a focus on the city-wide 
average masks the significant variation in the prevalence and rates of youth unemployment and 
disengagement between and within the suburbs. In the Geelong region, the five areas of Whittington, 
North Geelong, Corio, Bell Post Hill and Norlane-North Shore have been highlighted as zones of 
significant economic disadvantage (Brotherhood of St Laurence 2016, p.7; COGG 2016a). Youth 
unemployment rates in the districts of Whittington, Norlane-North Shore and Corio are consistently at 
least ten percentage points above the city average, and these areas are home to the highest proportions 
of people with below Year 11 levels of educational attainment (COGG 2016a). 
The 2007-08 Global Financial Crisis and its reverberations saw youth unemployment rates surge, 
most dramatically in Europe. With youth unemployment rates averaging 23.5 percent across the 
 
1 An investigation by television program Media Watch revealed the considerable ‘creative license’ taken by the 
Daily Telegraph in producing this report. It confirmed that one of the young women profiled, Amy, is in fact a 
Year 12 student who works part-time at McDonalds and does not claim any unemployment payments from 
Centrelink (Australian Broadcasting Corporation [ABC] 2016a). 
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European Union in 2013, and exceeding 50 percent in Greece and Spain, political leaders grew 
concerned about the threat of widespread social unrest (Neate & Wearden 2013). Serrano Pascual and 
Martín Martín (2017, p.803), for example, argue that in post-GFC Spain, with young people on 
average 2.4 times more likely to be unemployed than adults (in 2014), the difficulties young people 
face in securing employment ‘operate as a powerful instrument of precariousness’. Although they are 
the most highly qualified generation in Spanish history - 53.9 percent of young people aged 16–29 
are overqualified relative to the job they obtain, one of the highest rates in Europe - 34.5 percent of 
those aged 29 or under would accept any job (Serrano Pascual & Martín Martín 2017, p.803). Carbajo 
and Kelly (2019, p.82) observe that it was in conditions of post-GFC austerity ‘that an entrepreneurial 
ethos was prioritised as a solution to the precariousness and high unemployment rates among Spanish 
and Basque young people’.  
In the era of ‘neoliberal’ capitalism (I will examine the key concept of ‘neoliberalism’ in some detail 
in Chapter 2), a range of policy instruments and approaches have emerged to address the crisis of 
youth unemployment. However, as some commentators observe, many of these ‘solutions’ are 
overwhelmingly punitive in orientation, and have the effect of legitimating and normalising 
precarious employment as an increasingly mainstream experience (Standing 2014; Peck & Theodore 
2000). Those young people who are unable or unwilling to demonstrate their employability skills, 
enterprise, and capacity to contribute to cultures of innovation, are likely to fall victim to the 
unforgiving regimes of ‘activation’ and ‘mutual obligation’ that attach to the receipt of government 
income support. The ‘active’ labour market policy regimes which rose to prominence in many of the 
industrialised, liberal democracies in this period have typically featured a ratcheting up of the 
conditionality of welfare payments. In Australia, the Work for the Dole scheme was introduced by the 
Howard conservative Coalition Government in 1998, and in its first iteration the scheme was targeted 
at young jobseekers aged 18-24, seeking to ‘activate’ those who had been on unemployment benefits 
for more than six months (Smith 2017, p.22).  
In their criticism of active labour market policy regimes, Peck and Theodore (2000, p.120) suggest 
such regimes ‘can be seen as social policy analogues of flexible labour markets, as they serve to 
individualise employment relations, intensify competitive pressures at the bottom of the labour market 
and enforce low-paid work’. In the wake of profound changes in the production model in recent 
decades, the concept of ‘flexicurity’ has come to occupy a central place in European employment 
discourse, policy and regulation (Keune & Serrano 2014, p.1). Keune and Serrano (2014, p.7) 
problematise flexicurity’s purported union of ‘flexibility’ and ‘security’, suggesting that the ‘security’ 
component of the equation is in practice less about social protection, and more about self-insurance: 
‘security through self-insurance (the adaptability of the worker) becomes the subjective correlation of 
flexibility (of the labour market)’.  
Throughout history, the unemployed have often been an object of ridicule, and stigmatised as social 
pariahs - as the notions of the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor, that prevailed in a previous era, can 
attest (Archer 2009). In the mid-20th century, however, under the influence of ideas of social 
democratic redistribution, a somewhat different attitude prevailed in policymaking circles, one that to 
a large degree understood the problem of unemployment and its management as a collective 
responsibility. The policy of ‘full employment’ was, for more than three decades in the mid-20th 
century, pursued as a key macroeconomic objective by both state and federal governments in 
Australia (Quirk 2004, p.1; Smith 2017, p.5). The objective of a full employment society, Quirk 
(2004) and Smith (2017) maintain, emerged at a time when governments were concerned to 
acknowledge and ameliorate the hardships endured by the working class in the Great Depression of 
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the 1930s. In the 1940s, as the ‘Keynesian’ approach to economic management rose to dominance, 
Treasury economists embraced the view that the government should use its fiscal capacity to maintain 
full employment (Smith 2017, p.12).  
A very different state of affairs has, however, predominated in recent decades. Quirk (2004, p.1) 
suggests that ‘politicians and senior bureaucrats with the ability to eliminate it have deliberately 
maintained mass unemployment since the 1970s to avoid the profit squeeze and “cost-push” inflation 
that emerged under conditions of full employment during the 1960s’. Smith (2017, p.15) contends 
that, occurring against the background of the rise to dominance of neoliberal ‘free market’ ideas, the 
1974 oil shock and associated inflation triggered an abandonment of bipartisan full employment 
policy in Australia and throughout the Anglosphere. Unemployment rose sharply from a 1960s 
average of less than two percent to over six percent by the end of the 1970s and, after a brief reprieve, 
continued upwards to ten percent by the early 1990s (Smith 2017, p.14). This change in the political 
consensus was largely responsible for turning the tide of public opinion on the problem of 
unemployment, providing the context in which the disciplinary connotations of the ‘dole bludger’ 
became significant (Smith 2017, p.15; Archer 2009).  
A number of commentators suggest that, in the 21st century, the key ‘disruptions’ shaping the 
dynamics of youth employment and unemployment are technological in nature. The recent, rapid rise 
of the technologically-mediated, precarious forms of employment seen in the ‘gig economy’ caught 
labour market regulators, unions and others off-guard. And the so-called ‘digital disruption’ currently 
underway threatens mass technological unemployment, with predictions suggesting that anywhere 
from nine percent to around 40 percent of jobs are directly at risk of automation (Arntz, Gregory & 
Zierahn 2016; Frey & Osborne 2013; Durrant-Whyte et al. 2015). While the degree of technological 
unemployment likely to be experienced remains contested and uncertain, a range of education 
commentators and youth advocacy organisations predict that young people’s work futures will be 
characterised by almost constant churn and change, in labour markets fundamentally reshaped by the 
advance of automation, algorithms and artificial intelligence (Foundation for Young Australians 
[FYA] 2015a; Payton 2017; McKinsey Global Institute 2017).  
The discussion up to this point has revealed that there is a pervasive assumption, particularly among 
politicians and media commentators, that youth unemployment is an individual-level problem that 
must therefore attract individual-level solutions. However, what I want to suggest is that the problem, 
its framing, and the range of solutions proposed, appear to be intimately bound up with ‘macro’ level 
forces, such as de-industrialisation, neoliberal globalisation, and the structural economic crises (and 
emerging ‘disruptions’) impacting on the advanced capitalist world.  
This research project approaches the study of young people’s labour market experiences from the 
particular vantage point of a de-industrialising, predominantly working-class community, and in doing 
so, it follows in the tradition of some important studies of working-class young people as they form 
their identities in contexts shaped by radical economic restructuring. While I have selected the work 
of Lois Weis in the US, and Andy Furlong, Fred Cartmel, Tracy Shildrick, Robert MacDonald and 
colleagues in the UK for closer analysis here, I also recognise that this field of inquiry is shaped by 
the important contributions of a range of other scholars (see, for example, the work of the Youth 
Studies Group at the University of Newcastle [Australia]). Although it utilises a perhaps somewhat 
different methodological approach than has traditionally been employed by those studying the labour 
market experiences and identities of young people in ‘Rust Belt’ places, this research project is an 
attempt to engage with and build on some of the concerns and themes identified and explored by 
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Weis, Furlong and Cartmel, and Shildrick, MacDonald and colleagues, among others. In the following 
section I will review the contributions of these authors to understandings of youth unemployment and 
class relations in ‘Rust Belt’ communities, as a preliminary to outlining in more detail the particular 
concerns of my own research.  
Youth unemployment, ‘Rust Belt’ communities, class relations     
Sociologist Lois Weis has produced a number of pioneering studies of class relations in ‘Rust Belt’ 
communities and their impacts on the identities and aspirations of young people. Her 1985 
ethnographic study of processes of identity formation among white working-class youth in secondary 
school, Working Class Without Work (1990), was centred on the American town of ‘Freeway’ as it 
underwent social and economic transformation after the closure of its major employer, a steel plant. 
She found that patriarchal and racist ideologies in this place were a feature of young males’ identities 
in particular. These patriarchal ideologies typically informed the males’ attitudes towards work: 
‘mental labor is not only less valued than manual labor, but it is less valued because it is seen as 
feminine’ (Weis 1990, p.39, emphasis in original). The white male identity emerges in relation to the 
black male ‘other’, Weis (1990, p.77) observed, and she speculated that this stems from an 
‘historically based antagonism between the two groups’, in which they were pitted against each other 
in the economic sphere: ‘blacks were kept out of well-paid union laboring jobs by white males and, at 
the same time, used as strike-breakers by white capitalists’.  
While Freeway girls did not ‘elaborate an identity in relation to blacks in the way boys do’, ‘the 
current stress among Freeway girls on a wage labor identity’ is nonetheless formed in relation to the 
expectations placed on them by young males and others (Weis 1990, pp.54-55, 77). Specifically, 
young women commonly expressed a desire to continue their education and establish themselves in a 
career or job prior to having a family, rejecting the ‘ideology of romance’ that would see them 
prioritise domestic and family responsibilities over participation in the public world of work (Weis 
1990, p.63). In the minds of the parents of Freeway High students, education assumed an extreme 
importance in the context of plant closures, an attitude that signaled, for Weis, the decline of the class 
consciousness and militancy of the working class: 
It is noteworthy that parents are pushing their children in the direction of individual social 
mobility. There is no sense of struggle for the working class as a whole such as might have 
been the case in the previous generation. Plants are closing, and parents feel strongly that 
children must obtain further education so they can establish themselves in the future. In a 
sense, then, there is, for parents, no envisioned class to fight for any longer. It is only a 
question of their children’s individual survival, and schooling is seen as the only way to 
survive. This is a far cry from life before plant closings…Parents such as those in Freeway are 
not able to ‘get their sons jobs’ as was the case before. Now all they can do is stress the 
importance of schooling. Beyond stressing its importance, however, there is little of a 
concrete nature that parents can offer their children. (Weis 1990, pp.160-161). 
In her follow-up study, Class Reunion: The Remaking of the American White Working Class (2004), 
Weis reflects on the lives of these (former) Freeway High students, fifteen years later. Here Weis 
(2004, p.6) argues that ‘it is privileges historically associated with whiteness, as well as continuing 
struggles around gender roles and definitions, that are key to the ongoing struggles of the white 
working class as it redefines itself as a continued distinct entity amid radical economic restructuring’. 
Weis observes both changes and continuities in the lives and attitudes of this cohort. The relationship 
of the white working class to people of colour continues to be characterised by segregation rather than 
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solidarity (Weis 2004, pp.70-71). Some male interviewees opted to transcend the hegemonic working-
class masculinities that were a legacy of the industrial era: ‘it is in the reinforcement of and/or pulling 
away from what is defined within high school peer groups as hegemonic white working-class 
masculine form that we begin to see how…young men move toward adulthood’ (Weis 2004, p.106).  
In contrast, as the female interviewees moved into adulthood, they continued the critique begun as 
teenagers, of the ‘Domestic Code’ and its gendered and patriarchal precepts (Weis 2004, p.109). As 
teenagers, Freeway females, perhaps presciently, perceived that they could not depend on the shaky 
foundations of the male ‘family wage’, an institution that was crumbling in the face of major 
economic, social and cultural shifts. Freeway females are, as young women coming of age in the late 
20th - and early-21st centuries, and prioritising postsecondary education as they strive for independence 
and self-definition, positioned to take advantage of the opportunities that contemporary labour 
markets present. Weis’ findings, on the significance of gender and gendered subjectivities in these 
labour market transformations, raise significant themes that I will return to throughout this thesis.   
In the UK, the work of Andy Furlong and Fred Cartmel, and Tracy Shildrick, Robert MacDonald and 
colleagues has examined the role of post-Fordist economic, social and political change in shaping 
young people’s school-to-work transitions and broader ‘life transitions’, as well as their experiences 
of poverty and economic marginalisation. In their book Young People and Social Change: 
Individualization and risk in late modernity, Furlong and Cartmel (1997) consider youth transitions 
through the lens of the influential work of Ulrich Beck on ‘risk society’, and Anthony Giddens on the 
‘reflexive’ self, arguing that ‘young people today are growing up in a different world to that 
experienced by previous generations – changes which are significant enough to merit a 
reconceptualization of youth transitions and processes of social reproduction’ (Furlong & Cartmel 
1997, p.6). The transition from school to work, for example, ‘has become much more 
protracted...increasingly fragmented and in some respects less predictable’ (Furlong & Cartmel 1997, 
p.27).  
Furlong and Cartmel (1997) suggest that the impact of these changes can be conceptualised using the 
metaphor of a journey by train versus a journey by car. Young people coming of age in the 1960s and 
1970s could expect to board one of a number of trains – determined by factors like social class, 
gender and educational attainment - bound for different destinations (Furlong & Cartmel 1997, p.6). 
Although the ability to influence the direction of travel was limited, the commonality of experience on 
board the train bred a sense of social belonging and camaraderie (Furlong & Cartmel 1997, p.6). The 
societal changes of late modernity are such that there has been ‘a wholesale closure of the railways’, 
and ‘the journey from class of origin to class of destination is now undertaken by car’ (Furlong & 
Cartmel 1997, p.6). The young car driver, confronted with a much wider variety of routes and speeds, 
will typically develop a greater sense of their own agency to influence the journey: ‘because there are 
a much greater range of pathways to choose from, young people may develop the impression that their 
own route is unique and that the risks they face are to be overcome as individuals rather than as 
members of a collectivity’ (Furlong & Cartmel 1997, p.7).  
Tracy Shildrick, Robert MacDonald and colleagues have conducted much of their research in 
Teesside, a conurbation in England’s North East. In the post-war period Teesside was renowned as an 
industrial powerhouse specialising in steel, chemical and heavy engineering industries. However, by 
the end of the 20th century the area had rapidly transformed to become ‘one of the most de-
industrialised locales in the UK’ (Byrne 1999, cited in Shildrick & MacDonald 2007, p.592). The 
post-16 pathways of young people in these de-industrialised, deprived locales typically feature various 
combinations of ‘often low-quality, government training and employability schemes; usually 
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unfinished, lower level educational courses; low skill, low paid, insecure employment; and recurrent 
periods of unemployment’ (Shildrick & MacDonald 2007, p.599). These fragmented, interrupted, 
non-linear pathways ‘carr[y] little sense of forward motion toward more secure, rewarding 
employment’ (Shildrick & MacDonald 2007, p.599).  
In their study of life in ‘low pay, no pay’ Britain, Shildrick et al. (2012, p.5) suggest that ‘poor work’ 
– in other words, work that does not provide stepping-stones to better employment and security – has 
in recent decades been cemented as a permanent feature of life for economically marginalised groups, 
and that this is increasingly apparent across the age ranges. Shildrick et al. (2012, p.2) argue that their 
analysis has relevance well beyond the town of Middlesbrough, where their study is located:  
This story – of workers cycling between subsistence-level benefits and low-paid, low-skilled 
and insecure work, and circulating below and just above the poverty line as they do so – is 
one, we argue, that is now characteristic of working life in the flexibilised labour markets of 
late capitalism. 
Key to the emergence of the ‘low-pay, no-pay’ cycle have been the sweeping structural changes to 
Teesside labour markets across the last 40 years, changes which have seen large numbers of relatively 
skilled, well paid, secure jobs in the manufacturing industry eliminated, a decline that has only been 
partially off-set by the growth in service sector employment (Shildrick et al. 2012, p.4). Processes of 
restructuring not only precipitated an overall decline in the number of skilled manual jobs, but also 
meant that the jobs that did remain were often ‘precarised’ through processes of casualisation and a 
greater reliance on subcontracting arrangements (Shildrick et al. 2012, p.126). Shildrick et al. (2012, 
pp.3-4) maintain that the low-pay, no-pay cycle has emerged as one of the key consequences of 
structural economic change in the industrialised democracies:  
While persistent, structural unemployment and ‘new’ flexible forms of working are two well-
known corollaries of economic dispossession and deindustrialisation, a third, less well 
reported but no less significant outcome – tied to the first two – is the emergence of patterns 
of work that can be characterised as the low-pay, no-pay cycle. 
Those cycling between periods of unemployment and precarious employment on the lowest rungs of 
the labour market often encounter a further challenge in the form of the judgmental attitudes of 
employment agency staff. As Shildrick et al. (2012, p.5) highlight, it was a common perception 
among welfare to work agency staff that clients belonged to inherited ‘cultures of worklessness’; they 
understood that the plight of their clients was influenced by individual- and family-level factors, 
rather than ‘reflecting on the local history of decimated labour markets in which individuals have been 
placed and struggled’. In a 2014 paper, Robert MacDonald, Tracy Shildrick and Andy Furlong sought 
to put the idea of ‘intergenerational cultures of worklessness’ to the empirical test. MacDonald, 
Shildrick and Furlong (2014, p.200) note that, in the UK in recent decades, tabloid newspaper editors, 
welfare practitioners and politicians have expressed alarm at what they suggest are cultures of 
‘welfare dependency’ passed down through the generations, highlighting the need to address the 
blight that is ‘three generations of families where no-one has ever had a job’. In their fieldwork in 
some of the poorest neighbourhoods in Middlesbrough and Glasgow they encountered immense 
difficulty ‘in even finding a sample of families that had known very long-term worklessness over two 
generations in these locales of very high unemployment’ (MacDonald, Shildrick & Furlong 2014, 
p.206). In addition, the attitudes of study participants towards work were characterised not by a poor 
‘work ethic’ or low aspirations, but rather, ‘the social, psychological, financial and moral value of 
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working for a living was very strongly emphasised’ (MacDonald, Shildrick & Furlong 2014, p.208). 
MacDonald, Shildrick and Furlong argue that the idea of intergenerational cultures of worklessness is 
perhaps best understood as ‘a zombie argument’: zombie arguments as ones that ‘no matter how many 
times they are shot down in flames or have a stake driven through their heart … seem to get up again 
afterwards’ (Spicker 2007, cited in MacDonald, Shildrick & Furlong 2014, p.217). While such 
zombie arguments have little basis in rigorous social scientific evidence, they are nonetheless a key 
influence on contemporary welfare reform and social policy, and MacDonald, Shildrick and Furlong 
conclude that it is imperative that these zombie arguments are contested.  
Although this project is indebted to the influential work of Weis, Furlong and Cartmel, and Shildrick, 
MacDonald and colleagues (among many others), it approaches the study of youth unemployment in a 
‘Rust Belt’, de-industrialising locale utilising genealogical, rather than ethnographic and sociological, 
methods. It is my contention in this thesis that the key concepts of ‘employability skills’, ‘innovation’ 
and ‘enterprise’ have, in slightly different ways, and in slightly different historical periods (but 
generally since the 1970s), been understood as central determinants of young people’s labour market 
outcomes. I will also argue that these concepts have particular salience in the ‘Rust Belt’ cities and 
regions of the industrialised, liberal democracies. A series of developments at the local, national and 
global levels is indicative of the shift towards imagining young school-leavers and university 
graduates, as well as the wider population of job-seekers, as the architects of their own ‘opportunity 
structures’2. In Geelong, local news and business publications are among the chief proponents of 
discourses that celebrate the achievements and drive of individual entrepreneurs. And in these spaces 
the ‘figure’ of the young entrepreneur features prominently. Whether that is a local media personality 
who combines various marketing and modelling engagements while cultivating her ‘personal brand’ 
on social media and blogging platforms (Rooth 2016c), or a 23-year-old opening up one of the city’s 
many new cafes (Mayne 2016).  
Defining the terms ‘employability skills’, ‘innovation’, and ‘enterprise’ 
In slightly different ways, and in different historical periods, ‘employability skills’, ‘innovation’ and 
‘enterprise’ have functioned as ‘keywords’ that suggest ‘this is what the problem of youth 
unemployment is primarily about’. These concepts are made to function as ‘truths’ in relation to the 
 
2 The concept of ‘opportunity structures’ is a particular focus of youth studies researcher Ken Roberts’ work on 
young people’s careers in and through education, training and the labour market (Furlong, Biggart & Cartmel 
1996, p.552). The sense in which I deploy the term ‘opportunity structures’ in this thesis differs slightly from 
Roberts’ interpretation of the concept. Furlong, Biggart and Cartmel (1996) note that, where the study of young 
people’s transitions from school to work was concerned, Roberts was critical of approaches that he considered 
placed undue emphasis on the role of young people’s individual aspirations and choices in influencing their 
labour market outcomes. As Roberts (2009, p.362) writes: 
Choice is not irrelevant, but it fails to explain enough. It cannot account for the contexts, including the 
labour market contexts, in which young people make their choices, and it cannot identify the different 
limits within which different groups of young people choose. 
Furlong, Biggart and Cartmel (1996, p.553) build on Roberts’ work to suggest that it is in the complex interplay 
of ‘individual attributes (such as gender, class location and educational attainment) and contextual effects (local 
labour market contexts, neighbourhoods and rurality)’ that young people’s occupational aspirations are shaped. 
Following Furlong, Biggart and Cartmel I understand young people’s occupational aspirations as shaped by a 
combination of individual and structural factors, but in suggesting that young people are understood as the 
architects of their own opportunity structures, my thinking is also informed by the work of authors such as Kelly 
(2006, 2013), on the role of neoliberal governmentalities in shaping individuals’ understandings of themselves 
as entrepreneurs of their own biographies and portfolios of choice and achievement.  
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problem of youth unemployment, ‘truths’ which have emerged as particularly significant in the 
context of the ‘neoliberal’ capitalism predominant in many countries since the late 20th century. Yet 
the meanings of these concepts are not fixed and final, but rather are shifting and contested, complex 
and ambiguous. In recognising this, the project takes its cue from the ‘deliberately social and 
historical’ analysis of systems of meaning that cultural studies theorist Raymond Williams (1983, 
p.21) outlined in his influential work Keywords. ‘The most active problems of meaning’, Williams 
(1983, p.22) argued, ‘are always primarily embedded in actual relationships’, and these meanings and 
relationships are ‘typically diverse and variable’. Not only that, but ‘important social and historical 
processes occur within language, in ways which indicate how integral the problems of meanings and 
of relationships really are’ (Williams 1983, p.22, emphasis in original). The affinities and overlaps of 
Williams’ approach with a genealogical critique of key concepts are demonstrated in the following 
passage: 
The kind of semantics to which these notes and essays [in Keywords] belong is one of the 
tendencies within historical semantics: a tendency that can be more precisely defined when it 
is added that the emphasis is not only on historical origins and developments but also on the 
present - present meanings, implications and relationships - as history. This recognizes, as any 
study of language must, that there is indeed community between past and present, but also 
that community - that difficult word - is not the only possible description of these relations 
between past and present; that there are also radical change, discontinuity and conflict, and 
that all these are still at issue and are indeed still occurring. (Williams 1983, p.23, emphasis in 
original) 
This project will suggest that the key concepts of ‘employability skills’, ‘innovation’ and ‘enterprise’ 
are each the product of an ‘apparatus’ (Foucault et al. 1980, pp.194-195) composed of a distinctive 
configuration of elements. These elements are both discursive and non-discursive, are political, 
economic, social, cultural, and ideological in nature and are conditioned by, and in turn condition, 
spatial and temporal processes of de-industrialisation and labour market change. It is through an 
historical analysis of epochs, episodes, events and examples (Vucetic 2011) that the diverse elements 
that relate to each of ‘employability skills’, ‘innovation’ and ‘enterprise’ can be identified and 
analysed. This detailed analysis is the focus of chapters 4, 5 and 6, however, and it is the aim of the 
following section of this chapter to provide a preliminary sketch of the meaning and significance of 
these key terms in contemporary discourses, particularly as they apply to questions of youth 
employment, unemployment and labour market transitions.  
Employability skills 
The provenance of the concept of ‘employability’ has been interrogated by McQuaid and colleagues 
(McQuaid, Green & Danson 2005; McQuaid & Lindsay 2005). While ‘it is over 100 years since 
“employability” emerged as a concept in debates surrounding unemployment and labour markets’, 
McQuaid, Green and Danson (2005, p.191) suggest that it was in the 1990s that the concept came to 
occupy a central place in labour market policy and associated discourses, a development they observe 
in the European Union, the UK’s New Deal, and ‘elsewhere at national, regional and local levels’. 
The employability of young people has also become a core concern of the research and policy 
agendas of organisations with a supranational and/or global focus, such as the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (see, 
for example, ILO 2011; OECD 2015b).  
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For McQuaid, Green and Danson (2005, p.191), ‘employability relates to both unemployed people 
seeking work and those in employment seeking better jobs with their current or a different employer’, 
and there are both ‘labour supply’ and ‘labour demand’ dimensions of this concept, which give rise to 
‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ definitions of employability. A narrowly-defined supply-side focus understands 
employability as hinging on the skills and attributes possessed by the individual (McQuaid, Green & 
Danson 2005, p.191). The broader perspective, on the other hand, takes in contextual factors which 
impact on an individual’s ability to secure or to change employment, such as job search and labour 
demand conditions (McQuaid, Green & Danson 2005, p.191). However, McQuaid and colleagues 
observe that it is a ‘supply-side orthodoxy’ which has predominated in many of the industrialised 
democracies since the late 20th century:  
‘So-called’ employability policies have too often focused solely on activating the unemployed 
through a combination of compulsory training and job-seeking activities. That the success of 
these policies tends to differ significantly across regions and labour markets points to a 
fundamental weakness—that the concept of employability as currently formulated within 
many activation policies fails to acknowledge the importance of the geography of labour 
markets, issues surrounding travel to work, employer attitudes and behaviour, demand within 
local economies and other ‘context’ factors impacting on the experiences of job seekers. 
(McQuaid & Lindsay 2005, p.205) 
For employability and ‘activation’ policies to be effective in assisting individuals’ transitions into 
sustainable employment, McQuaid and Lindsay (2005, pp.206-213) assert that policymakers must 
embrace a broad, holistic model of employability that recognises the full range of supply-side and 
demand-side factors that influence labour market outcomes. In the employability equation, individual 
factors (in other words, skills and attributes) and personal circumstances (which McQuaid and 
Lindsay suggest includes a range of socioeconomic contextual factors related to the individual’s social 
and household circumstances) are significant alongside external macroeconomic and institutional 
factors (McQuaid & Lindsay 2005, pp.208-213).  
In Australia, the 1992 Mayer Committee report on Key Competencies was the first document that 
sought to codify the key employment-related competencies needed by young people. Ten years later, 
the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI) and the Business Council of Australia’s 
(BCA) Employability Skills for the Future report sought to investigate ‘possible new requirements for 
generic employability competencies that industry requires, or will require, in the foreseeable future, 
since the Mayer Key Competencies were developed’ (ACCI & BCA 2002, p.11). Employability Skills 
for the Future defines employability skills as ‘skills required not only to gain employment, but also to 
progress within an enterprise so as to achieve one’s potential and contribute successfully to enterprise 
strategic directions’ (ACCI & BCA 2002, p.3). In 2012, the Department of Education, Employment 
and Workplace Relations (DEEWR) commissioned a further review of the employability skills 
framework, the findings of which were published in a report by consultancy firm Ithaca Group (2012). 
In their 2002 report, the ACCI and BCA explain their semantic preference for the concept of 
‘employability’, as opposed to ‘employment-related’ skills:  
Employability is more attractive as a descriptor than employment-related since it conveys a 
greater sense of an individual’s long-term capacity to build a career and to prosper in a 
dynamic labour market. Employability implies qualities of resourcefulness, adaptability and 
flexibility, whereas employment-related suggests an orientation to the current state of the 
labour market. As such, employability has more potential as a term to signal the qualities 
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needed for success not only in paid employment but also in other domains of life. (ACER 
2001, cited in ACCI & BCA 2002, p.4) 
In much of the definitional work that these reports undertake, there is a concern to establish 
‘employability skills’ as distinct from, and yet at the same time interconnected with, the related 
concepts of ‘generic skills’ and ‘foundation skills’. As an example of how these different skill sets are 
positioned, the 2012 Employability Skills Framework suggests that employability skills form part of a 
suite of capabilities necessary for effective participation in society:  
For the purposes of this project, we have defined Employability Skills as being ‘the non-
technical skills required to effectively participate in the workplace’. Generic Skills are 
broader and include language, literacy and numeracy skills and other skills required to 
participate in society. In Australia, the term Foundation Skills is now being used to describe 
the combination of Core Skills (i.e. reading, writing, oral communication, numeracy and 
learning) and Employability Skills. (Ithaca Group 2012, p.2) 
 
Figure 1 below appears in the 2012 Employability Skills Framework and illustrates the significance of 
employability skills as one of three interrelated skill sets impacting on ‘work performance’.   
 
<Image removed due to copyright restrictions> 
 
Figure 1: Employability skills in context (Ithaca Group 2012, p.5). ‘Core LLN skills’ refers to the core language, 
literacy and numeracy skills of ‘reading, writing, oral communication, numeracy and learning’ (Ithaca Group 
2012, p.4).  
 
With the April 2017 launch of the Turnbull Liberal-National Coalition Government’s Youth Jobs 
PaTH internship scheme, employability skills training was cemented as a key component of ‘active’ 
labour market policy regimes in Australia. Youth Jobs PaTH is targeted at jobseekers aged under 25, 
and has three elements: ‘Prepare - Trial – Hire’ (Australian Government 2017). The ‘Prepare’ phase 
sees the jobseeker undergo six weeks of Employability Skills Training (EST), which, according to the 
Government’s Jobactive authority, ‘gives young people the opportunity to enhance their 
employability through two different blocks of targeted training. Participating in training will help 
young people understand the expectations of employers in both the recruitment process and as a new 
employee in the workplace’ (Australian Government 2017). Jobseekers in the ‘Trial’ phase of the 
scheme must complete an internship placement of four to 12 weeks duration, during which they will 
receive $200 per fortnight on top of their regular income support payment, in return for working 15-
25 hours a week, while employers that take on interns will receive an upfront payment of $1000 
(Australian Government 2016b). ‘Hire’, the third and final component of the scheme, involves the 
provision of a ‘Youth Bonus wage subsidy’ to employers who successfully hire young jobseekers on 
government income support (Australian Government 2016b).  
The Youth Jobs PaTH scheme and its utility in improving the labour market outcomes of young 
people has been critiqued by a range of commentators (and I will examine some of these criticisms in 
later chapters). The principles underpinning the scheme are emblematic of the ‘supply-side 
orthodoxy’ highlighted by McQuaid and colleagues, in which the causes of youth unemployment are 
understood as residing in the deficient skills, attributes and attitudes of the individual young person.   
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The imperative of employability is, in a context of significant levels of graduate unemployment and 
underemployment, an almost ubiquitous feature of contemporary Australian universities’ marketing 
materials and strategic plans. LaTrobe University’s Future Ready: Strategic Plan 2013 – 2017, for 
example, identifies ‘student employability’ as one of four strategic focus areas (LaTrobe University 
2015, p.4). Employability - and the work of establishing, maintaining and marketing that 
employability - becomes one of the core concerns of tertiary education, and is understood as a means 
for young people to ‘future-proof’ their careers and maintain the relevance of their skill sets in 
increasingly uncertain and changeable worlds of work.   
The problem of youth unemployment, Serrano Pascual and Martín Martín (2017, p.812) observe, is, in 
the 21st century, de-politicised (and subsequently re-politicised) in ways that are consistent with 
neoliberal logics of individualisation. With the proliferation of employability policies and 
programmes there has been an increasing ‘psychologisation’ of social problems (Serrano Pascual & 
Martín Martín 2017, p.812). ‘Social problems are turned into personal deficits – cultural, attitudinal, 
motivational’, and the structural factors that influence worker vulnerability are omitted from 
contemporary policy understandings of youth employment and unemployment (Serrano Pascual & 
Martín Martín 2017, p.812).  
Innovation 
In discussions of the drivers of future economic growth, ‘innovation’ and its counterpart ‘disruption’ 
(which Boyd and Holton [2017, p.3] suggest ‘is regarded positively as the midwife of innovation’), 
appear to be the current buzzwords favoured by many political and business leaders. However, the 
idea that innovation is a key driver of economic growth has a long history. Dodgson and Gann (2010, 
p.20) argue that, ‘if any economist lays claim to be the first to include innovation centrally within 
their theory of development, it is Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950), who remains today as one of the 
most influential thinkers on the subject’. For Schumpeter, processes of innovation unleashed ‘gales of 
creative destruction’; he understood that there were both generative and destructive aspects of the 
process of bringing a new concept or practice to fruition (Dodgson & Gann 2010, pp.20-21). While in 
his later writings, Schumpeter modified his theory of innovation to recognise that large companies 
were spaces in which innovation could take place, his celebration of the entrepreneur as a visionary, 
daring individual who, in his words, ‘seeks out difficulties, changes in order to change, delights in 
ventures’ (Dodgson & Gann 2010, p.47), has a particular resonance in 21st century discourses around 
innovation.  
With the launch of the National Innovation and Science Agenda in December 2015, Prime Minister 
Malcolm Turnbull aimed to ‘usher in the ideas boom’ that would ‘deliver the next age of economic 
prosperity in Australia’ (Turnbull 2015; Australian Government 2016a). The types of innovation 
emphasised in the National Innovation and Science Agenda are those that are scientific, technological, 
entrepreneurial. The centrepiece of the agenda is a raft of measures to encourage entrepreneurial talent 
and risk-taking, support for start-ups and financial assistance for businesses looking to compete in the 
fast-paced, dynamic 21st-century economy (Australian Government 2016a).3 Another major plank of 
 
3 The image of Australia as a highly derivative society was propounded by social commentator Donald Horne in 
his 1964 book The Lucky Country, and it is perhaps the legacy of Horne’s disparaging remarks that informs the 
Turnbull Government’s efforts to foster a national culture of innovation. Australia, Horne (2009, pp.11-13) 
wrote, is a nation ‘inimical to ideas’ and lacking in ‘a generally accepted public sense of a future’. As Horne 
(2009, p.11) asserted, ‘except in those few fields where it has had a history of enterprise, Australia has not been 
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the agenda aims to encourage young people to pursue education and careers in STEM fields (science, 
technology, engineering and mathematics) as these are ‘the skills [that young people] need for the 
jobs of tomorrow’ (Australian Government 2016a).  
In Geelong, the Chief Executive of the Geelong Chamber of Commerce, Bernadette Uzelac, contends 
that entrepreneurialism, innovation and creativity ‘will be critical success factors for the future of our 
city and for unleashing myriad career opportunities’ (Uzelac 2016, p.32). An insight into how 
innovation is claimed to be practised in one prominent Australian business is presented in a report in 
Geelong’s local daily newspaper the Geelong Advertiser (Judd 2016, p.14). Alisa Bowen is the Chief 
Technology Officer at News Corp Australia, the article reports, and was to be a guest speaker at a 
technology and innovation summit in Geelong, where she was to relate her experience of ‘leading the 
rollout of a national innovation platform which reaches into every part of the news business’ (Judd 
2016, p.14). The article quotes Bowen: 
‘At News Corporation we’ve defined innovation as recombining ideas, people and 
capabilities in new ways to deliver value,’ she says... ‘We decided early in our process not to 
make innovation the exclusive domain of one small group of privileged technologists or 
creative types in a corner’. (Judd 2016, p.14)  
In this brief survey of the discourse around ‘innovation’, there emerge three points that are 
particularly instructive. First, innovation appears as an imperative with the ability to transform and 
remake organisations, societies, cities, cultures, economies, and people. Second, in these examples 
innovation is useful insofar as it is able to generate economic value and profit via the development of 
intellectual property. And third, it is individuals, rather than collectivities or groups, that are 
understood as those primarily responsible for innovation.4  
The role of young people in facilitating innovation is commonly framed in terms of their potential to 
bring fresh perspectives and ideas into workplace projects and operations. A burgeoning subgenre of 
the popular business press, exemplified by such titles as The Millennial Myth: Transforming 
Misunderstanding into Workplace Breakthroughs (Kadakia 2017), seeks to demystify the secrets to 
managing this technologically-wired generation in the workplace, assisting managers to harness the 
often untapped ‘strategic advantage’ that young people can bring to the organisation. Jack 
 
a country of great innovation or originality. It has exploited the innovations and originality of others and much 
of its boasting is that of a parasite’.  
4 In her book The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths, Mariana Mazzucato (2013) 
seeks to debunk the idea that it is typically private enterprise and visionary individuals that drive innovation. 
From mainstream economic theory’s relegation of the role of the State to that of fixing ‘market failures’, to the 
discursive attacks on the purported inefficiencies of the welfare state – these are key factors fuelling the 
increasingly common perception that the supposedly bureaucratic, inertial and heavy-handed character of the 
State prevents it from developing and exercising the kinds of dynamic, proactive, risk-taking capacities that are 
required to make innovation happen (Mazzucato 2013, pp.1-3). Yet, Mazzucato (2013, p.3) argues that: 
Most of the radical, revolutionary innovations that have fuelled the dynamics of capitalism – from 
railroads to the Internet, to modern-day nanotechnology and pharmaceuticals – trace the most 
courageous, early and capital-intensive ‘entrepreneurial’ investments back to the State…such radical 
investments – which embedded extreme uncertainty – did not come about due to the presence of 
venture capitalists, nor of ‘garage tinkerers’. It was the visible hand of the State which made these 
innovations happen. Innovation that would not have come about had we waited for the ‘market’ and 
business to do it alone – or government to simply stand aside and provide the basics.  
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MacCauley, a young science student from Tasmania, is profiled in the Geelong Business News for the 
technical breakthrough he made while interning at Geelong refinery Viva Energy. As Geelong 
Business News (2017a) reports, ‘bitumen products are developing as an important revenue stream at 
the Geelong Refinery and Viva Energy’s General Manager Refining, Thys Heyns, said Jack had 
helped develop an alternative test to measure bitumen durability that is considered a world-first in the 
refining sector’. Jack’s efforts were recognised at the annual CareerTrackers awards in Sydney 
(Geelong Business News 2017a), and offer an example of the value of the ‘intra-preneur’, a figure 
celebrated in contemporary business discourse for their ability to act as a model agent of change, 
exercising their entrepreneurial and problem-solving capabilities to the benefit of the organisation 
(Heery & Noon 2008).  
Offering a counterpoint to these discourses of young people’s innovatory nous, some recent 
Australian research by Rampersad (2017) suggests that, despite innovation increasingly being framed 
as an essential employment-related capability, ‘there is a lack of consensus on what innovation skills 
actually are’. Rampersad (2017) interrogated the meanings and perceptions of ‘innovation’ held by 
both students and employers, finding a lack of overlap in the predominant understandings of each 
group. Students ‘were found to perceive innovation as a very fluid process that does not require any 
boundaries or rules’, an understanding that ‘reflects the loose and creative representations of 
innovation in popular culture and media’ (Rampersad 2017). Employers, on the other hand, viewed 
innovation as a purposeful, systematic process geared towards clear commercial outcomes through the 
development, commercialisation and marketing of a new product or service (Rampersad 2017). These 
perceptual differences, Rampersad (2017) ultimately concludes, ‘reflect the lack of preparedness of 
students for the workplace’. She concludes that it is only with the provision of greater opportunities 
for experiential learning in industry settings that students will develop innovation skills.  
Ball and Exley (2010, p.163, emphasis in original) identify discourses of ‘innovation’ and ‘enterprise’ 
as playing a key role in processes ‘of reformation of the objects and concepts of social welfare; of 
change in places or positions in which subjects can form; and of redistribution of expertise and power 
within policymaking and public service delivery’. They mapped some of the nodes in the policy 
networks which were an increasing influence on the social and educational policies of UK New 
Labour Governments (Ball & Exley 2010, pp.151-152). The discursive elements that flowed through 
these networks gave particular emphasis to ‘the role of “social enterprise” and social entrepreneurs in 
the modernisation of public service provision and in providing solutions to intractable social 
problems’ (Ball & Exley 2010, p.151). In this sense, in the 21st century, it is innovation, and those 
individuals with the capacity to enact it, that are understood as having a unique ability to modernise 
public service provision, solve pressing social, economic and environmental problems, and to 
reimagine government itself.  
Enterprise  
Of the three key terms of interest here, ‘enterprise’ has the most varied uses and interpretations. 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary (2016), ‘enterprise’ has four distinct meanings. It is a 
noun that describes ‘a project or undertaking, especially a bold or complex one’; the capacity of 
individuals or groups to demonstrate initiative and resourcefulness; a business or company; and 
entrepreneurial economic activity (Oxford English Dictionary 2016).  
It is a capacity for initiative, resourcefulness and innovation, and the development of business 
acumen, that programs like Geelong’s Upstart Entrepreneurial Challenge seek to establish in young 
people. In the annual Upstart Challenge, which began in 2012 and is open to secondary school 
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students, the young participants receive the support of local business mentors to develop and ‘pitch’ 
their startup business ideas5 (Upstart 2016a; Upstart 2016b, p.3). In fact, Upstart Challenge is just one 
of a range of entrepreneurial education programs, targeted at both primary school and secondary 
school students, that have been established in recent years in Australia. These programs aim to usher 
in a new generation of entrepreneurial leaders, equipped with the skills and attributes that they will 
need to survive in the labour markets of the future, and with a mindset to address pressing social 
problems (Ferrier 2016; Upstart 2016b, p.3). It is the demonstration of exceptional enterprise, often in 
the development of socially-useful goods and services, that one of the country’s most prestigious 
public awards, the Australian of the Year, and its counterpart, the Young Australian of the Year, seeks 
to recognise and applaud. An innovative business idea applied to a charitable and socially just cause, 
Orange Sky Laundry was the brainchild of Nic Marchesi and Lucas Patchett, for which they were 
awarded the 2016 Young Australians of the Year: 
Best mates, Nic Marchesi and Lucas Patchett, built a free mobile laundry in their old van to 
help the homeless. Orange Sky Laundry began in September 2014 and since then, the world 
first idea has expanded to five vans in Brisbane, Melbourne, South East Victoria, Sydney and 
the Gold Coast. (National Australia Day Council 2016) 
The recognition of Nic and Lucas’ venture underscores Ball and Exley’s (2010, p.151) observation 
that ‘social enterprise’ is increasingly prized for its ability to address intractable social problems such 
as homelessness. The operation of a social enterprise that provides work to those experiencing 
homelessness and social marginalisation is the focus of Jessica Gerrard’s (2017) ethnographic 
research among the vendors of street press publications such as The Big Issue. Gerrard (2017, p.3) 
investigates the meaning and experience of enterprise among those excluded from mainstream 
employment and education, and she seeks to challenge the ‘familiar popular narratives of failure and 
stigma’ that attach to lives on the margins, highlighting that ‘those who are unemployed and 
seemingly “unproductive” are in fact highly productive’. ‘Homeless street press sellers’, Gerrard 
(2017, p.3) explains, ‘engage in a range of enterprising activities in their attempt to feel and be 
productive and to manage the bleak material reality of poverty and homelessness within wealthy 
nations and cities’. 
The cultural cachet that attaches to youth enterprise is, according to youth studies researchers Kelly 
(2006, 2013) and MacDonald and Coffield (1991), the artefact of a neoliberal governmentality which 
understands one of its key tasks as the production of enterprising subjects. Kelly (2013) argues that 
the ‘self as enterprise’ is an ethical imperative that has particular salience in the context of globalised, 
precarious labour markets. Neoliberal governmentalities and capitalism require all (would be) labour 
market participants to imagine themselves as active, self-creating, economically-rational individuals, 
and to carry the responsibilities for the consequences of their differing abilities to be ‘enterprising’ 
(Kelly 2006, p.24). Kelly, Campbell and Harrison (2015) consider the ways in which social 
enterprise-based Transitional Labour Market Programmes targeted at unemployed youth operate as 
neoliberal ‘technologies of the self’. Such programmes ‘aim not for structural labour-market change, 
but to transform persons: to educate and re-make marginalised young people in ways that promise to 
 
5 The winners of the 2017 Upstart Challenge were Scarlett Moroney and Ella Johns, Year 7 and 8 students at 
Sacred Heart College Geelong, with their concept ‘Flo’, a positive mindset and mental health app ‘that they are 
planning to roll out to schools’, the Geelong Business News (2017b) reports.  
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equip them with the behaviours and dispositions that can secure less parlous labour-market 
participation’ (Kelly, Campbell & Harrison 2015, p.560).   
In their book Risky Business?: Youth and the Enterprise Culture (1991), MacDonald and Coffield 
consider the attempts by the Conservative Thatcher Government in Britain in the late 1980s to create 
an ‘enterprise culture’ as an ideological project targeted particularly at young people. The location of 
their research was the county of Cleveland in England’s North-East. MacDonald and Coffield 
describe the penchant for ‘enterprise’ among political elites at the time:  
When social historians come to assess Britain in the 1980s, they are likely to emphasize this 
key word. It has come to stand for a collection of political, economic and social values and, 
perhaps, more than any other term it summarizes the zeitgeist created by the Conservative 
Government during the last decade. (MacDonald & Coffield 1991, pp.18-19, emphasis in 
original) 
MacDonald and Coffield write that as the area rapidly transformed from an industrial powerhouse to 
an unemployment ‘blackspot’ in the late 20th century, there flourished in Cleveland a plethora of 
agencies, schemes and professionals whose task was ‘to rejuvenate the local economy through 
enterprise’ (MacDonald & Coffield 1991, p.15). MacDonald and Coffield (1991, p.81) sought to 
understand the activities and experiences of young people across three main types of enterprise 
projects: enterprise as self-employment in small business, enterprise as co-operative work, and 
enterprise as community development projects. However, as they engaged with young entrepreneurs 
and the various agencies and schemes for enterprise training and support, they discovered that 
‘enterprise’, in practice, was predominantly of the first type, concerned with the establishment of 
commercial, for-profit businesses (MacDonald & Coffield 1991, pp.81-82).  
Bailey (2013, p.817) observes the extension of the enterprise form throughout society – ‘there has 
been the extension, in some ways generalisation, of the enterprise form throughout society, from 
enterprising organisations, policies and practices, to enterprising subjects with entrepreneurial 
dispositions and comportments’ – a process bound up with the shift identified by Ball and Exley 
(2010), among others, towards networked modes of governance. In making this critique, Bailey 
follows in the footsteps of Foucault, who suggested that the ‘multiplication of the “enterprise” form 
within the social body’ was one of the key aims of a neoliberal art of government:  
It is not a matter of constructing a social fabric in which the individual would be in direct 
contact with nature, but of constructing a social fabric in which the basic units would have the 
form of the enterprise … In other words, what is involved is the generalization of forms of 
‘enterprise’ by diffusing and multiplying them as much as possible … I think this 
multiplication of the ‘enterprise’ form within the social body is what is at stake in neo-liberal 
policy. It is a matter of making the market, competition, and so the enterprise, the formative 
power of society. (Foucault 2007, cited in Bailey 2013, p.817) 
In the context of the ‘privatisation’ of the policy process and the shift to networked modes of 
governance, the ‘social enterprise’, and the enterprising individuals that comprise it, emerge as 
privileged agents of educational and social reform. Bailey (2013, p.824) suggests that, ‘rather than 
disadvantage being the problem and responsibility of the state, responsibility shifts to the enterprising 
capacities of individual agents in civil society and, ultimately, to the individual subject’.  
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Critical thinking, capabilities and creativity 
Proliferating in parallel with ‘employability skills, ‘innovation’ and ‘enterprise’, and sharing many of 
the same concerns, are a range of synonyms and related concepts, which include, most prominently, 
‘critical thinking’ and ‘creativity’, as well as ‘capabilities’, ‘collaboration’, ‘21st century skills’, and 
‘lifelong learning’ (Williams, Gannon & Sawyer 2013; Ministerial Council on Education, 
Employment, Training and Youth Affairs [MCEETYA] 2008; FYA 2016a). The character of this 
nomenclature suggests that there are fundamentally new challenges and concerns inherent in young 
people’s education and labour market pathways, which often necessitate a break with the conceptual 
and discursive categories of the past. For example, what is to distinguish ‘collaboration’ from its 
predecessor, ‘teamwork’? It appears that ‘collaboration’, unlike ‘teamwork’, has a particular affinity 
with the flexibility demanded in a ‘portfolio career’, in future working lives characterised by ‘many 
jobs, with many employers, often at the same time’ (FYA 2015a, p.15).  
In recent years there has been increasing consensus among education policy stakeholders that it is 
through a greater focus on the development of learner ‘capabilities’, that young Australians will be 
supported to become ‘successful learners’, ‘confident and creative individuals’, and ‘active and 
informed citizens’ (MCEETYA 2008, p.7). With the 2008 publication of the Melbourne Declaration 
on Educational Goals for Young Australians, the development of these attributes and capabilities was 
enshrined as a key educational goal for young people (MCEETYA 2008). The ‘general capabilities’ – 
encompassing literacy, numeracy, information and communication technology capability, critical and 
creative thinking, personal and social capability, ethical understanding, and intercultural 
understanding – are now recognised as a key dimension of the Australian Curriculum, underpinning 
and complementing curriculum content in each learning area (Australian Curriculum, Assessment & 
Reporting Authority [ACARA] 2016a). In a report for Melbourne-based education policy think tank 
the Mitchell Institute, Torii and O’Connell (2017, p.3) understand the concept of ‘capabilities’ as 
broadly commensurate with non-cognitive skills, enterprise skills, and 21st Century skills, suggesting 
capabilities ‘can bridge the academic and vocational divide’. ‘There is a growing evidence base for 
the power of capabilities’, the authors argue, with employers increasingly seeking them in young 
people, and they are the essential skills and dispositions that young people will need if they are to 
thrive in the ‘complex education and employment settings’ of the future (Torii & O’Connell 2017, 
p.3).  
It is increasingly claimed that complex problem solving, critical thinking and creativity are becoming 
the most significant and in-demand skills and capabilities, in the context of an impending Fourth 
Industrial Revolution in which ‘developments in genetics, artificial intelligence, robotics, 
nanotechnology, 3D printing and biotechnology, to name just a few, are all building on and 
amplifying one another’ (World Economic Forum [WEF] 2016, pp. v-23). At the same time, we 
cannot, apparently, be too confident of the immunity of these key skills to the effects of technological 
disruption. The WEF (2016, p.20) reports that, ‘on average, by 2020, more than a third of the desired 
core skill sets of most occupations will be comprised of skills that are not yet considered crucial to the 
job today’.  
The capacity for creativity, according to one of its foremost advocates Richard Florida (2014, p.7), 
resides within each and every individual. However, with the tendency towards organisational 
conformity and regimentation that was a feature of the 20th century industrial model of productivity, 
the creative potential of human beings in the workplace has often been stifled (Florida 2014, pp.16-
17). Creativity is not synonymous with intelligence, Florida is careful to point out, and he highlights 
Preti and Miotto’s observation that ‘many studies recognise creativity as cognitive ability separate 
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from other mental functions and particularly independent from the complex of abilities grouped under 
the word “intelligence”’ (Preti & Miotto 1997, cited in Florida 2014, p.18). The subversive potential 
of creativity lies in its ability to disrupt ‘existing patterns of thought and life’ (Florida 2014, p.19).6   
And yet, it appears that opportunities to exercise creativity are often sorely lacking in current 
education approaches and curricula. Education reform advocate and author Sir Ken Robinson’s (2006) 
insight that schools are ‘educating people out of their creative capacities’7 has become the oft-repeated 
refrain of education practitioners and commentators, echoed for example in an article for The 
Guardian by Ewing and Saunders: 
When politicians talk about equipping young Australians to succeed in the 21st century 
economy, they use buzzwords such as ‘creativity’, ‘collaboration’ and ‘imagination’. Yet our 
education system often seems to push creativity out of the curriculum, increasing the 
technical emphasis on literacy and numeracy, and focusing on stressful, high-stakes testing of 
young students. (Ewing & Saunders 2016) 
While there is a purported crisis of creativity in education institutions, there are increasing efforts to 
quantify the creative industries’ share of Australian jobs and economic output, a share which a 
number of commentators suggest is growing (Creative Geelong Inc. & Geelong Region Local 
Learning & Employment Network 2017; Clun 2017). One such commentator is Queensland 
University of Technology Distinguished Professor Stuart Cunningham (cited in a recent report for The 
Age by Clun [2017]), who emphases the appeal of creative labour, and its ability to offer ‘food for the 
soul as well as food for the table’. ‘The social level of meaningfulness, plus high growth, plus labour 
intensity’, Cunningham continues, means the creative industry sector ‘should be taken much more 
seriously by decision makers and economic planners’ (Clun 2017). In his criticisms of the creative 
industries policy vogue, Ross (2008, p.32) asserts that it is no surprise that ‘creatives’, as creative 
industry workers are now commonly labelled, are upheld as ‘paradigms of entrepreneurial selfhood’. 
Those making a secure living from culture and creativity have typically belonged to the commercial 
industries of broadcasting, recording and publishing, or to the design and academic professions, and 
have been the beneficiaries of ‘fair labor at union rates and conditions’ (Ross 2009, p.21). The 
noncommercial arts, on the other hand, ‘have long been a domain of insecurity, underpayment, and 
disposability’ (Ross 2009, p.21). Much of the job growth in the creative industries in recent decades 
has been in these kinds of nonstandard, non-unionised, flexible forms of work. Indeed, ‘the 
entrepreneurial paradigm touted by the policymakers defiantly points away from the fair standards 
commonly associated with a union job’ (Ross 2009, p.21). In this sense, ‘creatives’ are upheld as 
paradigms of entrepreneurial selfhood because they represent the contingent, self-enterprising labour 
force desired by the architects of labour discipline under neoliberalism. 
Key objectives of this project 
Given the concerns that I have outlined to this point, this project adopts a genealogical approach in 
order to explore the following research question: ‘How is it that, at the start of the 21st century, we 
have come to understand the problem of youth unemployment largely in terms of employability skills, 
innovation and enterprise?’ In seeking to explore the possible answers to this genealogical question 
this thesis has four key research objectives:  
 
6 Florida’s theorising of the vanguard of social and economic change, the ‘creative class’, and its role in the 
transformation of regional and urban economies will be examined in further detail in later chapters.  
7 At over 47 million views, Sir Ken Robinson’s ‘Do Schools Kill Creativity?’ is, at the time of writing, the most 
popular TED talk in the history of the series.  
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1. Identify and analyse how young people’s employability skills, innovation and enterprise 
are conceived in a variety of contemporary discourses in de-industrialising regions such 
as Geelong. 
2. Identify and analyse the historical conditions – the material and discursive ‘conditions of 
possibility’ - that give rise to contemporary discourses of young people’s employability 
skills, innovation and enterprise in de-industrialising regions such as Geelong. 
3. Identify and analyse the ways in which different understandings of employability skills, 
innovation and enterprise circulate, translate and shift between different contexts, 
different settings, and different texts. 
4. Identify and analyse the class, gender, ethnic and aesthetic dimensions of representations 
of employability skills, innovation and enterprise in de-industrialising regions such as 
Geelong. 
 
Structure of this thesis 
This thesis is structured in two parts. Part One, ‘Neoliberalism, capitalism, “Rust Belt” spaces and 
youth unemployment: A genealogical ethos’ establishes the contextual, theoretical and 
methodological foundations of the project, and Part Two, ‘“Employability skills”, “innovation” and 
“enterprise”: problematic solutions to the problem of youth unemployment?’ is where the detailed 
genealogical explorations of these key concepts take place.  
Chapter 1, ‘What is Genealogy?’ outlines the methodological framework of genealogy that guides the 
collection and analysis of data in this project. Genealogy is a distinctive historiographic approach – 
one that Foucauldian scholar Mitchell Dean (1994) characterises as ‘critical and effective history’ – 
that eschews the possibility of ‘total history’ in favour of a concern with ‘Three Es’: episodes, 
examples and effectiveness (Vucetic 2011). The genealogical ethos that I will introduce here, with its 
focus on identifying and analysing key epochs, episodes, events and moments, informs my approach 
not only to the substantive ‘data’ chapters of Part Two, but also the histories of de-industrialisation, 
globalisation and ‘neoliberal’ capitalism that I will examine in Part One. At the close of Chapter 1, I 
will introduce the ‘situational map’, a methodological device developed by sociologist Adele Clarke 
(2005, 2015), which is a configuration that lays out all the major human, nonhuman, discursive, 
historical, symbolic, cultural, political and other elements in the research situation of concern, and 
provokes analyses of relations among them (Clarke 2015, p.100). In this project I have utilised the 
situational map as a device for mapping some of the key elements and emphases, as well as some of 
the absences, silences, and subjugated knowledges that relate to each of ‘employability skills’, 
‘innovation’ and ‘enterprise’.  
Chapter 2, ‘Globalisation, “neoliberal” capitalism and youth labour markets in the 21st century’ is the 
first of two chapters that examine the social, economic, political, cultural and governmental 
‘conditions of possibility’ that enable employability skills, innovation and enterprise to function as 
‘truths’ in relation to the problem of youth unemployment. In this chapter I will explore the transition 
from a mid-20th century capitalism oriented towards principles of ‘social democratic’ redistribution, to 
the ‘neoliberal’ capitalism that has prevailed since the late 20th century, and consider what this and 
other developments portend for the constitution and regulation of youth labour markets in the 21st 
century. Having established the ‘macro’-level background to the local-level developments taking 
place in the regional city of Geelong, in Chapter 3, ‘Geelong: a “Rust Belt” locale’, I will present an 
overview of some of the key ‘episodes’, ‘events’ and ‘moments’ that have been instrumental in 
forging Geelong as a ‘Rust Belt’ city. For much of the 20th century, Geelong was a booming regional 
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centre, boasting an array of industrial operations that included oil refining, aluminium smelting, car 
manufacturing and glass making, as well as a significant textile and clothing industry (Johnson 2009a, 
p.474). This strong industrial economic base afforded high rates of participation across the age ranges 
in a labour market that became more ethnically diverse with waves of migration, even as it remained 
gender segregated. In the post war period, dominant social narratives promised that employees of 
Geelong’s major industries, such as the Ford Motor Company and International Harvester, could 
expect a ‘job for life’. However, as I will explore further in Chapter 3, through the late 20th century, 
the impacts of national- and global-level forces, such as economic recession and industry restructuring 
policies, fell heavily on industrial towns and cities in Australia, as they did in many of the other 
industrialised democracies. In the 21st century, entrepreneurialism, innovation and creativity are 
vested with the capacity to remake and reimagine ‘Rust Belt’ locales such as Geelong.  
Chapters 4 through 7 comprise Part Two of the thesis. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 tell the historical story of 
the emergence of ‘employability skills’, ‘innovation’ and ‘enterprise’, each of which is shaped by the 
concerns of a particular historical moment. These key concepts, each at a particular point in time, 
have been understood as the ‘solution’ to the problem of youth unemployment; ‘employability skills’, 
from the mid-1980s to the late-1990s, ‘innovation’ from the late-1990s to the mid- to late-2000s, and 
‘enterprise’, the mid-2000s to the present. However, it should be pointed out that, in reality, the 
movement from one key concept to the next is not necessarily linear and sequential, and there is 
considerable fluidity and overlap in these date ranges. Indeed, these discontinuities, ruptures, and 
continuities are key elements that both shape, and are highlighted by, genealogy as ‘critical and 
effective history’.  
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are each orientated around a central ‘figure’, in the sense developed by Donna 
Haraway. A ‘figure’, Haraway (2008, p.4) suggests, is a ‘material–semiotic node or knot in which 
diverse bodies and meanings co-shape one another’. In Chapter 4, ‘The Emergence of Economic 
Rationalism and Employability Skills’, the ‘figure’ of concern is a set of three reports: the Finn 
Review, Mayer Report and Carmichael Report. Released in the early 1990s, these three reports 
condense, at the national policy level, a variety of concerns emerging around that time about young 
people in the labour market. Chapter 5, ‘Guggenheim Dreaming in a Climate of Innovation’, takes as 
its ‘figure’ Geelong’s bid (which ran from 1998 to 2003) to secure a local franchise of the global 
Guggenheim museum brand. As its advocates argued, the Guggenheim offered a potent symbol of 
‘innovation’ as Geelong entered the 21st century with the desire to leave the legacies of 20th century 
industrialisation behind and remake the city. In Chapter 6, ‘New Work Orders? The Foundation for 
Young Australians and Young People’s Enterprise Skills’, the ‘figure’ is The New Work Order, a 
series of research reports released by Melbourne-based youth advocacy organisation the Foundation 
for Young Australians, beginning in 2015. The future of work will be characterised by almost 
constant change and adaptation, the FYA contends, and through the publication of this report series, 
the FYA has sought to push its concept of ‘enterprise skills’ to the forefront of the education and 
training policy agenda.  
Through Chapters 4, 5 and 6 there will be a focus on developments in Geelong, on tracing how 
imperatives and developments emerging in the international (EU, OECD, ILO) and national policy 
spheres cascade down and inform what plays out in a de-industrialising context, examining the ways 
in which specific understandings of employability skills, innovation and enterprise do or do not 
change as they are translated across different settings. So, for example, Chapter 6 considers how the 
Foundation for Young Australians’ efforts, at the national policy level, to influence the discussion and 
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understanding of young people’s enterprise reverberate at the local Geelong level, in the Geelong 
Region LLEN’s ‘gig economy’ seminar series that began in 2017.  
Chapter 7, ‘GT Magazine and the Figure of the Enterprising Young Person: The Gendered, Classed 
and Aesthetic Dimensions of Enterprise in a De-Industrialising City’ addresses research objective 
number 4, allowing me to identify and analyse the class, gender, ethnic and aesthetic dimensions of 
representations of employability skills, innovation and enterprise in de-industrialising regions such as 
Geelong. In this chapter I will utilise techniques of content analysis and discourse analysis to examine 
the ways in which young people’s enterprise is presented and packaged in GT Magazine, a weekly, 
large circulation magazine in Geelong. The analysis raises significant questions about the ‘aesthetic’ 
dimensions of the figure of the ‘enterprising young person’, and the ways in which this figure 
produces and reproduces classed, gendered and racialised understandings of young people, work and 
enterprise.  
Conclusion 
In this thesis I will argue that, across the last 30-40 years in industrialised countries such as Australia, 
young people’s engagement in education and training has been redefined narrowly around the need to 
develop their ‘human capital’. Even as ‘human capital’ has been talked about in different ways at 
different times. For example, as ‘employability skills’ from the 1980s onwards, and more recently, as 
‘21st century skills’ or ‘enterprise skills’. The genealogical ethos that I will articulate in the following 
chapter, and that I will put into practice in subsequent chapters, will allow me to analyse discourses of 
young people’s ‘employability skills’, ‘innovation’ and ‘enterprise’ and to critique these 
individualising, ‘human capital’ discourses as problematic ‘solutions’ to problems of youth 
employment and unemployment. As I will explore further in later chapters, one of the key themes that 
emerges from these genealogical investigations is that the figure of youth that is found in these 
discourses is an abstraction: this figure is of no particular gender, from no particular class background 
or geographical place, and is not encumbered with a physical body. What this thesis argues is that 
bodies, gender, class and place continue to matter for how it is that youth studies should continue to 
work with, and through, the challenges and opportunities that structure young people’s increasingly 
precarious engagements with education, training and work – in the present and the future. 
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Chapter One 
What is Genealogy? 
 
Introduction 
Genealogy is a methodological approach most commonly associated with the work of French 
historian and philosopher Michel Foucault. Genealogy ‘at its best involves a practice of critique in the 
form of the historical problematisation of the present’, and is concerned with identifying and then 
analysing submerged problems and subjugated knowledges (Koopman 2013, p.2; Foucault 1980, 
pp.82-83). The work of Foucault, in particular his historical analyses of systems of rationality, 
discipline and subjectification, has informed the development of a distinctive methodological 
approach to the investigation of social ‘problems’. This chapter establishes some of the key features 
and concerns of the genealogical ethos that will shape the ways in which I tell the ‘histories’ of de-
industrialisation, globalisation and ‘neoliberal’ capitalism, and of economic and spatial restructuring 
and transformation in the ‘Rust Belt’ city of Geelong, histories that are the focus of Chapters 2 and 3. 
The genealogical ethos that I will outline in this chapter - a chapter that is, in effect, my ‘methodology 
chapter’ - also informs my approach to the core ‘data’ chapters of Part Two of this thesis, which are 
concerned with illuminating the ‘conditions of possibility’ that enable ‘employability skills’, 
‘innovation’ and ‘enterprise’ to function as ‘truths’ in relation to the problem of youth unemployment.  
Foucault approached matters of methodology perhaps somewhat reluctantly, as some commentators 
have suggested (Megill 1985, cited in Kendall & Wickham 1999, p.vii), but certainly in ways that 
often depart significantly from more conventional approaches to the study of society and social issues. 
‘My work takes place’, Foucault (1991, pp.73-74) once suggested: 
Between unfinished abutments and anticipatory strings of dots. I like to open up a space of 
research, try it out, and then if it doesn’t work, try again somewhere else…My books aren’t 
treatises in philosophy or studies of history: at most, they are philosophical fragments put to 
work in a historical field of problems.  
The task of defining genealogy’s key functions and features is complicated by the knowledge that 
Foucault was something of an anti-foundationalist, who in fact described his research tools as ‘non-
defined method’ or ‘anti-science’, and frequently insisted that he only wrote about methodology, 
never a methodology (Vucetic 2011, p.1298; Garland 2014, p.366). In developing his genealogical 
method, Foucault sought ‘not a codification of distinctive techniques of inquiry, but an attempt to 
open the intellectual and political space for resistance to the dominant regimes of truth and the 
emancipation of marginalised forms of knowledge’ (Vucetic 2011, p.1298). When considering how 
his methods of investigation might be applied by others, Foucault suggested the metaphor of the 
toolbox: ‘I would like my books to be a kind of toolbox that people can rummage through to find a 
tool they can use however they wish in their own area’ (Foucault 1974, cited in Vucetic 2011, 
p.1299). Vucetic (2011, pp.1299-1300) emphasises that: 
If anything unifies this toolbox it is the concept of discourse – an anonymous collective 
consciousness within the human language through which meaning is given to subjects and 
objects. In turn, virtually all Foucauldian research tools embody the idea that history is the 
recovery of discourses and discursive contexts.  
 
29 
 
Foucault offers some of his most succinct thoughts on what ‘discourse’ is, and what it does, in his 
work The Archaeology of Knowledge, originally published in 1969. He writes: 
Of course, discourses are composed of signs; but what they do is more than use these signs to 
designate things. It is this more that renders them irreducible to the language (langue) and to 
speech. It is this ‘more’ that we must reveal and describe. (Foucault 2002, p.54, emphases in 
original) 
Stephen Ball (2015, p.307) suggests that Foucault was interested ‘both in the ways in which 
discourses are constructed and how they change, but also how they shape everyday existence, that is, 
in part at least, how they “form the objects of which they speak”’ (Foucault 1974 cited in Ball 2015, 
p.307). Ball (2015, p.311) acknowledges that, although Foucault uses the term discourse in different 
ways in his work, ‘most pertinently he was concerned to address the structures and rules that 
constitute a discourse rather than the texts and utterances produced within it’. In this sense, discourse 
‘is not present in the object’ but it ‘“enables it to appear”’. Discourse ‘is the conditions under which 
certain statements are considered to be the truth’ (Ball 2015, p.311).  
Foucault’s ‘anti-methodology’ stance requires that genealogists seek out methods and tools that are 
most pertinent to the particular problem and context under study, and that enable them to conduct 
‘critical and effective’ histories of the present (Dean 1994). My decision to adopt a genealogical 
approach to the investigation of my research questions has been informed by a desire to interrogate 
the multiple, diverse, non-linear trajectories that comprise the ‘history of the present’, where the 
‘present’ signifies an early 21st century period in which the problem of youth unemployment is 
understood largely in terms of ‘employability skills’, ‘innovation’ and ‘enterprise’. In this thesis I 
utilise genealogy as a critical, problematising approach that allows me to identify and analyse the key 
historical ‘epochs’, ‘episodes’, ‘events’ and ‘moments’, as well as some of the absences, silences and 
‘subjugated knowledges’, that pertain to discourses of ‘employability skills’, ‘innovation’ and 
‘enterprise’. The work of bringing these absences, silences and subjugated knowledges to light serves 
to illustrate that problems of youth employment and unemployment could be ‘thought differently’. In 
the 21st century, there are pervasive assumptions that the responsibility for managing the problem of 
unemployment should rest primarily with the individual young person, and that the purposes of 
education and training should be oriented toward the objective of developing individuals’ ‘human 
capital’. I want to suggest that the value of a genealogical approach, where it is applied to the 
investigation of complex social problems such as youth employment and unemployment, is its ability 
to illuminate the complex and varied ‘conditions of possibility’ that enabled the problem to be 
understood in these particular ways, and in doing so, to challenge the idea that the emergence of this 
state of affairs was ‘natural’ or ‘inevitable’.  
Foucauldian scholar Mitchell Dean characterises the practice of genealogy as ‘critical and effective 
history’, and this chapter will begin by considering how Dean distinguishes the particular 
epistemological orientation of this approach from those of the predominant historiographic 
approaches within sociology and social theory. Following this, I will review the roles of archaeology 
and genealogy in the Foucauldian methodological ‘toolbox’. Although there is some debate over the 
relationship of genealogy to its forerunner, Foucault ultimately understood both approaches as having 
utility in the work of bringing subjugated knowledges to light. At this point in the chapter, I will move 
to define some key features and concerns of a genealogical approach. I will examine the ‘Three E’ 
model of genealogy and its utility as a framework that assists me to identify and analyse the range of 
discursive and non-discursive elements that are pertinent to my investigation. Next, I will consider 
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how Foucauldian historical methods have been adapted and applied in the field of policy analysis, in 
order to provide an illustration of genealogical methods ‘in action’ within a particular field of inquiry. 
Toward the conclusion of the chapter, I will focus more practically on the ‘doing’ of a genealogy of 
‘employability skills’, ‘innovation’ and ‘enterprise’. I will describe the key methods, tools and devices 
forming the methodological ‘toolbox’ with which I have collected and analysed ‘data’. The three 
elements that I focus on here include the selection of an ‘archive’, content analysis and critical 
discourse analysis, and a device known as a ‘situational map’ (Clarke 2005, 2015) that assists in the 
analysis of historical discourses.  
The ‘history of the present’ as a critical and effective history  
Genealogy, as a method of examining the ‘history of the present’, employs the ‘use of historical 
resources to reflect upon the contingency, singularity, interconnections, and potentialities of the 
diverse trajectories of those elements which compose present social arrangements and experience’ 
(Dean 1994, p.21). Mitchell Dean situates genealogy in the tradition of ‘critical and effective history’, 
an approach he suggests differs markedly from the predominant historiographic approaches within 
sociology and social theory. By way of illustrating this contrast, he offers a sketch of three forms of 
intellectual practice, and the epistemological implications of each (Dean 1994, pp. 3-4). The first 
intellectual practice Dean identifies is a ‘progressivist theory’, which, as he explains:   
Proposes a model of social progress through the teleology of reason, technology, production, 
and so on. This is the model that might be called ‘high modernism’, and is exemplified by the 
narratives of the Enlightenment, by the nineteenth century positivism of Comte…it is a form 
of theory that seeks to adopt the prestige of the natural sciences, and often gives its statements 
the form of general causal explanations which have a law-like character. (Dean 1994, p.3) 
The second intellectual practice identified by Dean, ‘critical theory’, offers a critique of these 
modernist narratives and the ‘one-sided, pathological, advance of technocratic or instrumental reason 
they celebrate, in order to offer an alternative, higher version of rationality’ (Dean 1994, p.3). Here, 
narratives of progress are replaced with ‘narratives of reconciliation of the subject with itself, with 
nature, with the form of its own reason’ (Dean 1994, p.3). The third and final approach highlighted by 
Dean is a ‘problematising’ one, and it seeks the disturbance of narratives of both progress and 
reconciliation; it does not seek to prescribe the meaning of history (Dean 1994, p.4). Such an 
approach aims to unsettle the ‘taken-for-granted components of our reality and the “official” accounts 
of how they came to be the way they are’ (Dean 1994, p.4). Yet, as Dean observes, this form of 
critical history is quite a different practice from what is called critical theory; it ‘refuses to submit the 
critical impulse to both high and critical modernist narratives’. In so doing, ‘it becomes what 
Foucault, following Nietzsche, called an “effective history”, and sets itself against what might be 
called the colonisation of historical knowledge by these synthetic philosophies of history’ (Dean 
1994, p.4). He ventures that this form of intellectual practice can be considered an exercise in 
postmodernity, insofar as ‘“postmodernism” is defined as the restive problematisation of the given’ 
(Dean 1994, p.4). It is in this problematising approach that the practice of historiography is both 
‘critical’ and ‘effective’, and therefore capable of illuminating the ‘history of the present’.  
It was at the beginning of Discipline and Punish, his renowned study of punitive practice, that 
Foucault coined the phrase ‘history of the present’ to characterise his particular approach. Here, he 
poses the question of why write such a history: ‘Simply because I am interested in the past? No, if one 
means by that writing a history of the past in terms of the present. Yes, if one means writing a history 
of the present’ (Foucault 1979, p.31). These remarks reveal something of the essence of Foucault’s 
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historical approach, as one that seeks to challenge the tendencies towards both presentism and 
teleological notions of social progress, in which there is an assumed inevitability or superiority of 
modern social objects, institutions and practices. As Kendall and Wickham (1999, p.4) highlight, ‘to 
use history in the Foucauldian manner is to use it to help us see that the present is just as strange as 
the past, not to help us see that a sensible or desirable present has emerged…or might emerge’.  
Archaeology and genealogy in the Foucauldian methodological ‘toolbox’ 
Within the Foucauldian methodological ‘toolbox’, archaeology and genealogy are both historical 
methods with a focus on the analysis of discourse. There is some ambiguity, however, surrounding 
how Foucault conceived of the relation between archaeology and genealogy. Garland (2014, p.371) 
argues that Foucault understood genealogy as the successor to archaeology, observing that the mid-
1970s marked his turn to styling his historical methods of critique as ‘genealogical’ rather than 
‘archaeological’. Dean (1994, pp.33-35) offers a different perspective, arguing that archaeology and 
genealogy are positioned in a relation of complementarity, and he proposes that the ‘history of the 
present’ is an enterprise that ultimately draws on both approaches. In a 1976 lecture, Foucault 
develops some of his thoughts on archaeology, genealogy, and their relation to subjugated 
knowledges. He suggests that subjugated knowledges can be of two kinds: 
On the one hand, I am referring to the historical contents that have been buried and disguised 
in a functionalist coherence or formal systemisation... subjugated knowledges are thus those 
blocs of historical knowledge which were present but disguised within the body of 
functionalist and systematising theory and which criticism – which obviously draws upon 
scholarship – has been able to reveal. (Foucault 1980, pp.81-82) 
On the other hand, those local, popular, naive knowledges ‘that have been disqualified as inadequate 
to their task or insufficiently elaborated’ also represent subjugated knowledges (Foucault 1980, p.82). 
What emerges out of this concern with subjugated knowledges, Foucault continues, ‘is something one 
might call a genealogy’:  
Or rather a multiplicity of genealogical researches, a painstaking rediscovery of struggles 
together with the rude memory of their conflicts. And these genealogies, that are the 
combined product of an erudite knowledge and a popular knowledge, were not possible and 
could not even have been attempted except on one condition, namely that the tyranny of 
globalising discourses with their hierarchy and all their privileges of a theoretical avant-garde 
was eliminated. (Foucault 1980, p.83)  
However, archaeological methods also have a place here, for as Foucault later comments: 
If we were to characterise it in two terms, then ‘archaeology’ would be the appropriate 
methodology of this analysis of local discursivities, and ‘genealogy’ would be the tactics 
whereby, on the basis of the descriptions of these local discursivities, the subjected 
knowledges which were thus released would be brought into play. (Foucault 1980, p.85) 
The distinction between archaeology and genealogy, according to Kendall and Wickham (1999), 
turns, in large part, on their different approaches to discourse. Archaeologies provide a ‘snapshot’ or a 
‘slice’ through the discourse. Whereas genealogy is concerned with the ‘processual aspects of the web 
of discourse – its ongoing character’ (Kendall & Wickham 1999, pp.30-31). Despite the appearance of 
complementarity, Dean (1994, p. 34) asserts that genealogy ‘is clearly dominant’. As he explains, ‘if, 
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from the perspective of the production of a knowledge of discursive formations, archaeology remains 
the indispensable methodology, from the practical, polemical and strategic perspective of the use of 
historical analysis, genealogy holds the key’ (Dean 1994, pp.33-34). He proposes the ‘history of the 
present’ as an overarching approach that is profoundly inspired by Foucauldian methods of 
archaeology and genealogy, combining elements of both approaches (Dean 1994, p.35). According to 
Dean, one of the defining characteristics of genealogy is the fact that it is conducted in the light of 
some contemporary struggle or debate:  
A history of the present is concerned with that which is taken-for-granted, assumed to be 
given, or natural within contemporary social existence, a givenness or naturalness questioned 
in the course of contemporary struggles. This is certainly the case for madness, incarceration 
and imprisonment, sexuality, the hegemony of medicine, and so on. This does not mean these 
‘liberation struggles’ give rise to genealogy or that it is conducted on behalf of those affected 
by some system of domination. It means simply that genealogy is conducted in the presence 
of certain issues problematised by contemporary social struggles. (Dean 1994, p.35, emphasis 
added) 
Kendall and Wickham (1999, p.29) similarly observe that in developing his genealogical approach, 
Foucault sought to adapt and build on many of the essential ingredients of archaeology, adding to 
these ‘a new concern with the analysis of power’. In fact, Foucault understood the analysis of power 
as central to the practice of critique. In his 1978 lecture, What is Critique?, Foucault (2007, pp.42-43) 
suggests that the ‘critical attitude’ emerged in response to the ‘governmentalisation’ of the societies of 
Western Europe in a particular historical period: ‘from the 15th century on and before the 
Reformation, one can say that there was a veritable explosion of the art of governing men’. In this 
context, ‘critique’ is ‘the art of not being governed quite so much’:  
If governmentalization is indeed this movement through which individuals are subjugated in 
the reality of a social practice through mechanisms of power that adhere to a truth, well, then! 
I will say that critique is the movement by which the subject gives himself [sic] the right to 
question truth on its effects of power and question power on its discourses of truth (Foucault 
2007, p.47).  
 
In his 1982 essay The Subject and Power, Foucault develops his thoughts on the concept of ‘power’. 
The exercise of power, he suggests, is not necessarily that of acting immediately or directly on 
another person or group, ‘instead, it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, on existing 
actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future’ (Foucault 1982, p.789). If we 
understand the concept of ‘government’ in the sense that Foucault advocates, where ‘to govern’ is to 
structure the possible field of action of others, it is possible to recognise that ‘power’ is tied in 
intimate relation to the operations of ‘conduct’ and ‘government’:  
The exercise of power consists in guiding the possibility of conduct and putting in order the 
possible outcome. Basically power is less a confrontation between two adversaries or the 
linking of one to the other than a question of government. (Foucault 1982, pp.789-790)  
While power relations are an unavoidable feature of society – ‘power relations are rooted deep in the 
social nexus,’ Foucault (1982, p.791) comments, ‘…a society without power relations can only be an 
abstraction’ – this fact does not foreclose the possibility of critique and resistance. Indeed, for 
Foucault (1982, pp.791-792), this task is a political necessity: ‘the analysis, elaboration, and bringing 
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into question of power relations’, including, crucially, an examination of their historical conditions 
and formation, is not only the remit of the philosopher and historian but ‘is a permanent political task 
inherent in all social existence’. 
Some key features of a genealogical approach 
Despite the fact that Foucault was disinclined to think of ‘genealogy’ as a rigid, ‘rule-bound’ 
methodological framework in its own right - given the extent and variety of its applications to the 
study of social problems and other phenomena - it is nonetheless possible to identify some key 
concerns or emphases of this methodological approach. I want to suggest that there are typically at 
least four key activities involved in the ‘doing’ of genealogy, and these include: 1) ask ‘how’ rather 
than ‘why’ questions; 2) map the apparatus (‘dispositif’); 3) select an ‘archive’ of texts for 
investigation; and 4) look for contingencies instead of causes. In identifying these four key activities, 
my thinking has been shaped by the work of Kendall and Wickham (2004, p.132) in identifying some 
of the key features of a genealogical approach. In what follows I will explore each of these key tasks 
in some detail (with the exception of the matter of selecting an ‘archive’, which will be addressed in a 
later section of this chapter). This account of some of the key features of a genealogical approach is 
not intended to be exhaustive; it is a brief account that introduces ideas and concepts that will be 
further developed in later sections of this chapter.  
Ask ‘how’ rather than ‘why’ questions 
The framing of a genealogical research question is in terms of a ‘how’ rather than a ‘why’ question. 
Foucault asks, ‘How did such-and-such come to exist?’, or ‘How did such-and-such come to have 
such an important place in our society?’ (Kendall & Wickham 2004, p.132). Kendall and Wickham 
(2004, p.132) observe that ‘buried within such an approach is a commitment to constructionism…and 
a mistrust of anthropological universals’. The second point to be made here is that the Foucauldian 
method is a ‘problem-based’ rather than a ‘period-based’ approach to history; it involves the selection 
of a problem rather than an historical period for investigation (Kendall & Wickham 1999, pp.22-23). 
Rather than investigating every element of a specified time period, it is the task of the genealogical 
researcher to ‘follow your problem back as far as necessary’ (Kendall & Wickham 2004, p.132). This 
research project takes as its ‘problem’ that of youth unemployment, and seeks to examine the 
conditions, both historical and contemporary, of its emergence as a quite particular social issue, 
understood in quite particular, sometimes different, sometimes related, ways. This problem has 
occupied the attention of governments, business leaders, young people themselves, and a variety of 
other stakeholders in different, though connected, contexts during the last four decades in Geelong, in 
Victoria, in Australia, and elsewhere in the liberal democracies of the OECD and EU. So, the ‘how’ 
question that drives this investigation is: ‘how is it that, at the start of the 21st century, we have come 
to understand the problem of youth unemployment largely in terms of employability skills, innovation 
and enterprise?’ 
Mapping the apparatus (‘dispositif’)  
Garland (2014, p.379) contends that a genealogy begins with a critical distancing from the present and 
an analytical description of the dispositif within which the object of study is constructed and 
experienced in the present. Though the term dispositif is often translated as ‘apparatus’, Garland 
suggests that it is actually understood by Foucault in a far more expansive sense; its meaning might 
better be captured by terms such as ‘power-knowledge regime’ or a ‘regulatory ensemble’ (Garland 
2014, p.378). In a 1977 interview with Foucault, Alain Grosrichard sought to understand the 
methodological significance of the ‘apparatus’ to Foucault: ‘You talk about an “apparatus of 
sexuality”. What is the meaning or the methodological function for you of this term, apparatus 
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(dispositif)?’ (Foucault et al. 1980, p.194). In reply Foucault suggests there are three key emphases or 
functions of the ‘apparatus’:  
What I’m trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble 
consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, 
administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic 
propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus. 
The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements.  
Secondly, what I am trying to identify in this apparatus is precisely the nature of the 
connection that can exist between these heterogenous elements. Thus, a particular discourse 
can figure at one time as the programme of an institution, and at another it can function as a 
means of justifying or masking a practice which itself remains silent, or as a secondary re-
interpretation of this practice, opening out for it a new field of rationality. In short, between 
these elements, whether discursive or non-discursive, there is a sort of interplay of shifts of 
position and modifications of function which can also vary very widely. 
Thirdly, I understand by the term ‘apparatus’ a sort of – shall we say – formation which has as 
its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need. The 
apparatus thus has a dominant strategic function. This may have been, for example, the 
assimilation of a floating population found to be burdensome for an essentially mercantilist 
economy: there was a strategic imperative acting here as the matrix for an apparatus which 
gradually undertook the control or subjection of madness, mental illness and neurosis. 
(Foucault et al. 1980, pp.194-195, emphasis in original) 
In his 2009 essay, What is an Apparatus?, Giorgio Agamben (2009, p.1) suggests that ‘apparatus…is 
a decisive technical term in the strategy of Foucault’s thought’. In this essay, Agamben subjects the 
term ‘apparatus’ to genealogical analysis. In order to explore the interlinked meanings of ‘apparatus’ 
(‘dispositif’ in French), ‘positivity’, and ‘oikonomia’, Agamben traces the etymological significance 
and evolution of these key terms in and through the philosophical works of Hegel, Hyppolite, and 
Foucault, as well as early theological texts. ‘I shall call an apparatus’, Agamben (2009, p.14) writes, 
‘literally anything that has in some way the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, 
control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions, or discourses of living beings’. Bringing his 
genealogical analysis into the contemporary period, Agamben (2009, p.15) suggests that ‘the extreme 
phase of capitalist development in which we live’ features ‘a massive accumulation and proliferation 
of apparatuses…today there is not even a single instant in which the life of individuals is not modeled, 
contaminated, or controlled by some apparatus’. This array of apparatuses includes not only:  
Prisons, madhouses, the panopticon, schools, confession, factories, disciplines, juridical 
measures, and so forth (whose connection with power is in a certain sense evident), but also 
the pen, writing, literature, philosophy, agriculture, cigarettes, navigation, computers, cellular 
telephones and - why not - language itself, which is perhaps the most ancient of apparatuses. 
(Agamben 2009, p.14) 
Apparatuses are, by their very nature, concerned with subjectification, in other words, the production 
of subjects: ‘every apparatus implies a process of subjectification, without which it cannot function as 
an apparatus of governance, but is rather reduced to a mere exercise of violence’ (Agamben 2009, 
p.19). Foucault’s genealogies, Agamben (2009, pp.19-20) continues, have brought to light the 
function of apparatuses in a disciplinary society as aiming to ‘create - through a series of practices, 
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discourses, and bodies of knowledge - docile, yet free, bodies that assume their identity and their 
“freedom” as subjects in the very process of their desubjectification’. The concepts of ‘apparatus’, 
‘positivity’ and the theological concept of ‘oikonomia’, in similar though slightly different ways, 
describe a set of practices, discourses, and bodies of knowledge that are concerned with governing 
human beings and seeking to ‘guide them toward the good’ (Agamben 2009, p.13). 
In a methodological sense, the apparatus acts as a conceptual, material and discursive device for 
mapping the heterogeneous elements that are implicated in a particular social object/problem/practice, 
and the ‘system of relations’ by which they are connected. This project explores an apparatus which 
has as its ‘dominant strategic function’ the problem of youth unemployment; an issue made 
particularly significant and urgent in the second decade of the 21st century, a time in which the 
economic crises of the new millennium and their aftershocks, such as those associated with the 2007-
08 Global Financial Crisis, are occurring in tandem with more chronic, longer-range dynamics, such 
as the slow wind-down of the long boom of 20th century capitalism. An important task of this project 
is to explore and describe the character of this apparatus, its constituent elements, the shifting 
relationships between these elements, and the strategic focus and functioning of these elements and 
relationships. The heterogeneous elements of this apparatus are implicated in the production, 
circulation and translation of the concepts of ‘employability skills’, ‘innovation’ and ‘enterprise’, and 
the various synonyms and concepts with which they are related (for example, ‘21st century skills’, or 
skills in ‘creativity’ and ‘critical thinking’) when they are articulated to and with the ‘problem’ of 
youth unemployment. The apparatus concerned with the problem of youth unemployment can be 
understood, following Foucault and Agamben, as a set of practices, discourses and bodies of 
knowledge that seek to govern and guide the conduct of young people in education, training and the 
labour market in particular ways. As Foucault noted, in a disciplinary society, apparatuses aim to 
create docile, yet free, bodies. Likewise, the apparatus associated with ‘employability skills’, 
‘innovation’ and ‘enterprise’ involves the creation of particular subject positions. As I will explore 
further in later chapters, this apparatus is powerfully shaped by assumptions about the type of young 
person who is ideally positioned to acquire the kinds of ‘human capital’ that it is thought will provide 
them with a degree of ‘insurance’ against unemployment and underemployment, and that will allow 
them to navigate future working lives that, it is claimed, will be characterised by almost constant 
churn and change. 
Look for contingencies instead of causes 
To look for contingencies is to suspend the inclination or desire to see developments in terms of 
causes and effects (Kendall & Wickham 1999, pp.5-6). ‘When we describe an historical event as 
contingent’, Kendall and Wickham (1999, p.5) explain, ‘what we mean is that the emergence of that 
event was not necessary, but was one possible result of a whole series of complex relations between 
other events’. To say that events are contingent is not to say, however, that a course of events is the 
product of pure chance. Rather, it is to acknowledge the role of unintended consequences, that is, of 
some apparently unrelated change or development, in shaping the history of the object under study 
(Kendall & Wickham 1999, p.6).  
Another inclination that must be suspended is the concern to locate the ‘hidden’ meaning or logic of 
history (Kendall & Wickham 1999, pp.9-19). The desire to look for the ‘governing principle’ of a 
civilisation, epoch or society is one of the chief errors of an approach Foucault characterises as ‘total 
history’ (Foucault 1972, cited in Dean 1994, p.93). To eschew the total history and its teleological 
tendencies is to instead open up a space for considering ‘series, divisions, differences of temporality 
36 
 
and level, forms of continuity and mutation, particular types of transitions and events, possible 
relations and so on’, and their role in shaping the ‘history of the present’ (Dean 1994, p.93).  
Kendall and Wickham (2004, p.133) liken Foucauldian genealogy to detective work, in that each 
necessitates working backwards from a known outcome. As the researcher digs for precursors to a 
particular modern practice, they are concerned with piecing together the ‘sufficient conditions’ for the 
emergence of this problem, issue or practice (Kendall & Wickham 2004, p.133). Foucault often 
referred to this type of work as uncovering the ‘conditions of possibility’ that enabled a knowledge or 
an historical event to come about (Kendall & Wickham 1999, p.37). By this he means the description 
of the various elements that had to be in place to allow something else to be possible (Kendall & 
Wickham 1999, p.37). Foucault’s methods, it must finally be noted, ‘involve the generation of 
surprising stories’; the researcher working in the genealogical space must allow for the element of 
surprise that comes with the discovery of unexpected findings (Kendall & Wickham 1999, p.22).  
The ‘Three Es’: episodes, examples, effectiveness 
In addition to the key features of a genealogical approach discussed above, Vucetic’s (2011) ‘three E’ 
definition of genealogy suggests that genealogies are driven by the identification of ‘episodes’, 
‘examples’ and ‘effectiveness’. Although Vucetic provides only a brief exposition of this model, I 
want to suggest that it has utility as a method of engaging with the archive. Indeed, during the earlier 
phases of this project this model provided a means, a framework, for assisting me to identify, 
contextualise and make sense of particular programmatic texts. The first ‘E’ in this model is Episodes. 
Whether they are termed ‘episodes’, or historical series, epochs, events, moments (or perhaps the 
more traditional ‘cases’, in the terminology of conventional social research approaches), the point is 
to ‘provisionally’ periodise, or parcel into discrete moments, the (admittedly partial) history of the 
object under study (Vucetic 2011, pp.1300-1301). Each episode is narrated through Examples, ‘which 
are themselves reconstructed in a discourse analysis of a range of historical documents ranging from 
diaries left behind by marginal authors to programmatic or pioneering statements on how to maintain 
social order’ (Vucetic 2011, p.1300). Vucetic (2011, p.1300) suggests that it is in Discipline and 
Punish that Foucault demonstrates an engagement with ‘episodes’ and ‘examples’ as methodological 
devices. Here, Foucault identified the 18th century debate between two discourses of punishment – 
‘disciplinary/corporal’ versus ‘reformist’ – as a key episode in the development of the contemporary 
‘carceral’ society (Vucetic 2011, p.1300). ‘The famous example analysed within this episode,’ 
Vucetic (2011, p.1300) continues, ‘was Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon – an essay which prescribed an 
efficient disciplinary penal regime’. 
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1979) analyses the development of Panopticism as a modern 
disciplinary mechanism. In a text published at the end of the seventeenth century that stipulated the 
measures to be taken when the plague appeared in a town, Foucault (1979, p.195) found an elaborate 
description of mechanisms for the confinement and surveillance of individuals and the quarantining of 
sickness and disorder. These mechanisms, Foucault (1979, pp.197-200) suggests, operated ‘by means 
of an omnipresent and omniscient power’, in order to divide, isolate, and ‘brand’ individuals as 
‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’. The Panopticon was an architectural mechanism of surveillance designed by 
social reformer Jeremy Bentham in the 18th century. This structure was designed in such a way as to 
make power ‘visible and unverifiable’ - unverifiable because the subject of that surveillance was 
unable to discern whether he or she was or was not being watched at any particular moment (Foucault 
1979, p.201). Foucault was interested in the Panopticon as a metaphor for the ways in which 
surveillance and discipline were administered in modern societies. From the regime of ‘exceptional 
discipline’ that attempted to halt the spread of death and disease, to the development of mechanisms 
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of ‘subtle coercion’ in the form of the panoptic arrangement: Foucault (1979, p.209) understands that 
these are both important ‘episodes’ in the ‘formation of what might be called in general the 
disciplinary society’. 
Vucetic (2011, p.1301) suggests that the last of the three Es – Effectiveness – ‘is not as 
straightforward from the perspective of mainstream social science methodologies’. However, he 
offers a simple interpretation, suggesting that effective genealogies:  
Are those that focus on a ‘problem’ – a social phenomenon that appears (seems, feels) normal 
or true (commonplace, natural, intuitive) and then turns it into a question, that is, it asks how 
it came about in the light of contingency and power. (Vucetic 2011, p.1301)  
What makes Foucault’s historical analyses of European clinics, prisons, asylums and hospitals 
‘effective’ is that ‘they each clearly demonstrated how and why some subjects and social items were 
brought about and not others, what became forgotten and with what consequences for the present’ 
(Vucetic 2011, p.1302). In many respects, Vucetic’s definition of ‘effectiveness’ echoes Dean’s 
sentiment that ‘genealogy is conducted in the presence of certain issues problematised by 
contemporary social struggles’ (Dean 1994, p.35). A genealogy is an effective history that, in the light 
of some contemporary struggle or debate, critiques a social ‘problem’ or practice otherwise thought to 
be normal, inevitable or natural, questioning and problematising this ‘givenness’ or ‘naturalness’. 
While the identification and analysis of Episodes, Examples and Effectiveness represents one possible 
way to structure a genealogical investigation, a range of other authors have developed and applied 
Foucauldian historical methods, in different ways, in the analysis of policy. In many cases, these 
archaeologies and genealogies of policy are driven by a concern to interrogate the processes through 
which particular social phenomena become defined as ‘problems’ that must therefore be ‘fixed’ 
through policy interventions. As I will demonstrate in the following section of this chapter, this body 
of work is of relevance to this project in both a methodological and substantive sense. It provides an 
illustration of Foucauldian historical methods ‘in action’ within a particular field of inquiry. Not only 
that, but genealogical analyses of education policy have made a substantive contribution to 
illuminating the ways in which young people are constructed as particular kinds of subjects in and 
through education policies and discourses.  
Problematising the representation of social ‘problems’: Foucauldian methods in the 
analysis of policy  
‘Policy genealogy’ and ‘policy archaeology’ are among the various research approaches adapted from 
Foucauldian genealogical methods, and these approaches have had extensive application in analyses 
of educational policy. Gale (2001, p.384) asserts that, in the field of critical policy sociology, ‘policy 
historiography’, ‘policy genealogy’ and ‘policy archaeology’ form a suite of three overlapping 
historical lenses with which to ‘read’ and ‘write’ policy research. Beginning with policy 
historiography, Gale suggests that it: 
Asks three broad questions: (1) what were the ‘public issues’ and ‘private troubles’ within a 
particular policy domain during some previous period and how were they addressed?; (2) 
what are they now?; and (3) what is the nature of the change from the first to the second? 
(Gale 2001, p.385) 
In contrast, policy genealogy asks:  
38 
 
(1) how policies change over time, but it also seeks to determine (2) how the rationality and 
consensus of policy production might be problematised and (3) how temporary alliances are 
formed and reformed around conflicting interests in the policy production process. (Gale 
2001, pp.389-390).  
And finally, Gale refers to the work of Scheurich (1994) in developing and describing ‘policy 
archaeology’ as a distinctive historical method. Scheurich (1994) distinguishes policy archaeology 
from traditional approaches to the analysis of policy. These traditional approaches are underpinned by 
positivist and post-positivist epistemologies, and thus ‘see nothing unnatural or socially constructed 
about what comes to be labelled or identified as a social problem’ (Scheurich 1994, p.298). Policy 
archaeology, in contrast, ‘takes a radically different approach to policy studies in virtually all its 
aspects, including definitions of problems and problem groups, discussions of policies and policy 
alternatives, and presumptions about the function of policy studies within the larger social order’ 
(Scheurich 1994, p.299). Scheurich argues that: 
Policy archaeology studies the numerous, complex strands and traces of social problems prior 
to their naming as social problems. It examines the naming process, the process by which 
problems enter the gaze of the state and policy researchers. It critically probes why and how 
these strands and traces congeal (become visible) into what is thereafter labelled as a 
particular social problem. (Scheurich 1994, p.300) 
Policy archaeologies also seek to map the grid of ‘social regularities’, the ‘preconceptual glasses or 
frames through which human actions and categories, including social problems and policy solutions, 
become socially defined’ (Scheurich 1994, p.306). A study by Williams, Gannon and Sawyer (2013), 
which is inspired by the genealogies of policy networks and educational policy developed by Stephen 
Ball and colleagues, has a similar focus to the genealogical investigations of my project. These 
authors investigate how the ‘21st century learner’ is understood and conceptualised in educational 
policy discourses, and as they trace the various incarnations of this figure, their analysis moves 
historically but also geographically, through policy networks and discourses that are increasingly 
global in nature:   
Our mapping exercise...suggests some of the connections between documents produced at 
various sites – government agencies, organisations, corporations and think tanks. These 
constitute the policy networks through which flow policy concepts and discourses of the ‘21st 
century learner’, his/her desired skills, dispositions and capabilities. (Williams, Gannon & 
Sawyer 2013, p.795) 
Williams, Gannon and Sawyer’s analysis of these documents revealed a complexification and 
corporatisation of the skills and values embodied in this figure: 
Certainly, we have seen a progression from the kinds of basic employment-related skills 
outlined in the 1989 Hobart Declaration (and that would also soon appear in the Mayer Key 
Competencies) to the skills and dispositions of a more fully ‘entrepreneurialised’ learner and 
citizen who takes greater responsibility for his/her own learning and his/her life, apparent in 
the 2008 Melbourne Declaration. (Williams, Gannon & Sawyer 2013, p.798) 
As the authors highlight, ‘the goal of schooling becomes the production of the ideal neoliberal 
subject’ at the behest of industry-led agendas, geared to the development of the ‘self-managing, 
entrepreneurial individual, lifelong learner and responsibilised citizen of the post-welfare state’ 
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(Williams, Gannon & Sawyer 2013, p.799). However, the ‘21st century learner’ is not simply or only a 
neoliberal construct. As Williams, Gannon and Sawyer (2013, p.799) suggest, these specifications sit 
somewhat incongruously alongside social democratic discourses and values that emphasise equity, 
social justice and collective responsibility. 
In a similar way to the work of Scheurich, Bacchi’s (2009) ‘What’s the problem represented to be?’ 
approach (abbreviated to WPR approach) departs from conventional approaches to policy analysis 
and evaluation in its concern to reveal the assumptions and presuppositions that lie behind and shape 
selected policies. As Bacchi (2009, p.xi) argues: 
 
Policies are problematising activities…policies ‘claim’ to ‘fix’ things; hence, by their nature 
they assume the existence of a ‘problem’ that needs ‘fixing’. It follows that the ways in which 
issues are problematised – how they are thought about as ‘problems’ – are central to 
governing processes. In effect, we are governed through problematisations rather than through 
policies. Therefore, we need to direct our attention away from assumed ‘problems’ to the 
shape and character of problematisations.  
 
In the WPR approach, ‘problematisation’ has a dual meaning: problematisation refers to the way(s) in 
which particular issues are conceived as ‘problems’, while also referring to the task of problematising 
(interrogating) the problematisations on offer in current policies (Bacchi 2009, p.30). The WPR 
approach has a distinctly genealogical flavour insofar as it offers scope to trace the movements of 
particular problem representations across space and time: ‘it is useful to think of some of these ideas 
[particular representations of health/illness, crime/criminal justice, or other social issues, for example] 
as travelling ideas…or more precisely as travelling problem representations - whose journey needs to 
be tracked’ (Bacchi 2009, p.xx). And there are a number of other ways in which the WPR approach is 
informed by Foucauldian historical methods and studies of governmentality in the Foucauldian 
tradition. The WPR approach seeks to identify and analyse the discursive and non-discursive practices 
that shape a particular problem representation. It brings to light the history of struggle and conflict in 
which some knowledges, or ways of understanding the problem, came to be institutionally sanctioned, 
while other knowledges were subjugated (Bacchi 2009, p.36). As Bacchi (2009, p.11, 36) indicates, 
these institutionally-sanctioned discourses are often sustained by non-discursive practices, such as 
official statistics, censuses and surveys, that allow specific problem representations to gain 
dominance. Foucault understood that what is being struggled over here, is, ultimately, the ability to 
define and designate what counts as ‘true’ and ‘false’:  
Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of 
discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which 
enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; 
the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those 
who are charged with saying what counts as true. (Foucault 1980, cited in Bacchi 2009, p.36) 
 
Another key element of the WPR approach is the analysis of the implications and consequences that 
flow from these problem representations. For Bacchi (2009, pp.16-17), particular problem 
representations have flow-on material and discursive effects: they shape the ways in which it is 
possible to think and talk about a problem, they make certain subject positions possible and imply a 
particular portioning of responsibility for a problem, and crucially, they have lived effects, in the form 
of material impacts on bodies and lives.  
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In contrast with the various studies and approaches discussed in this section of the chapter, this 
research project is concerned with policy discussion as one constituent element of the apparatus that 
can be identified as emerging in relation to youth unemployment – and its differing attention to things 
such as young people’s employability skills, innovation and enterprise. Where the present study 
differs from the work of Gale, Scheurich, Bacchi and others, is that it is underpinned by a 
genealogical ethos that recognises that there are a multiplicity and variety of discourses that are 
implicated in the framing of young people’s employability skills, innovation and enterprise. In this 
sense, the project has identified and gathered a sample of texts (an ‘archive’) from a broad range of 
policy, media, scholarly and other sources. 
Developing a methodological ‘toolbox’ for doing a genealogy of ‘employability 
skills’, ‘innovation’ and ‘enterprise’ 
To briefly recap on the discussion to this point, Foucauldian historical methods do several things. 
They are a ‘problem-based’ rather than a ‘period-based’ approach to history. They differ from the 
predominant historiographic approaches within sociology/social theory (progressivist theory, critical 
theory) in that they reject ‘synthetic philosophies of history’ (Dean 1994, p.4) and teleological notions 
of social progress. And, finally, they analyse the ‘conditions of possibility’ that allow particular 
representations of the ‘problem’ to function as ‘truths’. In doing all of these things, Foucauldian 
historical methods represent a distinctive methodological approach to the investigation of social 
‘problems’. So, this project is framed in terms of a ‘how’ rather than a ‘why’ question, looks for 
contingencies instead of causes, and while it may seek out programmatic texts in the archive, it is also 
concerned with uncovering subjugated knowledges that are ignored by, are not considered, or are of 
little interest to these programmatic texts.  
Foucauldian historical methods have been conceptualised and operationalised variously in and 
through practices of: ‘critical and effective history’ (Dean 1994); the mapping of the ‘apparatus’ 
(Foucault et al. 1980; Agamben 2009); identifying and analysing ‘three Es’: episodes, examples and 
effectiveness (Vucetic 2011); and interrogating the premises that underpin particular problem 
representations (in the work of Bacchi and others). And this is a relatively brief and selective account 
of the wide variety of ways in which Foucauldian historical methods have been interpreted, developed 
and applied – there are many others that I have not surveyed here. There is not one singular approach 
that offers the definitive method for doing genealogy. Rather, each of these approaches has utility in 
shaping the genealogical ethos that drives this project. In keeping with Foucault’s suggestion that his 
researches be understood as ‘a kind of toolbox that people can rummage through to find a tool they 
can use however they wish in their own area’, the genealogical approach requires that the researcher 
seek out methods and tools that are most pertinent to the particular problem and context under study.  
In previous sections of this chapter, I established the epistemological and theoretical foundations of 
the genealogical approach, and considered its application in the area of policy analysis, in order to 
provide an example of genealogical methods ‘in action’ within a particular field of inquiry. In this 
final section of the chapter I will focus more practically on some of the key methods, tools and 
devices that form the methodological ‘toolbox’ with which I have been able to collect and analyse 
‘data’ in this project. The three elements that I focus on here include the selection of an ‘archive’, 
content analysis and critical discourse analysis, and a device known as a ‘situational map’ that assists 
in the analysis of historical discourses.  
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Selection of an archive 
According to Kendall and Wickham (2004, p.132), Foucault was relatively silent on the matter of the 
selection of his archive. However, it has been suggested that the selection of an archive for 
genealogical analysis is typically informed by the desire to identify and explore ‘programmatic texts’ 
or ‘paradigmatic cases’ (Kendall & Wickham 2004, p.132; Flyvbjerg 2001, pp.79-80). 
‘Programmatic’ texts are ‘writings that try to impose a vision or spell out most clearly a new way of 
conceptualizing a problem’ (Kendall & Wickham 2004, p.132). Flyvbjerg (2001, p.80) argues that 
Foucault’s work, and in particular, his focus on European prisons and the ‘Panopticon’, demonstrates 
a concern with the identification of paradigmatic cases, that is, cases that highlight more general 
characteristics of the societies in question. 
The ‘archive’ of documents that I have collected and analysed in this project is comprised of a variety 
of different types of sources across a variety of locations. In many cases I have sourced these various 
texts electronically, through the use of internet search engines and academic research databases, and 
in other cases I have conducted archival research among hard-copy historical documents and archived 
newspapers on microfilm. In order to identify and analyse some of the key ‘epochs’, ‘episodes’, 
‘events’ and ‘moments’ in the stories of labour market change, de-industrialisation, globalisation and 
neoliberal capitalism, particularly as they apply to ‘Rust Belt’ places such as Geelong, in Chapters 2 
and 3 my archive consists of key policies and policy discourses produced at the international, national, 
state and local government levels in the areas of economic policy, industry policy, and urban planning 
and regional development policy. In these chapters I also analyse a range of historical and 
contemporary documents and texts produced by non-government, media, business, and 
academic/research actors and organisations. In Chapter 3, the work of identifying and analysing some 
of the key ‘episodes’, ‘events’ and ‘moments’ in the history of the ‘Rust Belt’ city of Geelong 
required that I seek out special collections of historical documents, and archived editions of local 
newspaper, the Geelong Advertiser, held at the Geelong Heritage Centre and the Alfred Deakin Prime 
Ministerial Library at Deakin University.  
In Chapter 4, my focus is on three ‘programmatic’ texts - the Finn, Mayer and Carmichael Reports – 
the key policy documents setting the direction of reform of post-compulsory education and training in 
Australia in the 1990s. In this period, key documents such as Australia Reconstructed (Australian 
Council of Trade Unions & Trade Development Council 1987), and the 1983 Statement of Accord by 
the Australian Labor Party and the Australian Council of Trade Unions Regarding Economic Policy 
were also instrumental in establishing the climate in which ideas of ‘human capital’ and 
‘employability skills’ became significant, and they also form part of my ‘archive’ in Chapter 4. While 
Geelong’s turn-of-the-21st-century bid to secure a Guggenheim museum is a key focus of my analyses 
in Chapter 5, this event is significant in the context of a wider ‘climate of innovation’. In order to 
explore some of the ways in which network logics and networked approaches were conceptualised 
and enacted in this climate of innovation, the Kirby Report on post-compulsory education and training 
arrangements in Victoria (DEET 2000), and annual reports, newsletters and other key 
communications produced by the Smart Geelong Region LLEN were among the key texts I examined 
in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, the Foundation for Young Australians’ (FYA) New Work Order research 
report series is the central focus of my analysis, and at the time of writing this series comprises six 
titles. In that chapter, I also survey some of the key sources that the FYA has drawn on in developing 
its ‘enterprise skills’ agenda. These sources include reports and communications produced by 
Australian business groups and market research firms, such as the Australian Industry Group, the 
Business Council of Australia, AlphaBeta and McCrindle Research. In Chapter 7, the process of 
selecting an archive was informed by a desire to interrogate the ways in which young people are 
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represented as ‘figures’ of enterprise in contemporary media publications and sources. In that chapter, 
my ‘archive’ consists of all issues of GT Magazine – a large-circulation ‘lifestyle’ magazine published 
weekly in Geelong - for the year 2016.  
In this project, the work of selecting an archive was aided by the use of a methodological and 
analytical device known as the ‘situational map’, a device developed by sociologist Adele Clarke 
(2005, 2015) that I will describe in more detail below. This device has assisted me to map the range of 
historical ‘episodes’, ‘events’, ‘examples’ and ‘moments’, as well as ideas, concepts and sources more 
broadly, that are pertinent to each of the key concepts being investigated in this thesis – 
‘employability skills’, ‘innovation’ and ‘enterprise’ – which are the focus of Chapters 4, 5 and 6, 
respectively. 
Content analysis and critical discourse analysis 
Having selected an archive, the next task is to select techniques that will allow me to systematically 
analyse this collection of texts. The techniques of content analysis and critical discourse analysis 
represent a productive methodological fit for the aims of my project, as they provide scope to analyse 
not only texts and their constituent elements, but also images and other forms of symbolic 
communication, the contexts of their production and dissemination, and their wider social, cultural, 
economic and political significance.  
The practice of discourse analysis, Gee (2014, p.20) suggests, examines ‘how speakers and writers 
use clues or cues (namely, syntax and discourse) to shape the interpretations and actions of listeners 
and readers’. Discourse analysis can also have a political dimension, insofar as it is an inquiry into the 
‘relations between discourse and other elements of the social process’, into the ways in which systems 
of meaning are shaped by, and in turn shape, relations of power (Fairclough 2010, pp.8-10). It is this 
political dimension that is highlighted in Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which, according to two 
of its foremost proponents, Fairclough (2010) and Wodak (2001), calls attention to the role of 
language in the production and reproduction of power asymmetries and structural inequities. 
Wodak (2001, p.3) suggests that three concepts figure indispensably in all CDA: the concept of 
power, the concept of history, and the concept of ideology. CDA has particular value in scrutinizing 
the language of the mass media ‘as a site of power, of struggle and also as a site where language is 
apparently transparent’ (Wodak 2001, p.6). It challenges the assumption that media institutions 
provide a neutral platform for public discourse, that they reflect states of affairs disinterestedly, and 
that they give the perceptions and arguments of the newsmakers (Wodak 2001, p.6).  
 
CDA scholar Norman Fairclough (1989, 1995 cited in Janks 1997, p.329) suggests that there are three 
interrelated dimensions of discourse, the first of which is the object of analysis (including verbal, 
visual or verbal and visual texts); the second, the processes by which the object is produced and 
received (writing/speaking/designing and reading/listening/viewing) by human subjects; and the third, 
the socio-historical conditions that govern these processes. He proposes a three-part method of critical 
discourse analysis for capturing each of these dimensions and their interlinkages, the three ‘levels’ or 
‘stages’ of which include: text analysis (description), processing analysis (interpretation), and social 
analysis (explanation) (Fairclough 1989, 1995 cited in Janks 1997, p.329). Ruiz Ruiz (2009, p.5) 
further explicates some of the key tasks at each of these three levels of analysis, and suggests that it is 
common for the researcher to move back and forth across all three levels, allowing a continuous 
dialogue, or cycle, between the levels (see Figure 2 below).  
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Ruiz Ruiz (2009, pp.7-8) suggests that the first level, textual analysis, can involve the specific tasks of 
content analysis and/or semiotic analysis. Content analysis has a long history as a method of media or 
documentary analysis, and ‘consists of breaking down or fragmenting the text into pertinent units of 
information for their subsequent coding and categorisation’ (Ruiz Ruiz 2009, p.8). The second level, 
the contextual level, involves the description of the circumstances in which the text has been 
produced, but it also opens up a space for considering the intertextual properties of a discourse – the 
way in which a discourse dialogues with other discourses (Ruiz Ruiz 2009, pp.9-11). Rounding out 
the cycle of analysis, the sociological interpretation of discourse ‘involves making connections 
between the discourses analysed and the social space in which they have emerged’ (Ruiz Ruiz 2009, 
p.16). 
 
<Image removed due to copyright restrictions> 
 
Figure 2: Process of sociological discourse analysis (Ruiz Ruiz 2009, p.6) 
 
Situational maps in genealogical research 
Sociologist Adele Clarke (2015, 2005) suggests that a ‘situational map’ can be a particularly valuable 
tool in the mapping of historical discourses. A situational map is a configuration that attempts to lay 
out all the major human, nonhuman, discursive, historical, symbolic, cultural, political and other 
elements in the research situation of concern, and provokes analyses of relations among them (Clarke 
2015, p.100). This definition of a ‘situational map’ appears quite similar, in some respects, to that of 
Foucault’s ‘apparatus’. The construction of a situational map, or series of maps, may therefore go 
some way towards mapping the heterogeneous elements of an apparatus which has, as its ‘dominant 
strategic function’, that of responding to the ‘urgent’ problem of youth unemployment. The 
‘situational map’ allows me to visualise each of the key concepts – ‘employability skills’, ‘innovation’ 
and ‘enterprise’ – as the product of a contingent configuration of elements. 
According to Clarke, situational maps can perform several important functions in the research 
process. Situational maps are ‘excellent research design tools’ (Clarke 2015, pp.100-101). A series of 
situational maps, each drawn at a particular interval in the research journey, allows for the making of 
historical comparisons and ‘vividly demonstrates the reconfigurations that have occurred – as well as 
helping us to see the relatively unchanging elements’ (Clarke 2005, pp.280-281). Maps, for Clarke 
(2005, p.281), are a provocation to further analysis in ways that simply constructing a narrative are 
not: the act of drawing a map ‘can help rupture our own premature and/or ill thought through 
analyses’. Furthermore, in historical research, ‘getting lost in the interesting details is an ongoing 
risk’, and maps can prompt the researcher to return to the ‘big picture’ view (Clarke 2005, p.289). In 
essence: 
Situational maps and analyses do particular kinds of work through mapping and framing 
historical as well as contemporary materials. Together they lay out the key actors and actants, 
key social worlds and arenas, key discourses, and key axes of conflict, specifying the 
positions taken and not taken in the data, implicated actors, silent actors, missing discourses, 
and so on. While potentially useful in most if not all research, situational maps and analyses 
can be distinctively helpful in taking on understudied or unstudied larger historical projects. 
(Clarke 2005, p.289) 
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In developing the concept of the ‘situational map’, Clarke draws on traditional grounded theory 
analyses that centre on action, seeking to build on and refine Anselm Strauss and Julie Corbin’s 
‘conditional matrix’, as well as taking inspiration from Donna Haraway’s feminist theory of ‘situated 
knowledges’, among other influences (Clarke 2015, p.99). Clarke’s situational map differs from 
Strauss and Corbin’s ‘conditional matrix’ in that it understands the context for action as part of the 
situation, rather than external to it:  
There is no such thing as ‘context’ …the fundamental assumptions are that everything in the 
situation both constitutes and affects most everything else in the situation in some way(s). 
Everything actually in the situation or understood to be so ‘conditions the possibilities’… of 
interpretation and action. (Clarke 2015, pp.98-99) 
Another key strength of the situational map is its ability to illuminate dynamics of power, through a 
focus on the implicated, silent actors and actants that pertain in the situation. While ‘there are 
generally multiple discursive constructions circulating of both the human and nonhuman actors in any 
given situation’, the analysis of power recognises that some actors may be denied a voice and/or self-
representation in the situation by other, hegemonic actors (Clarke 2015, p.94). ‘Analysing power,’ 
Clarke (2015, pp.94-95) contends, ‘involves analysing whose constructions of whom/what exist? 
Which are taken as “the real” constructions—or the ones that “matter” most in the situation by the 
various participants? Which are contested? Whose are ignored? By whom?’. This analysis of 
hegemonic and subjugated actors/actants and their constructions echoes the concerns of Foucault in 
uncovering ‘subjugated knowledges’, which, he suggests, are those ‘historical contents that have been 
buried and disguised in a functionalist coherence or formal systemisation’, as well as those local, 
popular, naive knowledges ‘that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently 
elaborated’ (Foucault 1980, pp.81-82). 
Clarke (2015, p.100) suggests that there are two basic types of situational maps. In the ‘messy 
situational map’ (see Figure 3 below), the researcher sketches their initial ideas on paper, and in doing 
so, seeks to ‘capture the messy complexities of the situation in their dense relations and permutations’  
<Image removed due to copyright restrictions> 
 
Figure 3: Example of Messy Situational Map (Clarke 2015, p.100) 
 
In the next iteration of the map, the ‘ordered situational map’ (see Figure 4 below), the researcher can 
use a series of subheadings as a guide to further analysis. Clarke (2015, pp.101-102) stresses that the 
categories that appear on this Ordered Situational Map template are intended as a guide only. The 
researcher can, and should, modify, add and/or subtract categories depending on what appears in their 
particular situation of inquiry.  
<Image removed due to copyright restrictions> 
 
Figure 4: Example of Ordered Situational Map (Clarke 2015, p.102) 
 
In this project I argue that the key concepts of ‘employability skills’, ‘innovation’ and ‘enterprise’ are 
each the product of an historical ‘apparatus’ composed of both a generalised and more particular 
configuration of elements. These elements are both discursive and non-discursive, are political, 
economic, social, cultural, and ideological in nature and are conditioned by, and in turn condition, 
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spatial and temporal processes of de-industrialisation and labour market change. At an earlier stage of 
this project, I drafted an ordered situational map for each of the three, core ‘data’ chapters of this 
thesis - which are focused on ‘employability skills’, ‘innovation’ and ‘enterprise’ respectively - as a 
preliminary to constructing a narrative, and in order to provide an initial, visual representation of the 
diverse elements that have a role in the framing of each key concept. Please refer to Appendices 1, 2 
and 3 of this thesis for examples of Ordered Situational Maps that map the diverse elements informing 
the concepts of ‘employability skills’, ‘innovation’ and ‘enterprise’. 
Conclusion 
The work of French historian and philosopher Michel Foucault has informed the development of the 
distinctive methodological approach of genealogy. Genealogy attempts to problematise and unsettle 
the taken-for-granted components of our present social reality. Foucauldian historical methods have 
been conceptualised and operationalised variously in and through practices of: ‘critical and effective 
history’ (Dean 1994); the mapping of the ‘apparatus’ (Foucault et al. 1980; Agamben 2009); 
identifying and analysing ‘three Es’: episodes, examples and effectiveness (Vucetic 2011); and 
interrogating the premises that underpin particular problem representations (in the work of Bacchi and 
others). As the discussion in this chapter has highlighted, there is not one singular approach that offers 
the definitive method for doing genealogy. Rather, each of these approaches has utility in shaping the 
genealogical ethos that drives this project. In keeping with Foucault’s suggestion that his researches 
be understood as ‘a kind of toolbox that people can rummage through to find a tool they can use 
however they wish in their own area’, the genealogical approach requires that the researcher seek out 
methods and tools that are most pertinent to the particular problem and context under study.  
While genealogy should not be understood as a codified technique of inquiry, it nonetheless 
represents a distinctive approach to the investigation of social ‘problems’, and it is possible to identify 
some key features that distinguish this approach from other forms of historiography. Genealogy is a 
‘problem-based’ rather than a ‘period-based’ approach to history, and it seeks to analyse the 
‘conditions of possibility’ that allow particular representations of the ‘problem’ to function as ‘truths’. 
The genealogical ethos that I adopt in this thesis allows me to interrogate the multiple, diverse, non-
linear trajectories that comprise the ‘history of the present’, where the ‘present’ signifies an early 21st 
century period in which the problem of youth unemployment is understood largely in terms of 
‘employability skills’, ‘innovation’ and ‘enterprise’. While in the 21st century, these individualising, 
‘human capital’ discourses are understood as the ‘solution’ to problems of youth employment and 
unemployment, the value of a problematising, genealogical approach is its ability to suggest that the 
problem could be ‘thought differently’, and that the emergence of this state of affairs was by no 
means ‘natural’ or ‘inevitable’.  
The genealogical ethos that I have articulated in this chapter will shape the ways in which I tell the 
‘histories’ of de-industrialisation, globalisation and ‘neoliberal’ capitalism, and of economic and 
spatial restructuring and transformation in the ‘Rust Belt’ city of Geelong, histories that are the focus 
of Chapters 2 and 3. This genealogical ethos also informs my approach to the core ‘data’ chapters of 
Part Two of this thesis, which are concerned with illuminating the ‘conditions of possibility’ that 
enable ‘employability skills’, ‘innovation’ and ‘enterprise’ to function as ‘truths’ in relation to the 
problem of youth unemployment. It is to a consideration of some of the key ‘episodes’, ‘events’ and 
‘moments’ in the stories of de-industrialisation, globalisation and ‘neoliberal’ capitalism that I now 
turn. 
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Chapter Two 
Globalisation, ‘neoliberal’ capitalism, and youth labour markets in the 
21st century  
 
Introduction  
From the late 20th century into the 21st century, de-industrialisation, the emergence of ‘neoliberal’ 
capitalism, and the reconfiguration of ‘space’ and ‘place’ associated with processes of globalisation 
have fundamentally reshaped the industrialised democracies. The ‘social democratic’ political 
consensus that emerged in many of the industrialising democracies after World War II was the 
consequence of post-Depression, post-war contests and struggles between diverse interests and forces 
(state, labour, capital). This consensus saw governments take a much more interventionist role in the 
welfare of the working class, securing and/or supporting their access to housing, employment, 
insurance against infirmity, and other elemental needs. For a relatively brief period before the ‘long 
boom’ of 20th century capitalism began to dissipate in the 1970s, the post-war settlement would play 
an instrumental role in boosting the economic fortunes of many Australian towns and cities, and those 
of their inhabitants. 
The ‘conditions of possibility’ that had allowed this social democratic ethos to function as the 
dominant art of government began to change, disperse and unravel in the 1970s. At the global level, 
the accelerating financialisation of capital in the 1970s was a response to the crisis of overproduction 
in global manufacturing and declining capitalist profitability (Harvey 2005; Srnicek 2017). The 
Bretton Woods Agreement that had fixed exchange rates during the long boom was abandoned in 
1971-73, a development which generated significant instability of exchange and interest rates and 
spurred the growth of international financial markets (Lapavitsas 2013, p.793). The spatial 
reorganisation of production saw the ‘offshoring’ of manufacturing to locations with lower labour 
costs, and the late 20th century also witnessed profound changes in production methods, with ‘mass 
production’ principles replaced by flexible specialisation and ‘just-in-time’ production methods 
(Watkins 1994, p.13). At the Australian Federal government level, the Hawke Labor Government, 
with Paul Keating as Treasurer, floated the Australian dollar in 1983 and reduced tariff protection of 
domestic industries, signalling a definitive move away from the precepts of economic policy 
associated with the social democratic consensus, in favour of the ‘monetarist’ approach associated 
with the ascendant political consensus of neoliberalism (or ‘economic rationalism’ as it was 
frequently termed in Australia). The liberalisation of trade, the privatisation of key industries and 
enterprises, and the deregulation of the economy (though some scholars assert that ‘re-regulation’ is a 
more apt characterisation of the neoliberal approach to regulation) are key pillars of the neoliberal 
economic paradigm (Steger & Roy 2010, p.40), and these tenets have been pursued, to greater or 
lesser degrees, by all Australian Governments from the early 1980s onwards.  
A series of changes in the sphere of industrial relations and employment policy also impacted on the 
fortunes of workers, including the abandonment, in the early 1970s, of the policy of ‘full 
employment’ which had predominated in Australia for several decades through the mid-20th century, 
the progressive deregulation of labour markets through the 1980s and 1990s, and the move from 
centralised wage-fixing to collective bargaining at the enterprise level (Smith 2017, p.15; Briggs & 
Buchanan 2000). What I have offered here is not an exhaustive account of the many forces and 
developments that made their impacts in this period (the oil price shocks of the early 1970s, for 
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example, were also instrumental here) but it illustrates that the consequence of these various crises 
and challenges was that, in the late 20th century, industrialised democracies such as Australia were, for 
better or worse, ‘opened up’ to global forces. More recently, the 2007-08 Global Financial Crisis and 
its aftershocks have illustrated some of the particular risks and vulnerabilities to which domestic 
economies are exposed as a consequence of their entanglement in global economic systems in which 
deregulated finance capital plays an enhanced role.  
Rather than attempting to ‘tell the whole story’ through a detailed, linear and/or complete history, in 
this and the following chapter, I will focus on key historical ‘epochs’, ‘episodes’, ‘events’ and 
‘moments’ in the histories of globalisation, ‘neoliberal’ capitalism and youth labour market change, 
particularly as they relate to the experiences and trajectories of industrialised democracies such as 
Australia. My aim is to map the space in which the overarching genealogical question emerges – in 
which the problem of youth unemployment emerges in the way that it does – as well as the key 
concepts that are the ‘solution’ to this problem. The first three sections of this chapter – ‘Space, place 
and global flows’, ‘Neoliberal capitalism’, and ‘Digital disruption and the coming of the robots’ – 
sketch some of the key processes and developments evident in regimes of globalisation, neoliberal 
capitalism, and automation and wider technological change. The fourth and final section of the 
chapter, ‘Youth labour market change in the neoliberal era’, considers the impacts of these various 
social, political, economic, governmental, and technological changes in shaping the labour market 
experiences of young people in the 21st century. However, I will turn now to the first section of the 
chapter, where I will consider how a selection of theorists (sociologist Manuel Castells, geographers 
Doreen Massey and David Harvey, and youth studies researcher David Farrugia, among others) have 
responded to the challenge of defining and understanding ‘place’, in a world in which some of the 
boundaries and borders of space have become increasingly porous8. The sketch that I will offer here is 
a necessarily selective engagement with the vast literatures on globalisation, and will be developed in 
greater detail in later chapters.  
Space, place and global flows 
In the 21st century, people, capital and ideas are moving in novel and increasingly complex ways. The 
logics of networks, mobilities, scapes, and the architecture of flows and nodes, are among the spatial 
metaphors and analytical tools utilised in sociological understandings of globalisation (Urry 2000; 
Büscher & Urry 2009; Castells 2010). The concept of ‘flows’ is central to Manuel Castells’ 
monograph The Rise of the Network Society (2010). Modern society, he asserts, is:  
Constructed around flows: flows of capital, flows of information, flows of technology, flows 
of organizational interaction, flows of images, sounds, and symbols. Flows are not just one 
element of the social organization: they are the expression of processes dominating our 
economic, political, and symbolic life. (Castells 2010, p.442, emphasis in original)  
‘Nodes’, another key component of the network infrastructure, are the ‘location of strategically 
important functions that build a series of locality-based activities and organizations around a key 
function in the network’ (Castells 2010, p.443). Castells (2010, p.409) argues that the distinctive, 
 
8 An obvious exception here is US President Donald Trump’s efforts to fortify the borders of the United States 
in both a physical and metaphorical sense. In the run-up to his election victory, Trump promised to build a wall 
along the entire 2,000-mile length of the US-Mexico border, with the goal of preventing illegal crossings, and 
construction of the fortified barrier is currently underway (Rodgers & Bailey 2019). Trump’s 2016 presidential 
campaign also focused on ‘making America great again’ through a return to protectionist trade policies.  
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networked geography that is the ‘space of flows’ is replacing the ‘space of places’ as the ‘dominant 
spatial manifestation of power and function in our societies’. In a 2003 interview Castells reveals that 
in developing his theory of the space of flows, he drew on a philosophical tradition that 
conceptualised space ‘as the material construction of time simultaneity, which is what brings human 
practice together in time’: 
Throughout history in most human practice, simultaneity depended on vicinity, on territorial 
proximity. Now, what happens when we can do things together in real time, but from very 
distant locations? There is simultaneity, but the spatial arrangement that allows it is a different 
one. It is based on telecommunications, computer systems, and the places from where this 
interaction takes place. This is the space of flows: not just the electronic/telecommunications 
circuits, but the network of places that are connected around one common, simultaneous 
social practice via these electronic circuits and their ancillary systems. (Castells & Ince 2003, 
p.56) 
The late Doreen Massey (1994, 2005) probed the difficulty of thinking about ‘space’ and ‘place’, and 
the meaning of ‘locality’, in the context of the socially varied time-space changes associated with 
globalisation processes at the end of the 20th century. As she observed: 
The imagination of space as a surface on which we are placed, the turning of space into time, 
the sharp separation of local place from the space out there; these are all ways of taming the 
challenge that the inherent spatiality of the world presents. (Massey 2005, p.7)  
In her work Massey took issue with the assumption in much academic and policy discourse of the 
identity of place as singular, fixed and unitary, instead advocating a ‘progressive’ sense of place 
which recognises that places are processes, rather than static entities, constructed out of shifting 
constellations of social relations (Massey 1994, pp.154-156). In developing the concept of the ‘power 
geometry’ of time-space compression, Massey (1994, p.149) sought to describe the ways in which: 
Different social groups, and different individuals, are placed in very distinct ways in relation 
to these flows and interconnections...different social groups have distinct relationships to this 
anyway differentiated mobility: some people are more in charge of it than others; some 
initiate flows and movement, others don’t; some are more on the receiving-end of it than 
others; some are effectively imprisoned by it.9 
 
In some understandings of globalisation, local places are assumed to have no agency, in other words, 
place is figured as the inevitable victim of globalisation (Massey 2005, p.101). However, in the 
‘relational understanding’ of neoliberal globalisation advocated by Massey, ‘“places” are criss-
crossings in the wider power-geometries that constitute both themselves and “the global”’ (Massey 
2005, p.101). Scholars of de-industrialisation highlight the contributions of Massey, and fellow 
geographer David Harvey, in theorising the ‘uneven geography’ of capitalist development and its role 
in the production of ‘place’ (see for example, Mah’s [2012] work on landscapes of industrial decline 
and ruination). Harvey (1989, p.4) observes that a profound ‘reorientation in attitudes to urban 
 
9 It should also be acknowledged that the work of the late John Urry, and others, on mobilities, and on ‘mobility’ 
as a key analytical concept could also have been with engaged here (Urry 2000, 2007; Büscher & Urry 2009). 
Indeed, the ‘mobilities turn’ has been an influential moment in recent geographies and sociologies in general, 
and of youth and children’s geographies and sociologies in particular (see for example, Cuzzocrea 2018; 
Cuzzocrea & Mandich 2016; Farrugia 2016; Cuervo & Wyn 2017).  
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governance’, beginning in the 1970s, has been one of the fundamental forces shaping the dynamics of 
place in the era of neoliberal globalisation. This development appears to have its roots in the crisis of 
the nation state. As Harvey (1989, p.5) suggests:  
The greater emphasis on local action to combat these ills [of de-industrialisation, widespread 
unemployment, and fiscal austerity at both the national and local levels] also seems to have 
something to do with the declining powers of the nation state to control multinational money 
flows, so that investment increasingly takes the form of a negotiation between international 
finance capital and local powers doing the best they can to maximise the attractiveness of the 
local site as a lure for capitalist development.  
 
‘“Governance” means much more than urban “government”’, Harvey (1989, p.6) stresses: the former 
is much more ‘entrepreneurial’ in its aims and scope. He suggests that, traditionally, it was the local 
chamber of commerce, industrialists and merchants, business leaders and property developers that 
were understood as the key stakeholders where matters of civic boosterism were concerned. 
Increasingly however, educational and religious institutions, different arms of government, local 
labour organisations, as well as political parties and social movements ‘also play the game of local 
boosterism though often with quite different goals’ (Harvey 1989, pp.6-7). Harvey (1989, p.6) 
suggests that ‘urban government and administration have only a facilitative and coordinating role to 
play’ within this broader coalition of forces. The fact of inter-urban competition means that the 
‘speculative construction of place’ is a central concern of urban entrepreneurialism; the city must 
aggressively promote itself as an ‘innovative, exciting, creative, and safe place to live or to visit, to 
play and consume in’ (Harvey 1989, pp. 8-9). Although ‘urban entrepreneurialism has opened up the 
urban spaces of the advanced capitalist countries to all kinds of new patterns of development,’ the ‘net 
effect’, Harvey (1989, p.11) asserts, has often been ‘the serial reproduction of science parks, 
gentrification, world trading centres, cultural and entertainment centres, large scale interior shopping 
malls with postmodern accoutrements, and the like’, so that the cultural and spatial characteristics of 
places increasingly converge in an homogenised urban form.  
 
The work of Harvey in describing the enhanced role of creativity, culture and spectacle in the new 
urban development agenda is an important precursor to Florida’s (2014, pp. 228-265) theory of the 
‘creative class’, in particular the latter’s emphasis on cultures of open-minded bohemianism and 
creativity and their role in attracting the creative capital necessary to local economic development. 
The fundamental reorientations in urban governance that Harvey identifies, which were themselves 
informed by the emergence, in the mid-to-late 20th century, of new global flows and interconnections, 
establish the grounds on which the activities of Florida’s ‘creative class’ become productive of new 
patterns of development in different spaces and places.   
 
In the field of youth studies David Farrugia (2014, 2015) has drawn on Doreen Massey’s concept of 
power geometries, and Henri Lefebvre’s theory of the ‘production of space’, in order to explore some 
of the spatial inequalities shaping young people’s lives. Space and place have historically been 
marginal to the dominant theoretical perspectives in the disciplines of sociology and youth studies, 
Farrugia maintains, and he highlights two possible reasons for this marginalisation. The first is the 
tendency to understand children and young people in terms of universal developmental processes and 
transitions towards adulthood, often resulting in disembodied and disembedded views of childhood 
and youth (Farrugia 2015, p.610). The second is the inherent ‘metrocentricity’ of sociological 
theorising, which equates modernity with the process of urbanisation, and implies that the rural is less 
sociologically significant than the urban (Farrugia 2014, p.295). A spatialised youth sociology, 
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Farrugia (2014, p.300) argues, must be ‘attendant to the macro-level processes that create both urban 
and rural environments, as well as the specific histories of different localities and the way that this 
structures the transitions of young people from these places’: 
The lives of urban and rural young people are connected by social changes which, while 
represented as homogeneously influencing all young people, have changed urban and rural 
economies in different ways. The geographies of inequality being negotiated by young people 
across late modernity are outcomes of the local and global dynamics of contemporary 
capitalism, an intrinsic aspect of which is the production of space. (Farrugia 2014, p.300) 
The ‘spatial turn’ in youth studies opens up new fields for investigating processes of economic and 
spatial restructuring and their impacts on the life chances and patterns of labour market transition for 
young people in spaces and places such as Geelong. A series of studies has examined the ways in 
which class, gender, geographical location and other variables interact to shape the employment 
pathways and subjectivities of young people in both regional and urban areas (Kenway, Kraack & 
Hickey-Moody 2006; Ball, Maguire & Macrae 2000; Allen & Hollingworth 2013; MacDonald et al. 
2005; Thompson, Russell & Simmons 2014). Peter Kelly and Jane Kenway (2001), for example, 
examined how young people’s vocational and educational training (VET) pathways are structured, as 
well as how Local Government Areas (LGAs) identify and position themselves in relation to networks 
that are connected regionally, nationally and globally. Kelly and Kenway’s case study was of a rural 
locality whose economy is underpinned by the dairy industry, and they sought to understand how it is 
that students from the local technical school ‘have no opportunities for VET work placements at [the 
dairy factory] site, and fewer opportunities for a post-school transition “across the road” and into 
employment’ (Kelly & Kenway 2001, p.26). The dominance of flows over places has the potential to 
create ‘infinite social distance’ between people and places that may, indeed, exist in close physical 
proximity to each other (Castells 1996, cited in Kelly & Kenway 2001, pp.26-27).   
The dynamics of globalisation are, it can be argued, ‘neoliberal’ in character, insofar as they are 
underpinned by a political consensus which understands ‘free markets’ and private enterprise as the 
principal driver of economic change and growth. In the following section of this chapter I will explore 
the emergence of neoliberalism, ‘a governing rationality generating distinctive kinds of subjects, 
forms of conduct, and orders of social meaning and value’ (Brown 2018, p.12), which can be 
understood as the dominant discursive and material political-economic story of the late 20th and early 
21st centuries.  
Neoliberal capitalism  
The diverse implications and effects of neoliberalism have been extensively examined from Marxist, 
Foucauldian, post-structural, and critical theory perspectives, by scholars within the discipline of 
sociology and many others outside it. In much of this literature there is a consensus that neoliberalism 
(or ‘neoliberalisation’) works by ‘commodifying everything’ and extending market logics to all areas 
of human activity (Brown 2015; Harvey 2005; Prechel & Harms 2007). Prechel and Harms (2007, 
p.4), for example, assert that ‘neoliberalism goes beyond classical liberalism by embracing market 
fundamentalism...for classical liberals like [Adam] Smith, markets were efficient means for producing 
and distributing goods. In contrast, neoliberals assume that markets are morally good in themselves, 
and thus should be applied to all aspects of life’ including social relationships and identity. Kelly and 
Pike (2017, p.12) suggest, however, that neoliberalism takes on a slightly different meaning in the 
governmentality literature that has developed around the work of Michel Foucault, where it is 
imagined ‘as an art of government, a mentality of rule’:  
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Here, neo-Liberalism is much more than economic theory, or political discourse, or public 
policy. In this sense neo-Liberalism signals the emergence, development and deployment of a 
range of political rationalities and governmental technologies (Rose and Miller 1992) that 
seek to make the ‘real’ knowable and governable through the behaviours and dispositions of 
autonomous, rational, choice making, risk aware, prudent and enterprising individuals. 
Individuals who find a home in, and remake, the relationships between the State, Civil 
Society and the Economy: relationships that have been profoundly remade, though in 
different ways and with different consequences, in an array of national settings around the 
globe since the late 1970s.  
Brown (2015) expresses a similar view when she suggests that neoliberal rationalities seek to create 
‘ideal subjects’ in the mould of ‘homo economicus’. According to these neoliberal rationalities:    
All conduct is economic conduct; all spheres of existence are framed and measured by 
economic terms and metrics; even when those spheres are not directly monetized. In 
neoliberal reason and in domains governed by it, we are only and everywhere homo 
oeconomicus…an intensely constructed and governed bit of human capital tasked with 
improving and leveraging its competitive positioning and with enhancing its (monetary and 
nonmonetary) portfolio value across all of its endeavors and venues. (Brown 2015, p.10) 
As I suggested in the introduction to this chapter, the post-war ‘long boom’ of capitalism, and the 
social democratic consensus with which it was associated, was sustained through the mid-20th century 
by a confluence of particular economic, political, social, cultural, and governmental conditions. For a 
variety of reasons, these conditions began to dissipate and transform in the 1970s. At this time the 
neoliberal approach to economic management came to be understood as the solution to the conditions 
of ‘stagflation’ (slow economic growth occurring simultaneously with high rates of inflation) which 
plagued the economies of industrialised nations. Critics of neoliberalism have drawn attention to its 
early 20th century origins in the theories of economic management propounded by Friedrich Hayek, 
Milton Friedman and other thinkers associated with the pro-free market Mont Pelerin Society, its 
implementation, some decades later, in the form of ‘Thatcherism’ in the UK and ‘Reaganism’ in the 
US, and its export to the ‘developing’ world through the economic ‘shock therapy’ programs 
(officially termed ‘structural adjustment’ programs) imposed on countries by the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank (see for example Klein 2007).  
Harvey (2005) and Steger and Roy (2010) have also foregrounded the political and economic 
dimensions of neoliberalism. From a Marxist position David Harvey suggests that neoliberalism is a 
political project waged by and on behalf of the economic and political elite, a project concerned with 
reversing the redistributive tendencies of mid-20th century welfare-state capitalism. Harvey (2005, 
p.15) notes that ‘one condition of the post-war settlement in almost all countries was that the 
economic power of the upper classes be restrained and that labour be accorded a much larger share of 
the economic pie’. In contrast, the redistributions of late 20th century neoliberal capitalism were 
concerned with shoring up the wealth and influence of the ‘one percent’. The World Economic Forum 
(2017a, p.11) observes that, since the 1980s the share of income going to the top one percent of the 
population has increased in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Ireland and Australia 
(‘although not in Germany, Japan, France, Sweden, Denmark or the Netherlands’). The neoliberal 
project has overseen dramatic increases in economic inequality and social polarisation within and 
between countries.  
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Steger and Roy (2010, p.40) suggest that deregulation, liberalisation (of trade), and privatisation are 
signature features of a neoliberal approach to economic policy. In Australia, the scale of privatisation 
of state-owned enterprises in the 1990s was such that the Reserve Bank of Australia noted in 1997 
(pp.7-8): ‘in recent years, Australia has had one of the largest programs of privatisation among OECD 
countries...the value of privatisations in Australia during the 1990s ranks second after the UK; it also 
ranks second, after New Zealand, relative to GDP’. In this period, all of Australia’s major public 
enterprises that provided essential public services such as air transport, communications, electricity 
generation and distribution, and banking and financial services were sold off to the private sector 
(Reserve Bank of Australia 1997).  
The work of authors such as Harvey, and Steger and Roy, highlights an understanding of 
neoliberalism as an economic theory guiding the actions of governments. In this understanding, 
neoliberalism has formed the ‘commonsense’ body of ideas underpinning the approaches to policy 
(particularly economic and social policy, but also a range of other policy domains) taken in many of 
the industrialised democracies since the late 20th century. However, as authors such as Kelly and Pike, 
and Brown have highlighted with reference to the work of Foucault, neoliberalism can also be 
understood in a more expansive sense. Neoliberalism is an art of government that seeks to make and 
remake individuals (with the creation of particular ‘ideal subjects’), and their relationships with the 
state, civil society and the economy. Following Foucault, we can understand neoliberalism as an 
approach to the ‘conduct of conduct’: one that shifts the responsibility for managing the risks and 
contradictions of late modernity onto the shoulders of individuals. In this way, the individualisation of 
risk (Beck 1992; Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2002) represents one of the key dynamics of neoliberalism 
in its transformation of the social fabric.  
While neoliberal capitalism is individualised, deregulated, and globalised, it is also, increasingly, 
automated. Where globalisation and de-industrialisation were previously understood as the key forces 
driving contemporary processes of labour market change, in the second decade of the 21st century 
labour market discourses have become increasingly preoccupied with what they suggest are emergent 
forces of technological disruption. There are now a plethora of online quizzes and tools inviting 
workers to calculate the probability that their job will be taken by robots. This is not the first time that 
the industrialised democracies have confronted the issue of technological change reshaping 
production processes, and the role of human labour within those processes – in fact, it could be argued 
that issues such as these have been central to all prior industrial revolutions. In Australia in the early 
1980s, labour market commentators observed that the emergent forces of ‘computerisation’ and 
‘mechanisation’ were reducing the demand for labour in particular economic sectors. However, there 
is much evidence to suggest that 21st century processes of technological change are of a different 
magnitude to those earlier processes of computerisation. In the 21st century, it is the increasingly 
complex interactions of artificial intelligence and machine learning, algorithms and Big Data that 
represent the key technological forces that are shaping not only the interactions of workers with the 
labour market, but more and more domains of life in the advanced capitalist countries.   
Digital disruption and the coming of the robots 
‘Disruption’, the ‘midwife of innovation’ (Boyd & Holton 2017), is regarded by many commentators 
as the key force shaping the dynamics of capitalist accumulation in the 21st century. Advanced 
algorithmic analytics and Big Data increasingly energise and underpin the worlds in which people 
live, interact, work, consume and play. In fact, sociologist David Beer (2009, cited in Mazzotti 2017) 
suggests that algorithms have ceased to represent merely a set of precise instructions for performing 
mathematical calculations. Indeed, Beer suggests that they have become expressions of a new 
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rationality and form of social organisation. As Mazzotti (2017) argues, there are now very few areas 
of societal functioning that are outside the purview of algorithms:  
Algorithms have…become agents, which is partly why they give rise to so many suggestive 
metaphors. Algorithms now do things…They generate new forms of subjectivity and new 
social relationships. They are how a billion-plus people get where they’re going. They free us 
from sorting through multitudes of irrelevant results. They drive cars. They manufacture 
goods. They decide whether a client is creditworthy. They buy and sell stocks, thus shaping 
all-powerful financial markets. They can even be creative; indeed, according to engineer and 
author Christopher Steiner, they have already composed symphonies ‘as moving as those 
composed by Beethoven’. 
In 2013, two researchers from the University of Oxford, Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael Osborne, 
released a report which ‘has become something of a touchstone for discussion about the future of 
work’ (Dunlop 2016, p.78). The report categorises 702 occupations as at either low, medium or high 
risk of being automated, predicting that around 47 percent of total employment in the US labour 
market is at high risk of automation ‘over the next decade or two’ (Frey & Osborne 2013, p.44). In 
modelling performed for the Australian context, Durrant-Whyte et al. (2015, p.58) estimate that ‘40 
per cent of jobs in Australia have a high probability of being susceptible to computerisation and 
automation in the next 10 to 15 years’. Frey and Osborne (2013, p.44) highlight that robotics and 
computerisation are now being applied in domains that were previously thought to be unsuitable for 
automation, including non-routine cognitive tasks, and manual tasks requiring advanced dexterity.10   
A more recent report published by the OECD suggests that the particular methodology used by Frey 
and Osborne is liable to overstate the degree of future technological unemployment likely to be 
experienced. The ‘occupation-based approach proposed by Frey and Osborne’, Arntz, Gregory and 
Zierahn (2016, p.4) observe, ‘assume[s] that whole occupations rather than single job-tasks are 
automated by technology’, potentially leading to ‘an overestimation of job automatability, as 
occupations labelled as high-risk occupations often still contain a substantial share of tasks that are 
hard to automate’. Utilising a task-based approach, which takes into account the heterogeneity of 
workers’ tasks within occupations, Arntz, Gregory and Zierahn (2016, p.4) conclude that, ‘on average 
across the 21 OECD countries, nine percent of jobs are automatable’. They add the caveat that: 
Low qualified workers are likely to bear the brunt of the adjustment costs as the 
automatability of their jobs is higher compared to highly qualified workers. Therefore, the 
likely challenge for the future lies in coping with rising inequality and ensuring sufficient 
(re)training especially for low qualified workers. (Arntz, Gregory & Zierahn 2016, p.4) 
The Automation Advantage, a 2017 report by consultancy firm AlphaBeta on the significance of 
automation for the Australian economy suggests that if processes of disruption are managed correctly 
– with the establishment of a strong policy framework to ensure workers at risk of being displaced are 
redeployed – the Australian economy has much to gain and little to lose from automation. As 
 
10 In his address to Universities Australia’s Higher Education Conference, former US Ambassador to Australia, 
Jeffrey Bleich, mused on the dramatic acceleration of technology. He recounts a conversation he had with Astro 
Teller, the director of Google X, Google's research and development institute. Teller, when asked what he feared 
about technology, replied, ‘it is simply going so fast now that no one can control where it is taking us’ (Bleich 
2017). However, young people are not particularly concerned about the threat of technological unemployment, 
if the results of the World Economic Forum’s (2017b, p.25) Global Shapers Survey are anything to go by: An 
overwhelming number of young people (defined as 18-35 in this survey) think technology is ‘creating jobs’ 
(78.6 per cent) as opposed to ‘destroying jobs’ (21.4 per cent). 
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AlphaBeta (2017, p.7) argues, ‘history shows that past waves of technological disruption have 
ultimately led to increased prosperity, productivity and employment’. AlphaBeta (2017, p.8, emphasis 
added) asserts that ‘as machines take over our most dangerous, most tedious and least valuable tasks, 
human work will become more human’. The firm’s optimistic forecasts suggest a future in which 
work is safer, more satisfying and capable of attracting a much higher level of remuneration (see 
Figure 5):  
Assuming past automation trends continue, the amount of sick days due to accidents 
involving physical work in Australia could be 11 per cent lower by 2030…low skill workers 
will take on more stimulating and satisfying human tasks at work, and as many as 62 per cent 
of them would be happier in their jobs by 2030 compared with today. (AlphaBeta 2017, p.21) 
 
<Image removed due to copyright restrictions> 
Figure 5: Infographic from The Automation Advantage report (AlphaBeta 2017, p.3) 
There are echoes and continuities across AlphaBeta’s discussion of automation and late 20th century 
discourses around the technological changes reshaping the nature of labour and production (I will 
examine the latter in more detail in Chapter 4). A former assistant secretary of the Australian Council 
of Trade Unions, Laurie Carmichael, was a key voice in those earlier debates and discussions in 
Australia. In 1993, Carmichael confidently asserted that processes of technological change and work 
reorganisation would usher in an almost utopian future in which all workers could expect to 
participate in the labour market in highly-skilled and highly-fulfilling roles. However, as Mazzotti 
(2017) points out, ‘scientific knowledge and machines are never just neutral instruments. They 
embody, express, and naturalize specific cultures — and shape how we live according to the 
assumptions and priorities of those cultures’. In regarding processes of technological change in rather 
optimistic and unproblematic terms, the accounts of AlphaBeta and Laurie Carmichael tend to 
obscure the fact that the rollout of automation and digital disruption occurs unevenly, and in ways that 
typically reinforce and complement the existing social relations of production, rather than 
transforming them.  
Far from that putative world in which ‘human work [has] become more human’, a series of recent 
exposés has revealed the experiences of employees in feeling dehumanised and exploited in a 
workplace where human workers have become an extension of an algorithm (Burin 2019; see also The 
Guardian’s 2018 ‘Amazon Diaries’ series written by an anonymous insider). Headed by CEO Jeff 
Bezos, who, at the time of writing, is the richest individual in the world, Amazon’s rapid rise to one of 
the biggest corporations on the planet has been enabled by a ruthless corporate strategy of cornering 
the consumer goods market and a business model which eschews ‘bricks and mortar’ stores in favour 
of online-only sales. In recent years, the retailer has established a number of large ‘fulfillment centres’ 
on the outskirts of several Australian capital cities. This is a model, and mode of operating, that is 
repeated around the globe.11 As reporter Margaret Burin (2019) writes, employees here are a small 
 
11 Amazon has not been given the ‘green light’ in all of the cities in which it has sought to establish operations. 
Stone (2019) notes that the corporation has faced increasing animosity in its home town of Seattle, and in recent 
years has sought a second home for its corporate headquarters. New York City officials were sold on Amazon’s 
promise that it would bring 25,000 high-paying jobs over 10 years to the city, in exchange for close to US$3 
billion in tax breaks and subsidies. However, after encountering stiff local opposition from anti-Amazon 
activists and progressive politicians, in February 2019 Amazon walked away from its plans to build a second 
corporate headquarters in New York City (Stone 2019).  
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cog in a huge machine in which algorithms determine how many items should be moved, stored, 
picked and packed within the hour. Rather than being employed by the firm directly, all of Amazon’s 
Australian warehouses are staffed exclusively by casual labour hire workers who are subject to a 
punitive regime of performance targets, micromanagement and surveillance. As one Amazon 
‘associate’ reveals, ‘I feel dehumanised…I feel like they resent the fact that I’m not a robot and that 
I’m made of flesh and bone’ (Burin 2019).  
Although it is commonly asserted that technological innovation is rapidly transforming the economic 
and social fabric of the industrialised democracies in unprecedented ways, there is a lack of consensus 
around which nomenclature (‘late capitalism’, the ‘Third Industrial Revolution’, the ‘Fourth Industrial 
Revolution’, and the ‘Second Machine Age’ are but a few examples) most effectively captures the 
ethos of the times. In his influential work, published in 2011, Jeremy Rifkin saw in the emergence of 
the Internet of Things and the advance of green energy technologies the makings of the Third 
Industrial Revolution (Kelly 2018, p.9). The First Industrial Revolution, Kelly (2018, p.8) explains, 
‘emerged in England at the end of the eighteenth century and was powered by steam; the Second 
Industrial Revolution emerged in the US at the start of the twentieth century and was powered by 
electricity … the Third Industrial Revolution, it is argued, emerges globally, will be digital, bio-
genetic and post-carbon’. For Rifkin (2011, p.37), the five pillars of the Third Industrial Revolution 
are: 
1. Shifting to renewable energy; 2. Transforming the building stock of every continent into 
micro-power plants to collect renewable energies on site; 3. Deploying hydrogen and other 
storage technologies in every building and throughout the infrastructure to store intermittent 
energies; 4. Using Internet technology to transform the power grid of every continent into an 
energy-sharing intergrid that acts just like the Internet…; and 5. Transitioning the transport 
fleet to electric plug-in and fuel cell vehicles that can buy and sell electricity on a smart, 
continental, interactive power grid.  
 
Just five years after the publication of Rifkin’s watershed work, the World Economic Forum (WEF) 
released its report The Future of Jobs: Employment, Skills and Workforce Strategy for the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution, which suggests that ‘we are today on the cusp of a Fourth Industrial 
Revolution. Developments in previously disjointed fields such as artificial intelligence and machine 
learning, robotics, nanotechnology, 3D printing and genetics and biotechnology are all building on 
and amplifying one another’ (WEF 2016, pp.5-8). Founder and executive chairman of the WEF, 
Klaus Schwab, writes that:  
There are three reasons why today’s transformations represent not merely a prolongation of 
the Third Industrial Revolution but rather the arrival of a Fourth and distinct one: velocity, 
scope, and systems impact. The speed of current breakthroughs has no historical precedent. 
When compared with previous industrial revolutions, the Fourth is evolving at an exponential 
rather than a linear pace. Moreover, it is disrupting almost every industry in every country. 
And the breadth and depth of these changes herald the transformation of entire systems of 
production, management, and governance. (Schwab 2016) 
In Chapter 6 I will explore how key agencies such as the OECD at the international scale, and the 
Foundation for Young Australians in the Australian context, have sought to shape education and 
training policies and reforms in this context of ‘digital disruption’. These agencies seek to foster 
individuals who can adapt rapidly to the emergent occupational niches created by the globalising and 
rapidly changing circuits of capitalist accumulation and technological innovation. I will now turn to 
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the final section of this chapter, where I will consider what the dynamics of globalisation, neoliberal 
capitalism, and the digital disruptions of the 21st century portend for the constitution and regulation of 
youth labour markets.  
Youth labour market change in the neoliberal era 
In this final section of the chapter, I will offer a sketch of some of the key ‘episodes’, ‘events’ and 
‘moments’ shaping the experiences of young people in 21st century labour markets - a sketch that will 
be revisited in greater detail in different ways in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. Among the key episodes, 
events and moments that I will examine here are the rise in rates of underemployment in the youth 
cohort as a corollary of rising casualisation, a diminishing ‘graduate premium’ (MacDonald 2011, 
p.434), the growth in unpaid internships, falling rates of unionisation, the development of ‘workfare’ 
as a punitive instrument targeted at young people not in employment, education or training, and the 
proliferation of ‘on-demand’ forms of employment, as characteristic of a ‘gig economy’. It must be 
noted that my discussion is focused here predominantly on Australia and the Anglophone countries - 
a different configuration of episodes, events and moments would likely apply in other spaces.  
The mid-20th century concern to establish some level of collective responsibility for the welfare of the 
working class contrasts strongly with the neoliberal, individualising rationalities of labour market 
regulation and welfare provision in the 21st century. The individualisation of risk is evidenced by such 
key developments as the withering of trade union representation among the working class. Kelly 
(2001, p.23) argues that processes of individualisation ‘visit new forms of responsibility on young 
people and their families to prudently manage individual reflexive biographical projects in 
increasingly uncertain settings’. In the 21st century, labour markets are ‘uncertain settings’ par 
excellence.  
Research conducted by the Foundation for Young Australians (2014, p.8) suggests that today’s young 
people are three times more likely to be in part-time and casual work than their parents were at the 
same age, and they are 3.5 times more likely to be underemployed. Indeed, based on its analysis of 
data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and the Household, Income and Labour 
Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey, the Brotherhood of St Laurence (2017, p.2) suggests that 
‘young people are far more likely to be in casual and part-time jobs than at the beginning of this 
millennium’. In the second decade of the 21st century, underemployment appears to have displaced 
unemployment as the most significant challenge facing young people in the labour market. The youth 
underemployment rate reached 18 percent in February 2017, the highest level in the 40 years since 
records began in Australia (Brotherhood of St Laurence 2017, p.2). According to the Brotherhood of 
St Laurence (2017, p.2), in the past 15 years the average gap has widened between the actual working 
hours of young underemployed people and the hours they would like to work. They note that ‘the 
growing number of young people combining study with work does not explain the rise in 
underemployment, as the rise in the percentage of casual and part-time jobs has mostly been among 
young workers who are not studying’ (Brotherhood of St Laurence 2017, p.2). 
In fact, youth studies researcher Ken Roberts (2009, cited in MacDonald 2011, p.436) suggests that 
‘underemployment is the 21st century global normality for youth in the labour market’. However, the 
rise of underemployment as an increasingly mainstream experience is largely ignored by 
policymakers and other stakeholders in their focus on NEET young people (not in employment, 
education or training) (MacDonald 2011, p.429). The slackening of the labour market is being felt by 
young people across social classes. ‘Quite simply,’ MacDonald (2011, p.439) asserts, ‘limited 
“opportunity structures” unite the more and less disadvantaged in the experience of 
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underemployment’. There is a tendency on the part of policymakers to read all transitions through 
extended education as ‘successful’; young people in these ‘slow-track’ transitions are implicitly 
positioned as being on unproblematic social and economic tracks (MacDonald 2011, p.433). 
MacDonald (2011, p.433, emphasis in original) observes that ‘this is in part explained as a hang-over 
from earlier decades when these were solidly middle-class, elite routes to professional occupations’. 
However, in the 21st century these assumptions are increasingly challenged by the reality that slow-
track transitions are faltering (MacDonald 2011, p.439). 
Graduate unemployment is now much more significant in the context of the mass participation in 
higher education, and has seen steep increases since the Global Financial Crisis (MacDonald 2011, 
pp.433-434). MacDonald (2011, p.434) asserts that the ‘“double whammy” of rising tuition costs and 
declining labour market returns obviously raises questions about whether there remains a clear 
financial incentive for university study (especially for poorer prospective students)’. While 
MacDonald’s analysis of young people’s education-to-work transitions is focused on the UK context, 
Côté (2014) suggests that, in the US, the ‘college premium’ effect is similarly waning. The notion of a 
college premium, in other words, the idea that the attainment of higher credentials will translate into a 
higher earning potential, increasingly only applies to those young people with postgraduate and 
professional degrees, and not the undergraduate degree (Côté 2014, pp.533-534). In an historical 
analysis of the annual incomes of young adults, Sum and McLaughlin (2011, cited in Côté 2014, 
p.534) found that:  
Between 1979 and 2009, the annual earnings of 20- to 29-year-old males (not enrolled in 
educational institutions) on average declined by 15%, but those with a Master’s degree or 
higher experienced a 31% increase. Yet, those with a Bachelor’s degree show only a 5% 
increase. 
Postgraduate credentials are ‘far more likely to be awarded to students from more affluent 
backgrounds, and the more affluent gain more career advantage and income from those degrees’ (Côté 
2014, p.534). Another key development impacting on the earning potential of young people has been 
the decline in youth wages through the late 20th century (Côté 2014, pp.531-532). In the 21st century, 
the share of wages going to young workers is significantly lower as a proportion of the total wages 
bill. In addition, where young men once enjoyed a ‘male advantage’ in the labour force – in the US in 
1973, for instance, young males earned about one third more than young females – young males and 
young females now share a similar fate (Côté 2014, p.532). This is ‘not because female prospects 
improved; rather, both genders have experienced a loss in earning power to the point where their 
economic prospects are now about equally poor’ (Côté 2014, p.532). 
According to Brown, Lauder and Ashton (2012, p.6), a major factor bearing on the labour market 
outcomes of young graduates is the globalisation of the workforce: ‘the competition for jobs has 
shifted from one largely restricted within clearly defined national boundaries to a global auction open 
to competition across borders’. The ‘education explosion’ has also been observed in emerging 
economies, with China and India now offering high-skill, low-wage workforces capable of competing 
successfully for ‘hi-tech’, high-value employment (Brown, Lauder & Ashton 2012, pp.3, 7). Brown, 
Lauder and Ashton (2012, p.9) argue that companies are now in a position to identify and recruit a 
cadre of top talent from across the globe. 
Internships, Standing (2014, p.129) argues, ‘are becoming a rite de passage for middle-class youth in 
some countries’. Recent research on the prevalence of unpaid work experience suggests that it ‘is very 
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common in Australia’ (Oliver et al. 2016, p.5). In 2016, a team of researchers from the University of 
Adelaide, Queensland University of Technology and University of Technology Sydney surveyed 
3800 Australians, finding that more than half (58 percent) of respondents aged 18-29, and just over a 
quarter of respondents (26 percent) aged 30-64, had participated in at least one episode of unpaid 
work experience in the last five years (Oliver et al. 2016, p.5). Although more than one in four 
respondents (27 percent) were offered paid employment by the host company or organisation 
following their period as an intern, the researchers concluded that ‘on the face of it, the data does not 
give any clear indication as to whether or not participating in work experience improves the chances 
of finding a job’ (Oliver et al. 2016, p.9). Standing (2014) offers a critical assessment of the worth of 
internships for young people:  
Old style probationary employment at least led to stable jobs in principle, as did 
apprenticeships. Internships do not. They are presented as a way of gaining useful experience 
intended to provide, directly or indirectly, a potential gateway to a regular job. In practice, 
they are used by many employers as a means of obtaining cheap dispensable labour. Yet 
youths are competing fiercely for these unpaid or very low-paid internships, in the hope of 
staying busy, gaining skills and experience, expanding networks and, just perhaps, landing 
that elusive job. (Standing 2014, p.128) 
The neoliberal era has witnessed a dramatic decline in levels of unionisation, diminishing the 
bargaining power of labour vis-à-vis capital. From August 1992 to August 2016, the proportion of 
Australians who were trade union members in their main job fell from 40 percent to 15 percent 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2016a). In 2016, only four percent of employed people aged 15-19 
years and seven percent of those aged 20-24 were trade union members (ABS 2016a). In addition, the 
number of private sector workers in Australia covered by enterprise bargaining agreements has 
dropped by 34 percent since 2013, a decline that some commentators suggest has contributed to the 
lowest wage growth in Australia in at least two decades (Janda 2018). Research conducted by the 
Centre for Future Work at the Australia Institute, an independent research institute, has found that the 
wage share of economic output has fallen from 58 per cent just after World War II to 47 per cent in 
2017, with about 90 per cent of this captured by an increased profit share (Janda 2018).  
Standing (2014, pp.16-17) argues that representation security (the possession of a collective voice via 
independent trade unions) is one of seven forms of labour-related security that the emerging class he 
terms the ‘precariat’ lack in the neoliberal era. The ‘industrial citizenship’ agenda pursued by social 
democrats, labour parties and trade unions after the Second World War, Standing (2014, pp.16-17) 
maintains, afforded the working class ‘labour market security’, exemplified by adequate income-
earning opportunities, ‘employment security’, which includes protection against arbitrary dismissal, 
and ‘job security’, such as opportunities for upward mobility. In contrast, the ‘precariat’, a class with 
youth at its core, is defined by the shared experience of marginalisation and insecurity in the labour 
market. Members of the precariat are particularly vulnerable to ‘the four A’s – anger, anomie, anxiety 
and alienation’, suggests Standing (2014, p.33).  
The theoretical and empirical underpinnings of Standing’s ‘precariat’ thesis have been analysed and 
critiqued by a range of scholars and commentators. Many of these critiques take issue with Standing’s 
argument that the precariat constitutes a new ‘class’ (Wright 2016; Frase 2013; Munck 2013). 
Standing (2011, pp.7-8) suggests that seven distinct classes can be identified in the ‘global market 
system of the 21st century’, and he proposes that the precariat is a class distinct from the ‘old working 
class’. Wright (2016) argues that there is a lack of clarity in Standing’s work around precisely what 
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may distinguish the precariat from the working class, and that it may make more sense to understand 
the precariat as a segment of the working class. Breman (2013) and Frase (2013) suggest that 
Standing’s account lacks historical depth. Rather than treating the ‘standard employment relationship’ 
(SER) of the postwar period as a contingent form that emerged and persisted in particularly narrow 
limits of time and space, Standing assumes that the SER is the historical constant or benchmark from 
which precarious labour has diverged. As Frase (2013, p.12) argues: 
Stable employment and rising wages have been the exception rather than the rule in capitalist 
societies, and the condition of American or European workers in the nineteenth or early-
twentieth centuries appears at least as precarious as that facing contemporary labour.  
Munck (2013) interrogates Standing’s suggestion that the precariat constitutes ‘the new dangerous 
class’. He highlights that ‘the notion of a “dangerous class” has a long history in the racist 
construction of the Southern “Other”’ (Munck 2013, p.759). Munck argues that these racist 
underpinnings make the concept untenable as the basis of a progressive social transformation politics. 
For Munck, these shortcomings are symptomatic of the wider issue of Standing’s Eurocentric bias. He 
asks:  
Is the term [‘precariat’] novel or even relevant, for the millions of workers and urban poor in 
the global South for whom precariousness has always been a seemingly natural condition?... 
the term…can become a new political distraction if it is not rigorously deconstructed and 
reconstructed from a historical and majority-world perspective. (Munck 2013, pp.747-748) 
It is in these precarious, deregulated, de-industrialised and de-unionised labour market contexts that 
the vision of the future of work as a ‘gig economy’ is gaining currency with a range of labour market 
commentators, and in line with employer and corporate sector interests. The emergence of digital 
‘talent’ platforms (as apps such as Deliveroo, Airtasker and Uber are frequently termed in business 
literatures) has facilitated the delivery of goods and services across new technologically-energised 
platforms, and according to some commentators, represents a fundamental shift in the way in which 
workers interact with the labour market. For example, the Australian Industry Group (2016, p.5) 
argues that the rise of these independent, task-by-task forms of employment is being driven by 
workers, who are ‘expressing an increasing demand for autonomous and flexible work’. ‘This is 
particularly evident amongst youth,’ and signals a ‘generational shift towards greater freedom and 
entrepreneurship’ (Australian Industry Group 2016, p.5). This view is supported by the Foundation 
for Young Australians (2015, p.8), whose research suggests that around 70 percent of Australians 
under 34 are open to using a digital talent platform, such as Airtasker, Freelancer, or Uber to source 
income in the next year. However, this line of analysis tends to overlook the reality that young people 
are often turning to ‘gig’ work in the absence of other options. In the post-Global Financial Crisis era, 
full-time employment is out of reach for a growing number of people (OECD 2015a, p.146).  
A profound ‘de-synchronisation’ attends the rise of ‘gig’ working arrangements. Woodman and Wyn 
(2015, pp.126-130) suggest that the temporal de-synchronisation seen among current generations of 
young people is the product of processes of individualisation and the institutionalisation of greater 
fluidity in employment patterns, and is a factor with the potential to impact on the quality of a young 
person’s relationships with friends and family. This de-synchronisation is cast into sharp focus when 
compared with the rhythms and routines of industrial society, and the commonality of experience 
observed among its workforce. A survey of Australian automotive industry workers undertaken by a 
team of researchers at Australian Catholic University underscores the stability and standardisation that 
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characterised the working and employment conditions of this group (average 40 hours a week in a 
permanent full-time position they had held for around 20 years), as well as many of their demographic 
and biographical attributes (typically male, average age 50, with a mortgage and dependent children) 
(Barnes et al. 2016). This commonality of experience bred a strong sense of ‘family’ and community 
among those who lived and worked in industrial cities and towns such as Geelong. In the early 20th 
century, workers at Geelong’s textile mills, for example, established inter-factory sporting leagues in 
cricket and soccer, with women’s basketball and football teams. The Geelong Girls Unity Club 
operated from 1924 to 1965, and offered support, education and social events to women mill workers 
(Rice 2009, p.51). At the Valley Worsted Mill, workers and their families could partake in a thriving 
social calendar featuring dances, picnics and games nights (Rice 2009, p.51). 
The work of Oinonen (2018) among young university students in Finland and Spain, and the insights 
produced by the longitudinal Life Patterns study conducted by researchers at the Youth Research 
Centre at the University of Melbourne, offer a powerful critique of the assumption that current 
generations of young people value flexibility and mobility over stability and security when making 
their career choices. The young participants in the Life Patterns study continue to rate ‘job security’ as 
more important than other factors such as ‘[the job] pays well’ or ‘has flexible hours’ in influencing 
their choice of career or employment (Crofts et al. 2015, p.9). Oinonen’s (2018) research is suggestive 
of a number of important insights. The young people in Oinonen’s study strove for employment that 
was secure, fulfilling, and that enabled a sense of ‘work-life balance’. As two of the young women 
interviewed by Oinonen (2018, p.1355) commented: ‘I don’t want my work to be completely my life’, 
and ‘although work is important to me I don’t want it to be the centre of my life - there has to be place 
also for my partner and other close relationships’. Alongside this distaste for demands to be always 
‘on’, many of these students expressed a desire to ‘stay put’ rather than be mobile. The prospect of 
‘life as an expert-nomad who creates her working career following job opportunities around the 
European Union or world does not seem to attract students’ (Oinonen 2018, p.1356). For these young 
people, connection to people and place is valued for providing them with the ‘material and, most of 
all, immaterial (emotional, social and cultural) resources’ that enable resilience and wellbeing to be 
maintained (Oinonen 2018, p.1357). Finally, Oinonen (2018, pp.1357-1358) suggests that while many 
of these university students have bought into the promises of the ‘human capital’ model of education 
– in other words, the assumption that an investment in education will be rewarded with secure 
employment, high incomes, and possible upward social mobility - they are simultaneously aware of 
the limitations of this model. She ventures that, despite being cognisant of the reality that ‘the human 
capital model no longer works in the way it used to’, these young people exercise what Berlant (2011, 
cited in Oinonen 2018, p.1358) understands as ‘cruel optimism’, in which they pursue a vision of the 
future that perhaps remains always slightly out of reach.  
Some final comments must also be made about the rise of ‘workfare’ in neoliberal arts of government. 
In the late 20th century, ‘active’ labour market policy regimes rose to prominence in many of the 
industrialised democracies, as a corrective to the purported ‘crisis of welfare dependency’ and 
associated cultures of ‘worklessness’ (Standing 2014, pp.246-247; Considine et al. 2015, pp.19-20). 
Alan France (2016, p.160) suggests that ‘such regimes…have a strong connection to the moral 
economy of neoliberalism that shifts the responsibility (and blame) from the state to the individual in 
very clear ways’. Job-seekers must comply with logics of ‘activation’ and ‘mutual obligation’ 
(Considine et al. 2015, pp.20, 39). In Australia, the Turnbull Government’s Youth Jobs PaTH 
(Prepare-Trial-Hire) scheme, which places young job-seekers in internships, and which provides 
financial bonuses to both the employers and the job-seekers who participate, has been criticised by 
unions as amounting to ‘$4-per-hour jobs for young people’ (Australian Government 2017; ABC 
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News 2016b). And in the 2017 budget, the Federal Liberal-National conservative coalition 
government announced its proposal to trial mandatory drug testing of Newstart and Youth Allowance 
recipients, with quarantining of welfare payments for ‘repeat offenders’ (The Sydney Morning Herald 
2017). As of June 2019, the Social Services Legislation Amendment (Drug Testing Trial) Bill 2018 
remains before the Senate (Knaus 2019).  
 
A key contradiction of workfare regimes, Standing (2014, pp.248-249) observes, is that they engage 
participants in low-skill, low-productivity, ultimately unappealing jobs that do little to promote ‘good 
working habits and labour commitment’. The main intention of these schemes, according to Standing 
(2014, p.249), is to ‘massage the level of unemployment down, not by creating jobs but by 
discouraging the unemployed from claiming benefits’. Peck and Theodore (2000, p.120) similarly 
observe that, ‘there are…some senses in which workfare programmes can be seen as social policy 
analogues of flexible labour markets, as they serve to individualise employment relations, intensify 
competitive pressures at the bottom of the labour market and enforce low-paid work’.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has mapped some of the key ‘epochs’, ‘episodes’, ‘events’, and ‘moments’ in the stories 
of globalisation, ‘neoliberal’ capitalism, digital disruption and youth labour market change in the 
industrialised democracies. While the conjunction of the post-war ‘long boom’ and the ‘social 
democratic’ consensus had buoyed the fortunes of industrial towns and cities across Australia and the 
OECD economies through the mid-20th century, the crisis of overproduction in global manufacturing, 
declining capitalist profitability, and the ‘stagflation’ plaguing the industrialised economies in the 
1970s provided the ‘conditions of possibility’ in which the neoliberal art of government could emerge 
– even as this emergence was not inevitable.  
In advocating a reduced role for the state in the operation of the market, neoliberalism had the effect 
of deepening economic inequality through the reversal of the redistributive tendencies of mid-20th 
century welfare-state capitalism. While neoliberalism is often framed specifically as an economic 
theory or approach to public policy, the work of authors in the governmentality tradition suggests that 
neoliberalism can be understood in a more expansive sense. Neoliberalism is an art of government 
that seeks to make and remake individuals (with the creation of particular ‘ideal subjects’), and their 
relationships with the state, civil society and the economy. Following Foucault, we can understand 
neoliberalism as an approach to the ‘conduct of conduct’: one that shifts the responsibility for 
managing the risks and contradictions of late modernity onto the shoulders of individuals. In tandem 
with these developments, the new global flows and interconnections that began to emerge in the late 
20th century have been instrumental in the reconfiguration of ‘space’ and ‘place’. In light of these 
changes, the challenge for social scientists has been to define and understand ‘place’, in a world in 
which some of the boundaries and borders of space have become increasingly porous. The emergent 
‘spatial turn’ in youth studies seeks to understand the significance of processes of globalisation in 
shaping the identities and life chances of young people across urban, regional and rural areas. 
 
In the second decade of the 21st century, digital disruption has emerged as a key material and 
discursive force shaping the New Work Orders that structure the opportunities available to young 
people in contemporary labour markets. Technological disruption is joined by a complex array of 
forces shaping the development of youth labour markets that are increasingly precarious, deregulated, 
de-industrialised and de-unionised. Among the other key ‘episodes’, ‘events’, and ‘moments’ that 
have been particularly significant in the transformation of youth labour markets are the rise in rates of 
underemployment in the youth cohort as a corollary of rising casualisation, diminishing rates of return 
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on higher education, the growth in unpaid internships, falling rates of unionisation, and the 
development of ‘workfare’ as a punitive instrument targeted at young people not in employment, 
education or training. The various forces of ‘neoliberal’ capitalism, de-industrialisation, economic 
restructuring, globalisation, and the remaking of ‘space’ and ‘place’ have had significant local impacts 
on ‘Rust Belt’ places such as Geelong. In Geelong, the closure of International Harvester in 1982 was 
an event that signalled the beginning of the period of significant de-industrialisation. This event and 
the many other developments that have been instrumental in forging Geelong as a ‘Rust Belt’ city will 
be explored in the following chapter.  
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Chapter Three 
Geelong: a ‘Rust Belt’ locale 
 
Introduction 
Geelong, a city of over 250,000 people in Victoria, Australia, was, for much of the 20th century, 
renowned as a centre for industrial manufacturing. However, one of the key outcomes of more than 
four decades of economic and spatial restructuring has been to radically transform the accessibility of 
work, and the skill requirements of employment, in labour markets in which the services and 
‘information’ sectors are increasingly dominant, and in which manufacturing employs fewer and 
fewer workers. From the late 20th century into the 21st century, de-industrialisation, the emergence of 
‘neoliberal’ capitalism, and the reconfiguration of ‘space’ and ‘place’ associated with processes of 
globalisation fundamentally reshaped the industrialised democracies. In this chapter, I will tell a story 
about Geelong’s industrial development from the mid-to-late 19th century through the 20th century, 
and its subsequent de-industrialisation beginning in the late 20th century. Some of the more particular 
detail about key social, political and economic events and episodes in Geelong’s recent history, and 
their impacts on young people, will be taken up in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. In keeping with the 
genealogical ethos that guides this work, and in a similar vein to the work in the previous chapter, it is 
not my intention to provide a detailed, linear and/or complete story of Geelong’s historical 
development. Rather, my intent is to examine some of the key ‘epochs’, ‘episodes’, ‘events’ and 
‘moments’ which have shaped the character of this regional city and the labour market opportunities 
available to those who call it home.  
The modern history of Geelong’s industrialisation began in the 1860s with the establishment of the 
city’s first textile mills, and this is where the chapter will begin. By the first decades of the 20th 
century, Geelong had established a reputation as one of the preeminent textile producers of the 
Anglophone world, and as the local textile sector expanded it was joined by an array of other 
industries: car manufacturing, oil refining, and aluminium smelting, among others. In the mid-1950s, 
employment in manufacturing peaked at almost 50 per cent of the local labour force, and in this mid-
20th century period, it was thought that workers in the city’s major industries could be assured of a 
‘job for life’. The historical dynamics of industrial development and decline in Australia, and their 
spatial impacts, are the focus of the following section of the chapter, where I will explore some of the 
commonalities and contrasts across Geelong’s experience of development and those of other 
industrial locales in Australia. In these places, the investment decisions of multinational companies, in 
conjunction with the economic, social, and urban planning policies of governments, have been 
responsible for the creation of distinctive physical and social landscapes. As I will also demonstrate in 
this section, in these communities, processes of industrialisation were associated with particular 
configurations of class, gender and race: in the post-World War II period, the composition of 
Geelong’s workforce became much more ethnically diverse even as it remained segregated by gender.  
Next, the chapter will chart processes of de-industrialisation in Geelong through an examination of 
two key ‘events’: the first of which considers the historical transformation of the city’s northern 
suburbs - a concentrated area of public housing and low-skilled manual employment - and the 
second, the wind-down of Australia’s car manufacturing industry, the impacts of which have been 
locally significant. From this point, the chapter will consider responses to restructuring. Contemporary 
dynamics of capitalist accumulation are inscribing a very different story on this regional city. As a 
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self-consciously ‘post-industrial’, 21st century city, Geelong is attempting to move towards an 
economic base in which healthcare, services, and the ‘knowledge’ sector feature much more 
prominently. The influential though contested ideas of the mobile ‘creative class’ as the driver of local 
economic development are a central feature of the urban development agendas pursued by business 
and civic leaders. While the development of advanced manufacturing capabilities and methods in 
some local industries ensures that Geelong is still a ‘place where things are made’, manufacturing in 
Geelong is no longer the mass participation, mass production activity that it was in the 20th century.  
Geelong’s industrial heritage 
Geelong was first gazetted as a town in 1838, and ‘originally came into existence to service the needs 
of squatters in the hinterland’, historian Ian Wynd (1986, pp.3, 19) suggests. Its early development 
was shaped in large part by the wool and sheep trade, and the Victorian gold rush of the mid-19th 
century. The town became colloquially known as the ‘Pivot’ after local masthead the Geelong 
Advertiser declared in the late 1840s that Geelong was the pivot on which the commerce of Port 
Phillip District turned (Wynd 1986, p.2). The nickname was forged in the context of the competition 
between Geelong and Melbourne to be recognised as the administrative capital of the state. The 
moniker would later be utilised in the naming of a number of local businesses, with residents of the 
town and sporting teams referred to as the ‘Pivotonians’ (Wynd 1986, p.2).  
For much of the 20th century, Geelong was a booming regional centre, boasting an array of industrial 
operations that included oil refining, aluminium smelting, car manufacturing and glass making, as 
well as a significant textile and clothing industry (Johnson 2009a, p.474). This strong industrial 
economic base afforded high rates of labour market participation; in 1986 historian Ian Wynd noted 
that ‘of all Victorian regions, Geelong has the lowest level of youth unemployment’ (Wynd 1986, 
p.3). 
Geelong’s textile industry was established in the 1860s, and underwent significant expansion in the 
first decades of the 20th century (Wynd 1986, pp.54-56). In the 1930s and 1940s, Geelong’s textile 
industry appeared untroubled by the aftermath of the Great Depression, with textile workers in 
demand locally, and production booming across the city’s eight woollen mills in order to supply the 
war effort (Rice 2009, pp.27-31). As Rice (2009, p.28) highlights, the July 1934 issue of a leading 
textile industry journal ‘reported that nearly all local mills in the Geelong district had been advertising 
for worsted menders, weavers, spinners, loom tuners and other skilled artisans’. Output was on a par 
with the centre of woollen and worsted cloth production in Bradford, Yorkshire (UK), earning 
Geelong the title of ‘Bradford of Australia’ (Rice 2009, p.ix). Roughly 30 percent of Geelong workers 
were employed in manufacturing in 1933 (ABS 1933), rising to 43 percent in 1947, and peaking at 46 
percent in the mid-1950s (ABS 1947; ABS 1954), before a period of significant and sustained decline 
that continues to the present day (see Figure 6).  
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Figure 6: Employment in manufacturing in Geelong 1911-2016, expressed as a percentage of the total 
workforce. Source: ABS Census. Data for 1911 are for county of Grant, Victoria. 
The mid-20th century was a period of peak optimism for Geelong’s manufacturing sector. At this time 
it was thought that employees of companies such as International Harvester and the Ford Motor 
Company could be assured of a ‘job for life’. International Harvester, a manufacturer of agricultural 
machinery, opened its Geelong plant in 1939, and went on to employ over 2500 people by 1966, out 
of a total of 4500 Australia-wide (Medson 1988, p.10). In addition, the company engaged many local 
businesses in the manufacture of parts to its requirements.  
It is important to note that the buoyancy of Geelong’s manufacturing sector was made possible by the 
conjunction of the long boom of 20th century capitalism with the ‘social democratic’ political 
consensus which predominated in many of the industrialising democracies after World War II. 
Driving the development of the Australian manufacturing sector was the strategy of ‘import-replacing 
industrialisation’, which Fagan and Webber (1999, pp.51-52, 140) suggest was a goal ‘supported by 
political parties of both the right and left of the political spectrum and by organised labour’. Tariff 
protection of domestic industries was the centrepiece of industry policy after 1950, with Australian 
manufacturing protected against imports by a regime of tariffs and quotas (Fagan & Webber 1999, 
pp.140-141).  
These national policies were complemented by a wide range of social policies maintained by 
governments at both federal and state levels (Fagan & Webber 1999, p.140). As I explored in Chapter 
2, the social democratic consensus saw governments take a much more interventionist role in the 
welfare of the working class, securing and/or supporting their access to housing, employment, 
insurance against infirmity, and other elemental needs. For a relatively brief period before the long 
boom began to dissipate in the 1970s, this confluence of forces would play an instrumental role in 
boosting the economic fortunes of many Australian towns and cities, and those of their inhabitants. In 
the following section I will situate the story of Geelong’s industrialisation in the context of these 
wider currents of change. 
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The changing fortunes of Australia’s industrial towns and cities 
While there are significant local particularisms that distinguish the story of Geelong’s industrialisation 
(and subsequent de-industrialisation), this story is, in many important respects, comparable to those of 
other industrial towns and cities in Australia and the OECD economies. The 20th-century 
industrialisation of Australia’s towns and cities, Eklund (2002, p.2) argues, was associated with the 
creation of distinctive physical and social landscapes. Industrial towns:  
Are places where the global and local collide in an often tumultuous fashion. In Australia, 
Britain and the United States these towns have distinctive images among outsiders; they bear 
witness to the power of investment decisions made in distant boardrooms; and they 
experienced rapid population influx through immigration in periods of growth and expansion. 
Yet these towns also exhibit powerful moments of collective mobilisation and generalised 
place-based loyalty, where a sense of locality sharpened the edges of local culture while 
mediating the forces of the outside world. (Eklund 2002, p.3) 
Industrial society was associated with a set of distinct rhythms and routines which ‘infused every 
household and every social and religious event’ (Eklund 2002, p.164). The rhythms and routines that 
Eklund suggests predominated in the steel-producing town of Port Kembla in New South Wales could 
just as easily be those of Geelong in the early to mid-20th century:12  
Company time structured local time. Throughout Port Kembla sirens, hooters and whistles 
announced the beginning and end of every shift. Religious and other community groups took 
care to plan their fundraisers for the day or weekend immediately after pay Thursday. Local 
retailers learnt to expect the fortnightly fluctuations in their business as customers came in 
after pay Thursday, and the week before payday was characterised by little trade. (Eklund 
2002, p.164) 
The scale and pace of mid-20th-century industrial development was particularly remarkable in the 
state of Victoria. Eather (1988, p.70) highlights that Victoria’s post-war population growth was the 
largest of all Australian states, increasing by 41 percent between June 1946 and June 1950, and that 
this growth was due, predominantly, to a rapid expansion in manufacturing. Figures from the 1962 
Victorian Year Book (cited in Eather 1988, p.70) reveal that the number of factories increased from 
10,195 in 1945-46 to 16,979 in 1959-60. The extra 6784 factories, plus expansion in the established 
factories, created a further 125,265 jobs in the same period. The population of the Barwon region, 
which encompasses Geelong and surrounding districts, rose by 23,764 between 1947 and 1954 
(Eather 1988, p.88). The robust industrial development and associated population growth seen in 
regional Victoria boosted the economic fortunes of the state, and this general mood of confidence is 
reflected in a mid-20th-century publication, Spotlight on Australia, in which the Australian Publicity 
Council (n.d., cited in Wixted, Zahra & Reeves 2008, p.16) boasts that ‘Melbourne itself, and the 
 
12 As suggested by the recollections of people known to the author who were residents of Geelong at this time, 
and the oral histories of former employees of Geelong’s textile industry which are featured as part of a multi-
media exhibit at the National Wool Museum in Geelong. As Rice (2009, p.50) writes, ‘the mill whistle…was a 
call for the mill workers to commence and finish work, but the citizens of Geelong regulated their lives by the 
mill whistles heard over long distances…as one observer commented in 1924: “When the factories dismiss 
hands at five o’clock the array of bicycles is simply astounding. The thousands of work people making their way 
to their homes is a sight not easily forgotten”’. 
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principal provincial cities of Geelong, Ballarat, Bendigo and Dandenong, all contribute to the state’s 
title as the “workshop of Australia”’. 
This rapid post-war population growth triggered a housing shortage, Eather (1988, p.71) observes, 
with families sometimes ‘forced to live in overcrowded and substandard dwellings or in tents, 
garages, caravans or single rooms when they could be found, with in-laws or in emergency camps’. It 
was in this context that the governments of several Australian states embarked on an ambitious 
program of housing reform, seeking greater powers to construct, sell and rent out low cost housing for 
workers, in many cases with the associated goal of clearing the unsightly and unsanitary ‘slums’ 
which had come to characterise many inner-city working-class neighbourhoods since the late 19th 
century (Harris 1988, p.2). The two dominant schools of early- to mid-20th-century planning – one 
the Garden City movement founded by Englishman Ebenezer Howard, and the other, architectural 
modernism – were borne out of concerns that the city was a site that fomented working class unrest, 
through its propensities for overcrowding, disease and pollution (Rogers 2018). Ebenezer Howard’s 
1902 publication, Garden Cities of Tomorrow, offered a template for well-ordered and pleasant urban 
design featuring accessible open spaces and parklands for recreation and sporting pursuits (Lewi 
2010, p.146). This wariness of high-density living, Rogers (2018) maintains, ‘infected government 
policy across much of the world in the post-war decades, with city leaders encouraging the demolition 
of dense working-class neighbourhoods and the construction of industrial parks, suburbs, motorways 
and cars’.  
In early 20th-century Geelong, property developers also sought to capitalise on the appeal of the 
Garden City in marketing their new housing developments. A promotional booklet produced in 1924 
by the Melbourne Subdivisions Company (reproduced in Wynd 1979) showcases the attractions and 
locational advantages of the ‘Garden Suburb of Corio’13 planned for the city’s north. The prospective 
suburb had already secured key pieces of infrastructure, including ‘railways, roads and educational 
advantages’; it therefore promised to be ‘better in its lay-out and in its provisions than any previous 
design in Australia’ (Melbourne Subdivisions Company 1924, cited in Wynd 1979, pp.23-24). This 
‘magnificent location’, boasted the advantages of a ‘daily railway service, excellent motor roads, 
beach and plantation frontages, large area (609 acres), educational, social and industrial activities’ 
(namely the Geelong Grammar School and the Ford Motor Company) and was located within five to 
seven-and-a-half miles of ‘the established and growing City’ (Melbourne Subdivisions Company 
1924, cited in Wynd 1979, p.24). However, the Garden Suburb of Corio ultimately failed to prosper, 
for ‘less than a quarter of the 2555 allotments were sold and by 1931 there were only six houses on 
the estate’ (Wynd 1981, p.196). The development of Corio would eventually occur some decades 
later, in large part due to the Housing Commission of Victoria’s construction of large housing estates 
in the area. 
In the mid-20th century, the regional focus of the Housing Commission of Victoria’s housing 
construction programs was underpinned by the Commission’s mandate to facilitate the 
decentralisation of industry (Eather 1988, p.73). This policy had been initiated by the Dunstan 
Country Party Government in 1943, and was carried through by the Cain Labor Government of 1945-
47 and the Bolte Liberal-Country Party Government of 1955-1972 (Eather 1988, p.73). The 
imperative of industry decentralisation also informed the activities of the South Australian Housing 
Trust at this time. It was thought that low cost housing, in conjunction with Adelaide’s relatively 
 
13 The Corio Garden Suburb estate was later renamed Grandjean Park, in honour of P.W. Grandjean, who, as the 
secretary of Ford Canada, ‘had selected Geelong as the company’s headquarters’ (Wynd 1981, p.195).   
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lower wages bill, would magnify the state’s competitive advantage. In this sense, these ideas were a 
central element of the ‘Playford Plan’, the policy of industrialisation mounted by South Australian 
Premier Thomas Playford with the aim of attracting industrial investment that would otherwise 
gravitate towards the eastern states (Peel 1995, p.33). The township of Elizabeth, on Adelaide’s 
northern fringe, was conceived as a ‘city for tomorrow’, and at the time of its establishment in 1955 
was regarded as a triumph of the town planning efforts of the South Australian Housing Trust (Peel 
1995, pp.14-15). Its layout and design were inspired by the Garden City ideal so in vogue in the early- 
to mid-20th century (Peel 1995, p.25). The growth and evolution of Elizabeth entered a new phase 
with the decision of General Motors-Holden to establish car manufacturing operations there in the 
early 1960s, and the ‘model town’ became a ‘workers’ city’ (Peel 1995, p.4, 69).  
The gender composition of the manufacturing workforce in the mid-20th century was unmistakably 
male-dominated. Figure 7 below utilises census data for Geelong in 1961 to illustrate the size of the 
male and female workforces, and the major sectors of employment for each gender. In 1961, 
Geelong’s male workforce numbered 26,817. There were 11,809 males employed in manufacturing, 
4210 in commerce, 3270 in building and construction, and 1858 in transport and storage. In contrast, 
there were a total of 8732 women in the workforce, and, although they were more likely to be 
employed in non-manual roles, the predominant sector of employment for women was also 
manufacturing (2634), with the majority of these jobs in textile and clothing production. This was 
followed by community, professional and business services (2079), commerce (2019), and 
‘Amusement, Hotels, &c’ (944) (ABS 1961, pp.88-89).  
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Figure 7: Male and female workforces in Geelong 1961, segmented by major sectors of employment. Source: 
Census of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1961. Figures are for Geelong urban area. 
While the gender structure of the industrial workforce was predominantly male, with post-World War 
II waves of migration, there was a broadening in the mix of ethnicities. In the post-war period, the 
Commonwealth Government’s Displaced Persons Resettlement Scheme stood at the intersection of 
industry policy and immigration policy. Johnson (2009b, p.199) argues that, ‘while initially explained 
in terms of the humanitarian acceptance of war refugees, the systematic encouragement of European 
immigration was carefully linked to the expansion of Australia’s industrial base’. In the Displaced 
Persons camps of Occupied Europe, the Australian Government aggressively marketed the lifestyle 
attractions of Australia as ‘the best country in the world’, and the Scheme successfully attracted more 
than 180,000 migrant-labourers to Australia’s shores between 1947 and 1952 (Balint 2014, pp.102-
104). By signing a two-year labour contract, each person who enlisted in the Australian resettlement 
scheme agreed to go anywhere and undertake any job allocated by the Commonwealth. As Balint 
(2014, p.110) notes, ‘in practice this usually meant rural locations, in unskilled labouring work’. 
Eklund (2002, p.179) observes that by 1975 four out of every ten workers in the Australian 
manufacturing industry had been born overseas, and these workers were overwhelmingly 
concentrated in low-paid, unskilled jobs.   
With the end of the long boom of 20th century capitalism and successive economic recessions, many 
of Australia’s industrial towns and cities became unemployment blackspots. ‘Elizabeth was a 
quintessential “long boom” landscape,’ Peel (1995, p.84) asserts, ‘and that left it savagely exposed as 
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that long boom eventually wound down and petered out in the 1970s’. By the 1980s, the popular 
image of Elizabeth was of a slum, a ‘place made poor’ (Peel 1995, pp.1,58). In 1992, Elizabeth’s 
youth unemployment rate soared well above 50 percent, Peel (1995, p.201) observes, a trend seen in 
other de-industrialising centres such as Newcastle in New South Wales (Westbury 2015, pp.18-19).  
As I will discuss in greater detail in Part Two of this thesis, the late 20th century was also a time of 
unfolding transformation and restructuring in Geelong. Although the Ford automotive factory was the 
leading employer in a local economy still heavily reliant on manufacturing (Wynd 1990, p.703), 
‘Geelong began the process of re-inventing itself’ in the 1980s, planning for a future in which it 
would be less economically-dependent on heavy industries (Johnson 2012, p.6). A key ‘event’ in the 
story of Geelong’s de-industrialisation occurred in 1982, when major employer International 
Harvester faced insolvency due to a combination of factors, including a saturated market and cheaper 
imports (Medson 1988, pp.14-16). At the time of the plant’s closure, the workforce had dwindled to 
600 loyal employees (Medson 1988, p.14).  
The 1990s opened inauspiciously: the locally-based Pyramid Building Society collapsed with debts of 
$2 billion, leaving thousands of depositors and shareholders out of pocket (Mills & Cannon 2015, 
p.4). Having once boasted that ‘Driving a Ford drives Geelong’, the Ford Motor Company began its 
long wind-down, as new technologies and international rationalisation signalled the end of car 
manufacturing in the region (Johnson 2012, p.6).  
More recently, during 2012-2016, Geelong has been harder hit by more job losses: aluminium 
production at Alcoa’s Point Henry smelter was stopped at the end of 2014, leaving more than 800 
workers out of a job; Ford announced that it would close its Geelong and Broadmeadows plants by 
2016; three hundred jobs were cut at Avalon airport with the closure of Qantas’ maintenance facility; 
Boral Cement shed 100 jobs in 2013 (Paul 2014). And in April 2016, retailer Target announced its 
decision to relocate its headquarters to Melbourne, spelling an uncertain future for 900 employees, 
and the end of Target’s 90-year association with Geelong (Tyler 2016).  
Having briefly surveyed the impacts of the end of the long boom of 20th century capitalism on 
Geelong and a selection of other key regional manufacturing centres, I will now turn to look in some 
detail at two key ‘events’ which are illustrative of the impact of global and local processes of 
restructuring in shaping the economic and social fabric of Geelong. The first of these considers the 
historical transformation of Geelong’s northern suburbs, and the second, the local impacts of the 
growth and subsequent decline of Australia’s car manufacturing industry.  
Geelong’s northern suburbs: from ‘Garden Suburb’ to pocket of disadvantage   
Feminist geographer Louise Johnson argues that Geelong has ‘register[ed] on its urban and social 
fabric some of the more dramatic changes in the recent economic geography of the nation’, and 
perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in the former industrial powerhouses of Geelong’s northern 
suburbs (Johnson 2012, pp.6-7). In order to grasp the reasons behind the ghettoisation and 
stigmatisation of Geelong’s northern suburbs from the late 20th century onwards (‘the Bronx of 
Geelong’ is how one respondent in Warr’s [2009] study, a resident of Corio, described the area), it is 
first necessary to examine their origins as predominantly working class suburbs, and to consider the 
factors that have produced disinvestment and disadvantage in these spaces.   
The 1920s and 1930s were periods of considerable growth in the North Geelong-North Shore area. 
The Ford Motor Company established its Geelong plant, and a range of other industries also 
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commenced operation, including Cresco Fertilizers Limited, the Phosphate Co-operative of Australia 
Limited, Corio Distillery, Shell Oil Refinery, International Harvester, as well as a constellation of 
firms supplying goods or services to Ford (Wynd 1981, pp.104-105). In this early 20th century period, 
the northern suburbs were promoted, in ambitious plans for the Garden Suburb of Corio, as Geelong’s 
‘city for tomorrow’. Perhaps more significant than the largely unrealised plans of property developers 
was the fact that Geelong would later become the site of one of the largest housing projects completed 
by the Housing Commission of Victoria. It was this combination of affordable housing and ample 
employment opportunities in the burgeoning industrial hub in Geelong’s northern suburbs that 
allowed a great number of migrants to start their lives in a new country (Wynd 1981, pp.204-209). 
In response to the housing shortage precipitated by Geelong’s rapid industrial development, the 
Housing Commission of Victoria constructed more than 5000 houses in the northern suburbs of 
Geelong over a thirty-year period (Wynd 1981, p.202). Norlane was the Commission’s largest country 
estate, and the majority of its 2348 houses were built between 1951 and 1957 (Eather 1988, p.72; 
Wynd 1981, p.200). From the late 1950s to the 1970s, the Commission also constructed a series of 
large housing estates in Corio (Wynd 1981, pp.200-202). Winter and Bryson (1998, p.62) argue that 
the enhanced, interventionist role that Australian governments took in the construction of housing in 
the post-war period was something of an historical anomaly. From 1945 to 1970, about 36 per cent of 
all new houses and flats completed in Australia were directly financed by governments, primarily 
through the state housing authorities (16 percent) and War Services Homes Scheme (13 percent) 
(Jones 1972, cited in Berry 1988, p.99). This figure was comparable with the lower end of 
development occurring in European social housing schemes in Britain, the Netherlands, West 
Germany and Denmark (Winter & Bryson 1998, p.62).  
The new post-war suburbs represented a distinctive urban form that Winter and Bryson (1998) term 
‘Holdenist suburbia’, a form which they maintain was the product of the particular conjuncture of the 
interests of the state and capital that predominated in Australia in the mid-20th century. For Winter and 
Bryson (1998, p.60), the ‘measures the state has adopted in relation to economic change and housing 
provision have, in conjunction with the forces of economic restructuring, actually forged particular 
suburban spaces as sites of urban poverty’. The defining features of Holdenist suburbs, which have in 
later years contributed to their disadvantage and stigmatisation, include that they were: built by 
government; of a large scale and uniform appearance; constructed of poor quality, cheap materials; 
home to relatively high percentages of public renters; comprised of predominantly working-class 
families; and adjacent to manufacturing employment (Winter & Bryson 1998, p.61). Winter and 
Bryson (1998, p.70) also highlight the lack of maintenance programs for the upkeep of public housing 
stock. 
This claim resonates with the experience of Geelong’s northern suburbs, which, as a concentrated area 
of relatively low-skilled employment and public housing, is a space left particularly vulnerable to the 
effects of economic restructuring and disinvestment. The northern suburbs feature a higher proportion 
of manual and manufacturing employment. While only 11 percent of the city’s workforce are engaged 
in manufacturing, in the northern suburbs of Corio and Norlane close to 20 percent are employed in 
this sector (Johnson 2016, p.17). In public perception, however, Norlane and Corio have transformed 
from ‘working’ into ‘workless’ suburbs (Warr 2009, p.289). The status of the northern suburbs as a 
pocket of disadvantage has been reinforced in research mapping the geographic distribution of social 
disadvantage in Australia, undertaken by Tony Vinson and colleagues (Vinson, Rawsthorne & Cooper 
2007; Vinson et al. 2015). In the 2015 Dropping Off the Edge report, the 3214 postcode, which 
encompasses Corio, Norlane and North Shore, recorded an average ranking of 45 — the third worst in 
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the state — across 22 indicators of disadvantage including internet access, income, education level, 
literacy and numeracy, long-term unemployment, unskilled workers, juvenile offending and criminal 
convictions (Crane 2015).  
There has been a range of local, place-based initiatives concerned with mitigating the disadvantage 
experienced in the northern suburbs. Northern Futures, established in 2007, is an organisation which 
aims to create education, training and employment opportunities to assist the unemployed to secure 
long-term sustainable employment (Northern Futures n.d., p.8). The Northern Bay Challenge, a 
program offering an education and training guarantee for students of Corio’s Northern Bay College, 
aims to dramatically improve the post-secondary school prospects of young people living in the 3214 
postcode (Shying 2018, p.11). In recognition that the birth rate for women aged 15-24 in the northern 
suburbs was well in excess of the national average for this age group, the Young Parents’ Access 
Program commenced in 2002 at Corio Bay Senior College (now Northern Bay College) to support the 
educational outcomes of young mothers (Angwin et al. 2004, p.6). The program remains in operation, 
under the title of Supporting Parents’ Access to Childcare and Education (SPACE).  
The wind-down of Australia’s car manufacturing industry 
The Ford Motor Company produced cars in Geelong for a total of 91 years, and in its manufacturing 
heyday, the workforce of the Geelong plant numbered over 5000 (ABC 2016b). A veteran Ford 
employee reflects that, ‘we couldn’t really produce enough cars, in the good days’ (ABC 2016b). 
Nicholas Heath of the Geelong Motoring Museum asserts that, ‘if you bought a Ford between the ‘20s 
and the ‘60s, it had either been assembled or made in Geelong’ (ABC 2016b). However, the future of 
Australian car manufacturing began to appear increasingly uncertain with the rise of Japanese and 
Korean producers in the late 20th century, who established their competitive advantage through the use 
of novel methods of production. In addition, the impacts of the 1973 oil price shock increased the 
demand for smaller and more fuel-efficient cars (Fagan & Webber 1999, pp.124-125).  
Fagan and Webber (1999, p.144) also cite the move away from the policy objective of tariff 
protection of domestic industry and the increasing integration of Australia into the global economy 
after 1980 as factors bearing on the fortunes of the Australian car industry. Tariff reductions were 
instigated by the Whitlam Labor Government of 1972-1975, and accelerated in the 1980s as part of 
the Hawke Labor Government’s economic reforms (Capling, Considine & Crozier 1998, pp.34, 47-
48). As Minister for Industry and Commerce in the Hawke administration, John Button argued that 
the structure of the Australian car industry ‘encouraged too many manufacturers to chase too small a 
market’, and that Australian industry more generally lacked an ‘export culture’ (Button 1998, p.292). 
In 1984 Button announced the Motor Industry Development Plan, which intended to rationalise the 
number of manufacturers and the number of models produced (Button 1998, p.303). This 
restructuring process, arguably, helped to sustain the Australian car industry for a limited period of 
time.  
The death knell of the industry sounded in the 2013-14 period, when, within months of each other, 
Australia’s three remaining car manufacturers – Ford, General Motors-Holden, and Toyota – 
announced their decisions to cease production in the country by 2016-17 (Barnes 2016, p.6). 
Calculating the total number of retrenchments associated with the closures is difficult, Barnes asserts. 
The structure of the automotive industry is complex and multi-layered, with the majority of workers 
employed in the supply chain rather than directly employed by the carmakers (Barnes 2016, p.7). 
However, modelling conducted in 2014 by researchers from the University of Adelaide and the 
National Institute of Economic and Industry Research (NIEIR) predicted that Australia would suffer a 
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fall in national employment of around 200,000 as a result of the planned closures, with up to half of 
these job losses occurring in Victoria (Barbaro, Spoehr & NIEIR 2014, p.1). A more modest estimate 
of 40,000 direct and indirect job losses nationally by 2018 was offered by the Productivity 
Commission in 2014 (Barnes 2016, p.8).  
In industrial towns and cities such as Geelong and Broadmeadows (Australia), Detroit (US), and 
Birmingham (UK), the growth of car manufacturing through much of the 20th century shaped the 
patterns of development, the identities, the social and spatial characteristics of these communities in 
particular ways. With a road-dominated cityscape inspired by American car cities such as Detroit, in 
the post-war period Birmingham became a city of ‘flyovers and underpasses’ (Parker & Long 2004, 
pp.37,43). As had occurred in Geelong around the time of the closure of the Ford plant, an emerging 
crisis at Birmingham’s largest car factory at the turn of the 21st century proved the catalyst for a 
moment of reflection on the city’s past and future identities:  
 
With the future of one of its biggest employers at the mercy of corporate strategy, venture 
capitalists, national and European grant aid, the question of just what Birmingham should be 
and do as a city in the 21st century was posed with startling clarity. How much of its 
manufacturing and motor industry past should be preserved? How far can a[n] historic 
industrial city depend on service sector jobs in the new economy? And…what politics 
underlie the images of Birmingham’s past and present in play in the debate over its possible 
futures? (Parker & Long 2003, pp.160-161) 
 
Parker and Long (2003, p.163) observe that in official and popular accounts of Birmingham’s history, 
there is a tendency to represent the city’s past as ‘a place of settled and knowable community’. This is 
a history in which the role of ethnic minorities in shaping the development and character of this 
industrial city is frequently ‘written out’ (Parker & Long 2003, pp.164-165). In this way, the politics 
of memory risks becoming a politics of exclusion: ‘community is by implication here the property of 
the [white] working classes who inhabited this milieu, “hard-working and neighbourly folk” who gave 
areas “a strong sense of identity” (Chinn 1999, cited in Parker & Long 2003, p.163). 
In 1973, a full 75 percent of the workers at Ford’s factory at Broadmeadows, in Melbourne’s north, 
were born overseas, and in the 1980s, more than half of Geelong’s Ford workforce was from a 
migrant background (Wallman 2016). While the erasure of racial difference appears to be less of an 
issue in the histories of Australia’s car manufacturing communities, these histories are often 
‘sanitised’ in other ways. In reconstructing the ‘golden age’ of industrial capitalism through the lens 
of nostalgia there is a risk that the fine-grained realities of what it meant to labour in these spaces, 
realities characterised by ambivalence and struggle, will be lost, or glossed over. In many accounts of 
the wind-down of car manufacturing in Australia, there is a tendency to romanticise industrial labour 
that was, in a large number of cases, physically grueling and relatively unskilled. Strangleman and 
Rhodes (2014, p.417) observe that many of the tropes of de-industrialisation ‘critically juxtapose the 
“good jobs” of the past versus the “poor jobs” of the now’. The prosaic reality of industrial labour is 
highlighted by Cowie and Heathcott (2003, cited in Strangleman & Rhodes 2014, p.417), who suggest 
that it was ‘tough work that people did because it paid well and it was located in their communities’. 
The recollections of former Ford employees are bittersweet as they reflect on many years spent in 
work that punished their bodies even as it provided them with occupational and financial stability. 
‘The job ruined my body’, a former employee says, ‘It was such hard work. But I don’t regret it. Look 
at my son, he is an accountant. I didn’t have an education, and now my son is an accountant’. Former 
Ford employee Darren expresses a similar sentiment: ‘It was a place I could work even though I never 
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went to school. You didn’t have to have an education - as long as you were there on time, you could 
make a living’ (Wallman 2016) 14.  
Responses to restructuring: ‘Rust Belt’ cities and the aesthetics of the post-industrial  
Emerging in the 1980s, the appellation ‘Rust Belt’ originally described a distinct economically-
depressed area of North America, stretching from New York to Chicago (Neumann 2016, p.5). 
However, at this time the manufacturing centres of the Canadian heartland were also in decline, as 
was Western Europe’s steel and coal country, ‘from Lille to the Ruhr to Sheffield and Glasgow’ 
(Neumann 2016, p.5). The ‘Rust Belt’ has therefore more recently come to symbolise a more 
generalised pattern of de-industrialisation that implicates numerous places/spaces in the industrialised 
democracies. Neumann also interrogates the provenance of the concept of the ‘post-industrial 
society’, suggesting it was the 1973 publication of The Coming of Post-Industrial Society by 
sociologist Daniel Bell that brought the concept to prominence. In this work, Bell outlined some of 
the structural changes evident in the shift towards an economy based on the provision of services 
rather than the production of goods (Neumann 2016, p.8). Although the ‘“post-industrial society” 
rapidly became part of the popular and professional lexicon’ at the behest of journalists, pundits and 
politicians (Neumann 2016, p.8), it was a term freighted with distinct political connotations: 
On the ground in economically troubled cities, ‘deindustrialization’ and ‘post-industrial 
society’ functioned as rhetorical devices through which urban constituencies articulated 
competing visions for cities after the decline of manufacturing. Planners and politicians 
embraced the positive connotations of the forward-looking ‘post-industrial society’. Labor 
activists preferred the term ‘deindustrialization,’ which evoked powerful place-based imagery 
of abandoned factories and boarded-up buildings in a way that ‘post-industrial’ did not. 
(Neumann 2016, pp.9-10) 
As ‘Rust Belt’ cities such as Geelong and Newcastle in Australia, and Pittsburgh and Detroit in the 
US seek to position themselves in the globalised, technologised, knowledge economy of the 21st 
century, the aesthetics of particular kinds of enterprise and economic development are understood by 
political and business leaders as key to the post-industrial fortunes of these places. Urban 
redevelopment and place marketing become central strategies in the (re-)branding and marketing of 
these places as centres for economic investment, production and consumption that appeal particularly 
to members of the ‘creative class’. The work of urban studies theorist Richard Florida has been 
influential here. Florida develops his theory of the ‘creative class’ and its role in processes of urban 
development in his works The Rise of the Creative Class (2014), originally published in 2002, and 
Cities and the Creative Class (2005). He argues that there are ‘3 Ts’ involved in the economic 
development of cities: talent, technology and ‘tolerance’. In a globalised, networked society, 
resources like talent and technology do not settle too long in any particular geographical location, 
rather they ‘are highly mobile factors, flowing into and out of places’ (Florida 2005, p.6). In order to 
mobilise and attract the creative talent and technology necessary for economic growth, places must 
demonstrate a culture of ‘openness, diversity, and tolerance’ (Florida 2005, p.7). As Florida explains: 
 
14 The reflections of Darren and other former Ford employees are featured in Winding Up the Window: The End 
of the Australian Auto Industry, a story told in the form of a comic by cartoonist Sam Wallman (2016), which 
can be viewed here: https://www.sbs.com.au/news/feature/winding-window-end-australian-auto-
industry  
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Places that are open to immigrants, artists, gays, and racial integration… are the kinds of 
places that, by allowing people to be themselves and to validate their distinct identities, 
mobilize and attract the creative energy that bubbles up naturally from all walks of life. Such 
places gain an economic advantage in both harnessing the creative capabilities of a broader 
range of their own people and in capturing a disproportionate share of the flow. (Florida 2005, 
p.7) 
 
I will survey some of the many criticisms of Florida’s work in Chapter 5, however at this point it is 
important to note the traction that Florida’s ideas have gained among political and business elites in 
Geelong, as in other former industrial centres. In 2016, the Committee for Geelong, one of several 
groups which pursue the strategic economic and business interests of the region, commissioned an 
international study tour to examine what makes so-called ‘Second Cities’ – such as Cleveland and 
Pittsburgh in the US, and Sheffield and Liverpool in the UK – successful (Correia & Denham 2016). 
In their final report, Correia and Denham note that in such places as Dundee, Cleveland and 
Pittsburgh, ‘there is…a recurring emphasis on creating vibrant city centres as an attractor of new 
residents and businesses, particularly millennials’ (Correia & Denham 2016, p.3). Florida’s ‘creative 
class’ theory has a central place in the recommendations they propose for the ‘Branding of Geelong’:  
 
The lifestyle and amenity attributes of Geelong can be used to attract new residents to the 
city…the continued development of [the] city centre as a place for shopping, culture, 
entertainment and dining can build on this appeal, particularly for what Florida (2004) refers 
to as “the creative class”. The marketing and improvement of Geelong as a place to live is an 
ongoing priority. There should be continued investment in Arts, Culture and Sport to foster 
new creative talent, attract new people to the region and build on the international profile of 
Geelong. (Correia & Denham 2016, p.81) 
Although Florida’s work has been a particularly compelling contemporary influence on the ‘place 
branding’ strategies adopted by aspiring global cities, both large and small, the key elements of the 
economic development strategy that Florida advocates – urban redevelopment, place marketing, 
creativity-led economic growth – typically have much longer histories in Rust Belt places such as 
Geelong. Johnson (2009a, p.474) observes that Geelong’s post-industrial reimagining was underway 
by the 1980s, when the city began looking to the arts, tourism and recreational industries for its future. 
As I will explore further in Chapters 4 and 5, beginning in 1981, when the City By The Bay plan was 
released, the redevelopment of Geelong’s city centre and waterfront areas have been conceived as 
core priorities, as far as local regimes of ‘manufacturing of place’ are concerned. The joint vision of 
the Geelong Regional Commission (GRC) and the Geelong City Council, City By The Bay was the 
first comprehensive plan for the redevelopment of Geelong’s city centre and waterfront areas. It 
identified the series of disused wool stores lining the city’s waterfront, relics of Geelong’s industrial 
heyday, as standing in the way of a more effective integration of Geelong’s Central Activities Area 
and bay front (GRC 1981). However, for reasons I will explore further in Chapter 4, progress towards 
the objectives of the City By The Bay plan stalled in the early 1990s. The ‘Steampacket Place’ 
waterfront redevelopment project of the late 1990s, and the ‘City Centre Reactivation’ that the 2014 
G21 Region Economic Development Strategy identified as a ‘game changer’ strategic economic goal 
(COGG & Steampacket Waterfront Geelong Development Board 2000; G21 2014, p.7) are more 
recent examples of the significance attributed to the development and redevelopment of central 
Geelong in local economic and urban planning agendas.  
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In Geelong, as elsewhere, the city centre is a canvas on which the prosperity or decay of the wider city 
is writ large. The dynamism and vibrancy of the CBD expands and contracts as the vicissitudes of 
local and global flows of capital make their impact on the urban fabric. The Renew Newcastle 
(Australia) project, launched in 2008 by writer, broadcaster and Newcastle native Marcus Westbury, 
has inspired similar revitalisation schemes in a variety of places including Geelong, and has 
highlighted the role of more than four decades of de-industrialisation and economic restructuring in 
precipitating the urban decay witnessed in many of Australia’s regional towns and cities (Renew 
Newcastle 2016; Westbury 2011; Sully 2015; Zappone 2011). The ‘solution’ that the Renew franchise 
offers is to reactivate vacant commercial spaces through the brokering of short-term leases for 
creative enterprises (Renew Newcastle 2016).15 This recipe for economic renewal is part of the 
broader ‘Cultural Capital’ agenda which Johnson (2009b) suggests a range of Rust Belt spaces, 
Geelong among them, have pursued from the late 20th century onwards. A Cultural Capital, Johnson 
(2009b, p.6) explains, is ‘a city which has recently and consciously made the arts (and often related 
Cultural Industries) central to its society, economy, urban form and place identity’. Johnson’s interest 
is not so much with metropolises such as London, New York and Paris, which are readily identified as 
centres of culture, but in:  
Those cities which have been in decline; which have been industrial centres and are dealing 
with the agonies of spatial and economic restructuring by attempting to rebuild their 
economies and societies through the mobilisation of the arts. It is an ambitious and potentially 
progressive social and economic agenda which has and continues to offer a model to others. 
(Johnson 2009b, p.6) 
In imagining Geelong as a world city, city leaders have sought to establish the region as a hub for 
cultural and heritage tourism. As Johnson highlights, in the late 1990s, this involved an unsuccessful 
campaign to secure a southern hemisphere Guggenheim museum for Geelong’s waterfront, a 
campaign that used the Basque city of Bilbao as its point of reference (Johnson 2009b, p.218). In 
Chapter 5 I will discuss Geelong’s Guggenheim campaign in relation to the imperative of/for 
‘innovation’. Two other key events also have their genesis in the climate of innovation that 
characterised local economic development regimes in Geelong at the turn of the 21st century: the 
‘Geelong: Smart Move’ campaign, and the establishment of the G21 as a networked, regional 
‘solution’ to the challenge of local economic development in a globalising world. 
The ‘Geelong: Smart Move’ campaign 
The ‘Geelong: Smart Move’ campaign to attract businesses and members of the public to live, invest 
in, and visit the city was launched in 1997 by the City of Greater Geelong (COGG 1998a). The 
campaign, including its distinctive logo (see Figure 8 below), was featured across several different 
sites and media platforms, with the highlights including: an Ambassador program, in which Geelong 
personalities were recruited to spread the ‘Smart Move’ message around Australia and the world; a 
partnership with the real estate sector which sought to incentivise people living outside the region 
 
15 In more recent times, this creative revitalisation agenda has focused its attention on the revival and 
repurposing of Geelong’s disused industrial spaces, such as the site of the former Barwon Paper Mill in 
Fyansford which operated from the 1870s until the 1920s, and today serves as a mixed-use space for art and 
industry. After a 2016 crowdfunding campaign, the short documentary series ‘Hubcaps to Creative Hubs’ was 
launched, the product of a collaboration between two Deakin University researchers and local organisation 
Creative Geelong, which showcases the industrial past and the creative potential of the old Paper Mills in 
Fyansford and other key sites (Hubcaps 2 Creative Hubs n.d.). 
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(namely Melbourne) to make the switch and relocate; a ‘Buy Local, Create Jobs’ campaign; the 
erection of 40 ‘Smart Move’ flagpoles along the Northern entrance to the city; television 
advertisements; and a website (COGG 1998a; COGG 1998b; COGG 1998c; COGG 1998d; COGG 
2000).  
 
<Image removed due to copyright restrictions> 
 
Figure 8: The 'Geelong: Smart Move' logo (COGG 1998b) 
 
The ‘Smart Move’ campaign is significant as the first ‘place branding’ campaign waged by Geelong 
as it attempted to define a modern, ‘post-industrial’ identity. Place branding, Khamis (2012, pp.49-50) 
explains:  
Points to the various ways which nations [or cities, regions] ‘speak’ and ‘behave’ or the range 
of contact points that link consumers with a place, and how these encounters affect 
perceptions of it, or its ‘strategic equity’. It requires a marketing message to be sustained 
across multiple fronts, aims and agendas to be synergised across several industries, and 
various stakeholders to commit to a common vision.  
The concept of ‘place branding’ rose to prominence throughout the second half of the 20th century. In 
business and marketing literatures it came to be understood as the next step in the evolution of the 
place promotion activities traditionally utilised by the tourism sector (Papadopoulos & Heslop 2002; 
Kaplan et al. 2010, p.1289). The turn to place branding strategies has also been evidenced in other 
‘Rust Belt’ spaces and places across the OECD and EU during the last two decades. One such place is 
the former car manufacturing centre of Birmingham, in the UK. Efforts to define a new brand identity 
for the city intensified after Birmingham failed in its bid to win the title of the 2008 ‘European Capital 
of Culture’ (Parker & Long 2004, p.53). Parker and Long (2004, p.53) note that these place branding 
activities included the debut, in 2003, of a new logo for the city – the letter b – that was featured 
across city buildings, the City Council website, and local newspapers. In marketing materials 
produced for the campaign – a campaign that would ‘driv[e] forward the renaissance of Birmingham’ 
– it was suggested that this logo would ‘provide a framework for the presentation of Birmingham’s 
visual identity over the next decade’ (Parker & Long 2004, pp.53-54).  
‘Geelong: Smart Move’ aimed to project a sense of dynamism through its reference to mobility, and, 
with businesses and potential future residents as its two key target markets, sought to highlight 
Geelong’s competitive advantages, its ‘liveability’ (particularly vis-à-vis the bustling metropolis of 
Melbourne nearby), and its proximity to natural attractions, such as beaches and mountains. Here, the 
Kennett Government’s ‘Victoria on the Move’ branding, ‘a slogan which was meant to encapsulate 
the new, enterprising and forward-looking energy of the state’ (Glow & Johanson 2007, p.175), was 
clearly a key referent. Kelly and Kenway (2014, p.172) observe that the impact of regimes of 
economic restructuring on Australia’s regional areas was such that, in the 1990s, many locales once 
renowned as ‘places of manufacturing’ were now engaged in a ‘manufacturing of place’. For those 
regions that remained reliant on an industrial economic base, it became essential for place marketing 
agendas to emphasise the inter-linkages of local industry with global commodity chains. As Kelly and 
Kenway (2014, p.173) illustrate, with reference to Melbourne’s Western region:  
This accessibility to various important nodes in transport networks figured prominently in the 
region’s promotional material. It appeared that if you intended to promote the region for its 
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manufacturing industrial base, then you had to be able to demonstrate its connections to 
transport networks that can move manufactured products into global markets. This process 
was different from promoting an information-age economy because in that context one 
needed only to demonstrate access to information networks. In the context of three decades of 
de-industrialisation, there was an attempt to reposition the region as an industrial zone that 
had access to global transport networks (for export/import activities), and which compared 
favourably to other industrial zones in global manufacturing economies/markets. 
For its advocates, the utility of the ‘Geelong: Smart Move’ campaign lay in its ability to capture the 
various capacities and aspirations – old and new, industrial and post-industrial – that were at play in 
this regional city at the turn of the 21st century. It demonstrated Geelong’s aspirations for the 
dynamism and agility that would project it into the ‘information age’, while also recognising the 
continued, albeit diminishing, contribution of manufacturing to the local economic base. In Geelong, 
as in Melbourne’s West, economic development authorities continue to highlight the region’s 
substantial transport infrastructures – from roads and sea ports to rail and airports - and its position in 
networks for moving goods, people, capital and information (G21 2014).  
The G21: a networked, regional solution to the challenge of economic development in a 
globalising world  
In the early 2000s, the G21, an alliance of five local councils and community and business agencies 
emerged as a new, networked political entity that promised to more effectively advocate for the 
strategic economic interests of the Geelong region at higher levels of government. Today, the five 
Local Government Areas (LGAs) that comprise the G21 – City of Greater Geelong, Colac Otway 
Shire, Surf Coast Shire, Golden Plains Shire, and the Borough of Queenscliff – are distinguished by 
different geographical and commercial characteristics, while remaining economically interdependent.   
As the G21 explains in Our Region, Your Future (2003, p.5), a document outlining its strategic plan, 
the ‘G’ of G21 stands for Group, Geelong and Goals, and ‘21’, the 21st Century. Our Region, Your 
Future projects an aspirational vision of the future: ‘in 2020, the Geelong Region is Australia’s most 
desirable destination for living, visiting and investing; it is renowned for its vibrant, cohesive 
community, exceptional physical environment and vigorous economy’ (G21 2003, p.4). In many 
respects, the Geelong Regional Commission (GRC), one of several regional commissions established 
in the 1970s and 1980s to manage the planning and development of selected growth centre regions, as 
well as other regions of significance in Australia (McLean 2005, p.1), was an important precursor to 
the G21, though the latter is significantly different in scope and composition. The GRC itself replaced 
the Geelong Regional Planning Authority (GRPA) which ceased to operate in 1977 (McLean 2005, 
p.3). The early-1990s rationalisation of LGAs and their responsibilities by the Victorian Kennett 
Government saw the number of local governments in the state fall from 210 to 78, and from 12 to 5 in 
the Geelong region. As part of this process of amalgamation, regional planning commissions, 
structures that provided an opportunity for local governments to engage in co-ordination (of which the 
Geelong Regional Commission was one), were terminated (OECD 2013, p.160).  
By the end of the decade, however, there was a pressing need for an entity that could negotiate and 
leverage competitive state and Federal grants, and that would offer a coordinated, regional ‘solution’ 
to the challenge of spatial and economic planning in a world in which global flows of capital and 
ideas were increasingly dominant, and the borders and boundaries of spaces and places increasingly 
porous. The OECD (2013) notes that the G21 is one of a number of ‘rural-urban partnerships’ that 
have proliferated across the world, with a variety of purposes and motives. Soon after its 
79 
 
establishment, the G21 founded a series of ten ‘Pillar groups’ through which the priorities and 
projects of the alliance would be mapped and delivered. These Pillars included: Arts, Culture and 
Heritage, Community Safety and Security, Economic Development, Environment, Health and 
Wellbeing, Lifelong Learning, Research, Sport and Recreation, Telecommunications, and 
Transportation (G21 2003, p.6). As I will explore in later chapters, the emergence of networked 
approaches to local problem solving, of which the G21 is an example, reveals something of the shift 
in the nature of governance in the late 20th century. This shift sees a variety of non-state actors (with 
business actors often foremost among these) increasingly bringing their influence to bear on processes 
of local decision-making and policy formulation, alongside and in cooperation with different levels of 
government.   
Towards the future? Geelong as a ‘global city’ 
Against Geelong’s recent history of de-industrialisation and job losses, much of the projected 
economic and employment growth in the region is clustered around the three sectors of Knowledge, 
Healthcare, and Services (G21 2013, p.30).  
 
<Image removed due to copyright restrictions> 
 
Figure 9: Employment by industry in Geelong 2018. Source: G21 Economy Profile (G21 2018), utilising 
REMPLAN data. Figures are for the G21 region, encompassing the City of Greater Geelong and the Colac 
Otway, Golden Plains, and Surf Coast Shires 
 
Figure 9 (above) represents the Geelong labour market in 2018, segmented by industry, in order of 
largest to smallest employer. When this distribution is compared with the composition of Geelong’s 
workforce in 1961, it is possible to observe some continuities, as well as some dramatic changes. 
While manufacturing remains one of the leading sectors of employment, it is interesting to note that, 
compared with the predominantly male industrial workforce of the mid-20th century, there has been a 
feminisation of the Geelong workforce, insofar as several of the leading sectors of employment, 
including Health Care and Social Assistance, Retail Trade, and Education and Training, are those with 
predominantly female workforces (Workplace Gender Equality Agency 2016, p.2). The 2016 Census 
of Population and Housing revealed that males were outnumbered by females in Geelong’s labour 
force: there were 51,549 males in the workforce, compared to 55,920 females (ABS 2016b). Despite 
this, fewer women were employed on a full-time basis, and were much more likely to be ‘away from 
work’ (in other words, did not work any hours in the week prior to Census night) (ABS 2016b). While 
Geelong’s contemporary labour force is characterised by a low degree of cultural and linguistic 
diversity (in 2016, 82 per cent of workers were born in Australia), among those born overseas, 
European expatriates are joined by small numbers of migrants from a wide range of areas, including 
Asia, the Americas, the Middle East and the Pacific (ABS 2016b). In 2016, 76.2 per cent of Geelong 
residents were employed locally, with 23.8 per cent of residents travelling outside of the area to work 
(COGG 2016b). These proportions remained relatively static between 2011 and 2016 (Skilling the 
Bay n.d., p.16).  
A number of commentators, noting the recent relocation of several State and Federal Government 
agencies to Geelong, including the Transport Accident Commission (TAC), WorkSafe and the 
National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA), suggest that this emerging ‘social insurance cluster’ 
may form the basis of Geelong’s regional specialisation (Casson 2016; Correia & Denham 2016, 
pp.43, 78), and is a development which has boosted the image of Geelong as a future ‘knowledge 
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economy’ (Lyons 2015, p.2). In conjunction with this idea of Geelong as the national capital of social 
insurance, a number of other visions for the future of the city have emerged, including: Geelong as a 
‘clever and creative city-region’ (the outcome of a community consultation initiative facilitated by the 
City of Greater Geelong [2017b]); and as a hub for advanced manufacturing and ‘smart tech’ 
innovation (Deakin University, G21 & COGG 2017; Siemens 2017).  
The political consensus which underpins these various models and visions for Geelong’s future 
understands innovation, creativity and enterprise as the building blocks of economic growth. The 
emergence of this consensus is particularly apparent in those ‘Rust Belt’ cities and regions – such as 
Newcastle (Australia), Birmingham (UK), and Detroit and Pittsburgh (US) – that are being reshaped 
by the dynamics of de-industrialisation and globalisation, and which have greater pressures to adopt a 
more self-consciously ‘global’ approach to economic growth.  
The city of Detroit ‘is perhaps the global exemplar of industrial decline’ (Barnes 2015, p.iii). Its 
experience of economic hardship, which has been compounded by such factors as persistent racial and 
class division, and the bankruptcy of its municipal government, is arguably much more dramatic than 
anything observed in Australia (Barnes 2015, pp.iii-5). Nonetheless, Barnes asserts that the story of 
Detroit and its post-industrial rebuilding and reimagining is in many ways comparable to that of 
Victorian cities and regions in which car manufacturing is in decline. The move towards advanced 
manufacturing and a diversification of the regional economy to support entrepreneurship (Barnes 
2015, pp.14-19) are two features that are particularly relevant to Geelong’s experience of economic 
restructuring. In the southeast Michigan region, foundations and nonprofits have provided extensive 
philanthropic assistance to support the ‘New Economy Initiative’ (NEI), an economic development 
initiative which has seen the development of an ‘entrepreneurial ecosystem’ providing more than 225 
resourcing and support services for businesses, both emerging and established (NEI 2019, p.8). 
American business publication Barron’s suggests that the NEI has successfully ‘interrupt[ed] the 
downward spiral of structural disinvestment’ in Detroit (Clark 2018).  
Two financial assistance packages established in the aftermath of the Ford Motor Company’s 
announcement of the closure of its Australian operations were designed around the goal of facilitating 
the economic diversification of the communities hardest hit (Barnes 2016, p.25). The Melbourne 
North Innovation and Investment Fund (MNIIF) and the Geelong Region Innovation and Investment 
Fund (GRIIF), were jointly funded by the Victorian and Federal Governments, providing a program 
of competitive grants for projects and businesses that supported job growth and the economic 
diversification of the region (Barnes 2016, p.25; Australian Government n.d.). Despite the move away 
from heavy industry in Geelong, manufacturing still constitutes a major proportion of the region’s 
value-added production (G21 2013, p.8). The decision of Carbon Revolution, a manufacturer of 
carbon fibre automotive components (and a recipient of GRIIF funding in its first round) to 
commence operations in Geelong, and more recently, the establishment of a carbon fibre research and 
development facility at Deakin University’s Waurn Ponds campus are developments that a number of 
stakeholders suggest will help launch Geelong as a hub for advanced manufacturing (G21 n.d.). 
Conclusion  
This chapter has surveyed the impact of more than four decades of economic and spatial restructuring, 
at global, national and local levels, in shaping the character of the regional Australian city of Geelong 
and the labour market opportunities and experiences available to those who call it home. It has 
explored some of the key ‘epochs’, ‘episodes’, ‘events’ and ‘moments’ in the stories of Geelong’s 
industrial development from the mid-to-late 19th century, and its subsequent de-industrialisation 
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beginning in the late 20th century. At the height of industrialism in Australia, there were abundant 
employment opportunities for young (albeit predominantly male) people and migrant populations in 
the newly-established factories. In the 21st century, however, the dynamics of de-industrialisation and 
‘neoliberal’ globalisation combine to make young people’s labour market experiences and pathways 
precarious, fragmentary, non-linear and uncertain. Geelong is increasingly entangled in networks and 
flows that are global in nature, and the city’s business and civic leaders seek to harness these new 
global interconnections to attract the mobile ‘creative’ capital that is understood as necessary for 
economic growth in the new millennium. Across this chapter and the preceding chapter, I have 
established some of the key elements of the social, economic, political, cultural and governmental 
‘conditions of possibility’ that have enabled the ‘truths’ about young people’s ‘employability skills’, 
‘innovation’ and ‘enterprise’ to become powerfully articulated with particular understandings of the 
‘nature’ of employment, unemployment, labour market changes and opportunities, and New Work 
Orders. I will now turn to the first chapter of Part Two of this thesis, where I will undertake a detailed 
genealogical exploration of the emergence of the concept of ‘employability skills’.  
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Part Two 
‘Employability skills’, ‘innovation’ and 
‘enterprise’: problematic solutions to the problem 
of youth unemployment? 
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Chapter Four 
The Emergence of Economic Rationalism and Employability Skills 
 
Introduction: the collapse of Australia’s full-time youth labour market and the 
emergence of the problem of youth unemployment 
In Australia in the early years of the 1980s, youth employment was in crisis, yet official reporting on 
unemployment statistics betrayed only the faintest trace of a turbulence that was, these reports 
suggested, largely a thing of the past. The 1980-81 Annual Report of the Department of Employment 
and Youth Affairs (1982, pp.5-7) suggested that the growth in teenage employment was one of the 
key factors behind the general upswing in employment: ‘teenage employment increased by 29,300 
(4.5 per cent) in 1980-81. This followed an increase of 13,300 (2.1 per cent) in the previous year and 
continued the reversal of the declining trend in evidence during the preceding decade’. That the 
number of 15-19-year-olds looking for a full-time job was in fact falling appeared to indicate further 
evidence of a robust youth labour market: ‘the average number of 15-19-year-olds looking for their 
first full-time job fell by 4800 to 37,700 during the year. The number of other teenagers and adults 
looking for full-time work fell by 2600 and 1200 respectively’ (Department of Employment and 
Youth Affairs 1982, p.8). Although close to 20 per cent of 15-19-year-old females were unemployed, 
the highest proportion of any cohort, the ‘strong seasonal nature of unemployment’, the Department 
indicated, was behind much of the variation in Australia’s unemployment rates, with ‘sharp seasonal 
rises in December and January of each year, as school leavers enter the labour force’, and again in 
February, ‘with the entry into the job market of married women seeking part-time employment at the 
end of the school holidays’ (Department of Employment and Youth Affairs 1982, pp.8-9).  
These reports belie the fact that across the previous decade, Australia’s full-time youth labour market 
had effectively collapsed. Alarmed by a fourfold increase in youth unemployment, education studies 
scholar Peter Watkins observed in 1984 that ‘over the last ten years the employment situation for 
young people and their movement from school into the workplace has become a matter of extreme 
concern’ (Watkins 1984, p.4). A particularly telling statistic was that the average length of 
unemployment among young people had risen dramatically, from 7-8 weeks in 1973 to 25.4 weeks in 
1981 (Watkins 1984, p.4). And for a variety of reasons, young women were bearing the brunt of 
unfolding labour market changes. In the early 1980s, the Australian labour market remained highly 
segregated by gender, with women concentrated in low-skill, low-wage occupations – such as clerical 
and retail work – in sectors that appeared increasingly vulnerable to the effects of the general 
economic recession and incipient economic restructuring and technological change (Earley 1981, 
pp.271-272). The manufacturing industry, a major employer of relatively poorly educated migrant 
female labour, ‘has shed 200,000 jobs over the last five years’ (Earley 1981, pp.272-273). Many 
female-dominated occupations, such as stenographer, typist, and bookkeeper were under direct threat 
from advancing computerisation and the emergence of word processing technologies. An analysis of 
Australian Census data and ABS Labour Force surveys revealed that, between 1970 and 1979, nearly 
26 per cent – or roughly a quarter – of full-time jobs for school-leaving young women had been 
replaced by part-time roles or eliminated through processes of technological change, compared with 
only 2.8 per cent for young men (Sweet 1980, cited in Earley 1981, p.274). According to Earley 
(1981, p.270), this state of affairs was such that, ‘unless young girls broaden their occupational and 
career horizons and enter types of work that have hitherto been seen as largely out of bounds and 
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exclusively or predominantly male, then they will be increasingly relegated to a life of intermittent 
employment and/or domesticity’. 
In March 1983, the Hawke Labor Government swept to power after eight years of conservative rule. 
At the National Economic Summit convened by Prime Minister Bob Hawke the following month, the 
newly-appointed Minister for Education and Youth Affairs, Senator Susan Ryan, broke with the 
optimistic tone that had been sounded by that same Department the previous year. The current 
unemployment rate for youth was the highest ever recorded, she pointed out, with 29 per cent of the 
full-time teenage labour force out of work, a rate that had been reached as almost 80,000 full-time 
jobs previously held by teenagers had disappeared in the preceding 12 months (Ryan 1983, cited in 
Watkins 1984, p.5). Senator Ryan also observed, with some alarm, that the number of apprenticeships 
was in decline: the forecast for the number of new apprentices in 1982-83 was 25 per cent lower than 
previous projections (Ryan 1983, cited in Watkins 1984, p.5). In her address to the Summit 
Conference, Senator Ryan underscored the importance of bringing all segments of the workforce 
along on the journey of national economic recovery: ‘The threat – and the fact – of unemployment has 
been present for many of our young people and for women for almost a decade’ (Ryan 1983, p.58). 
To embark on the process of recovery while neglecting to address the entrenched exclusion of women 
and disadvantaged young people from full participation in education and the economy would be ‘no 
cause for self-congratulation’, Senator Ryan (1983, p.59) warned. And the consequences of failing to 
heed this warning would be dire for Australia:  
In the long term the distrust and division that will occur if [disengaged and disillusioned 
young people are] cut off from the fruits of recovery can only create tension and destructive 
conflicts which will eat away at the very basis of our social cohesion and economic 
prosperity. (Ryan 1983, p.59) 
 
Framed in this way, and for the first time since the Great Depression of the 1920s and 1930s, 
Australia confronted the problem of what to do with the surplus of potentially ‘idle’ young people. 
The youth transition programs that were instituted at this time, and the official targets for the increase 
in rates of post-compulsory education participation that came later, were intended to facilitate the 
‘warehousing’, in education and training programs, of young people who would otherwise be 
classified as unemployed, though this intention was never explicitly stated by policymakers (Watkins 
1984, pp.25-26). Alongside the emergence of this solution for the corralling of populations of 
unemployed young people (and the associated work of ‘massaging’ youth unemployment statistics), a 
series of important discursive shifts occurred at this time. The new labour market and education 
discourses gave much greater prominence to the concept of ‘employability skills’, defined as that set 
of competencies, skills and dispositions understood as essential for successful participation in the 
world of work (ILO 2000). They ensured that, against the background of a youth labour market that 
was changing, even ‘collapsing’, young people were to be understood as the architects of their own 
opportunity structures, and must strive to embody the qualities of the ‘multi-skilled’ worker 
demanded by a ‘post-Fordist’ regime of production. In the recessionary 1980s, business interests were 
calling for the education system to be made more responsive to the needs of industry, echoing 
demands made in earlier periods of economic crisis and high unemployment, notably the 1890s and 
1930s (Bessant 1988, p.19). In much of this discussion it was assumed that the education and training 
sector should carry the burden of responsibility for curing the social ill of unemployment and aiding a 
return to national economic prosperity (Bessant 1988). In response to these and other concerns, the 
Finn, Mayer and Carmichael Reports - the key reports establishing the parameters for reform of 
Australia’s education and training systems in the early 1990s - advocated a greater convergence of 
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‘general’ and ‘vocational’ education, sectors which had, up to that point, been understood as relatively 
distinct and separate.  
 
This chapter aims to map the ‘conditions of possibility’ which enable the concept of ‘employability 
skills’ to function as a ‘truth’ in relation to the problem of youth unemployment. Earlier, I introduced 
Donna Haraway’s (2008, p.4) concept of the ‘figure’: a ‘material–semiotic node or knot in which 
diverse bodies and meanings co-shape one another’. In this chapter the ‘figure’ of concern is the Finn, 
Mayer and Carmichael Reports, three programmatic documents published in the early 1990s in which 
a variety of concerns about young people in the labour market condensed around the idea of 
‘employability skills’. I will begin by adopting a broad focus, examining some of the key ‘events’ in 
late 20th century processes of economic restructuring, as they manifested at the global and national 
scales. In Australia in the early 1980s, a distinctive approach to economic policymaking emerged, 
known as ‘the Accord’, which attempted to harmonise the interests of industry, unions and 
government in a collective effort of national economic recovery. The Accord was forged in response 
to two key imperatives: first, the need to lift Australia out of the economic recession in which it had 
been mired for roughly a decade; and second, the need to establish the international competitiveness 
of Australia’s economy as protectionist industry policies were abandoned.  
 
The following section considers the influence of emerging global flows, in conjunction with changing 
policy directions at the Federal and State levels of government, in shaping the economic and spatial 
transformations of Geelong in the late 20th century. With factory closures and downsizing decimating 
Geelong’s workforce, and the Pyramid Building Society collapse engendering a local economic crisis, 
the 1980s and 1990s were challenging times for this regional city. In 1993 Victorian Premier Jeff 
Kennett dubbed himself the unofficial ‘Minister for Geelong’ and in doing so implied that this 
increasingly beleaguered ‘Rust Belt’ city was in need of rescuing. From this point, the discussion 
moves into the education and training policy space, examining the Finn, Mayer and Carmichael 
Reports, the three documents forming a comprehensive agenda for reform of Australian post-
compulsory education and training policy in the 1990s. These documents not only framed 
understandings of the problem of youth unemployment, but more broadly, sought to meet the needs of 
a ‘post-Fordist’ economy for ‘cross-skilled and multi-skilled workers who could adapt and respond to 
domestic and global requirements’ (Cushnahan 2009, p.8). After examining each of the Finn, Mayer 
and Carmichael Reports in some detail, I will explore some of the key agencies and knowledge flows 
shaping ideas of ‘human capital’ and ‘employability skills’. Towards the conclusion of the chapter I 
will identify and analyse some of the key absences, silences and ‘subjugated knowledges’ in the Finn, 
Mayer and Carmichael Reports and in the policy discussion surrounding their publication. There I will 
argue that, while policymakers and other stakeholders assumed that the ‘employability skills’ 
discourse that emerged from these reports would be automatically applicable to young people from a 
diversity of socioeconomic, cultural and linguistic backgrounds, these reports were marked by 
significant silences and absences where questions of disadvantage and accessibility were concerned. 
As I will demonstrate, these absences and silences served to limit the relevance and inclusivity of 
‘employability skills’ for a range of different social groups.  
Late 20th century economic restructuring and the transformation of global flows 
The Hawke Labor Government was elected to power in 1983 amid widespread public dissatisfaction 
at the effects of recession (Ryan & Hawthorne 2011, p.10). In a joint statement released in February 
1983 the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) 
proposed a Prices and Incomes Accord, a new approach to economic policy that they suggested would 
control inflation and high unemployment simultaneously. In doing so, they lambasted the ‘monetarist’ 
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policies pursued by the conservative Fraser Government, in power from 1975 to 1983 (ALP & ACTU 
1983, p.408). In the ten years between 1973 and 1983, Australia was buffeted by no less than five 
recessions (Humphrys 2019, p.4). The ALP and ACTU (1983, pp.408-409) argued that a new 
approach to national economic policy was necessary because ‘we enter 1983 with official predictions 
of negative growth, double digit unemployment, double digit inflation and no sign of recovery on the 
basis of the continuation of current policies’. The premise of ‘the Accord’, as it became known, was 
that, in return for trade unions restraining their wage demands to the level of inflation (and making 
‘no further claims’ via industrial action), the government promised to moderate prices and non-wage 
incomes, expand the ‘social wage’, and implement tax reform (Humphrys 2019, p.5).16 The Accord 
featured a consensus-oriented style that ‘brought the union movement inside the economic policy 
management tent’, and business interests would be represented via the newly-established Economic 
Planning Advisory Council (Forsyth & Holbrook 2017). Along with the floating of the Australian 
dollar in 1983, opening the Australian economy to international banks, and the reduction of tariffs, the 
Accord was a key component of the Hawke-Keating Governments’ economic reform agenda, and 
signalled a turn toward a more globally engaged Australian economy (Forsyth & Holbrook 2017). 
 
As the 1980s progressed, several subsequent Accords were brokered in response to new economic 
challenges.17 In 1986, following Accord Mark II, and with Prime Minister Hawke in his second term 
in office, unemployment remained high, at 8.1 percent, with a more alarming youth unemployment 
rate of 15.1 percent (Ryan & Hawthorne 2011, p.10). That same year, Treasurer Paul Keating voiced 
his concerns that Australia would become a ‘banana republic’ if it continued to rely on exports of 
natural resources for its economic prosperity:  
We took the view in the 1970s – it’s the old cargo cult mentality of Australia that she’ll be 
right. This is the lucky country, we can dig up another mound of rock and someone will buy it 
from us, or we can sell a bit of wheat and bit of wool and we will just sort of muddle through 
… In the 1970s … we became a third world economy selling raw materials and food and we 
let the sophisticated industrial side fall apart … If in the final analysis Australia is so 
undisciplined, so disinterested in its salvation and its economic well being, that it doesn’t deal 
 
16 However, not all of the parties to the ‘social contract’ upheld their end of the agreement. As Humphrys (2019, 
p.6) writes, while the trade unions honoured their commitment to restrain wage claims, many of the promises 
made by the government failed to materialise. Many core elements of the ALP and ACTU’s original statement 
‘were not implemented and, on frequent occasions, policy contrary to the text was adopted’:  
The process quickly narrowed to focus almost exclusively on wages. Real wage levels, to be 
maintained under the Accord, declined markedly. Early in the period, the ALP adopted a policy - ‘the 
trilogy’ commitment - not to increase taxation, government expenditure or the size of the budget deficit 
as a percentage of gross domestic product. This significantly curtailed the planned social wage 
spending…Australia’s tariff system was dismantled and free tertiary education was abolished, in 
contravention of the agreement. Taxation—which was to be restructured under the Accord to ensure 
business paid a ‘fair share’—moved in the opposite direction. (Humphrys 2019, p.6) 
While the dominant narrative of the emergence of neoliberalism in the industrialised democracies focuses on the 
ascendancy of New Right ideas and coercive implementation of economic reform, Humphrys (2019, p.9) 
advances the argument that the Accord was a key moment in the construction of ‘vanguard neoliberalism’ in 
Australia: ‘the agreement engendered consent for the neoliberal project to take place by integrating the unions 
and the working class into the efforts of political society to construct a new form of social rule’. 
17 Humphrys (2019, p.6) notes that there was a total of eight Accords across the Hawke-Keating Government’s 
thirteen years in office. 
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with these fundamental problems … Then you are gone. You are a banana republic. (Keating 
1986, cited in Conley 2013) 
Keating’s comments reveal that, even as he and other policymakers took steps to open Australia up to 
global forces, he feared that Australia was at times sorely lacking in the kind of strategic planning and 
foresight that could firmly establish the competitive advantage of its products, services and expertise 
on the ‘world market’ into the future.  
 
As part of its microeconomic and macroeconomic reform agenda, the third Hawke Labor Government 
turned its attention to reform of Australia’s industrial relations system. While the policy regimes of 
the Fraser Government and the early years of the Hawke Government (1983-1987) were focused on 
regulating wages and reducing strike levels through enhancing the power of centralised wage-fixing 
institutions, Briggs and Buchanan (2000) note that the balance of payments crisis of 1985-86 triggered 
a major debate on the future of wage fixing in Australia. It was in this context that, in 1987, the 
Business Council of Australia (BCA) proposed a more radical deregulation of labour markets. The 
BCA, Briggs and Buchanan (2000) write, ‘began from the position that Australia's industrial relations 
system was an impediment to the development of an “enterprise orientation” and the source of 
periodic wage explosions’. The BCA established a study commission to investigate ways of 
establishing an enterprise-based industrial relations system. The proposals of the BCA, that the wages 
system should be fragmented into different ‘streams’ and that non-union bargaining should be 
expanded, ‘had an immediate impact on both mainstream political parties’, and with the passing of 
Accord Mark VII in October 1991, enterprise bargaining was formalised at the Federal level (Briggs 
& Buchanan 2000).  
 
The late 1980s was also a period of nascent reform of Australia’s tertiary education sector. In a 1987 
policy discussion paper, education minister John Dawkins (1987, p.8) predicted that, in the context of 
Australia’s efforts to broaden its export base and introduce policies that would encourage the 
development of internationally competitive manufacturing and service industries, the demand for a 
more highly skilled and better educated workforce would only increase into the future. Dawkins 
(1987, p.8) argued that ‘as the prime source of higher-level skills for the labour market, the higher 
education system has a critical role to play in restructuring the Australian economy’. In a later section 
of this chapter I will examine the Dawkins reforms in the context of the reorientation of the purposes 
of education towards ‘human capital’ objectives. However, at this point it is important to note that 
Dawkins’ proposals ushered in a series of unprecedented reforms that would ultimately effect the 
transformation of Australia’s universities from elite institutions into a mass system of higher 
education (Macintyre, Croucher & Brett 2017). The various technical colleges, teachers’ colleges and 
colleges of advanced education disappeared from the structure of higher education in Australia and 
were incorporated into a system of multi-campus universities, with the aim of creating a ‘unified 
national system’ (Abbott & Doucouliagos 2003, p.1). While rates of participation in tertiary education 
did increase markedly over the following decade (Macintyre, Croucher & Brett 2017, pp.214-215), 
the reforms were also fundamentally concerned with making the tertiary education sector more 
accountable to ‘market’ imperatives. The establishment of the Higher Education Contribution Scheme 
(HECS) in the final years of the 1980s signalled the abandonment of the Australian Labor Party’s 
commitment, established under the 1972-75 Whitlam Government, to the provision of fully-
subsidised tertiary education.18  
 
18 While the Federal Government indicated its support for the reforms proposed in Dawkins’ Green Paper, it 
cited budgetary constraints as ruling out any substantial increase of outlays on higher education (Macintyre, 
Croucher & Brett 2017, p.71). The government established the Higher Education Funding Committee, chaired 
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These changes in the realms of economic and industrial relations policy and tertiary education are a 
sketch of the various ‘events’ that were significant in this busy period of economic and social 
policymaking and reform in Australia. This sketch is not meant to be exhaustive. It also builds on 
earlier discussions about the global, national and regional flows and consequences for restructuring of 
spaces, places and relations during this period. Policymakers framed these various reforms as essential 
in the work of establishing the flexibility, dynamism and agility that Australia would need to compete 
in global markets. Yet, other commentators regarded these developments as indicative of the influence 
of ‘economic rationalism’ on the Australian policymaking apparatus. In Economic Rationalism in 
Canberra: A Nation-Building State Changes its Mind, published in 1991, Michael Pusey sought to 
document what he saw as a major rupture in policy thinking and policymaking among senior 
bureaucrats in Canberra, and in doing so, brought the concept of ‘economic rationalism’ into popular 
usage (a term that would later be understood as interchangeable with ‘neoliberalism’) (Pusey 1991; 
Barnes, Humphrys & Pusey 2018). Pusey (2018, pp.13-14) observes that in the post-war period, 
Australia’s senior public servants understood that ‘the purpose of policy was to improve the quality of 
life of a nation-society’, and the nation-building agenda they pursued was underpinned by principles 
of social democratic redistribution. From the early 1980s, however, under the influence of New Right, 
free market ideas, the purpose of economic management was ‘reduced to little more than the 
protection and accumulation of capital’ by a new generation of policymakers who were drawn 
overwhelmingly from the disciplines of economics and accounting (Pusey 2018, pp.13-14).  
 
The 1970s and 1980s were periods of significant disruption and transformation for industrialised 
societies such as Australia, and many commentators and academics were attempting to understand 
and theorise the relationship of the emerging global flows and the changing social, political, 
economic, cultural and governmental composition of these societies. For example, Scott Lash and 
John Urry, in their 1987 book, The End of Organised Capitalism, regarded the shift from 
manufacturing to service-based economies, the decline in national-level collective bargaining 
procedures in favour of enterprise- and plant-level bargaining, and the associated decline in collective 
working class representation in the labour market as evidence of a more far-reaching ‘disorganisation’ 
of capitalism. The previous era of ‘organised capitalism’, in contrast, began ‘in most countries in the 
final decades of the nineteenth century’ and was characterised by such features as the concentration 
and centralisation of industrial, banking and commercial capital, and the development of 
extractive/manufacturing industry as the dominant sector with a relatively large number of workers 
employed (Lash & Urry 1987, pp.3-5). While Lash and Urry understood recent changes in terms of 
the ‘disorganisation’ of capitalism, other commentators suggested that the shift from a ‘Fordist’ to a 
‘post-Fordist’ mode of production was the key dynamic shaping processes of economic change in the 
industrialised democracies. In theorising this shift, scholars turned their attention to the experiences 
and trajectories of industrial reorganisation in those places eschewing the mass production model, 
such as in Italy and Japan. Japan, for example, had weathered processes of technological change and 
 
by Neville Wran, to explore the options for funding the significant expansion of the tertiary education sector 
(Macintyre, Croucher & Brett 2017). The Wran Committee indicated its support for a ‘user pays’ system, citing 
the argument that university graduates benefitted from an ‘income advantage’ in the labour market (Macintyre, 
Croucher & Brett 2017, pp.72-73). Introduced in 1989, the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) 
involved an income-contingent repayment of part of the cost of tuition: the requirement to pay would arise only 
when the student’s personal taxable income exceeded average Australian weekly earnings (Jackson 2003). After 
the election of the Howard Coalition Government in 1996, HECS was subsumed into the larger Higher 
Education Loan Program (HELP), where it became known as HECS-HELP. The Howard Government instituted 
changes to the repayment rates and thresholds, and established the alternative loan option of FEE-HELP, which 
assists fee-paying students with the costs of postgraduate courses of study (Ey 2018).  
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economic restructuring by replacing Fordist principles of production with ‘work teams, job rotation, 
learning by doing, flexible production and integrated production complexes’ (Watkins 1994, p.16).19 
At the same time as the Japanese model was upheld as an exemplar of adaptability and ingenuity, the 
precipitous decline of North America’s steel producing regions in the 1970s and 1980s ‘served as a 
bellwether for aging manufacturing cities around the world’ (Neumann 2016, p.5). In the early 
postwar decades, the manufacturing centres of the US Great Lakes region:  
Projected an image of invulnerability to the boom-and-bust cycles that affected other 
economic sectors. At midcentury, the hulking factories that punctuated the regional landscape 
lent an air of permanence to industries like steel and automotive and to the hundreds of 
thousands of jobs they created. (Neumann 2016, p.5) 
 
Only a few decades later, however, trade liberalisation, changing industry policies, and a range of 
other factors facilitated the flight of manufacturing offshore and decimated these at-one-time proud 
industrial communities (Neumann 2016, p.5). Initially, the ‘Rust Belt’ was understood as a peculiarly 
American phenomenon, where it pejoratively denoted a specific, economically depressed, 
geographical region (Neumann 2016, p.5; High 2003). However, as the 20th century drew closer to its 
end, the figure of the ‘Rust Belt’ city or region spread, materially and discursively, throughout the 
North Atlantic and beyond, connecting Bilbao, Birmingham, the Ruhr Valley and many other cities 
and regions in a vast network of beleaguered industrial places.   
Geelong: becoming a ‘Rust Belt’ city 
The work of feminist geographer Louise Johnson and colleagues has made a significant contribution 
to illuminating the ways in which processes of economic restructuring – many of which had their 
origins in developments at the national and international scales – played out in the local Geelong 
context, transforming the economic and social fabric of this regional city. Wright and Johnson, 
writing in 1995, identified four moments of intensified labour market restructuring occurring in 
Geelong across the late 20th century, each of which was centred upon a particular manufacturing sub-
sector. First, the textiles, clothing and footwear sector restructured during the mid-1970s; second, 
agricultural machinery in the early eighties; third, clothing and footwear in the late eighties; and 
finally, the automotive sector at the beginning of the nineties (Wright & Johnson 1995, p.125).  
 
Wright and Johnson (1995, p.125) observe that a number of Federal Government decisions made in 
the first years of the 1970s drastically impacted on Geelong’s textile, clothing and footwear industry. 
The Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission enshrined the principle of equal pay for 
women through a series of rulings handed down between 1969 and 1974. These legislated increases in 
 
19 The concept of ‘post-Fordism’ has been discussed and debated extensively by scholars, across a range of 
disciplines including economics, political theory, sociology, geography, cultural studies, and education studies, 
among others. Amin (1994, p.3) suggests that post-Fordism is perhaps best characterised as ‘a debate about the 
putative transition from one dominant phase of capitalist development in the post-war period to another thirty to 
fifty year cycle of development based upon very different economic, societal and political norms’. The three 
predominant theoretical positions at the heart of the post-Fordist debate - the regulation approach, the neo-
Schumpeterian approach, and the flexible specialisation approach - attempt, in different ways, to theorise the 
key features and underlying causes of this transition to a new phase of capitalist accumulation (Amin 1994, 
pp.6-16). Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2004) identify ‘immaterial labour’ as one of the defining features 
of post-Fordist production. ‘The contemporary scene of labour and production’, they suggest, ‘is being 
transformed under the hegemony of immaterial labour, that is, labour that produces immaterial products, such as 
information, knowledges, ideas, images, relationships, affects’ (Hardt & Negri 2004, p.65). Hardt and Negri’s 
work in this space has informed contemporary theories of ‘aesthetic labour’ and ‘affective labour’, theories 
which will be explored further in Chapter 7.  
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the value of women’s labour had the perhaps unforeseen effect of displacing large numbers of women 
from the textile workforce, altering the sexual division of labour in local factories (Wright & Johnson 
1995, p.126). The Whitlam Government’s implementation of a 25 percent across-the-board tariff cut, 
and the devaluation of the Australian dollar precipitated a dramatic collapse in the market for 
domestically produced textiles, clothing and footwear (Wright & Johnson 1995, p.126). The scale of 
job losses associated with the closure and downsizing of local textile operations was such that 
between 1971 and 1973, Geelong’s 3000-strong textile industry workforce was halved (Wright & 
Johnson 1995, p.126).  
 
The second wave of labour market restructuring in Geelong fell heavily on the workforce of 
International Harvester, a manufacturer of agricultural machinery (Wright & Johnson 1995, p.126). 
Again, changes in policy direction by the Federal Government were a contributing factor in the crises 
encountered by this multinational corporation in the early 1980s, culminating in the closure of its 
Geelong plant in 1982. In the context of falling demand for heavy agricultural equipment, it appeared 
likely that Federal Government assistance to the sector, in the form of a tractor bounty, would be cut 
after 1984 (Wright & Johnson 1995, p.126). Faced with a contraction in the global market for farm 
machinery, International Harvester closed more than a third of the plants in its global operation 
between 1979 and 1983, cutting its staff from 98,000 to 32,000 in the process (Marsh 1985, cited in 
Wright & Johnson 1995, p.126). Once boasting a workforce numbering in the thousands, a much 
smaller number was employed at the Geelong plant at the time of its closure. Wright and Johnson 
(1995, p.126) note that in the midst of the wider dynamic of corporate downsizing, ‘Harvester’s 
Geelong employees were simply minor casualties’.  
 
Geelong’s clothing and footwear industry was at the epicentre of the next moment of restructuring. 
Wright and Johnson (1995, p.126) observe that, in the late 1980s, the number employed in the sector 
‘again began to fall at a marked rate’. According to Wright and Johnson (1995, p.126), ‘the impact of 
tariff reductions and product market shifts, and management decisions to increase outwork and/or 
relocate production processes from traditional sites’ were among the forces buffeting Geelong’s 
clothing and footwear sector and its counterparts in other industrial locales across the country. The 
final moment of labour market restructuring identified by Wright and Johnson centred on the city’s 
automotive manufacturing sector. As in the case of International Harvester, the problems besetting 
local automotive production in the early 1990s were bound up with those of its dominant transnational 
corporation: in this case, the Ford Motor Company (Wright & Johnson 1995, p.127). In addition, the 
Australian Government’s Motor Industry Development Plan, implemented in the mid-1980s, placed 
pressure on manufacturers to rationalise the number of car models produced. In Geelong this resulted 
in production stoppages and job losses, both at the Ford plant and throughout the automotive 
component supply chain. Wright and Johnson (1995, p.127) highlight that the 1991 Census recorded a 
loss of more than 1600 positions in the local transport equipment sub-sector since the 1986 Census: a 
net contraction of 31 per cent. In a 1992 study of ‘economically vulnerable’ Australian regions 
conducted by the Office of Local Government and the Department of Employment, Education and 
Training, Geelong was rated the region most vulnerable to the impacts of the Federal Government’s 
tariff reduction and industry restructuring policies (Bita 1992, p.1).  
 
As I highlighted in Chapter 3, with Geelong’s manufacturing sector experiencing significant and 
continuing decline, in the 1980s city administrators and business leaders turned their attention to an 
ambitious proposal for the comprehensive redevelopment of Geelong’s waterfront and city centre, 
known as City By The Bay, in the hope that it would deliver on its promise of economic renewal and 
revitalisation of this increasingly beleaguered ‘Rust Belt’ city. The plan was the joint vision of the 
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Geelong Regional Commission (GRC) and Geelong City Council, with the sponsorship of the State 
Government and retailer, Myer Shopping Centres (GRC 1981). In the 1970s and 1980s, Geelong’s 
city centre was hollowing out as a result of the significant development of commercial and retail 
amenities in suburban locations, alongside ‘changes in wool handling and selling technology’ which 
were rendering the woolstores lining the city’s waterfront ‘empty and redundant’ (GRC 1981, p.11). 
According to the authors of City By The Bay, an outsider visiting Geelong’s city centre would 
encounter the:   
Immediate problem of location and orientation, emphasised by the noticeable lack of a 
distinctive place either in the form of an open space or an architecturally significant landmark. 
In the face of suburban retail counterparts offering one-stop undercover shopping and easy 
parking, the central area has lost out. (GRC 1981, pp.10-11) 
While the decline of textile manufacturing had contributed to this problem, it also provided the city 
with an opportunity: ‘with the removal of the woolstore function to more economic locations, a great 
opportunity exists for the revitalising of this area to restore to the city a strong physical connection 
with the bay’ (GRC 1981, p.11). Stage One of City By the Bay featured the significant expansion of 
retail amenities in the city centre, incorporating many of the disused woolstores, along with the 
proposed construction of a fully-undercover ‘central pedestrian spine’ that would link this revitalised 
commercial precinct with the foreshore (GRC 1981, p.12). In 1988, with many of the elements of 
Stage One completed, the GRC released its blueprint for Stage Two of City By The Bay, known as 
The Bay Link. The developments proposed as part of The Bay Link included an amphitheater and 
entertainment area looking onto a landscaped foreshore, conference and entertainment facilities 
including an IMAX cinema, and an international food court, among a range of other tourist and 
leisure attractions (see Figure 10). It was anticipated that these various developments would together 
constitute a vibrant foreshore precinct (see Figure 11), ‘a place children will want to bring their 
parents and grandparents. A place where tourists relax with lunch and where office workers and 
shoppers get away from the day’s hustle-and-bustle’ (GRC 1988, p.13). 
 
 
 
<Image removed due to copyright restrictions> 
 
Figure 10: The developments proposed as part of Stage Two of the City By The Bay plan (GRC 1988, p.11) 
<Image removed due to copyright restrictions> 
 
Figure 11: Artist’s impression of the completed Bay Link project (GRC 1988, p.13) 
 
Before any meaningful progress could be made towards the realisation of the second and final stage of 
the City By The Bay plan, the city of Geelong entered the 1990s and was faced with a range of further 
crises and challenges. In June 1990, the Pyramid, Countrywide and Geelong Building Societies 
closed, and up to 200,000 accounts at 54 branches, 19 of them in the group’s Geelong heartland, were 
frozen (Schelle 2018, p.25). In all, an estimated 220,000 Victorians were victims of the collapse, and 
the resulting local economic crisis cast a pall over Geelong, as people lost their life savings, 
businesses and homes (Schelle 2018, p.25). A 1994 parliamentary inquiry found that company 
chairman Bill Farrow had pursued ‘reckless and imprudent lending policies’ which deliberately 
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breached the provisions of the Building Societies Act (Schelle 2018, p.25). In 1993, Victorian Premier 
Jeff Kennett cast himself in the role of Geelong’s saviour, dubbing himself the unofficial ‘Minister for 
Geelong’ and pledging funds for waterfront redevelopment works (Sinnott 2016). However, other 
changes instituted by the Kennett Government at this time would prove incredibly disruptive to the 
foundations of local communities.  
While local government had not featured as an issue in the 1992 Victorian state election, in the years 
following his electoral victory Premier Kennett embarked on one of the most radical programs of 
local government amalgamation and restructuring seen in any Australian state (Kiss 1999, p.111). 
Sweeping amalgamations throughout the state left only the Borough of Queenscliff untouched and 
reduced the number of municipalities from 210 to 78 (Kiss 1999, p.111). In addition, Kiss (1999, 
p.111) notes that Compulsory Competitive Tendering of at least 50 per cent of council expenditures 
‘led to the contracting in or out of every type of council service’. Geelong was the first region to go 
through amalgamation, with six local Councils and part of a seventh (Barrabool) formed into one 
large municipality called the City of Greater Geelong in 1993 (COGG 2018b). Across the state, 
opinion was divided on Premier Kennett’s local government restructures. The City of Geelong, for 
example, had indicated its support for a change in the boundaries of local government several years 
before the reforms were implemented (City of Geelong 1991). Critics of the amalgamations, on the 
other hand, often situated Kennett’s rationalisation of local government in the context of the broader 
‘economic rationalist’ agenda that was a feature of his administration, an agenda which left no area of 
policy untouched (Economou & Costar 1999, p.x). In pursuing the amalgamations, the Kennett 
Government understood itself to be taking decisive action to resolve the ‘pressing financial issues 
facing the state’ (Martin 1999, cited in Connoley 2007, p.6). However, a less openly-stated intention 
of the reforms was to reduce the size of the public sector workforce, and, in conjunction with this, to 
reduce the influence of the public sector unions which conservative think tank, the Institute of Public 
Affairs, suggested had ‘created work inefficiencies and had unnecessarily promoted the expansion of 
government services’ (Institute of Public Affairs 1993, cited in Connoley 2007, p.6). One estimate 
suggested that as many as 11,000 council positions were lost across the state by the late 1990s (Millar 
& Dowling 2004).   
 
In the context of this period of crisis, transformation and restructuring, concerns about youth 
unemployment in Geelong sometimes mirrored, sometimes shaped, broader conversations and debates 
about ‘the problem’. In 1992, with the Australian economy emerging from recession, the 
unemployment rate among 15-to-19-year-olds reached 24.2 percent nationally (Mission Australia 
2006, p.1). At this time, Geelong’s youth (15-19) unemployment rate was 16.1 percent, 3.6 percentage 
points higher than that for Victoria (GRC 1992a, p.3)20. However, the differential spatial distribution 
of youth unemployment between Geelong’s suburbs was such that, in 1992, 53.5 percent of people 
aged 20 or younger receiving either the Job Search or Newstart allowance were residents of the 
northern suburbs of Geelong (GRC 1992b, p.1), reflecting the contraction in the number of job 
opportunities with the decline of manufacturing industries in Geelong’s northern suburbs. A 
precipitous decline in the availability of apprenticeships in the early 1990s was another likely 
contributor to this state of affairs. While the Ford Motor Company remained the major employer of 
skilled trades persons in the Geelong region, a 1991 report in the Geelong Advertiser noted that the 
 
20 The Geelong Regional Commission calculated these rates through an analysis of numbers of people registered 
with the Commonwealth Employment Service. The GRC (1992a, p.1) explains that, at this time, Australian 
Bureau of Statistics data did not accurately reflect unemployment rates in the Geelong region because ‘Geelong 
is part of an ABS region which stretches to the [South Australian] border and useful breakdown of labour force 
figures for specific cities/regions is not possible’.  
93 
 
number of first-year apprenticeship positions in the region had effectively halved between 1990 and 
1991, in large part as a result of Ford’s downsizing (Busfield 1991, p.1). In 1993 the Federal 
Government assembled a Task Force on Regional Development, chaired by secretary of the ACTU, 
Bill Kelty, and asked it to ‘identify how the regions can best contribute to national economic growth 
including attracting greater private sector investment’ (Minister for Industry, Technology and 
Regional Development 1993, p.1). In its submission to the Task Force, a confederation of Geelong-
based community service agencies suggested that ‘the social blight that is our rising unemployment’ 
was one of the most pressing issues facing the Geelong region (Barwon Regional Housing Council et 
al. 1993, p.22). The submission noted that, in Geelong, there were a significant number of 16-to-20-
year-olds living below the accepted poverty line. Barwon Regional Housing Council et al. (1993, 
p.22) identified this cohort as one of three groups most adversely affected by processes of economic 
restructuring and recent changes to the Federal Government’s industry policy, alongside single 
parents with dependents, and the families of the long term unemployed. The submission observed 
with particular alarm the deleterious local effects of the rise in the numbers of long-term unemployed:  
The region’s long term unemployed are quickly becoming a ‘forgotten group’ and a growing 
underclass. As the experience of the previous recession has shown, a great many of the long 
term unemployed remain jobless. It is not uncommon for support workers to be still working 
with unemployed people with whom they began working a decade ago. It is more than likely 
that this phenomenon will be compounded as we emerge from this recession. (Barwon 
Regional Housing Council et al. 1993, p.19) 
The Finn, Mayer and Carmichael reports: framing the problem of youth 
unemployment 
Through the late 20th century, a succession of government-commissioned special committees inquired, 
variously, into the state of the labour market, the pace and scope of technological change, and the 
adequacy of existing education and training approaches, among a range of other issues. A consistent 
theme running through these various inquiries was an explicit, though sometimes implicit, concern 
with the problem of youth unemployment. The Williams Committee of Inquiry into Education, 
Training and Employment reported in 1979, and was among a range of major policy reviews 
commissioned by the Fraser Liberal-Country Party Coalition Government in the late 1970s (Watkins 
1984, p.11). Schools should have a central role in fostering young people’s employability, the 
Williams review suggested, through ‘greater attention to the problems of transition’, a greater 
emphasis on ‘teaching the essential basic skills required for further learning’ and encouraging in 
students ‘a disciplined habit of work’ (Committee of Inquiry into Education and Training 1979, 
p.133). However, in a later interview, the chairman of the review, Professor Bruce Williams, 
expressed the belief that ‘the solution to the problems of unemployment is not going to be found 
within the education system. It can help, in all conditions it can help, but it can only help. It cannot 
solve’ (Hoffman 1979, cited in Watkins 1984, p.8). An earlier working party, convened by the 
Australian Education Council to investigate young people’s transitions from secondary education to 
employment, had similarly concluded that ‘education systems have no control over the labour market 
situation…they cannot by themselves correct the social problems which arise from unemployment’ 
(Working Party on the Transition from Secondary Education to Employment 1976, cited in Freeland 
& Sharp 1981, pp.58-59).  
With the election of the Hawke Labor Government, however, reform of education and training 
systems was harnessed much more firmly to the imperatives of national economic recovery and 
reconstruction. And with the ‘opening up’ of Australia to global forces through the 1980s, a range of 
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new international influences were brought to bear on Australian education, training and labour market 
policy. ‘As a central policy-making agency’, Soucek (1994, p.66) notes, ‘the OECD played an 
extremely influential part in the subsequent shaping of individual member countries’ educational 
policies’. In key policy documents released by the OECD in the late 1980s, there was an explicit 
linking of education to processes of capital accumulation: Structural Adjustment and Economic 
Performance, and Education and the Economy in a Changing World are two examples (OECD 1987, 
1989 cited in Soucek 1994, p.66). In arguing for skills to be conceptualised as competencies, and for 
these to be work-related, documented and transferable, and nationally recognised, the latter report 
presaged many of the reforms associated with the emergence of the new skills paradigm in Australia 
in the 1990s (Soucek 1994, pp.66-67). Ryan and Hawthorne (2011, p.10) trace the OECD’s interest in 
these matters even further back, to the 1984 ‘landmark conference’ Competence and Cooperation, 
which examined the relationship between vocational education and enterprise skill formation. In this 
chapter I will explore in more detail the influence of the work of key agencies such as the OECD in 
shaping conceptions of ‘human capital’.  
 
In addition to the ‘trickle down’ of policy agendas originating at the supranational scale, Australian 
policy actors were ‘reaching out’ to overseas jurisdictions. Australian delegations ventured to other 
parts of the globe to gain insight into the processes and policies adopted in other countries, and to 
consider whether, and how, these should be adapted to the Australian context. In the 1980s Australia 
was facing a decline in its terms of trade and a balance of payments crisis. A 1986 trade union-led 
tour of Sweden, Norway, West Germany, Austria and the UK investigated how these northern 
European countries had successfully overcome similar challenges and established their international 
competitiveness. The resulting report, Australia Reconstructed (Australian Council of Trade Unions 
[ACTU] & Trade Development Council [TDC] 1987, p.xi), proposed a series of recommendations 
across six key policy areas: Macroeconomic Policy; Wages, Prices and Incomes; Trade and Industry 
Policy; Labour Market Policies; Industrial Democracy; and Trade Unions. The report observed that 
Sweden and West Germany, in particular, had pioneered new approaches to the delivery of general 
and vocational education, ensuring the development of a highly-skilled workforce (ACTU & TDC 
1987, pp.108-109). This finding left a particular impression on the report authors, who argued that 
‘Australia's international competitiveness depends on our ability to develop the skill base of our 
workforce’ (ACTU & TDC 1987, p.xiii). Symes (1995, p.260) maintains that the recommendations 
offered by Australia Reconstructed ‘provide[d] the blueprint for the educational restructuring of the 
1990s’.  
 
Symes (1995, p.259) suggests that what was distinctive about the post-Fordist reworking of education 
in Australia, epitomised by the Finn, Mayer and Carmichael Reports, was that these reforms were 
‘grounded in an accord politics marked by a confluence of interests between unions, governments and 
industry’. It is significant, in terms of my later discussion of the rise to dominance of a view of the 
purpose of education as being about the development of an individual’s human capital, that 
educationalists were largely absent from the groups of consultants responsible for producing each of 
these reports. Brian Finn, for example, was Managing Director of the Australian branch of 
multinational technology company IBM; Eric Mayer was chair of the Business/Higher Education 
Round Table, and former Chief Executive Officer of life insurance company National Mutual; and 
Laurie Carmichael, assistant secretary of the ACTU, drew on his experience as one of the authors of 
Australia Reconstructed in his role as chair of the Carmichael review (Symes 1995, p.261). Indeed, as 
Collins (1992, p.45) observed, ‘Finn is the first national level report dealing with schooling and 
universities which has dispensed with the screen of professional educational expertise and been 
written unblushingly by managers’. In what follows, my aim is to explore the Finn, Mayer and 
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Carmichael Reports as key elements of an ‘apparatus’, the ‘dominant strategic function’ (Foucault et 
al. 1980, p.195) of which is the development of the ‘employability’ and ‘human capital’ of the 
individual young person.  
The Finn Review 
The ‘Finn Review’, officially titled Young people’s participation in post-compulsory education and 
training: report of the Australian Education Council Review Committee, was a major national review 
of post-compulsory education and training that was published in 1991, with the review committee 
reporting to the Australian Education Council and the Ministers of Vocational Education, 
Employment and Training. While rates of young people’s retention in education and training had risen 
throughout the 1980s, the Report of the Working Party to establish the Agenda and Scope for an AEC 
Review of Post-Compulsory Education and Training (Finn Report 1991, vol.2, p.4) noted that 
‘Australia falls well short of achieving universal participation in education and training by the 15-19 
age group’. Most Australian states and territories were responding to the need to promote greater 
interlinkages between schools and vocational education providers such as colleges of Technical and 
Further Education (TAFE), and between the curriculum they offered. However, at the national scale 
there remained a lack of clarity around the ‘appropriate form and focus of education and training 
provision at the post-compulsory level, and the organisational and delivery arrangements which will 
best meet the needs of the 15-19 age group’ (Finn Report 1991, vol.2, p.3). In light of these issues, it 
was proposed that the national committee of inquiry would examine seven key terms of reference: 
 
1. The appropriate form and level of a new national target for participation in post-compulsory 
education and training, an appropriate basis of measurement of that target, and a 
recommended timetable and strategies for its achievement; 
2. Appropriate national curriculum principles designed to enable all young people, including 
those with special needs, to develop key competencies, with the associated implications for 
curriculum development, initial teacher preparation and continuing professional development; 
3. The means by which links can be drawn between different education and training pathways 
and sectors to expand the options available to all young people, including those with special 
needs, and to achieve national coherence in entry and exit points between education, training 
and employment; 
4. The appropriate roles and responsibilities of schools, TAFE and higher education in the 
provision of post-compulsory education and training for young people…and the roles of 
private and industry providers; 
5. Current barriers to the effective participation of disadvantaged young people, including those 
with disabilities, in post-compulsory education and training, and strategies for increasing their 
participation and improving their educational and labour market outcomes; 
6. The implications of current and prospective changes in post-compulsory education and 
training for the provision of careers education, information and counselling to students, 
including the requirements for information on educational pathways and associated career 
paths; and 
7. The likely resource and funding implications of existing trends in, and further strategies for, 
post-compulsory education and training. (Finn Report 1991, vol.2, p.10) 
 
The review consulted widely, receiving more than 80 written submissions from interested individuals, 
education bureaucrats, and representatives of schools, higher education, vocational education, 
industry, and community service organisations, among others (Finn Report 1991, vol.2, pp.143-149). 
The review committee conducted face-to-face consultations with the following organisations:  
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National Catholic Education Commission; Australian Council of Trade Unions; Union of 
Australian College Academics; Federation of Australian University Staff Associations; 
Australian Teachers Union; Metal and Engineering Workers Union; Youth Affairs Council of 
Australia; Australian Parents Council; Australian Vice-Chancellors’ Committee; Dusseldorp 
Skills Forum; Industry Education Forum; Business Council of Australia; Confederation of 
Australian Industry; Metal Trades Industry Association; Australian Chamber of 
Manufacturers; Australian Council of Social Services; Association of Youth Affairs Councils; 
National Board of Employment, Education and Training; National Training Board. (Finn 
Report 1991, vol.2, p.153) 
Additional information gathering activities included the commissioning of special reports to examine 
the barriers standing in the way of disadvantaged young people or those with a disability participating 
in post-compulsory education and training more effectively. Overseas missions were also deployed to 
study how other jurisdictions were developing vocational education and training systems. Members of 
the Finn review committee represented Australia at a seminar attended by several OECD member 
countries on ‘Linkages in Vocational-Technical Education and Training’ (VOTEC) in Arizona, USA 
(Finn Report 1991, vol. 2, p.15). A key point of discussion was the suggestion that it was increasingly 
recognised internationally that the ‘half-life’ of skills and knowledge was shrinking: ‘an estimate of 5 
years before skills need to be up-dated, and strategies re-aligned, was the subject of keen interest’, the 
Australian delegation noted (Finn Report 1991, vol.2, p.27)21. And processes of technological and 
labour market change were demanding new skills requirements:  
Where in the past, on the assembly line, for example, people could be trained within a week, 
and required little cognitive ability at any sophisticated level, the modern workplace demands 
a far higher level of intellectual acuity of ‘base-level’ workers. The modern workplace 
demands workers with familiarity and confidence with information technology, and more 
advance[d] levels of language, communication and numeracy skills. (Finn Report 1991, vol.2, 
p.27) 
 
The Report of the Australian Delegation to the International Seminar on Linkages in VOTEC 
suggested that, internationally, there was a growing evidence base for the power of ‘pathways’, 
‘lifelong learning’, and a greater convergence of general and vocational education in meeting the new 
labour market and skills challenges (Finn Report 1991, vol.2, pp.23-27). These recommendations 
would provide the foundations of the reforms proposed by the wider Finn Review Committee. 
‘“Pathways” is a powerful and persuasive concept to drive policies and practices for post-compulsory 
education and training’, the Australian delegation argued:  
A fundamental virtue in the pathways concept is its positive overtones of clear points of 
progression, and successive educational and training milestones. These milestones can then be 
regarded as defined in competency (or outcome) terms rather than as they are currently 
defined by duration (or time served). (Finn Report 1991, vol.2, p.23) 
 
The ‘learning continuum’ was proposed as a model for facilitating lifelong learning (see Figure 12 
below). As the authors explain, ‘education and training should NOT be perceived as sets of “blocks” 
 
21 Krbavac and Stretton (1988, p.6) trace the argument that the ‘half-life’ of skills is diminishing back to ‘some 
United States companies’, who, in the late 1980s ‘calculated that the “occupational half-life”, the time in which 
one half of workers’ knowledge and skills becomes obsolete, has declined from 7-14 years to 3-5 years’.  
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…the dynamism of the broader environment in which VOTEC operates requires more fluid policy 
development strategies and implementation mechanisms’ (Finn Report 1991, vol.2, p.25). In the 
learning continuum model represented in Figure 12, the various service providers delivering learning 
experiences, including TAFE/Higher Education (multi-modal), private providers, enterprise-based 
providers (on-the-job education and training), and schools, form the ‘thread’ at the centre of the 
continuum (Finn Report 1991, vol.2, p.25). The learning continuum model should be considered 
simplistically, the authors suggest: 
As a fluid form of pathways which provide flexibility for individuals in moving in and out of 
learning modes. An individual may access learning at a given point in the situational context 
(on-job) but at all stages is progressing along the continuum. The individual may then move 
along the curve to develop the appropriate cognitive/theoretical appreciations of the 
experientially based learning experience. (Finn Report 1991, vol.2, pp.25-26) 
 
Importantly, this model was understood as facilitating a greater articulation of ‘general’ education 
with its vocational counterpart. ‘International experience is showing clearly’, the authors argued, that 
the maintenance of a distinction between the two sectors ‘is not only unsustainable, but in many 
respects, is one of the major obstacles to economic regeneration of the workforce, and the process of 
work re-organisation to meet the demands of rapidly changing technology and production processes’ 
(Finn Report 1991, vol.2, p.26). 
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Figure 12: The Learning Continuum model proposed by the Report of the Australian Delegation to the 
International Seminar on Linkages in VOTEC (Finn Report 1991, vol.2, p.25) 
 
The convergence of general and vocational education was also represented in diagrammatic form (see 
Figure 13 below) in the main body of the Finn Report. In Australia, as in many other Anglophone 
countries, the Review Committee argued, there persisted an educational and cultural tradition: 
Which until recently has tended to see as separate the concepts of ‘education’ and ‘training’, 
‘theoretical’ and ‘practical’, and ‘general’ and ‘vocational’ education…Moreover, in common 
understanding the concepts of ‘skills’ and ‘skill training’ have been associated with only a 
limited range of occupations, mainly the so-called ‘skilled trades’. (Finn Report 1991, vol.1, 
p.5) 
In contrast, the education systems of France, Japan, Italy, Finland and Sweden were not structured 
according to this notional separation of general and vocational education. In those countries ‘schools 
accept as a matter of course that they have a role in providing students with skills that are required by 
the labour market, as well as roles in preparing them for higher education and for active citizenship’ 
(Dusseldorp Skills Forum 1991, cited in Finn Report 1991, vol.1, p.5). The new forms of work 
organisation, the Review Committee argued, were shaping the demand for workers that were not only 
‘multi-skilled, creative and adaptable’, but were possessed of the civic and ethical capabilities and 
mindsets that enabled them to participate actively in society (Finn Report 1991, vol.1, pp.5-6). This 
demand could be met through the concept of ‘General/Vocational Education’ (see Figure 13), which 
would necessitate a greater convergence in the curricula offered by schools and TAFE. This 
convergence would require: 
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Schools to become more concerned with issues of employability and the provision of broad 
vocational education; and TAFE to recognise that initial vocational courses must increasingly 
be concerned with competencies that are more general than those which, for example, 
characterised the traditional craft-based apprenticeships. (Finn Report 1991, vol.1, p.7) 
Although there would be increasing overlap between these two types of education, this convergence 
was necessarily incomplete, for ‘there are elements of general education which do not have any clear 
vocational character, and there are elements of vocational education which are so specific to an 
individual task or occupation that they have no wider application’ (Finn Report 1991, vol.1, p.7).  
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Figure 13: The Finn Report’s illustration of the convergence of general education and vocational education to 
form the concept of ‘General/Vocational Education’ (Finn Report 1991, vol.1, p.8) 
 
On the question of the problem of youth unemployment, the Finn Report (1991, vol.1, p.15) suggested 
that transitions between education and work in the teenage years were often characterised by a degree 
of flux and uncertainty: ‘changes of jobs and short periods of unemployment often reflect 
experimentation with different employment options. For a small proportion of teenagers however the 
transition is very risky indeed, with prolonged periods of unemployment and underemployment’. The 
Finn Report (1991, vol.1, pp.28-32) identified the drop in the availability of full-time employment, the 
at-times slow growth in apprenticeships and traineeships, and the move toward recruitment of older, 
more experienced workers in sectors which historically had been major providers of youth 
employment, including retail, banking, and the public service, as key factors making the transition 
from school to work more difficult for a growing number of young people. In much of this discussion 
it was tacitly accepted that boosting rates of young people’s participation in education and training 
offered the best strategy for addressing the problem of youth unemployment, through absorbing the 
surplus of potentially ‘idle’ young people within education and training systems. ‘It is certainly 
likely’, the Finn Report (1991, vol.1, p.15) suggested, ‘that increased educational participation over 
the last decade has constrained the level of teenage unemployment which would otherwise have been 
experienced’: 
The combined effects of an increase in the size of the youth population and a decline in full-
time employment over the 1980s would have led to increased teenage unemployment had it 
not been for the growth in full-time educational participation over the same period. In 1980 
some 8.5 percent of all teenagers were unemployed and looking for full-time jobs, compared 
to about 8 percent in 1991, despite the less favourable labour market conditions in 1991.  
It was further intimated that the benefits of increased participation would also flow to individual 
young people themselves, providing them with a degree of ‘insurance’ against unemployment: 
‘whatever the relationship between education and employment patterns for teenagers it is important to 
note that young people with higher levels of education and training experience lower rates of 
unemployment than their peers’ (Finn Report 1991, vol.1, p.15).  
 
In order to facilitate progress towards the goal of universal participation of 15-19-year-olds in 
education and training, the Finn Review Committee proposed a set of new national performance 
targets for rates of educational attainment and participation, with the key target that ‘by the year 2001, 
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95 per cent of 19-year-olds should have completed Year 12 or an initial post-school qualification or 
be participating in education and training’ (Finn Report 1991, vol.1, pp.ix-x). Governments could 
support the proposed participation targets, the Review Committee suggested, through the 
implementation of an ‘Education and Training Guarantee’, whereby ‘all young people would be 
guaranteed a place in school or TAFE after Year 10 for two years of full-time education or training or 
its equivalent part-time for up to three years’ (Finn Report 1991, vol.1, pp.91-92). Finally, one of the 
other key outcomes of the Finn Review was the Committee’s identification of six key employment-
related competencies, in the areas of language and communication; mathematics; scientific and 
technological understanding; cultural understanding; problem solving; and personal and interpersonal 
characteristics, which ‘young people should be able to develop…regardless of the education or 
training pathway that they follow’ (Finn Report 1991, vol.1, p.x). The responsibility for the detailed 
conceptualisation of these key competencies, however, would fall to the Mayer Committee, which 
reported its findings in 1992.  
The Mayer Report  
The remit of the Mayer Committee was to develop the key competencies concept recommended in the 
Finn Report. The Committee’s final report, Key competencies: report of the Committee to advise the 
Australian Education Council and Ministers of Vocational Education, Employment and Training on 
employment-related key competencies for postcompulsory education and training, was handed down 
in September 1992. The Mayer Report was the culmination of three stages of research and 
consultation, which included a ‘Preliminary Industry Validation’ of the proposed Key Competencies, 
and an ‘Access and Equity Audit’ examining issues of access for disadvantaged and disengaged 
young people (Mayer Committee 1992, p.vii). The Mayer Report defined ‘key competencies’ as 
‘competencies essential for effective participation in the emerging patterns of work and work 
organisation’:    
They focus on the capacity to apply knowledge and skills in an integrated way in work 
situations. Key Competencies are generic in that they apply to work generally rather than 
being specific to work in particular occupations or industries. This characteristic means that 
the Key Competencies are not only essential for participation in work but are also essential 
for effective participation in further education and in adult life more generally. (Mayer 
Committee 1992, p.7) 
 
The seven Key Competencies proposed by the Mayer Committee (1992, p.4) included ‘collecting, 
analysing and organising information’, ‘communicating ideas and information’, ‘planning and 
organising activities’, ‘working with others and in teams’, ‘using mathematical ideas and techniques’ 
‘solving problems’ and ‘using technology’. The six key competencies proposed in the Finn Report – 
language and communication; mathematics; scientific and technological understanding; cultural 
understanding; problem solving; and personal and interpersonal characteristics – had undergone 
development and evolution in order to reflect the Mayer Committee’s understanding of competence as 
concerned with the application, and not simply the acquisition, of knowledge and skills (Mayer 
Committee 1992, pp.11-12). As an example, the Mayer Committee (1992, p.11) highlighted that the 
Key Competency of ‘using technology’ emphasised the application of scientific knowledge and skills 
in ways that its earlier incarnation in the Finn Report, ‘scientific and technological understanding’, did 
not. While cultural understanding, arts, creativity, and family and household management, among 
others, did not make the final list, the Mayer Committee (1992, pp.11-12) suggested they were 
nonetheless integral to the Key Competencies, representing essential forms of knowledge 
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underpinning the Key Competencies, or contexts in which the Key Competencies could be developed 
and applied.  
 
The Mayer Committee (1992, p.7) suggests that it ‘drew on a wide range of sources in the process of 
arriving at the set of Key Competencies’. Consultations with industry provided the Committee with 
insights into ‘the attributes required and valued most highly by industry for entry to the workforce’, 
and the Preliminary Industry Validation studies provided ‘direct and practical input’ on the generic 
employment-related competencies that young people would need (Mayer Committee 1992, pp.7-8). 
Dialogue with the school and training sectors, including with curriculum workers and practitioners, 
represented another key reference point. Most significant, the Mayer Committee (1992, p.8) 
maintains, was the extensive feedback generated in response to the initial discussion papers produced 
by the Committee, which provided ‘opportunities to test and refine proposals with the school and 
training sectors, industry and the broader community’. The Mayer Committee was also in accord with 
the broad consensus forming among education policymakers across several of the industrialised 
democracies (the US, UK and New Zealand) around what should constitute key employment-related 
competencies for young people. In the early 1990s, Australia was one of several countries 
experimenting with the development of a national generic skills scheme, and the Mayer Committee 
identified many similarities in the content and scope of the UK’s ‘Core Skills’, ‘Workplace Know-
How’ in the US, ‘Essential Skills’ in New Zealand, and Australia’s Key Competencies (Mayer 
Committee 1992, pp.13-15). These countries were meeting the challenge posed by economic 
restructuring and the emerging forms of work organisation through very similar processes of 
education and training reform, and the similarities across these various schemes ultimately reinforced 
‘the Committee’s belief in the importance of the Key Competencies and the validity of the proposed 
set’ (Mayer Committee 1992, p.14). Figure 14 (below) appears in the Mayer Report, and is a mapping 
of the set of Key Competencies against its UK, US and New Zealand counterparts.  
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Figure 14: A comparison of the Mayer Key Competencies with similar generic skills schemes in the UK, US 
and New Zealand (Mayer Committee 1992, p.15). 
The Carmichael Report 
Where the Finn and Mayer Reports focused on general (albeit work-related) competencies, the 
Carmichael Report was concerned with vocationally-specific competencies (Kenway et al. 1997, p.5). 
Officially titled The Australian Vocational Certificate Training System, the Carmichael Report was 
handed down in early 1992 after several months of deliberations by the Employment and Skills 
Formation Council (ESFC). The Carmichael recommendations led to the establishment of an 
integrated national system of providing entry-level training that was designed to replace existing 
apprenticeships and traineeships over a two-year period beginning in 1995 (Kenway et al. 1997, p.5). 
It was intended that the set of seven general competencies established by the Mayer Report would 
complement and underpin the acquisition of vocational and occupation-specific competencies (ESFC 
1992, p.vii). Kenway et al. (1997, p.5) observe that four key arrangements were planned for providing 
vocational education and training: school-based; part-time work in combination with part-time study; 
a vocational year (Year 13); and employment-based training. As with the Finn and Mayer Reviews, 
the Carmichael Report was shaped with the input of a variety of individuals, agencies and 
organisations situated within the business and industry, government, trade union, education and 
training, and community service sectors (ESFC 1992, pp.154-170). 
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In his foreword to The Australian Vocational Certificate Training System, Laurie Carmichael 
suggested that the Employment and Skills Formation Council ‘saw as a fundamental task the devising 
of a system that would extend structured entry level training for that large number of young people 
who do not at present have the opportunity to participate’ (ESFC 1992, p.v). However, ‘this report is 
not a response to youth unemployment in the current recession’, he specified, ‘it is much more a 
response to structural changes in industry and the labour market which are shaping our future for 
decades to come’ (ESFC 1992, p.vi). In its deliberations on access and equity issues, the ESFC (1992, 
pp.98-104) identified women, NESB (non-English speaking background) migrants, Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people, people with disabilities, and ‘the rural poor and marginal workers’ as the 
populations most likely to be overrepresented in unemployment and underemployment statistics, and 
poorly represented in vocational education and training programs. Women, for example, were 
disadvantaged by their concentration in industries and occupations characterised by inadequate and 
poorly recognised training, a lack of career paths, and low wages (ESFC 1992, pp.98-99). The ESFC 
proposed a series of targets and recommendations for boosting the participation of disadvantaged 
populations in vocational programs by 2001. Where addressing gender inequity was concerned, these 
recommendations included incentives to encourage young women to enter ‘non-traditional’ vocations 
and vocational training, and extending equal training, accreditation and recognition arrangements to 
traditionally female occupations (ESFC 1992, pp.99-100).  
The Purpose of Education: the development of an individual’s human capital  
As Prime Minister Bob Hawke observed in 1984: ‘as a nation we must be prepared to invest heavily 
in human skills. The more efficient use of our human resources will enhance prospects for achieving 
economic recovery’ (Hawke 1984, cited in Bessant 1988, p.25). Hawke’s conceptualising of workers 
as the nation’s ‘human resources’ not only revealed how the language of the corporate sector had 
begun to reconfigure and reshape the education debate, but was significant against the background of 
the increasingly vocal calls of business interests that education should be made more responsive to the 
needs of industry (Bessant 1988). Symes (1995, p.247) observes that in the late 1980s-early 1990s 
period there was a ‘resurgence of human capital imperatives in educational policy’. He further notes 
that ‘unlike its manifestations in the past, which contained Fordist and Taylorist elements, the new 
nexus which is now being forged between school and work is post-Fordist in character’ (Symes 1995, 
p.247). Traditionally the school was cast in the role of a ‘moral technology’, Symes (1995, pp.250-
251) argues, responsible for inculcating in young people the skills and dispositions appropriate to the 
industrial work ethic, and ensuring the reproduction of the hierarchical, highly-differentiated 
workforce demanded by the Fordist regime. In contrast, the new school-work nexus being shaped in 
the era of ‘flexible specialization’, ‘just-in-time’ production, and the emerging ‘knowledge economy’, 
was concerned with the production of the ‘multi-skilled’ worker capable of ‘lifelong learning’, and 
whose skills in ‘symbolic analysis’ were in demand in the new economy (Symes 1995, pp.254-257, 
263). 
Key agencies and knowledge flows shaping understandings of ‘human capital’  
Human capital theory understands the purpose of education as providing individuals with skills and 
credentials, with the ‘human capital’, that will allow them to accrue economic rewards in the labour 
market. The theory assumes that the investments of governments and individuals in education will, in 
the aggregate, enhance productivity and contribute to national economic growth (OECD 1989). 
Marginson (2019) and Blackmore (1992) highlight that, in the conditions of relative prosperity that 
prevailed in the industrialised democracies in the mid-20th century, the core propositions of human 
capital theory appeared to be confirmed. Marginson (2019, p.288) writes that ‘the 1960s’ expansion of 
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opportunity and social mobility enabled human capital economists to imagine that the theory was not 
just necessary in explaining the relationship between higher education and work, it was sufficient’. 
The appeal of human capital theory at this time was its ability to describe, with econometric 
sophistication, the relationship between education, work, productivity and earnings (Marginson 2019).  
The key international agencies propagating these ideas were the United Nations Educational, Social 
and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), and later, the OECD and International Labour Organisation 
(ILO). UNESCO observed in 1968 that, within the space of ‘ten short years’ there had been a 
dramatic surge of interest, across many parts of the world, in the potential roles of education in 
economic development (UNESCO 1968, p.15). In Readings In The Economics of Education, 
UNESCO (1968) invited a range of economists to reflect on the various aspects of the education-
economy nexus and their implications for issues of ‘manpower’, education planning, and government 
expenditure and the broader financing of education, among other issues. The OECD (1989, p.50) 
highlights that, beginning in the 1960s, interest in growth accounting studies saw attempts in a 
number of countries to quantify the contribution of education to national economic growth. However, 
the OECD (1989, pp.49-50) noted that human capital theory was but one of a number of theories 
which sought to explain the relationship of educational attainment to labour productivity, alongside 
theories of sorting-screening, socialisation, and others. The OECD (1989, pp.51-52) warned that:  
 
There are obvious dangers in relying too much on any one of the theories of the economic 
significance of education, or in excluding other factors in employment and economic 
performance. Even in the case of youth unemployment, a problem linked so closely to 
educational failure…the limits of education policy’s ability to ameliorate labour market 
problems can be seen clearly. The youth unemployment problem has many dimensions that 
go beyond education and training solutions. Some of these dimensions may rest on the 
demand side of the labour market, outside the control of schools and training institutions.  
 
Marginson (2019, p.288) observes that, in the late 20th century, as equality of opportunity and social 
mobility faltered in many of the advanced capitalist countries, the explanatory power of human capital 
theory was nonetheless strengthened. Indeed, a 1998 OECD document reveals that human capital had 
become a key priority area in the Organisation’s research and policy work:   
Investment in human capital is at the heart of strategies in OECD countries to promote 
economic prosperity, fuller employment, and social cohesion. Individuals, organisations and 
nations increasingly recognise that high levels of knowledge, skills and competence are 
essential to their future security and success. (Centre for Educational Research and Innovation 
[CERI] 1998, p.7) 
 
According to CERI (1998, p.9), the concept of human capital ‘powerfully emphasises how important 
people have become, in knowledge- and competence-based economies’: ‘human capital…constitutes 
an intangible asset with the capacity to enhance or support productivity, innovation and 
employability’. Human resources development and training was also a focus of discussions among the 
member states of the ILO gathered at the 2000 International Labour Conference. With knowledge and 
skills increasingly representing a key source of economic growth and productivity in a large number 
of countries, the ILO (2000, p.5) predicted that education and training would play a crucial role in 
equipping nations, enterprises and individuals with the skills and capabilities to overcome the 
constraints of globalisation, benefit from processes of technological change, as well as ‘create more 
and better jobs, and improve incomes and living conditions’. The concept of employability was a 
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central theme of the ILO’s (2000) analyses and recommendations, and in particular, its analysis of 
policies and programs for youth employment and unemployment.  
A key text providing the theoretical justification for arguments in support of the ‘upskilling’ of the 
workforce was the 1984 book The Second Industrial Divide. In this book, Michael Piore and Charles 
Sabel (1984, p.5) advance the concept of the ‘industrial divide’, a moment of rupture in which ‘social 
conflicts of the most apparently unrelated kinds determine the direction of technological development 
for the following decades’. They suggest that after passing through the first industrial divide in the 
19th century, the industrialised democracies were, in the 1970s, facing a second divide: ‘the present 
deterioration in economic performance results from the limits of the model of industrial development 
that is founded on mass production’ (Piore & Sabel 1984, p.4). The marginalisation of systems of 
craft production at the time of the first industrial divide ultimately represented a missed opportunity, 
Piore and Sabel (1984, pp.5-6) argue, to channel human creativity and ingenuity towards the 
democratic improvement of economy and society: 
Under somewhat different historical conditions, we argue, firms using a combination of craft 
skill and flexible equipment might have played a central role in modern economic life – 
instead of giving way, in almost all sectors of manufacturing, to corporations based on mass 
production. Had this line of mechanised craft production prevailed, we might today think of 
manufacturing firms as linked to particular communities, rather than as the independent 
organisations – barely involved with their neighbours – that, through mass production, seem 
omnipresent.  
In Piore and Sabel’s work could be found not only a deeply felt desire for a return to the world of the 
autonomous craftworker (Watkins 1994, p.15), but more importantly, the assumption that an 
investment in human skills was the kind of solid foundation on which a nation’s future economic 
prosperity could depend. This sentiment can be traced through Bob Hawke’s entreaty that Australia 
should ‘invest heavily in human skills’ and the argument of the ACTU and TDC (1987, p.xiii) in 
Australia Reconstructed that ‘Australia's international competitiveness depends on our ability to 
develop the skill base of our workforce’. It was also a feature of the proposals advanced by John 
Dawkins (1987, p.8) in envisioning an enhanced role for the higher education sector in restructuring 
the Australian economy. He noted that Australia continued to lag behind several other OECD 
countries in rates of educational participation and output of graduates, suggesting that a substantial 
increase in participation across the age ranges would be necessary to ameliorate this situation, as 
would efforts to ‘improve the educational opportunities available to those people who have not 
traditionally participated in the system’ such as people from financially disadvantaged backgrounds, 
people from rural and isolated areas, and Aboriginal people (Dawkins 1987, pp.9-13, 21). Dawkins’ 
contention appeared to be that the productive capacities of all the various segments of the nation’s 
‘human capital’ must be activated, developed and harnessed in the effort of establishing Australia’s 
international competitiveness.  
Laurie Carmichael’s analysis of the ways in which skills approaches were being reshaped by 
processes of technological change and economic restructuring was also profoundly shaped by 
discourses of ‘human capital’. Collins (1993, p.8) maintains that from the early 1980s, and 
particularly since the 1987 publication of Australia Reconstructed, Laurie Carmichael ‘had a sense of 
urgency about the restructuring of Australia’s economic base and industrial relations’. Carmichael 
saw The Australian Vocational Certificate Training System, and competency-based education and 
training more generally, as contributing to the more fundamental process of restructuring the economy 
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and establishing the competitiveness of Australian industry on the international market (Collins 1993, 
p.8). In a 1993 essay, Workplace Imperatives for Education and Competence, Carmichael outlined 
four key imperatives which he suggested were constitutive of changes to work and work organisation 
and were shaping the demand for competency-based approaches in education and training. The first 
imperative was the ‘computer-based technological revolution’ that was eliminating a large number of 
the repetitious and laborious jobs that were previously performed by early school leavers (Carmichael 
1993, p.15). ‘The jobs created with the use of the new technology’, in contrast, ‘require significantly 
higher and broader levels of education and skills formation’ (Carmichael 1993, p.15). These 
sentiments are echoed in the 21st century skills/enterprise skills agenda that I will examine in greater 
detail in Chapter 6.  
‘The second imperative’, Carmichael (1993, p.15) continued, ‘is the emergence of markets for high 
quality products and services that are globally competitive’. Participation in these markets would 
require an incessant drive to work ‘smarter’ in order to maintain competitive advantage. Carmichael 
(1993, pp.15-16) also argued that a growing convergence of work and learning made the practice of 
lifelong learning essential. Third, the ‘increasing awareness, understanding, and legal accountability 
about the environmental and social effects of industry demand that all enterprises must take greater 
corporate responsibility for the level of knowledge, understanding and commitment of all employees 
for the outcomes and effects of their efforts’ (Carmichael 1993, p.16). Finally, Carmichael (1993, 
p.16) understood the emergence of work groups and teams as facilitating greater participation and 
involvement of all employees in the objectives of the enterprise. However, ‘to effectively participate 
in work teams…each individual needs to contribute their own particular growing expertise’, and each 
member of the team will be ‘called upon to own the objectives they pursue as a team’ (Carmichael 
1993, p.17). The increasing convergence of general and vocational education and training, and the 
further maturation of the modern labour market would usher in an almost utopian future, Carmichael’s 
predictions indicated, in which all workers could expect to participate in the labour market in highly-
skilled and highly-fulfilling roles:  
As work is substantially freed of repetitious and laborious drudgery; as work and continuous 
learning increasingly converge in the pursuit of quality, innovation, and creativity; as higher 
educational levels of entry into work are required; and as social skills and self-management 
increasingly bring a convergence of general and vocational education – then work over time 
will become more and more professional and the gap between the humanities and 
instrumentalist pursuits become less and less. (Carmichael 1993, p.20) 
 
The Dusseldorp Skills Forum, named in honour of its inaugural Chair, Dick Dusseldorp, founder of 
the Lend Lease group of companies, was established in Australia in 1989 as an ‘independent 
organisation’, formed ‘to benefit the Australian community by stimulating innovation and educational 
developments’ (Dusseldorp Forum n.d.). As the 1990s progressed, the organisation claimed an 
authoritative voice in discussions and debates on post-compulsory education and training, young 
people’s labour market transitions, and how policy and practice in these areas could adapt and 
respond to the emerging, global economic and labour market challenges. Across a series of 
publications through the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Dusseldorp Skills Forum’s research 
coordinator, Richard Sweet, became a key translator and disseminator of these debates and 
discussions for a variety of academic, business and policy audiences in Australia (see for example, 
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Sweet 1988, 1994, 1995).22 In a position paper prepared for the Finn Review, the Dusseldorp Skills 
Forum (1991, p.i) argued that the emerging skill and labour market challenges facing Australia could 
be addressed through expanding and improving options for vocational preparation in the post-
compulsory years. On the question of how the national education and training targets emerging from 
the Finn Review would be met, Sweet (1995, p.5) suggested that: 
  
Clearly we cannot and are not going to try to meet them by a never ending expansion of 
higher education…The gap between 77 per cent [the proportion of 19-year-olds completing 
post-compulsory education as of 1993] and 95 per cent will be met by expanding places in 
and outputs from vocational education and training. This means expanding the initial 
vocational education and training system by at least a third by the end of the century. 
 
In advocating for the vocational education and training system to play a greater role in young people’s 
preparation in the post-compulsory years, Sweet (1988, p.347) highlighted that Australia was, at that 
time, ranked second lowest in the OECD in terms of the proportion of post-compulsory students in 
vocational preparation programs. Sweet (1988, p.350) questioned why, in Australia, vocational 
education and training continued to be regarded as the ‘poor cousin’ of more generalist, academically-
oriented programs, when such an attitude was noticeably absent in many of the other industrialised 
economies. However, for a variety of reasons, none of the major training providers – schools, TAFE 
colleges, the workplace – would be capable of single-handedly meeting the need for expanded 
provision of vocational education and training (Dusseldorp Skills Forum 1991, p.i). Rather, the 
Dusseldorp Skills Forum (1991, p.i) argued that the way forward was through these institutions 
forming new partnerships, allowing learning in various settings to occur within a common framework 
of certification. And the Dusseldorp Skills Forum highlighted its pioneering TRAC (Training for 
Retail and Commerce) program as an example of how such a partnership-based model might work to 
the benefit of both industry and young labour market entrants. Initially piloted in the Hunter region of 
New South Wales in 1989, TRAC was later adopted in a range of locations throughout four Australian 
states and territories (Dusseldorp Skills Forum 1991, p.9; Sweet 1993, p.3). In the TRAC model, 
senior secondary students participate one day a week in a work placement in the retail, commercial 
services or hospitality industries (Sweet 1993, p.3). A key strength of TRAC, the Dusseldorp Skills 
Forum (1991, p.10) argued, was that the competency-based curriculum, designed and accredited 
jointly by industry and education providers, allowed students to develop competencies that are not 
only relevant to key service sector roles, but that also foster the broader ‘employability skills’ of 
participants.  
Employability skills for all? 
A major consequence of the Finn, Mayer and Carmichael Reports was that post-compulsory education 
and training was dramatically expanded and its utility was reconceived according to the criterion of 
young people’s ‘employability’. As the Finn Review Committee explained, a major focus of its terms 
of reference was the issue of employability:   
 
The Review’s terms of reference direct attention to the immediate post-compulsory school 
period and the transition from education to employment. The Committee has therefore 
approached the issues before it from a perspective of ‘employability’, understood in the 
 
22 In Chapter 6 a key figure in my analysis will be the Foundation for Young Australians and its New Work 
Order series. The significant role that the FYA has assumed, in the second decade of the 21st century, in 
discussions about young people’s education, training and participation in the labour market mirrors that of the 
Dusseldorp Skills Forum in the 1990s.  
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broadest possible sense. That is, the Committee has consciously given greater prominence in 
its thinking to those issues or aspects of issues which bear most directly on the process of 
transition from the world of education to the world of work. (Finn Report 1991, vol.1, p.10) 
 
And this demand for ‘employability’ was apparently emanating not only from industry but also young 
people themselves. In The Perceptions of Youth of the Education System, a report prepared for the 
Finn Review Committee, market research firm Motive Market Research (Finn Report 1991, vol.3, 
pp.10-11) noted that: 
While there were considerable individual differences in the young people we spoke to, the 
vast majority were aware of the importance of school and education. Educational 
qualifications are acknowledged as the pre-requisite for finding an effective and secure place 
in the workforce. Indeed, young people clearly see the role of the education system as 
providing them with skills which will aid their ‘employability’. There is little interest in 
knowledge for knowledge’s sake.   
 
However, such an account is problematic for a number of reasons. First, in suggesting that young 
people were demanding that education develop their employability skills rather than provide them 
with ‘knowledge for knowledge’s sake’, it fails to recognise the various and complex ways in which 
young people were increasingly being incited to imagine themselves as an enterprise, an enterprise 
that must develop employability skills and engage in lifelong learning (Kelly 2006, 2013). This leads 
into the second point, that the employability skills paradigm, like the theory of human capital that it is 
informed by, understands these skills in the abstract, and young people in the abstract: disembodied, 
of no particular gender or socioeconomic background, from no particular place, and all with more or 
less equal capacities to develop and exercise employability skills in education, training and labour 
market settings. In this final section of the chapter I will explore the relevance and accessibility of 
‘employability skills’ for a range of different social groups. Here I will argue that, for a variety of 
reasons, the employability skills paradigm, as it emerged from the Finn, Mayer and Carmichael 
Reports, was not sufficiently sensitive to the needs of young people from a diversity of 
socioeconomic, cultural and linguistic backgrounds.   
What also tends to be subjugated and silenced in accounts of the type offered by Motive Market 
Research is the fact that many of the reforms proposed in the Finn, Mayer and Carmichael Reports 
were highly contested. In the extensive debate and commentary that surrounded their publication, 
there crystallised recent, and more long-running, concerns over the ‘instrumental’ direction in which 
post-compulsory education policy was being taken (see for example, Collins 1992, 1993). Peter 
Watkins (1994, p.31), for example, argued that ‘the power of the business sector which is now evident 
in educational policymaking underpins the instrumental expectations of education embodied in 
managerial post-Fordism’, and his critique echoed his concerns of ten years earlier. In 1984, Watkins 
expressed the view that the refocusing of the purposes of education on the development of 
employment-related competencies was closing off opportunities for young people to develop a more 
critical understanding of structural change in the economy and its role in shaping the experiences of 
individuals and groups in the workplace. The youth transition programs that were proliferating at that 
time, Watkins (1984, p.6) observed, eschewed a reflection on ‘inequality, power, and the hierarchical 
structure of the workplace’ in favour of a focus on preparation of the individual:  
Discontent or unrest over a society that cannot provide enough jobs for young people is 
deflected away from a broad general analysis of contemporary capitalism…Directing the 
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attention of youth to the perspective that social outcomes are individual, and not structural, 
allows any blame for the failure to acquire a job to be shifted away from the State. Blame for 
unemployment is placed either on the individual for not acquiring skills or on the educational 
institution for not providing appropriate skills and development opportunities.  
 
The Finn Report (1991, vol.1, p.58) had proposed ‘cultural understanding’ as one of six key areas of 
competence, suggesting it could encompass such things as ‘understanding and knowledge of 
Australia’s historical, geographical and political context’, ‘understanding of major global issues – e.g. 
competing environmental, technological and social priorities’ and ‘understanding of the world of 
work, its importance and requirements’. The Mayer Committee, however, ultimately disagreed that 
cultural understanding was a priority for post-compulsory education, as it was omitted from the 
Committee’s list of seven Key Competencies. If stakeholders such as Watkins had hoped that it might 
be possible to leverage ‘cultural understanding’ as a platform for taking young people’s 
understandings of the world of work in a more critical direction, the Mayer Committee’s decision 
ensured that it was not possible.  
 
Other critiques of the new skills paradigm emerging from the Finn, Mayer and Carmichael Reports 
interrogated and problematised the apparent neutrality and universal applicability of the concepts of 
‘competence’ and ‘skills’. Collins (1993, p.4) observes that the concept of ‘competencies’ was a 
feature of educational psychology discourses in the 1960s, and returned to education in the 1990s 
‘along a circuitous route through industry and the training sector’. While a range of jurisdictions were 
exploring competency-based approaches – the Anglophone countries of Britain, Canada and the US, 
in particular – Collins (1993, p.4) notes that only in Australasian countries were they applied beyond 
the training sector and seen as relevant for all cohorts in post-compulsory education, including senior 
high school and university students. The application of competency approaches beyond the training 
sector had raised the issue of how to define and measure competence in areas of human performance 
that are more holistic, human-relational and open-ended. The implicit view of competence is a skills 
collection model, in which each ‘skill’ is understood as comprised of a series of tasks that are 
sequential, discrete and material in nature (Collins 1993, p.4). Such considerations appeared not to 
dim the enthusiasm of policymakers for the concept of ‘competencies’, which was swiftly revived and 
pressed into service to meet the new economic and labour market challenges facing industrialised 
democracies such as Australia.  
 
Blackmore (1992) critiques the implicit gendering of ‘skill’ as it is understood within human capital 
theory. At the micro level, human capital theory understands that individuals pursue education as an 
investment – an investment of time and effort for which individuals can hope to receive, in return, 
skills and credentials that are transferable to work – and assumes that ‘the longer one invests in 
education, the greater the economic rewards’ (Blackmore 1992, p.354). Blackmore (1992, p.354) 
argues that, in this model, ‘women’s lower economic rewards are a consequence of individual 
“choice” not to invest in longer periods of training as they give priority to their family responsibilities, 
rather than due to discrimination or structured disadvantage’. This is just one of the many ways in 
which human capital theory has traditionally been blind to the sexual division of labour and the 
gendered inequalities shaping notions of ‘skill’ (Blackmore 1992, p.354). While human capital theory 
typically rests on a ‘positivist’ approach to skill, feminist and social constructivist critiques have 
highlighted the relational and context bound nature of ‘skill’. As Blackmore (1992, pp.355-356) 
argues, skill ‘is socially and historically constructed in ways which favour particular individuals and 
social groups’. The term ‘takes on new meanings in specific historical contexts and different 
worksites’:  
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For example, we may think of someone being skilled in the use of a lathe, sewing machine or 
computer. But empirical research indicates that each of these ‘skills’ is judged differently 
according to how the skills are acquired (training/experience), who possesses the skills 
(male/female, adult/youth) and in what context these skills are used (public/private). 
Individuals are generally only seen to have expertise or ‘skill’ when such a skill is associated 
with paid work and when such skills have been acquired through training. Particular types of 
skills such as social skills (e.g., interpersonal and emotional management) and operational 
skills (carrying out routine tasks), which are generally possessed by women, are less highly 
valued (and paid) or defined as being a lesser skill than other types of skills. Manual, 
strength-related skills and technical skills which have connotations of expertise, those 
generally possessed by men, receive higher remuneration and status. (Blackmore 1992, 
pp.355-356) 
 
Speculating on how this gender differential may have come about, Blackmore (1992, p.356) suggests 
that, initially through guild activity, and later, the law and union activity, male workers were able to 
monopolise the more valued forms of skill and knowledge (craft, management and technological) 
through an often-deliberate strategy of excluding women. Women’s work has generally been 
perceived as relatively unskilled and of lesser value, and this is ‘not due to any real difference in 
actual content or technical knowledge’ but rather because women have lacked the equivalent 
industrial strength to define it otherwise (Blackmore 1992, p.356).  
 
The work of bringing all segments of the labour force along on the journey of economic recovery (to 
take up the gauntlet thrown down by Senator Susan Ryan at the 1983 National Economic Summit 
Conference) required that the new skills paradigm target even those young people understood to be 
‘residualised’ and most ‘at-risk’.23 The Finn Review had identified the need to focus special attention 
on the issue of reengaging those populations of young people understood to be recalcitrant or 
‘residualised’, and the two groups it identified were the ‘hard core unemployed’ and ‘traumatised 
learners’. The Report of the Australian Delegation to the International Seminar on Linkages in 
VOTEC (Finn Report 1991, vol.2, p.35) suggested that the ‘hard core unemployed’ are ‘the “street 
kids” of the major cities who currently are tending to form a very strong and impermeable sub-culture 
of their own’. ‘The unfortunate side effects of this sub-culture’ included ‘the increasing number of 
youth suffering from AIDS, being exposed to this and other STDs, and the steady development of the 
drug culture in major cities in particular’ (Finn Report 1991, vol.2, p.35). ‘Traumatised learners’ were 
described as ‘individuals for whom the traditional “chalk and talk”, reading oriented education system 
has failed’ (Finn Report 1991, vol.2, p.36). This focus was also a feature of the Mayer Report (Mayer 
Committee 1992, p.vii), which in its ‘Access and Equity Audit’ examined issues of access to the Key 
Competencies for young people with disabilities, those experiencing disadvantage, or otherwise not 
currently engaged in formal education and training. The Mayer Committee (1992, p.65) argued that if 
the goal of 95 per cent of 19-year-olds participating in or completing post-compulsory education was 
to be achieved, then different learning settings and methods would need to be employed to facilitate 
re-entry into the education and training system of young people currently disengaged. In addition to 
the ‘hard core unemployed’ and ‘traumatised learners’, the full list of groups the Mayer Committee 
suggested were likely to ‘have inadequate opportunities to acquire the Key Competencies’ was 
extensive, and included:  
 
23 In youth studies, researchers such as Tait (1995) and Kelly (1998, 2000a) have explored the role of key 1990s 
policy documents such as the Finn Report in shaping the category of ‘at-risk’ young people.  
109 
 
 
Young people with limited levels of literacy, numeracy and self-esteem; young people of non-
English speaking background, particularly those poorly represented in education, training and 
the labour market; young women, particularly those in non-traditional areas of education, 
training and employment; young mothers; young Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people; geographically isolated young people; young people with disabilities; young people in 
institutions; young people who are homeless or ‘at risk’ of homelessness; young people who 
are on protective or corrective orders; young people who display behavioural problems and 
are difficult to manage; and other young people ‘at risk’ of leaving school. (Mayer Committee 
1992, p.66) 
 
The barriers to participation encountered by these various groups could be overcome, the Mayer 
Committee (1992, p.66) suggested, through the provision of flexible models of delivery that catered to 
different learning styles and needs, and the establishment of mechanisms for providing young people 
with credit for learning undertaken in non-traditional settings. As I noted previously, the Key 
Competency of ‘cultural understanding’ proposed by the Finn Report was absent from the list outlined 
in the Mayer Report. The Mayer Report’s Access and Equity Audit revealed that a number of groups 
representing culturally and linguistically diverse and Indigenous populations took exception to this 
omission, viewing it as a missed opportunity to develop young people’s appreciation for, and 
proficiency in, cross- or inter-cultural communication. The multicultural and multilinguistic character 
of Australia’s workforce, these groups argued, made competence in this area a necessity for all 
Australian young people (Mayer Committee 1992, p.81). In a similar vein, Collins (1992, p.47) 
observed that, despite the Finn Review Committee commissioning several studies of the needs of 
various disadvantaged populations, ‘only a single substantive new recommendation concerning 
specific groups, one on young people with physical disabilities, is actually passed on to government in 
the Finn Report itself’. ‘The chapter in the Finn Report which specifically addresses the term of 
reference on participation and disadvantage is simply evasive’, she writes:                   
 
It says almost nothing. Most young Australians face forms of disadvantage in relation to post-
compulsory education. We know a fair amount about who they are and the kinds of 
difficulties they experience. They include young women (in TAFE particularly); aboriginal 
young people; rural and isolated young people; young people from impoverished 
backgrounds; and, generally, young people who are first-generation school stayers. This 
overwhelming majority is treated as a set of minorities who are each the province of some 
other specialist body. Their difficulties are issues for which, apparently, the Finn Review felt 
no particular responsibility. (Collins 1992, p.47, emphasis in original) 
 
The Mayer Committee, and the Finn Committee before it, had perhaps failed to recognise the 
potential of such omissions to inhibit the greater inclusivity and relevance of the new skills paradigm 
for a range of social groups. 
Conclusion 
In Australia in the late 1970s, education policymakers remained unconvinced that the solution to the 
problem of unemployment was to be found within the education system. As late as 1989, the OECD 
was of the view that the ability of education policy to ameliorate labour market problems was limited.   
By the 1990s, however, in the context of new and reemerging economic pressures, a very different set 
of statements prevailed. As the ACTU and TDC argued in Australia Reconstructed (1987), 
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‘Australia's international competitiveness depends on our ability to develop the skill base of our 
workforce’, and such a view increasingly came to represent the policy orthodoxy as the 20th century 
drew to a close. Among the various crises and pressures bearing on many of the industrialised 
democracies in the late 20th century were the decline of manufacturing, economic restructuring, and 
the abandonment of a protectionist approach to industry policy precipitated, in part, by the turn to an 
‘economic rationalist’ (or ‘neoliberal’) model of government. In conjunction with this were growing 
pressures to ‘warehouse’ young people in education and training programs for longer periods of time, 
as full-time youth labour markets effectively collapsed, and rates of youth unemployment peaked at 
levels not seen since the Great Depression. These developments represented the ‘conditions of 
possibility’ that enabled the resurgence of ‘human capital’ objectives in education policy to take 
place. 
 
The appeal of human capital theory for economists, and for the political and business establishment 
more generally, was its purported ability to describe and explain, with mathematical precision and 
econometric complexity, the relationship of educational attainment to labour market outcomes. The 
‘employability skills’ paradigm that emerged in the late 20th century, built as it was on the precepts of 
human capital theory, tended to view ‘young people’ in the abstract: disembodied, of no particular 
gender or socioeconomic background, and from no particular place. The Finn, Mayer and Carmichael 
Reports give extensive consideration to Access and Equity issues. And yet, these reports are marked 
by significant silences and absences: they do very little to actually address the particular forms of 
disadvantage experienced by the various groups they identify as disadvantaged and ‘at-risk’. The 
Carmichael Report, for example, discusses in some detail the kinds of strategies that may be effective 
in overcoming gender segmentation and inequality in vocational training and in the labour market. 
Yet, it has relatively little to say about the many other groups – NESB (non-English speaking 
background) migrants, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, people with disabilities, and ‘the 
rural poor and marginal workers’ – that it identifies as ‘at considerable risk of not making an effective 
transition to adult independence’ (ESFC 1992, p.96). As Collins (1992, p.47) observes of the Finn 
Report’s treatment of disadvantaged populations, ‘this overwhelming majority is treated as a set of 
minorities who are each the province of some other specialist body. Their difficulties are issues for 
which, apparently, the Finn Review felt no particular responsibility’. Such a criticism can equally be 
made of the Carmichael Report: it treats the problem of unemployment among, for example, NESB 
migrants, or ATSI populations, as one to be dealt with, in large part, by some other specialist body. It 
can therefore be argued that these reports are imbued, in ways that were perhaps not intended by their 
authors, with assumptions about the type of young person who is ideally positioned to acquire 
employability skills, to acquire the kinds of human capital that it is thought will provide them with a 
degree of ‘insurance’ against unemployment and underemployment.  
 
For some education practitioners and commentators, the Finn, Mayer and Carmichael Reports 
represented a key juncture, an opportunity in which curriculum reform could be harnessed to the goal 
of encouraging young people to reflect more critically on the world of work and their place in it. 
Advocates for disadvantaged and marginalised populations hoped that these major policy reviews 
would provide an opportunity for the needs of disadvantaged young people in post-compulsory 
education and training to be recognised and acted on. However, such considerations were ultimately 
subordinate to the objective of reinforcing understandings of the purpose of education as developing 
an individual’s ‘human capital’. The following chapter is oriented around a ‘figure’ of a different 
kind: Geelong’s turn-of-the-21st-century bid to secure a southern hemisphere Guggenheim museum.   
Geelong’s ‘Guggenheim dreaming’ illustrated the city’s ambition to be recognised as a global centre 
for innovation and creativity, and in the following chapter I will explore the implications that this 
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emerging ‘climate of innovation’ had for understanding the problem of youth unemployment in a de-
industrialising city.  
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Chapter Five 
Guggenheim Dreaming in a Climate of Innovation  
 
Introduction  
 
There are many points in the historical evolution of a City where it will reach a crossroad in its 
development. Geelong at the end of the twentieth century is in such a position. Having dragged 
itself out of the recessive gloom of the early 1990s, the past five years have witnessed a significant 
turn around in its level of confidence and economic investment potential … Greater Geelong is a 
city with a new attitude – it is now dynamic, proactive and outward looking. The City is intent on 
aggressively marketing its strengths and achievements.  
Geelong’s Vision and Guiding Principles, Greater Geelong Planning Scheme (2001, p.1) 
 
This statement, appearing in a document titled Geelong’s Vision and Guiding Principles, is one of a 
plethora of ostentatiously forward-looking and aspirational vision statements propagated by economic 
development authorities in Geelong as it transitioned into the 21st century. It encapsulates the 
enthusiasm and dynamism with which civic and business leaders sought to characterise Geelong’s 
‘post-industrial’ future. As MacDonald and Shildrick (2018, pp.89-90) observe, beginning in the late 
20th century, the ‘old industrial regions’ of the OECD and EU – places that were once centres of 
capital accumulation and growth – were transformed into ‘regions of decline, characterised by capital 
flight, devalorisation and disinvestment’. The logic of uneven capitalist development was such that 
not all of these places would be successful in their attempts to position themselves as nodes within the 
emerging global flows of networked, informational capitalism. As Mah (2013, cited in MacDonald & 
Shildrick 2018, p.89) observes, ‘not every old industrial city can have a Tate’. The risk that the ‘Rust 
Belt’ city of Geelong would join the annals of the economic ‘losers’ of globalisation was a very real, 
and bleak, prospect. In a desperate attempt to ensure that Geelong was not relegated to the ranks of 
‘the left behind’ (MacDonald & Shildrick 2018, p.90), the city’s business and civic leaders strove to 
project an attitude of confidence and optimism in Geelong’s economic recovery and ‘post-industrial’ 
future.  
This chapter aims to map the ‘conditions of possibility’ which enable ‘innovation’ to function as a 
‘truth’ in relation to the problem of youth unemployment. The ‘epochs’, ‘episodes’, ‘events’ and 
‘moments’ that I will explore in this chapter occurred largely (but not exclusively) in the mid-1990s-
to-mid-2000s period. As I will demonstrate, this was a particularly busy period in Geelong’s 
development, with a range of local authorities actively engaged in reimagining and re-imaging the 
city, as processes of economic and spatial restructuring continued to make their impacts on the 
economic and social fabric of this regional locale. The central ‘figure’ of concern in this chapter is the 
story of Geelong’s bid to secure a Guggenheim museum, a campaign which ran from 1998 to 2003. 
This story has been selected for exposition in this chapter, as it represents Geelong’s attempt to 
connect to a global ‘brand’ that offered the promise of renewal, and is illustrative of a variety of 
priorities and imperatives – arts- and culture-led urban renewal, ‘post-industrial’ economic 
restructuring, innovation, ‘place branding’ – that were emerging in Geelong, and in a range of other 
‘Rust Belt’ places, in this period. Geelong’s business and civic leaders took inspiration from the 
success of the Basque city of Bilbao, an at-one-time peripheral, Rust Belt city that had, in the 1990s, 
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turned its fortunes around by successfully plugging in to global cultural flows and networks of 
exchange.  
I want to suggest that Geelong’s Guggenheim campaign was significant within a ‘climate of 
innovation’. In this climate of innovation, there was a growing awareness among policymakers and 
other stakeholders that many of the existing approaches to problems of youth employment, 
unemployment and transitions, or to issues of urban and regional development, were no longer fit for 
purpose. Another key event occurring in the climate of innovation was the emergence of the Smart 
Geelong Region Local Learning and Employment Network (SGR LLEN), one of a series of LLENs 
established throughout the State of Victoria between 2001 and 2002. A product of the ‘Innovation 
State’ agenda that the Bracks Labor Government suggested would make Victoria globally 
competitive, the LLEN was a configuration that promised to unite local providers and stakeholders in 
relation to the shared responsibility to address young people’s challenges and needs in education, 
training and the labour market. The SGR LLEN was one of a range of new, networked entities that 
flourished in Geelong in the first years of the new millennium, and whose stated ambit was the 
development of innovative, ‘strategic’ approaches to solving local problems and planning for the 
future needs of the region. In Chapter Three I explored the emergence of the G21, an alliance of five 
Local Government Areas (LGAs) that promised to more effectively advocate for the strategic 
economic interests of the Geelong region at higher levels of government. In 2001, the G21 was joined 
by the Committee for Geelong, an alliance of local business leaders seeking to provide ‘strategic 
leadership and influence to leverage the economic potential of the region to make Geelong a world-
class place’ (Committee for Geelong n.d.).  
What all of these initiatives claimed to do differently was to apply a ‘strategic’ focus to issues of 
planning, whether it be urban or regional spatial and economic planning, or planning for the education 
and training needs of young people in the post-compulsory years. Indeed, ‘strategic’ and ‘smart’ 
emerged as key motifs across the various publications and communications produced by the G21, 
Committee for Geelong, SGR LLEN and other entities like them. In 2003, for example, the G21 
released its inaugural Geelong Region Strategic Plan, ‘a blueprint to achieve the desired long-term 
vision for the Region’ (G21 2003, p.5). And the SGR LLEN’s Executive Officer, Anne-Marie Ryan, 
had a key role in framing the Strategic Plan’s proposals in the area of education, training and lifelong 
learning. The August 2003 Newsletter of the SGR LLEN (2003a) reported that Anne-Marie, as head 
of the ‘Lifelong Learning Pillar’ in the G21, was leading local education and training professionals in 
developing a strategic plan for the future education and training needs of the Geelong region. This 
example illustrates that the various Geelong-based planning networks – G21, Committee for Geelong, 
SGR LLEN – articulated with each other at various points. Indeed, this kind of cross-sectoral 
collaboration and partnership was what the increasingly popular ‘regional planning’ approach was all 
about.  
 
What the emergence of entities such as the G21, Committee for Geelong, and SGR LLEN (and their 
counterparts in other OECD member countries, such as the Local Strategic Partnerships established in 
the UK in 2001 [Kamp 2003, p.4]) also indicates is that, in the climate of innovation, networks 
emerged as the organising principle par excellence. A network perspective became increasingly 
central to efforts to understand the workings of 21st century, global capitalism, and to address the 
challenges and issues that these new global flows and interconnections raised. As dynamic, nimble 
and adaptable structures, networks were upheld as the preferred model for facilitating systems of 
governance and local problem solving. As I will explore in more detail below, in the late 1990s to 
early 2000s period, network logics were applied in a range of fields, from education and training 
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policy, to structures for local governance, to systems for managing unemployed populations. It 
appeared that, much as sociologist Manuel Castells had predicted in his influential thesis The Rise of 
the Network Society, first published in the late 1990s, networks were the infrastructure on which the 
global flows of 21st century capitalism travelled.  
Geelong’s Guggenheim campaign, and the establishment of the SGR LLEN, are key events in the 
climate of innovation that emerged in this regional city at the turn of the 21st century. While I will 
explore the creation of the SGR LLEN later in the chapter, I will begin by considering Geelong’s 
Guggenheim bid as a key event in the city’s campaign to forge a distinctive ‘post-industrial’ identity. 
Next, I will explore the significance of the ‘creative industries’ and the ‘creative class’, and 
‘networks’ and ‘globalisation’ as key discursive and material elements in the climate of innovation. I 
will consider the policy agendas emerging in Australia at Federal and State levels in the 1990s, the 
intent of which was to prioritise and highlight the role of the ‘cultural industries’ and the ‘creative 
class’ in economic growth. I will then consider how sociologists and youth scholars were, from the 
1990s onwards, developing new ways of ‘thinking the social’, harnessing concepts such as ‘networks’ 
and ‘mobilities’ as new analytical tools in the effort to theorise the impacts of globalisation on human 
beings and society. The following section of the chapter will bring the discussion firmly into the 
education and training sphere, examining how the State-level policy initiatives of the Bracks Labor 
Government were shaping new approaches to addressing young people’s pathways and transitions 
through and into education and the labour market. At the close of the chapter, I will problematise the 
notion that innovation, in the form of the development of novel, networked methods of problem-
solving, is the answer to the problem of youth unemployment. I will do this by interrogating some of 
the tensions, contradictions, absences and silences that emerge in such an approach.  
Geelong’s Guggenheim dreaming 
As the 20th century drew to a close, the city of Geelong approached the new millennium with a desire 
to not only forge a new, ‘post-industrial’ identity, but with the more immediate goal to distance itself 
from the economic hardships of the early 1990s. At that time, the local economic woes associated 
with the collapse of the Geelong-based Pyramid Building Society were compounded by a more far-
reaching downturn - ‘the recession that Australia had to have’, as then-Federal Treasurer, Paul 
Keating, described it in 1990. In the turn of the century period, Geelong embarked on an audacious 
bid to secure a Southern Hemisphere Guggenheim museum for the city’s waterfront, as the 
culmination of efforts to reimagine Geelong as a global centre for arts, culture, tourism and 
knowledge. Although the ‘Cultural Capital’ agenda, and its concern to revalue and reinvigorate urban 
spaces decimated by the decline of manufacturing, had been in place in Geelong since the early 1990s 
(Johnson 2009b, p.194), in the late 1990s to early-2000s, these efforts were accelerated as Geelong 
increasingly became conscious of the need to harness to its advantage the new global flows and 
interconnections that were remaking ‘space’ and ‘place’, and the identities and livelihoods of cities 
and the people within them.  
 
The story of Geelong’s Guggenheim dreaming begins in 1998, when a small group of key figures 
from Geelong’s civic, business and cultural sectors got together to strategise what might be needed to 
revive the city’s economic prospects, and to offer a viable alternative to a declining manufacturing 
sector (Johnson 2009b, p.218). Geelong Mayor Ken Jarvis, City of Greater Geelong (COGG) CEO 
Geoff Whitbread, National Arts Gallery Director and Geelong businessman Jim Cousins, and former 
Geelong Performing Arts Centre (GPAC) General Manager Sue Hunt were in search of an iconic 
‘brand’ or attraction that could rival the Sydney Opera House in scale and that would put Geelong ‘on 
the map’ internationally (Johnson 2009b, p.218). Johnson observes that tourism and cultural tourism 
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were seen as a start but on their own were not enough: as Ken Jarvis recalls, ‘we recognised that what 
was needed was a re-imaging of Geelong to become a world city, one that ranks alongside the likes of 
Edinburgh, Glasgow, Toronto and Bilbao’ (Geelong Business News 2000, cited in Johnson 2009b, 
p.218). It was in this context that the ambitious plan for Geelong to secure a franchise of the global 
Guggenheim museum brand was hatched, and it quickly garnered the support of the State 
government, with COGG CEO Whitbread, Mayor Jarvis and Victorian Premier Steve Bracks 
travelling to New York in 1998, by way of Bilbao, to meet with Guggenheim Director Thomas Krens 
(Johnson 2009b, p.219).  
In New York, a key outcome of consultations was that the Geelong delegation pledged to conduct an 
initial feasibility study, in order to demonstrate Geelong’s commitment to the Guggenheim project. 
This proposed AU$1 million feasibility study would be jointly conducted by New York and Victorian 
experts, but funded by the Geelong bidders (Johnson 2009b, p.219). The Geelong campaign 
considered that a Guggenheim museum would be the ‘jewel in the crown’ of Geelong’s restored 
waterfront (more on the city’s waterfront redevelopment later in the chapter). Bilbao was clearly the 
model to be emulated; the Basque city was the most recent to successfully secure a Guggenheim 
franchise. The Guggenheim Museum Bilbao opened in 1997 and had drawn huge crowds and 
attracted international acclaim, largely for its architectural excellence (Plaza 2007). Designed by 
Canadian-American architect Frank Gehry, the imposing building – a ‘striking titanium-dressed 
concoction of interlocking planes, curves and abstract shapes’ (McNeill 2000, p.473) – was 
constructed on one of the banks of the Nervion River.  
 
The Geelong campaign secured the travelling exhibition ‘Bilbao: Transformation of a City’ to visit 
Geelong’s National Wool Museum in 2001, which would present Bilbao ‘as a paradigm of what 
Geelong could be if it could replicate Bilbao’s strategy for renewal’ (Johnson 2009b, p. 221). Thomas 
Krens stipulated that Geelong’s Guggenheim would need to be of a scale and impact that could ‘set 
new standards in architecture’, and, as with Bilbao, the Guggenheim Foundation would not contribute 
to the cost of the building, with the multimillion-dollar funding commitment having to come from 
local, State and Federal governments as well as the private sector (Johnson 2009b, p.219). Geelong 
city council moved to set up a company limited by guarantee – the Geelong Guggenheim Bid Co. Ltd 
– to formalise and coordinate local lobbying efforts (Johnson 2009b, p.221). Johnson (2009b, p.221) 
explains that the establishment of this separate company was ‘designed to distance the bid from local 
politics and better attract corporate finance – connecting museums to business in a clear and 
unabashed way – with the Guggenheim long seen as the organisation which brought business and art 
together’. 
 
Advocates were seeking the ‘Bilbao effect’, taking inspiration from the unlikely success of this at-
one-time decaying industrial city.24 While ‘those who first proposed a Guggenheim museum there 
were shouted down’, in 2002 the Guggenheim Bilbao was estimated to inject the equivalent of 
AU$1.3 billion into the city's economy (Bunworth 2002).25 If successful, Geelong would join the 
 
24 As González (2010) highlights, cities such as Bilbao and Barcelona have been transformed into key 
destinations for urban policy tourism, attracting thousands of urban policy and planning professionals from 
across the globe every year to learn the secrets of their successful regeneration.  
25 As a counterpoint to this triumphalist narrative of Bilbao’s Guggenheim coup, Friedman (2002) suggests that 
the Guggenheim Bilbao story is one of ‘uneven power relations, mortgaged urban futures, and fiscal chicanery’, 
pointing to the work of Joseba Zulaika in exposing the real cost of the Guggenheim to Bilbao. It appears that the 
grandiose museum stuck the city with a stiff bill: ‘by 2000, Zulaika writes, the Basques were in for $250 
million—that’s $700 for each Bilbao resident. On top of that, the local government is committed to a perpetual 
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ranks of Bilbao, New York, Venice, Berlin and Las Vegas in the global network of Guggenheim 
cities, achieving nothing less than a wholesale reimagining of this regional ‘Rust Belt’ locale. 
Advocates such as Ken Jarvis perceived that, if successful, the project would generate a massive 
return on investment, and was the ‘big ticket item’ that could kickstart Geelong’s international 
tourism economy and make the city a magnet for investors. An attitude of dogged optimism and 
determination, Mayor Jarvis believed, would get Geelong over the line: ‘I firmly believe that it’s there 
for us. If we want a Guggenheim enough, we can get it’ (Geelong Business News 2000, cited in 
Johnson 2009b, p.219). The bid was not without its detractors, who cast doubt on the viability of the 
campaign and questioned city council’s choice of priorities (Johnson 2009b, pp.219-222). The bidders 
countered such criticisms by suggesting that the local climate of optimism that the bid generated was 
as important as the particular outcome of the campaign: the bid itself was seen as a bold and 
ambitious thing for the city to do (Johnson 2009b, pp.220-221). As Mayor Jarvis observed in 2000:  
 
What we have done is to create the biggest talking point in the Australian art world at the 
moment. The bid itself is a statement about Geelong – it shows us as positive, bold and 
forward thinking. In this regard we’re already ahead in the ‘positive perception’ stakes, both 
within the region and for businesses and people wanting to invest here. That positive 
perception is crucial in today’s business climate. And if we succeed, we will have gained 
what amounts to a cultural icon, a brand name that will push Geelong onto the world scene. 
(Geelong Business News 2000, cited in Johnson 2009b, pp.220-221) 
 
Commentators such as Leon van Schiak, a Professor of Architecture at RMIT University, noted the 
scale of the challenge facing Geelong. For one, the city was at a geographical disadvantage, remote 
from the major tourist routes and networks of capital that were within arm’s reach of a city like Bilbao 
(Bunworth 2002). ‘I guess the most difficult thing for Geelong really is to prove that they can get 
enough people through the doors’, van Schiak maintained: 
Bilbao - within an hour’s flying time of Bilbao you have many millions of people. Within a 
couple of hours flying time you have over 100 million people. You’ve also got Bilbao well on 
the routes, the tourist routes - people flying in from the US or elsewhere can stop off there. I 
think one of the biggest impacts on Bilbao has been what’s happened to the local airport. 
Geelong has to prove that it can get a sustainable number of visitors through the doors. 
(Bunworth 2002)  
 
There was also the risk that, in connecting to a global museum enterprise, Geelong would be made 
vulnerable to the market fluctuations of the Guggenheim brand. The financial difficulties of the 
Guggenheim corporation became apparent at this time with the closure of the Las Vegas branch and 
the abandonment of plans to open a Manhattan branch (Johnson 2009b, p.222). Within a few short 
years, the campaign to secure a southern hemisphere Guggenheim for Geelong’s waterfront had lost 
 
public subsidy of $7 to $14 million a year’ (Friedman 2002). In effect, this meant that ‘the funds going to the 
Guggenheim were immediately slashed from [public] subsidies for Basque culture, which pays for libraries, 
cinema, theater, art, literature, popular crafts, and publications’ (Zulaika 1997, cited in Friedman 2002). ‘The 
Bilbao museum has no local artistic director and no permanent collection of its own’, Freidman (2002) adds, 
‘what you won’t see at Bilbao is much in the way of local Basque art, much less new Spanish art’. It is also 
important to note that the establishment of the Guggenheim was but one piece of a much larger program of 
urban renewal activities in Bilbao, which included the restoration of a former shipyard area in a central inner-
city area, a new airport and a new Exhibition Fair, among others (González 2006, p.844).  
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momentum, and financial considerations were likely a key influence in the apparent lack of interest 
shown by Guggenheim headquarters. As Geelong’s Guggenheim bid was declared dead in 2003, city 
boosters turned their attention to campaigning for a major convention centre, and Geelong joined the 
annals of the more than a hundred cities who had at one time strove to secure a Guggenheim of their 
very own (Johnson 2009b, pp.222-223; Friedman 2002).  
Creative Nation, creative classes 
Geelong’s Guggenheim bid occurred against the background of some key developments that were 
occurring in this period at both the Federal and State levels of the Australian policy context, the intent 
of which was to more fully articulate the potential of culture and ‘cultural industries’ to drive a ‘nation 
building’ economic development agenda. The Keating Government’s Creative Nation (1994), and the 
Kennett Victorian Government’s Arts 21 (1994) were the key policy documents establishing the 
parameters of this agenda at the Federal and State levels of government. ‘Creative Nation was the first 
Commonwealth cultural policy document in Australia’s history’, Johnson (2009b, p.205) notes, and, 
in developing the notion of the ‘cultural industries’, one of the first policies to explicitly recognise the 
economic dimension of arts and culture, and the potentially fruitful interconnections of these sectors 
with the tourism sector (Department of Communications and the Arts 1994). As Prime Minister Paul 
Keating explained in an interview at the time of the release of the Creative Nation report in October 
1994: 
[Creative Nation advances] the simple proposition that the arts are central to Australian life 
and culture and that as our identity becomes more obvious, as we make a greater claim on our 
own sovereignty, as we project ourselves into the world, as we rejoice in what we become, the 
arts will be an obviously central ingredient to all of that. (Keating & O’Brien 1994, p.1) 
 
The flourishing of information and communication technologies, Keating foresaw, would allow for 
the dissemination of art, culture, news and education across new media: ‘this technology has the 
capacity to take the creator’s product straight to the person’ (Keating & O’Brien 1994, p.2). Young 
people were uniquely positioned, he argued, to take advantage of the myriad commercial and creative 
opportunities presented by the ‘information superhighway’, as the new telecommunications 
infrastructures were often termed in laudatory 1990s political discourses around technological 
innovation. Thus, one of the central aims of Creative Nation was ‘to bring in the creativity of a lot of 
young people’:  
This is not going to be a business that people of your age and my age are going to be in. This 
is going to be, basically, young people who have, I think, the chance with that creativity and 
the technical opportunity which comes with this medium. Now, this will not be true of film 
and television because that will be a highly developed business as it is in every other country. 
But, there is a tremendous, that sort of blossoming of creativity one sees – particularly with 
young people today who are computer literate – we are going to see this opportunity. (Keating 
& O’Brien 1994, p.3) 
 
In the competition to secure and host high-profile and lucrative cultural events, in the 1990s 
Australian States dramatically expanded their arts policy and funding programs, enthusiastically 
underwriting the costs of building cultural precincts, and casino and festival marketplace 
developments (Stevenson 2000, cited in Glow & Johanson 2007a, p.177). ‘Victorian cultural policy 
under [Premier] Kennett’, Glow and Johanson (2007a, p.177) observe, ‘did not just attempt to 
broaden the audience for the arts but to broaden the economic attractiveness of the state of Victoria 
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through the arts’, with the Arts 21 policy representing ‘the height of this fervour for the industry 
paradigm’. Through massive investment in the city of Melbourne, and in particular the development 
of ‘mega precincts’ such as Southbank, Crown Casino and Docklands, and major events such as the 
Formula One Grand Prix, Premier Kennett sought to make Victoria the ‘cultural capital’ of Australia 
(Glow & Johanson 2007a, p.178; Johnson 2009b, p.209). Key regional centres were also the 
beneficiaries of the Arts 21 agenda, with new or redeveloped art galleries secured for Bendigo, 
Ballarat and Geelong (Glow & Johanson 2007b, p.129).  
The outcome of these developments, Johnson (2009b, p.210) suggests, was that Victoria ‘moved from 
being a State which somewhat benignly supported those major cultural institutions inherited from 
colonial times – especially its public galleries, libraries and museums – to a far more entrepreneurial 
actor’, harnessing arts and cultural policy (in a fashion some would characterise as ‘economic 
rationalist’) to the broader agenda of economic renewal. The Kennett Government’s penchant for 
place marketing and ‘big ticket’ projects nonetheless provoked significant disquiet among some 
commentators and critics, with this period witnessing a slashing of expenditure on essential public 
services. Engels (1999, cited in Stilwell & Troy 2000, p.919) notes that ‘public funding for health, 
education and community care all declined while resources were redirected to “mega-projects” 
designed to appeal to prospective investors’. Another major influence on the spread of the cultural 
industries agenda was the work of ‘Cultural Capital proselytisers’ Richard Florida and Charles 
Landry, both of whom placed creativity front and centre of urban renewal efforts, and who were 
invited, by Australian jurisdictions among many others, ‘to visit, speak, advise and generally enthuse 
metropolitan and provincial authorities with their visions’ (Johnson 2009b, p.209).  
As Geelong moved further into the 2000s, the quest was no longer for the iconic monument which 
could kick start a tourist economy, ‘but for a more physically attractive and culturally vibrant city 
which can attract and keep the creative class who will hopefully populate the expanding service and 
new manufacturing industries of the city’ (Johnson 2009b, p.227). Business and civic leaders had, in 
other words, shifted their sights from Bilbao and its Guggenheim to the increasingly influential theory 
of the ‘creative class’ and its author Richard Florida. In doing so they joined a multitude of countries, 
cities and regions around the globe who have, since the early 2000s, sought in Florida’s work a ‘fix’ 
for faltering and uneven economic growth.  
The central argument of Florida’s influential book The Rise of the Creative Class, first published in 
2002, is that we (in the industrialised democracies, at least) have entered a new era of capitalism, in 
which human creativity has become the driving force of economic growth (Florida 2014, p.30). The 
activities of a ‘Super-Creative Core’ of professionals, Florida (2014, p.38) suggests, a diverse group 
that includes scientists and engineers, university professors, artists, designers, as well as thought 
leaders, writers and researchers, among others, are increasingly central to processes of innovation and 
economic development. The challenge for jurisdictions seeking to attract the creative class to their 
shores is to understand what makes the members of this class tick: ‘as the source, apparently, of all 
good economic things, the Creative Class must be nurtured and nourished, its talents must be 
harnessed and channelled’ (Peck 2005, p.743). In Chapter 3, I described the ‘3 Ts’ of Florida’s model 
of economic development – talent, technology and tolerance – and noted the influence of Florida’s 
ideas on urban development agendas in Geelong in the second decade of the 21st century. I will not 
reprise that discussion here, except to note that Florida’s advocacy of open-minded bohemianism and 
tolerance as particularly generative cultures (the third and final ‘T’ of his model) has overwhelmingly 
been interpreted by planning and economic development authorities as a prescription for amenity-led 
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growth. He also stipulates that ‘an environment attractive to young people must be part of the mix’ for 
contemporary cities (Florida 2002, cited in Peck 2005, p.754).   
 
Florida’s ideas were catapulted into Australian regional planning and policy discourses with the 
inclusion of his ‘creativity index’ (a statistical model for ranking and quantifying the success of 
various places) in the 2002 State of the Regions report, a report produced annually by think tank 
National Economics on behalf of the Australian Local Government Association (Gibson & Klocker 
2005). The report employed the ‘creativity index’ to create a map of Australian regions, with the 
perhaps predictable result that inner areas of the capital cities performed well on the creativity index, 
and rural and regional areas inland from Australia’s heavily-populated Eastern/Pacific coast 
performed badly (Gibson & Klocker 2005, p.97). The effect of such an exercise, and of Florida’s 
arguments more generally, Gibson and Klocker (2005, p.98) suggest, was to advocate for the targeting 
of assistance at those regions understood as lacking in creativity, in order to create the conditions in 
which inter-regional competition could operate more effectively. ‘The report’s recommendations’, 
Gibson and Klocker (2005, p.98) write, ‘ultimately centre on fostering creativity, reiterating the 
primacy of global markets, and the inevitability and singularity of the economic development “game” 
that all places must “play” against each other’. 
Other criticisms of Florida’s work have focused on the contradictory and perhaps unintended effects 
of his recommendations for creativity-led economic growth as they are translated into policy. Young 
people have been particularly vulnerable to the effects of these policies. Florida’s ideas are so 
politically palatable, Peck (2005, p.760) suggests, because they do not fundamentally challenge 
existing social and economic orders. In fact, the creative class thesis as it has been interpreted by 
various authorities has often been used to justify the normalisation of flexible labour market 
conditions: ‘The Rise of the Creative Class both glorifies and naturalizes the contracted-out, “free-
agent” economy, discursively validating the liberties it generates, and the lifestyles it facilitates, for 
the favoured class of creatives’ (Peck 2005, p.756). Gibson and Klocker (2005, p.99) highlight that 
social displacement is often the outcome of ‘creative’ urban revitalisation; Florida himself 
acknowledges this but offers no solutions. There is a significant contradiction between Florida’s 
emphasis on the utility of ‘garage’ and cheap space for business start-ups and emergent creative 
enterprises, and the effect that his policy prescriptions often have in reality, in pushing low cost 
spaces out of the city through gentrification (Atkinson & Easthope 2007, p.594).  
Florida’s ideas were beginning to have an impact in ‘Rust Belt’ cities and regions just as the most 
recent and perhaps most successful in a long line of attempts at waterfront redevelopment was being 
completed in Geelong. His emphasis on attractive and vibrant city centres and the provision of 
cultural and leisure amenities as drawcards for the creative class provided further legitimation of city 
council’s decision to prioritise the major capital works project, ‘Steampacket Place’. As I explored in 
the previous chapter, a comprehensive plan for the redevelopment of Geelong’s city centre and 
waterfront areas, known as City By The Bay, had been developed by the Geelong Regional 
Commission as early as 1981 (and updated in 1988). However, Johnson (2009b, p.211) observes that 
little came of such plans until the late 1990s due primarily to the local economic crisis precipitated by 
the Pyramid Building Society collapse. With the backing of the Kennett State government, a vocal 
supporter of Geelong’s efforts at urban renewal, and with significant private sector investment, work 
began on the ‘Steampacket Place’ development in 1995. In plan and realisation, the waterfront 
redevelopment differed significantly from City By The Bay, and included a new quay and gardens, 
antique carousel and pavilion, and a ‘baywalk promenade’ that showcased key public art assets, the 
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painted bollards26 (COGG & Steampacket Waterfront Geelong Development Board 2000). The 
remarks of city Councillor Allana Goldsworthy in Waterfront Geelong: The Future Is Here, Be Part 
of It Today (2000), a brochure touting the achievements of the waterfront redevelopment project, 
reveal something of the significance attributed to the project by civic and business leaders:  
This transformation of the once underutilised and derelict foreshore into a vibrant leisure, 
recreation and tourist precinct will be the sort of lasting legacy from the leaders of today to 
the community of tomorrow that will generate ongoing permanent changes to our region for 
decades to come. (COGG & Steampacket Waterfront Geelong Development Board 2000, p.3) 
 
Both Geelong’s Guggenheim campaign and the redevelopment of its waterfront were reflective of the 
policy vogue for culture- and amenity-led economic growth at the turn of the 21st century. What these 
key events also illustrate was that a range of emergent global networks of exchange were increasingly 
significant in shaping the fortunes of de-industrialising cities such as Geelong. The following section 
of this chapter will take up this theme of networks. I will explore how a range of scholars sought to 
theorise these new global flows and interconnections, and to understand the implications of these 
changes for shaping the fortunes of ‘places’ and the people within them.   
Network logics, network thinking 
As the discipline of sociology confronted the new millennium, scholars were bringing a range of new 
analytic tools to bear on the social, economic, political, cultural and governmental changes associated 
with processes of globalisation. Manuel Castells develops his theory of the ‘network society’ across 
several publications spanning the early 1990s to late 2000s. Castells (1991) considers the confluence 
of a range of forces in the late 20th century, which included the restructuring of capitalism in the late 
1970s and 1980s, the emergence of a new, ‘informational’ mode of development, and the advance of 
scientific discovery and technological innovation, and their impact on the transformation of cities, 
regions and societies. As he writes of the organisational transition from industrialism to 
‘informationalism’:  
The main process in this transition is not the shift from goods to services but, as the two main 
theorists of the ‘post-industrial society’ proposed many years ago, Alain Touraine in 1969 and 
Daniel Bell in 1973, the emergence of information processing as the core, fundamental 
activity conditioning the effectiveness and productivity of all processes of production, 
distribution, consumption, and management. (Castells 1991, p.17) 
In his Information Age trilogy originally published between 1996 and 1998 (and republished in a 
revised form in 2010), Castells seeks to identify the key features of this networked, informational 
capitalism. In Volume One of the series, The Rise of the Network Society, Castells (2010, pp.442-443) 
demonstrates the significance of ‘flows’ and ‘nodes’ as key pieces of network architecture in the 
emergent ‘space of flows’, and he highlights the primacy of financial flows in networked capitalism:  
While finance capital has generally been among the dominant fractions of capital, we are 
witnessing the emergence of something different: capital accumulation proceeds, and its 
 
26 The more than 100 bollards dotted along Geelong’s waterfront were designed and produced by local artist Jan 
Mitchell on commission from the City of Greater Geelong, as part of waterfront rejuvenation efforts. 
Constructed from large wooden pylons recovered from the demolished Yarra Street Pier, the bollards depict 
many of the people, events, places, institutions and moments that have been important in the history of the 
Geelong region (Johnson 2009b, pp.213-214). 
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value-making is generated, increasingly, in the global financial markets enacted by 
information networks in the timeless space of financial flows…in the age of networked 
capitalism the fundamental reality, where money is made and lost, invested or saved, is in the 
financial sphere. All other activities (except those of the dwindling public sector) are 
primarily the basis to generate the necessary surplus to invest in global flows, or the result of 
investment originated in these financial networks. (Castells 2010, pp.502-503) 
In the late 1990s-early 2000s period, the late sociologist John Urry also focussed his attention on these 
new global flows and interconnections. Urry became one of the leading theorists of the emergent 
‘mobility turn’ in the discipline of sociology, which he suggested was producing new ways of 
‘thinking the social’. Urry (2000, pp.1-2) argued that the ‘social as mobility’ was replacing the ‘social 
as society’ as the organising concept of sociological analysis. In this sense: 
Issues of movement, of too little movement for some or too much for others or of the wrong 
sort or at the wrong time, are it seems central to many people’s lives and to the operations of 
many small and large public, private and non-governmental organisations. From SARS to 
plane crashes, from airport expansion controversies to SMS texting, from slave trading to 
global terrorism, from obesity caused by the ‘school run’ to oil wars in the Middle 
East…issues of what I term ‘mobility’ are centre-stage on many policy and academic 
agendas. (Urry 2007, p.6) 
For Urry (2007, p.6), the mobility turn is ‘post-disciplinary’, with contributions from cultural studies, 
feminism, geography, migration studies, politics, science studies, sociology, transport and tourism 
studies serving to mobilise analyses ‘that have been historically static, fixed and concerned with 
predominantly aspatial “social structures”’. As Urry, Castells and a range of other theorists 
recognised, the global flows and interconnections made possible by late 20th century globalisation 
were reconfiguring the dynamics of economic and spatial inequality in new and significant ways. In 
Globalization: The human consequences, first published in 1998, Zygmunt Bauman (1998, p.113) 
suggests that ‘the mark of the excluded in the era of time/space compression is immobility’. This 
point is echoed by Urry (2007, p.9): ‘moving between places physically or virtually can be a source of 
status and power, an expression of the rights to movement either temporarily or permanently. And 
where movement is coerced it may generate social deprivation and exclusion’.  
 
Many of these themes have been taken up by youth studies researchers in their work in theorising the 
impacts of globalisation on young people’s lives (see for example Farrugia 2015). The concept of 
‘sticky subjects’, for example, emerges as particularly useful for thinking about those young people 
who are unable to take advantage of the new mobile, flexible circuits of capital, information and 
ideas. In their study of the factors influencing young people’s aspirations for creative sector 
employment in three de-industrialising urban locales in England, Allen and Hollingworth (2013, 
p.502) argue that mobility must be understood as a social resource that is unequally distributed: ‘some 
subjects, through their spatial and social location, can embody mobility and weightlessness while 
others remain “sticky”’. The particular ways in which places come to be constructed — as dynamic 
and fluid or as sticky or dead-ends, for example — also play a key role in shaping the aspirations of 
local young people (Allen & Hollingworth 2013, p.502).  
 
Although their efforts were ultimately unsuccessful, it was precisely this ‘stickiness’ that Geelong’s 
Guggenheim bidders were attempting to shake off, in advancing an innovative, aspirational vision of 
the city as a global centre for arts, culture and tourism. It was hoped that, through positioning Geelong 
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as a key node in relation to the emergent global circuits of ‘cultural/creative’ and ‘knowledge’ capital, 
this regional city could emphatically, and finally, eschew its ‘Rust Belt’ status. However, other 
initatives in the climate of innovation fared considerably better than Geelong’s Guggenheim 
campaign. In the following section of this chapter I will explore, with reference to the emergence of 
the Local Learning and Employment Network, the ways in which the imperative of innovation was 
remaking the spaces in which young people’s education, training and labour market participation were 
discussed and addressed.  
Local Learning and Employment Networks (LLENs): bringing networks to bear on 
the challenge of pathways planning for young people  
As Furlong and Cartmel noted in 1997 (p.27), ‘the transition from school to work has become much 
more protracted...increasingly fragmented and in some respects less predictable’. The advent of an 
increasingly networked, globalised capitalism demanded the development of networked, ‘whole of 
government’ and ‘whole of community’ approaches to addressing young people’s labour market 
transitions and outcomes (Department of Education, Employment and Training [DEET] 2000, p.9; 
Kamp 2003). As part of a growing policy focus on young people at risk of early school leaving, 
‘smarter’ pathways planning in secondary school that drew on a range of intersectoral links was 
framed as the solution to the complexity and uncertainty that increasingly characterised young 
people’s transitions and pathways.  
The election of a ‘reformist’ Labor government in Victoria at the end of 1999, Kamp (2009, p.474) 
highlights, fostered a change in approach from that of the former conservative Liberal government. 
The Victorian Labor Government identified the education and training policy domain as central to the 
realisation of a dual commitment to foster greater social cohesion, and to support the development of 
Victoria as an ‘innovation economy’ (Kamp 2009, p.474; Kosky 2002). In 2000, the Government 
commissioned two reviews of education and training policy: a review of the future directions of the 
State’s public schools, and a review of post compulsory education and training policy and provision. 
Both reviews pointed to the need for novel, networked approaches to revive a poorly performing 
education and training system (Kamp 2003, pp.6-7). The problem, the Ministerial Review of Post 
Compulsory Education and Training Pathways in Victoria (known as the ‘Kirby Report’) suggested, 
was that: 
The linkages between education and training, employment and industry, and other support 
and safety net resources are weak. There is a lack of coordination between the parts of the 
education and training system, and there is a need for stronger and clearer vision. The system 
lacks accountability for all young people: many ‘fall through the cracks’. (DEET 2000, p.7) 
Moving immediately to further investigate the Kirby Report’s suggestion that ‘the pathways for young 
people are uncertain, unequal and poorly signposted’, the Victorian Department of Education, 
Employment and Training selected twelve localities for a Pathways Project, the aim of which was to 
review the range and adequacy of local pathways planning services offered to young people (DEET 
2000, p.7; Kamp 2006, p.47). The responsibility for deciding what particular form the project would 
take was devolved to each of the twelve localities. In Greater Geelong, the Project was auspiced by 
local government, and a team of researchers at the Centre for Education and Change at Deakin 
University was engaged to map the services already existing and to explore the experiences of 
secondary students and service providers (Kamp 2006, p.47). While the researchers noted that ‘the 
concept of the “pathway” as an educational and developmental conduit from one stage of life to 
another is dominant in the policy and practice environments of the post-compulsory years’, sweeping 
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social and economic changes occurring in industrialised societies in recent decades had rendered the 
concept problematic: ‘the pathways metaphor is seen to be inadequate as it suggests a linear staging 
rather than a mosaic or complex web of shifts between school, part time work, training, employment 
and unemployment’ (Angwin et al. 2001, pp.14-15, 31).  
Nonetheless, it was suggested that, if armed with the right knowledge and support, schools could 
more effectively prepare young people to negotiate ‘multiple and fragmented transitions’ (Angwin et 
al. 2001, p.31). Schools would do this through a combination of internal reform of careers education 
approaches and the forging of greater external links with local youth agencies and expertise, the 
researchers suggested. While schools’ careers education programs remained narrowly focused on the 
end goal of the senior secondary certificate and university entrance score, there was a need to expand 
the range of vocational offerings to better cater to the interests, capacities and needs of the 70 percent 
of students not going on to tertiary studies (Angwin et al. 2001, pp.33-34). In addition, Angwin and 
colleagues (2001, p.32) argued that ‘planning for transition can no longer be seen as the sole 
responsibility of schools, given the complexity of the post-school sector and the rapidly changing 
world of work’. They advocated for greater intersectoral communication and sharing of responsibility 
between schools and local youth agencies. While each of the twelve localities participating in the 
Pathways Project had designed and implemented their project in different ways, an evaluation of the 
state-wide Pathways Project found that ‘three identifiable approaches or “models” emerged’, and the 
authors described these as the ‘direct negotiation model’, the ‘coordinator facilitation model’ and the 
‘network facilitation model’ (Stokes & Tyler 2001, p.10). ‘While each of the models has advantages 
and disadvantages,’ Stokes and Tyler (2001, p.10) continued, ‘the network facilitation model provides 
the most direct mechanism for developing more innovative, systematic, inter-sectoral approaches to 
supporting young people’s pathways through education, training and employment’. However, Stokes 
and Tyler (2001, p.10) suggested that a number of key elements needed to be in place for the network 
to do this work effectively, and that some of these elements would take some time to be developed: 
The development of a ‘shared vision’ for a network is a process that occurs between people 
working in the different sectors within a network over time. It can be hampered by changes in 
personnel and requires external support (in the form of professional development) to be 
developed. Professional development can be especially significant in assisting with the 
establishment of structures that facilitate the network’s goals. Similarly, the establishment of 
good working relationships with young people is a process that is developed over time. 
The Kirby Report was also interested in the capacity of networks to facilitate innovative approaches to 
post-compulsory education and training and pathways planning. The report argued that the move to a 
networked, regional model of coordination and delivery was in evidence in a range of locations 
internationally and throughout Australia:  
Post compulsory education and training is delivered on a municipal basis in Sweden; the UK 
is to establish a set of regional Learning and Employment Skills Councils to coordinate 
delivery at the post-16 level; and Denmark has organised its post compulsory education and 
training through regional ‘social partnerships’. Even France, among the most centralised of 
education systems, has moved towards a regional approach. (DEET 2000, p.114) 
 
In addition, the Kirby Report noted that the OECD, in its 1998 report, Overcoming Failure at School 
‘points out that network approaches to solving problems related to failure at school are becoming 
more common in member countries than programmatic approaches which seem to be less successful 
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in implementing reform’ (DEET 2000, p.115). The Danes had developed an effective system for 
identifying and monitoring those young people ‘at risk’ of disengagement from education and 
training, and this ‘Danish Safety Net’ was highlighted by the Kirby Report as an example of what 
regional planning networks could achieve for young people (DEET 2000, pp.116-117). The Report 
noted that in this system – a system designed around the goal of attracting and retaining all young 
people ‘no matter what their interests, motivation and talents’ – ‘personal, educational and career 
guidance is widely available at all points within the system’ (DEET 2000, p.116). In order to ensure 
that no young person ‘falls through the cracks’, schools, municipalities, and a youth guidance service 
are legally obliged to identify and follow up those young people leaving school or post-compulsory 
education without a qualification (DEET 2000, pp.116-117). Another feature of the system designed 
to encourage the retention of ‘at risk’ young people in education and training programs was that the 
receipt of income support was made contingent on the young person remaining enrolled in a course of 
study and continuing to follow the ‘personal action plan’ that they had developed in consultation with 
the youth guidance service (DEET 2000, p.117).  
 
The Kirby Report also pointed to a range of Australian research and analysis advocating regional, 
networked approaches, citing recent reports published by the Australian Student Traineeship 
Foundation (ASTF) and the Business Council of Australia (BCA), among others. In Bright Futures 
for Young Australians: Community Partnerships for the Future of Successful Transitions, the ASTF, 
‘an independent industry-led body established in 1994 that was responsible for supporting the 
expansion and enhancement of joint school and industry programs’ (National Centre for Vocational 
Education Research n.d.), argued that:  
 
The achievement of successful transitions in the future in our view is most directly dependent 
upon building and supporting the capacity for communities through genuine partnerships to 
appreciate and respond to the diverse learning needs of the young people in that community, 
to understand their own situation and the external factors influencing it, to develop strong and 
enduring relationships between schools, employers and other community organisations. 
(ASTF 1999, pp.22-23)  
 
The ASTF suggested that the importance of school-community partnerships was being recognised in 
key policy documents such as the 1999 Adelaide Declaration on National Goals for Schooling in the 
Twenty-First Century, which recommended the ‘further strengthening [of] schools as learning 
communities where teachers, students and their families work in partnerships with business, industry 
and the wider community’ (MCEETYA 1999, cited in ASTF 1999, p.32).  
 
The BCA emerged as a key voice in support of regional approaches to addressing the problem of what 
it suggests were young people’s ‘failed’ school-to-work transitions. Pathways to Work: Tackling 
Long-Term Unemployment, a report prepared by the Boston Consulting Group (2000) on behalf of the 
BCA, argued that it was imperative to ‘focus intervention efforts on high-risk individuals before they 
enter long-term unemployment’ (Boston Consulting Group 2000, p.27, emphasis in original). A 
failure to do so, the report argued, would result in deleterious outcomes for individual young people 
and for society, because ‘failure in the transition from school to work is a pathway to marginalisation 
and long-term unemployment’ (Boston Consulting Group 2000, p.11). The Boston Consulting Group 
(2000, p.11) advocated for the increased application of market logics to the field of pathways planning 
for young people: ‘stated simply, some fundamental management principles are missing from the way 
we manage the school-to-work transition; they are accountability, measurement of outcomes and 
informed purchasing of services’. The solutions to this problem, the Boston Consulting Group 
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suggested, lay in developing and enhancing local accountability structures for improving school-to-
work transitions in areas of high disadvantage. The Boston Consulting Group (2000, p.12) argued that 
this should involve the creation of a new role, the Local Director of Youth Futures, an individual who 
would work closely with ‘a Community Board comprising local businesses, school principals, 
vocational education and training (VET) representatives, youth representatives, and other members of 
the community with relevant expertise’. The Boston Consulting Group (2000, p.13) proposed the 
introduction of a new performance measure, the ‘“youth participation ratio” – defined as the 
proportion of young people from an age cohort who have spent at least half of the preceding year in 
full-time work, education or training’, which would be tracked at the school, local and regional levels 
and would offer a means to assess the efficacy of the Local Director’s and Community Board’s efforts 
to improve outcomes for young people.  
 
The Kirby Report noted that, already in many places throughout Australia, ‘local planning networks’ 
were emerging to address the shortcomings of a poorly integrated education and training sector, and it 
recommended that these networks be expanded and nurtured: 
Local planning networks have the potential to meet some of the broad objectives that have 
underpinned the Government policy and this report. They are focused upon the needs of 
young people, are cross sectoral, and can support stronger links with industry and other 
agencies. An important goal should be their capacity to develop a corporate commitment to 
account for all young people in a region. In doing this, the needs of groups such as Koorie 
students should be incorporated. The Government should aim to develop and nurture a state-
wide pattern of local planning networks consisting of relevant education and training 
providers, industry and other agencies. (DEET 2000, p.11) 
The Victorian Government endorsed this recommendation, and 31 Local Learning and Employment 
Networks (LLENs) were established between 2001 and 2002, covering all areas of the State. The 
LLEN would play a central coordinating role in the service of the ideal of ‘joined up’ government, a 
configuration that Kamp (2003, p.3) argues was vested with the power and remit to foster ‘lifelong 
learning’: ‘the idea of partnership and joined-up government has come to be seen as a necessary 
condition for the operationalisation of lifelong learning’. The emergence of an entity like the LLEN, I 
want to argue, carried a significance that extended well beyond the education and training sector – it 
was indicative of a wider shift in thinking about the capacity of networks to facilitate innovative 
approaches to addressing local problems. In developing and applying network approaches to problems 
of youth unemployment in ‘Rust Belt’ (or otherwise economically marginal) places such as Geelong, 
policymakers and other stakeholders understood themselves to be enacting the process of 
‘innovation’.  
The advantage of a network model of governance is that it ‘resides between the extremes of “macro” 
central steering and micro “local autonomy” perspectives’ (Keating and Robinson 2003, cited in 
Kamp 2003, p.4). The OECD emerged as a key advocate for systems of ‘devolved’ government that 
moved power and responsibility for decision-making from central government to the local or regional 
levels. In its 2001 report Devolution and Globalisation: Implications for Local Decision-makers, the 
OECD examined the ways in which city and regional governments would need to redesign their 
institutions and development policies in order to respond to the twin trends of devolution and 
globalisation. The OECD (2001, p.9) argued that, in order to compete successfully in a globalising 
economy, ‘territories increasingly need policies that help build and exploit endogenous capabilities. 
Devolved governments are best placed to design and deliver such policies’. The emergence of this 
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network orthodoxy was also significant in the context of the reconfiguration of the relationship 
between governments, industry and civil society. As authors such as David Harvey and Patrick Bailey 
have argued, ‘governance’ implies that a much broader range of actors are bringing their influence to 
bear on policy formulation than has traditionally been the case27:  
As the state ‘retracts’ some of its power and jurisdictions of government through outsourcing, 
contracts and privatisations, policy and public services are ‘opened up’ to a whole array of 
non-state actors from across civil society. This kind of governance, it is argued, is exercised 
across, between and through networks of complex relationships which traverse established 
sectoral boundaries and which constitute a mix of state and non-state, public and private, and 
profit and not-for-profit organisations and actors who are involved in the advocacy, 
development, researching, ‘moving’ and delivery of social and public policy. (Bailey 2013, 
p.817) 
This shift does not entail a diminution of the role and power of the state, Bailey (2013, p.817) 
continues; rather, the state’s role is reconceived as that of a central catalyst, mobilising all sectors – 
public, private and voluntary – into action to solve the community’s problems. In this turn of the 
century period, Australia’s employment services system was also being remodelled according to a 
network logic. In 1998, the Howard Liberal-National Coalition Government dissolved the 
Commonwealth Employment Service, the public employment service created 50 years earlier, and 
tendered out the delivery of employment services to a range of not-for-profit and for-profit providers 
under the banner of the ‘Job Network’ (Thomas 2007). The Howard Government also restructured the 
welfare system at this time, establishing Centrelink, a Commonwealth service delivery agency in the 
form of a ‘one-stop-shop’ that would deliver income support services and act as a gateway to the Job 
Network (Thomas 2007). 
These reforms were justified by the Howard Government on the grounds that the establishment of a 
quasi-market framework for the delivery of employment services would introduce a necessary level of 
competition that could bring costs down, promote efficiency and provide a better quality of service 
(Thomas 2007). The Howard Government’s employment services reforms represented the fulfillment 
of the desires of successive ‘economic rationalist’ governments to fully privatise and outsource the 
delivery of these essential public services. Considine and colleagues (2015, p.32) observe that, ‘in 
under a decade, Australia’s system of assistance to the unemployed went from entirely publicly run to 
the most comprehensively outsourced service in the world’. Bessant (1999) argues that the economic 
and labour market policies pursued by the Howard conservative Government in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s – such as the ‘Work For the Dole’ scheme, more stringent activity testing for 
unemployment benefits and harsher sanctions for non-compliance, and the ‘WorkChoices’ industrial 
relations legislation designed to reduce the ‘interference’ of unions and industrial arbiters in the 
labour market – impacted heavily on the lives of young Australians, in many cases with the effect of 
exacerbating inequality and poverty.  
 
At the same time, policymakers understood that boosting rates of young people’s participation in, and 
completion of, education and training programs remained an effective strategy for addressing the 
problem of youth unemployment. The consensus was that the establishment of a set of performance 
targets remained an effective way for policymakers to incentivise the education and training sector to 
assume a large degree of responsibility for the management of this problem. In 2003, the Minister for 
 
27 I explored Harvey’s work in this space in Chapter 2. 
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Education and Training in the Victorian Labor Government, Lynne Kosky, addressed the inaugural 
conference of the LLENs and the Victorian Learning and Employment Skills Commission (VLESC), 
the body charged with funding LLENs and monitoring their progress and outcomes. In her speech, 
Kosky (2003, p.5) outlined the Government’s two key targets for increasing young people’s 
participation in education and training: that by 2010, 90 percent of young people in Victoria would 
successfully complete Year 12 or equivalent, and that by 2005, the number of 15-19-year-olds in rural 
or regional areas engaged in education and training would increase by six percent. Kosky challenged 
LLENs to play a central role in fulfilling these targets, while maintaining a focus on the ‘wider goal of 
promoting lifelong learning – by making near-universal participation in post school education a norm 
in our society’. Certain groups of young people were at particular risk of leaving school early, and ‘we 
expect LLENs to target these pockets of poor achievement’ (Kosky 2003, p.5). Furthermore, LLENs 
should develop strong links with industry ‘to make sure our education and training system meets both 
its needs and those of young people’ (Kosky 2003, p.5).  
 
At the end of the Smart Geelong Region LLEN’s first year of operation, the network was comprised 
of 190 members, ‘including government and non-government schools, businesses, unions, education 
and training providers, community and youth agencies, neighbourhood houses, government 
departments and a range of interested individuals’28 (SGR LLEN 2001, p.12). Figure 15 below 
provides an illustration of how the SGR LLEN conceptualised its various functions in 2001. The SGR 
LLEN would stand at the centre of a series of interlinkages of community, industry and service 
providers, acting as an advocate, a disseminator of best practice, a data collector, and an ideas and 
information clearinghouse in order to facilitate the development of a local, strategic approach to the 
education and training needs of young people. ‘In the thirteen months that I have been with the LLEN 
and in the Geelong region’, Executive Officer Anne-Marie Ryan wrote in the SGR LLEN’s 2001 
Annual Report:  
I have come to recognise that Geelong is ‘Network City’. There is a strong history of 
collaboration between the spheres of endeavour that comprise the LLEN membership 
including the education, training, employment and youth sectors. Less evident is cross-sector 
collaboration focussing on the learning needs and transitions of young people as they move 
between the sectors. This area is the LLEN’s primary focus. (Ryan 2001, p.4) 
 
<Image removed due to copyright restrictions> 
 
Figure 15: The SGR LLEN functions (SGR LLEN 2001, p.11) 
In its initial surveys of the local learning and employment landscape, the SGR LLEN (2003b, p.7) 
noted that ‘the unemployment rate for the region as a whole is dropping in line with national trends 
(5.6 percent and 6.3 percent)’. However, the unemployment rate among 15-19 year olds remained at 
16.8 percent in 2003, a rate higher than the Victorian average (SGR LLEN 2003b, p.7). In line with 
the mandate set out for LLENs by the Bracks Labor Government, the SGR LLEN (2003b, p.7) would 
maintain a focus on ‘at risk’ young people, with the category of ‘at risk’ referring to those young 
 
28 As the ‘Geelong: Smart Move’ campaign also attests, the ‘Smart’ appellation emerged as a key discursive 
element in the Climate of Innovation. In Geelong and further afield, ‘Smart’ found its way into the titles of an 
array of projects, organisations, initiatives, and even places (for example, Queensland was declared the ‘Smart 
State’ in the turn of the 21st century period). The precise meaning of ‘Smart’ varies across these different 
contexts, however the common theme appears to be that ‘Smart’ is intended to lend an aura of purpose and 
intelligence to the thing to which it attaches, and to signify a new and innovative way of doing things.  
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people ‘considered from a range of factors to be likely to leave school before the completion of Year 
12 or equivalent, or not continue in education and training or gain full-time work’. The SGR LLEN’s 
analyses revealed that risk was organised and distributed along the lines of race and gender. While 
Indigenous young people, in line with national trends, were at disproportionate risk of early school 
leaving and poor post-school outcomes, male early school leavers tended to fare better than their 
female counterparts:  
Whilst more young men do leave school before the completion of Year 12 or equivalent, their 
post school opportunities and outcomes are better than for young women who are early 
leavers. More apprenticeship opportunities are available to young men than young women, 
and women are at increased long-term risk of permanent casual employment or long-term 
unemployment. (SGR LLEN 2003b, p.6) 
In conjunction with the Pathways Project and the establishment of a state-wide network of LLENs, 
the Bracks Labor Government invested in a range of vocational education and training initiatives that 
it suggested would transform Victoria into an ‘innovation State’. As Minister Kosky explained in her 
2002 Ministerial Statement Knowledge and Skills for the Innovation Economy, reform of the 
vocational sector would enable Victorian industries to compete internationally: ‘the VET sector must 
transform itself from one that is designed for an industrially based economy to one that assists 
businesses to compete in the innovation economy, assists communities to develop and assists 
individuals to gain the skills they need for the future’ (Kosky 2002, p.1). While many of these 
initiatives and reforms were targeted at the TAFE sector, the vocational education ‘stream’ in 
secondary schools also underwent significant expansion, through a number of initiatives, including 
the further development of the Vocational Education and Training (VET) in Schools program; the 
introduction of the Victorian Certificate of Applied Learning (VCAL), a ‘hands-on’ alternative to the 
Victorian Certificate of Education; increased funding for school-based apprenticeships; and the 
introduction of Managed Individual Pathways, which would provide more intensive assistance and 
mentoring to students enrolled in study in government schools or TAFE and who are deemed ‘at risk’ 
of discontinuing their studies (Kosky 2003, p.5; VLESC 2002, p.17). The Victorian Government, 
moving to implement one of the key recommendations of the Kirby Report, that ‘the capacity for 
tracking the destinations of young people in their post compulsory years be developed through the 
local planning networks’, charged LLENs with the responsibility for the follow-up and referral 
functions of the On Track program that would monitor the post-school destinations of school leavers 
in Years 10-12 (Kirby 2000, cited in Kamp 2006, p.141).  
The introduction of new network infrastructures into the education and training sphere was designed 
to bring vastly increased resources of social, economic and intellectual capital to bear on the problem 
of youth unemployment. Yet, the model was not without its challenges and limitations. For a start, 
there was the entrenched nature of the competitive model of inter-school relations that militated 
against schools developing more collaborative ways of working together and with non-school 
agencies, and the difficulty of building norms and trust among ‘weak ties’ (Kamp 2009, p.477). The 
theory of the ‘strength of weak ties’, proposed by sociologist Mark Granovetter in the 1970s, suggests 
that social capital is comprised of different combinations of ‘bonding’, ‘bridging’ and ‘linking’ ties 
(Kamp 2009, p.473; Granovetter 1973). As Kamp (2009, p.473) explains, the theory proposes that 
‘individuals improve their likelihood of achieving change by not only being connected to others in 
their primary network but also by having weak but powerful ties with other communities’. ‘The weak 
ties of bridging and linking networks’, Kamp (2009, p.477) observes, ‘can provide access to a far 
broader range of resources but also inhibit the development of norms and trust because of differences 
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which come into play when networking outside familiar contexts’. Indeed, while promoted in policy 
as a relatively simple linear process, in practice, networking is ‘a learning process marked by tensions 
and contradictions’ (Warmington et al. 2004, cited in Kamp 2009, p.477). Another challenge the 
LLEN model faced was the persistent lack of clarity among local stakeholders in relation to the 
boundaries and role of the LLEN: ‘th[e] tension between an understanding of a LLEN as an entity that 
“should do something” as opposed to an understanding of a LLEN as being just another part of the 
network which “would do something” has remained constant throughout the operation of SGR LLEN’ 
(Kamp 2006, p.69).  
As structures that are open, highly dynamic, and able to expand without limits, networks are 
particularly suited to a ‘culture of endless deconstruction and reconstruction’ (Castells 1996, cited in 
Wittel 2001, p.52). The work of networking among weak ties demands a particular form of sociality – 
what culture and media studies researcher Andreas Wittel (2001) terms ‘network sociality’. This new 
form of sociality was emerging ‘among the new middle class of culturally educated and media- and 
computer-literate people’ in ‘urban (post)industrial spaces and milieus’, and Wittel (2001, pp.51-53) 
traced its rise to the development of information and communication technologies, and to processes of 
globalisation and individualisation. Network sociality is, in short, ‘the social expression of a “liquid 
modernity”’ (Wittel 2001, p.51). Wittel contrasts network sociality with ‘community’. Where the 
latter entails ‘stability, coherence, embeddedness and belonging’ and ‘involves strong and long-lasting 
ties, proximity and a common history or narrative of the collective’, network sociality typically 
‘consists of fleeting and transient, yet iterative social relations; of ephemeral but intense encounters’ 
(Wittel 2001, p.51).  
Social relationships are transformed into commodities, and become transactional in nature. Social 
encounters in the network are organised around a particular purpose, goal or project, and ‘when the 
project terminates, these collaborations are kept on a low flame and new projects, cooperations and 
social ties are established or re-established’ (Wittel 2001, p.66). In addition, these encounters are 
shaped by the imperatives of mobility and speed; they are concerned with the rapid exchange of data 
rather than the sharing of stories, discourses and narratives: ‘narratives are time-consuming; 
information is quick’ (Wittel 2001, p.68). There is some evidence to suggest that the SGR LLEN 
understood its role as cultivating precisely these kinds of purpose-focused, transactional relationships 
– certainly, as the organisation moved further into the 2000s, ‘partnership brokerage’ featured much 
more explicitly in the SGR LLEN’s stated mission. 
Wittel (2001, p.67) notes that, while some commentators such as Richard Sennett are pessimistic 
about the ability of networked sociality to promote a sense of community responsibility, norms and 
trust, we should not discount the ‘possibility of a reconfigured trust being inscribed in informational 
social bonds, bonds based less in hierarchical relations and more in the complex, reciprocal intricacies 
of the transverse networks of information exchange’. As Wittel (2001, pp.67-68) argues:  
Trust here might be based less on continuous work relations of a long duration, and more on 
iterated work relations of a short duration; less on the knowledge of someone’s character and 
more on the knowledge of someone’s resources and his/her position in the social field. Trust 
here is constructed and produced as a social relation rather [than] already pre-given or 
reproduced. Giddens…calls this ‘active trust’. It is a matter of mutual influence rather than 
mutual fatedness.  
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In the SGR LLEN’s inaugural Annual Report, Executive Officer Anne-Marie Ryan suggested that ‘an 
enormous amount of goodwill’ on the part of the network members was part of the glue that held the 
LLEN together, as was a shared commitment among the various network members to the ‘strategic 
imperative’ of supporting young people’s transitions:   
Predictably, when people come together to form cross-sector groups there will be different 
interpretations of priorities and goals. An enormous amount of goodwill and a mutual interest 
in young people is needed to make these groups work. This goodwill is a marked feature in 
the region and an enabling factor as we move towards refocusing our joint attention on the 
needs of young people rather than on the agendas of the various players. (Ryan 2001, p.4) 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored some of the social, political, economic, cultural and governmental 
‘conditions of possibility’ which enabled ‘innovation’ to function as a truth in relation to the problem 
of youth unemployment. In the context of the challenges facing ‘Rust Belt’ places in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, networks were, at one and the same time, understood as the problem and the 
solution. While the new global flows of networked, informational capitalism threatened to cast the old 
industrial cities of the OECD and EU to the economic periphery, the promise of innovative, 
networked approaches to regional planning was that ‘Rust Belt’ places such as Geelong would not be 
relegated to the ranks of ‘the left behind’, and that the young people in these places would not be 
‘sticky subjects’, unable to enact the forms of mobility and weightlessness increasingly understood as 
necessary in 21st century, flexible capitalism. Geelong’s Guggenheim campaign, an event that 
represented the culmination of efforts to reimagine this regional, de-industrialising locale as a global 
centre for arts, culture and tourism, was ultimately unsuccessful. While the financial woes of the 
Guggenheim brand were to blame in this case, the likelihood that the Guggenheim corporation would 
choose to invest in a place at such a significant geographical remove from the major (Northern 
Hemisphere) cultural networks and circuits of capital was perhaps remote to begin with. Yet, other 
initiatives that were the product of the innovation agenda, such as the LLEN, have endured in the 
Geelong context.  
 
However, in adopting the LLEN model as ‘best practice’ for facilitating pathways planning for young 
people, policymakers and stakeholders made a series of assumptions about the ability of this model to 
address complex social and economic problems such as unemployment. In the remaining paragraphs 
of this chapter, I want to problematise the notion that ‘innovation’, in the form of the development and 
application of networked approaches, is the solution to the problem of youth unemployment. Here I 
will seek to bring to light some of the tensions, contradictions, absences and silences that emerge in 
such an approach.  
So, what are some of the assumptions that are embedded in an approach such as the LLEN? To begin, 
there is the assumption that the answers to the problem are already ‘out there’ in the community: that 
it is simply a matter of drawing the kind of expertise that could solve the problem into the network. 
Another key assumption is that the causes of the problem originate at the local or regional level, 
therefore so too must the solutions. Such an approach assumes that structural changes in local labour 
markets and education and training systems are somehow disconnected from patterns of change at the 
national and global scales. As John Spierings, a research strategist with the Dusseldorp Skills Forum, 
asked in 2000 (p.19), ‘how can community partnerships at the local level engineer sustainable change 
when the issues they are dealing with arise from macro-forces in the economy and culture?’. The 
characteristics of the ‘place’ in which the young person is embedded are important in shaping the 
131 
 
kinds of educational and employment outcomes that they can expect to experience. Spierings 
suggested that there was increasing evidence that inequalities within and between regions and 
localities in Australia were growing, and he highlighted the finding of the 1999 State of the Regions 
report, that ‘around half our population live in communities that are equipped to handle the economic 
pressures of the early 21st century. The rest live in either marginalised communities or communities 
that…run a strong risk of becoming marginalised’ (National Economics 1999, cited in Spierings 2000, 
p.5). However, it is important to recognise that wider patterns of change at the national and global 
levels have a key role in shaping the fortunes of particular places. Indeed, in previous chapters I 
identified that ‘macro’ processes and forces emerging in the late 20th century, such as the crisis of 
overproduction in global manufacturing, and the turn away from ‘protectionist’ industry policies at 
the national level, played a critical role in shaping the fortunes of industrial towns and cities in 
Australia and in many of the other industrialised democracies. Spierings (2000, pp.4-5) noted that, in 
the late 1990s, Australia was confronting the problems of capital flight and a skills drain, and that this 
was ‘happening at two levels: from Australia as a nation-state to other international centres; as well as 
internally’, with the major metropolitan centres of the Eastern/Pacific coast prospering while many 
inland rural and regional areas were in decline.  
Another point to be made here is that a number of the networked entities that were established in the 
climate of innovation were the products of government policy initiatives. This is certainly true of the 
LLENs in Victoria, which were instituted as part of the Bracks Labor Government’s education and 
training reform agenda, and the Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) in the UK, which Geddes (2006) 
suggests were a key plank of New Labour’s strategy to ‘modernise’ local government structures. As 
Geddes (2006, p.80) explains, ‘an LSP is a body which brings together at a local level the different 
parts of the public sector as well as the private, business, community and voluntary sectors’ to 
develop local solutions to issues of unemployment, crime, health, education, housing and physical 
environment. It is interesting to note, and perhaps something of a contradiction that, while place-based 
networks such as the LLENs and LSPs were intended to facilitate and build on ‘local’, ‘endogenous’, 
‘grassroots’ approaches, they were imposed ‘from above’ – on municipalities by higher levels of 
government. Earlier I referred to Kamp’s (2006) observation that there was a persistent lack of clarity 
among local stakeholders in the Geelong community in relation to the boundaries and role of the 
LLEN. In this context it is possible to imagine that existing education and training and youth agencies 
would question the motives behind the introduction of these new entities. LSPs, for example, were 
tasked with the ‘rationalisation’ of local partnerships within their area (Geddes 2006, p.80). In a 
climate of confusion, established local agencies could, for example, perceive the LLEN as another 
layer of bureaucracy, or alternatively, view it as a new player on the scene and a competitor for scarce 
sources of funding, or be wary or suspicious of the authority bestowed on the LLEN to sit above local 
agencies and coordinate local strategic planning efforts.  
In the climate of innovation, policymakers believed that the network model represented the most 
effective way of making local stakeholders responsible and accountable for a problem such as youth 
unemployment. Indeed, network approaches were hailed as a panacea that could cure all manner of 
social, political, and economic ills afflicting all manner of different populations, so that in the climate 
of innovation, support for networked approaches formed a kind of orthodoxy. Advocates of 
networked approaches assumed that it was possible to achieve a commonality of purpose and 
intention among stakeholders drawn from a range of diverse sectors. LLENs, for example, operate on 
the premise that all network members have the ‘best interests’ of young people at heart and are 
equally invested in tackling the problem of youth unemployment.  
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However, as my analysis above indicates, while the formation and development of networks is often 
framed as a process that unfolds organically, spontaneously and smoothly, the reality is likely to be 
somewhat different. Indeed, in the Network Society we cannot expect networks to emerge 
spontaneously and organically because they have become institutionalised, rationalised and 
governmentalised (Kelly & Kenway 2001, p.30). Kelly (2000b, p.305) argues that in contemporary 
liberal democracies, the responsibility for the government of populations – where ‘government’ is 
understood, following Foucault, as the ‘conduct of conduct’ – is vested in multiple agencies across 
diverse settings: ‘in schools, in the justice system, in families, in economic relations’, and in an entity    
such as the LLEN. Although power here is not vested in a centralised, monolithic state, Foucault 
(1983, cited in Kelly 2000b, p.305) suggests that ‘in a certain way all other forms of power relation 
must refer to [the state]’. The various other social, economic, and political institutions responsible for 
the ‘conduct of conduct’ have become ‘governmentalized, that is to say, elaborated, rationalized and 
centralized in the form of, under the auspices of, state institutions’ (Foucault 1983, cited in Kelly 
2000b, p.306). In their study of the restructuring of young people’s school-to-work transitions and of 
processes of pathways planning in the Network Society, Kelly and Kenway (2001, p.30) suggest that 
‘in these processes of rationalisation, the need for networks to be supported by institutionalised 
practices emerges as a major element in the structuring of the “reflexivity chances” of those people 
caught in the “web” of these networks’. 
The personal capacities, and access to resources and opportunities, of those who must do the work of 
networking and partnership brokering are also an important element here. We should question 
whether all network members can practice forms of ‘network sociality’ in more or less equal, 
intuitive, and straightforward ways. Network forms of sociality may not develop as readily in smaller, 
regional and rural areas away from the urban centres, for in these places it is more likely that an 
established sense of ‘community’ (in the sense that Wittel [2001] intended) prevails. Certainly, an 
attitude of ‘goodwill’, and being a ‘people person’, are essential attributes, but they are only part of 
the equation (Kelly & Kenway 2001, p.30). As Stokes and Tyler (2001) pointed out in their evaluation 
of the Victorian Pathways Project, the various elements that underpin a network can take some time to 
be developed, and are often reliant on supports and resources generated elsewhere, such as the 
professional development of those who must do the work of partnership brokering and collaboration. 
 
In the policy discussion around networked approaches, there was an absence of critical reflection on 
the strengths and weaknesses, advantages and disadvantages of these approaches, and on the 
differential capacities of networks to effect change, across varied policy, institutional and 
geographical contexts. The Kirby Report, for example, highlights the ‘Danish Safety Net’ as a model 
of what regional, networked approaches can achieve for pathways planning for young people, without 
taking into account the social, political, economic, cultural and governmental ‘conditions of 
possibility’ that make such a system possible. The Report is silent on the fact that Denmark is a 
country whose political and governmental institutions are very different to those of Australia, so that 
the Danish Safety Net occurs within the context of a much stronger overarching social safety net. 
Shaped by very different political, social, cultural and economic traditions to those of Australia, 
Denmark’s political institutions are underpinned by a commitment to principles of social justice and 
social democratic redistribution - principles that Australian politicians and policymakers were, in the 
1990s and 2000s, moving further away from.  
In Australia, reports published by the Australian Student Traineeship Foundation (ASTF) and the 
Business Council of Australia (BCA) were among the key sources influencing the Kirby Report’s 
support for networked, regional approaches to addressing youth unemployment, pathways planning 
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and transitions. In different ways, the ASTF and BCA argued for business and industry to play a 
greater role in shaping the directions of reform of the education and training and youth sectors. While 
the ASTF (1999) was concerned with strengthening schools’ capacities for building partnerships with 
business, industry and community organisations, the BCA (Boston Consulting Group 2000) argued 
for the extension of managerial and market logics into the fields of education and training and youth 
work as a means to promote greater local accountability for the problem of youth unemployment.  
However, there is a basic tension to be found between, on the one hand, the BCA’s suggestion that 
young people’s school-to-work pathways, and the pathways planning necessary to facilitate these 
transitions, can be ‘rationalised’ and made manageable, knowable, and quantifiable, and on the other, 
the growing body of evidence demonstrating that young people’s pathways were becoming 
increasingly fragmented, complex, non-linear and uncertain in the face of the sweeping social, 
cultural, political and economic changes associated with processes of globalisation. These are just 
some of the many tensions, contradictions, absences and silences that a genealogical analysis of the 
emergence of networked approaches is able to reveal. These tensions, contradictions, absences and 
silences make problematic the notion that ‘innovation’, enacted as it was in the late 1990s and early 
2000s through the development and application of networked approaches, is the ‘solution’ to the 
problem of youth unemployment. Having explored the processes through which innovation was 
‘made real’ in the particular context of the ‘Rust Belt’ city of Geelong in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, in the following chapter I will explore the emergence of a new, algorithmically-energised, 
regime of capitalist accumulation, and other key ‘disruptions’ shaping the demand for young people’s 
‘enterprise skills’ in the 21st century.  
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Chapter Six 
New Work Orders? The Foundation for Young Australians and 
Young People’s Enterprise Skills 
 
Introduction 
In the second decade of the 21st century, the concept of ‘enterprise’ is increasingly, and powerfully, 
vested with the capacity to rescue ‘Rust Belt’ locales such as Geelong, and the young people within 
them, from economic insecurity and destitution. The previous chapter, ‘Guggenheim Dreaming in a 
Climate of Innovation’, considered Geelong as it stood on the cusp of the new millennium, at a time 
in which local business and civic leaders began to harbour global ambitions for the city, as they strove 
to leave the legacies of 20th century industrialism behind, and to remake and re-image this regional 
locale. In that period, ‘creative cities’, the ‘creative class’ and ‘innovation’ were the watchwords 
underpinning local strategies for economic and labour market transformation.   
This chapter is the third and final of three chapters that seek to problematise and historicise each of 
the key terms, ‘employability skills’, ‘innovation’ and ‘enterprise’, all of which have, in slightly 
different ways and in slightly different periods, been understood as promising the solution to the 
problem of youth unemployment. This chapter brings the discussion into the historical present, into an 
early 21st century period in which new, algorithmically-energised circuits of capitalist accumulation, 
and discourses of the ‘gig economy’, are shaping notions of youth enterprise. The central ‘figure’ of 
concern in this chapter is the Foundation for Young Australians’ (FYA) New Work Order report 
series, a series which argues for the significance of the transferable, ‘enterprise skills’ that young 
people will need if they are to successfully navigate future labour markets characterised by almost 
constant churn and change.  
The FYA’s interventions into the education and training policy space are occurring at a time when 
algorithms, Big Data, and artificial intelligence are becoming increasingly significant as drivers of 
economic growth, and of processes of societal change more generally. In his 2017 book, Platform 
Capitalism, Nick Srnicek argues that in the 21st century, advanced capitalism has come to be centred 
on the extraction and use of a particular kind of raw material: data. Srnicek (2017, pp.41-42) argues 
that data have come to serve a number of key functions in processes of capitalist accumulation:  
They educate and give competitive advantage to algorithms; they enable the coordination and 
outsourcing of workers; they allow for the optimisation and flexibility of productive 
processes; they make possible the transformation of low-margin goods into high-margin 
services; and data analysis is itself generative of data, in a virtuous cycle.  
The need to effectively manage all of this data has given rise to what Srnicek (2017, p.42) suggests is 
‘a powerful new type of firm: the platform’. Srnicek (2017, p.43) argues that, at its most basic level, a 
platform is a digital infrastructure that enables two or more groups to interact. Numerous companies, 
across both ‘old’ and ‘new’ sectors of the economy, are now reliant on platforms: from leading 
technology companies such as Google, Facebook, and Amazon, to ‘dynamic start-ups’ such as Uber 
and Airbnb, to some of the key behemoths of 20th century industrial capitalism, such as GE, Siemens, 
John Deere and Monsanto (Srnicek 2017, p.43). Srnicek traces the ‘conditions of possibility’ which 
enabled this data-driven regime to emerge. Forming a background to the transformations of late 20th 
century capitalism was the crisis of profitability and oversupply in global manufacturing that emerged 
in the 1970s (Srnicek 2017, pp.13-17). In the 1990s, with manufacturing continuing to decline, the 
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advent of the World Wide Web saw a frenzy of investment in, and speculation on, technology 
companies and stocks, so that, by the late 1990s, the telecommunications sector became the favoured 
outlet of financial capital (Srnicek 2017, pp.19-22). Srnicek (2017, p.23) observes that ‘the 1990s tech 
boom was a bubble that laid the groundwork for the digital economy to come’. And the global 
economic conditions which have prevailed in the post-Global Financial Crisis period have proved 
particularly conducive to the growth in size and influence of technology firms such as Google and 
Apple. As governments and central banks have pursued low interest rates and a loose monetary 
policy, ‘investors seeking higher yields have had to turn to increasingly risky assets – by investing in 
unprofitable and unproven tech companies, for instance’ (Srnicek 2017, p.30). At the same time, the 
post-2008 conditions supported the growth of the flexible labour force necessary to platform 
capitalism. In a context of high unemployment in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, large 
numbers of workers have been pushed into the hyper-exploitative ‘gig economy’ as a result of their 
need to earn an income (Srnicek 2017, pp.33-35). 
In a context of post-Global Financial Crisis austerity, a variety of policy, media and academic actors 
and agencies have focused their attention on the rise in rates of youth unemployment and the 
withering of traditional opportunity structures, and their role in shaping contemporary patterns of 
precarity and generational inequality. In Australia, the FYA’s own research has highlighted that 
‘today’s generation of young people is the first to be worse off than their parents on a number of key 
social and economic measures’ (FYA 2018, p.7). An oft-cited statistic is that it now takes young 
people 4.7 years, on average, to secure a full-time job after leaving full-time education, compared 
with an average of one year in 1986 (FYA 2015b, p.2). Today a home buyer pays 6.5 times the 
average income for their home; in 1985 houses typically cost 3.2 times the average income (FYA 
2014, p.18). With a full 31.5 percent of young people classified as unemployed or underemployed in 
2018 (FYA 2018, p.8), it is feared that, despite their best efforts to ‘get on and get ahead’, current 
generations of young people are often locked out of the opportunity structures that previous 
generations were able to fall back on. In 2016, the ‘smashed avocado’ debate that erupted across 
Australian media became a site where many of these anxieties and concerns were not only expressed, 
but also contested. In October of that year, Australian social commentator Bernard Salt made the 
(apparently tongue-in-cheek) provocation that young people’s proclivities for posh breakfasts in 
‘hipster cafes’ were imperilling their prospects of home ownership (Salt 2016). The avalanche of 
impassioned commentary and debate that ensued across digital and traditional media became 
colloquially known as the ‘smashed avocado’ debate, and sparked a discussion of generational 
inequality and housing affordability that reverberated around the globe (see for example, Levin 2017; 
Delaney 2016).  
In the academic field, a multidisciplinary research agenda has emerged to suggest that the experiences 
of young people, as they move through 21st century education and work contexts reshaped by 
processes of globalisation and neoliberal individualisation, can increasingly be understood in terms of 
‘precarity’ and/or ‘precarisation’ (see for example, Ross 2008; Standing 2011; Carbajo & Kelly 
2019). There has been renewed impetus for such an agenda in the aftermath of the 2007-08 Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC), the impacts of which in many cases fell (and continue to fall) 
disproportionately on young people. As Carbajo and Kelly (2019, p.74) observe, in large parts of 
Europe the youth labour market is yet to recover from the effects of the GFC. In Spain, for example, 
youth unemployment reached a peak of 41.4 percent in 2013, and the country’s youth unemployment 
rate remained over twice that of the EU-28 average several years later, with 28.7 percent of young 
people out of work in 2017 (Carbajo & Kelly 2019, p.74). In these contexts, in which precarity 
appears to have become the new normality for young people, there have proliferated a large number 
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of policies and programs designed to improve the employability of this population through the 
cultivation of their capacities for entrepreneurship and enterprise (Carbajo & Kelly 2019, pp.74-75). 
The OECD at the international scale, and the FYA in the Australian context have sought a key role in 
identifying the kinds of work that education and skills development systems should do in fostering 
individuals who can adapt rapidly to education and work contexts reshaped by the ‘disruptions’ of 
neoliberal capitalism and technological innovation. This chapter will begin by exploring the FYA’s 
New Work Order report series. At the time of writing, the series comprises six titles: The New Work 
Order, which was published in August 2015; How Young People Are Faring, published in November 
2015; The New Basics, published in April 2016; The New Work Mindset, published in November 
2016; The New Work Smarts, published in July 2017; and The New Work Reality, published in June 
2018. I will analyse the arguments put forward in the key titles in the series, examine some of the key 
sources that the FYA draws on in developing its ‘enterprise skills’ agenda, and offer a critique of 
some of the core assumptions embedded in the particular vision of the future of work that the New 
Work Order advances. I will also briefly take a closer look at the visual representations of youth 
enterprise that appear across the pages of these reports, and examine what these images say about the 
kinds of enterprise privileged by the FYA and other agencies like it, in the technologised, globalised, 
corporate contexts of the 21st century.  
In the following section of the chapter I will move into the local Geelong context to analyse 
contemporary economic and labour market developments in this ‘Rust Belt’ city. While these 
developments continue to be shaped by the reverberations of de-industrialisation and ‘neoliberal’ 
globalisation, a new generation of entrepreneurial leaders have claimed an authoritative voice in 
Geelong, advocating a vision of the city’s future as ‘Silicon Bay’. Having lost the ‘Smart’ part of its 
title in the intervening years, in the second decade of the 21st century the Geelong Region Local 
Learning and Employment Network (GRLLEN) understands itself as taking a leading role in 
preparing the Geelong region for the coming of the ‘gig economy’. Analysing the GRLLEN’s 2017-
18 Gig Economy seminar series in some detail, I will demonstrate that the FYA’s efforts to influence 
the national education and training policy agenda represent a key reference point for the GRLLEN as 
it attempts to mobilise a diverse array of community stakeholders around the need to prepare young 
people for the future of work. The work of organisations such as the FYA and GRLLEN ensures that 
the key concepts of ‘enterprise skills’, the ‘gig economy’, and ‘portfolio careers’ feature heavily in 
contemporary discourses around youth employment and unemployment, where they function to 
individualise and responsibilise young people for managing their lives as an enterprise in increasingly 
uncertain settings (Kelly 2017). At the conclusion of the chapter I will offer some provocations for 
rethinking the dominant ways in which the ‘gig economy’ and processes of digital disruption are 
understood in the 21st century.  
The Foundation for Young Australians and the New Work Order 
During the last decade, the FYA, via the publication of a series of research reports, has attempted to 
spearhead a national discussion of the skills that young people will need if they are to survive and 
thrive in labour markets fundamentally reshaped by the dynamics of automation and globalisation. 
The FYA (2017a, p.1) suggests that its work is driven by four key goals: 
We inspire young people by providing ideas, inspiration and opportunities to connect young 
people to inspiring, purposeful futures; we back young people by building the capabilities and 
knowledge young people need to thrive in the future; we connect young people by building a 
network of inspired and inspiring young Australians; [and] we transform the way government, 
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industry and community sectors engage young people to rethink the systems that shape the 
world.  
 
The FYA ‘was formed in 1999 through a partnership between The Queen’s Trust and the Australian 
Youth Foundation, with the objectives of providing increased opportunity and access for young 
people of disadvantaged background, as well as supporting the leadership development of young 
Australians’ (FYA n.d.-b). In 2008 an alliance was formed between Education Foundation and FYA 
that consolidated the established expertise and knowledge of the youth and education sectors, and 
established FYA ‘as the pre-eminent advocate for young Australians’ (FYA n.d.-b). The FYA also has 
historical connections to conservative politics in Australia: Victorian Liberal Party MP Mary 
Wooldridge was the FYA’s CEO from 2001 to 2005 (Parliament of Victoria 2019). The FYA’s 
current, high-profile leader, CEO Jan Owen, is ‘a highly regarded social entrepreneur, innovator, 
influencer and author’, whose ‘lifelong mission is to unleash the potential of young people to lead 
positive change in the world’, the FYA’s website (n.d.-a) explains. Although Owen commands an 
authoritative voice in the field of education reform, she is but one of a growing number of (often self-
styled) ‘thought leaders’ vying for influence in this space.  
 
The view that education and skills development systems, as currently constituted, are inadequate to 
the task of preparing young people for the future of work, and more broadly, of equipping young 
people with the tools to navigate uncertain futures, is now pervasive. And it is one voiced by a 
multitude of policymakers, education practitioners, and other stakeholders across multiple settings and 
scales – from the various emerging ‘thought leaders’ and ‘influencers’ seeking to ‘disrupt’ 
understandings of what it means to work and to learn, and who use the professional networking 
website LinkedIn as their platform (see for example, McGowan 2014), to the high-level policy 
coordination and leadership activities of the OECD. The OECD’s Skills For A Digital World (2016, 
p.4) report, for example, suggests that the impact of digital disruption on the workplace ‘is raising the 
demand for new skills along three lines’: 
ICT specialist skills to programme, develop applications and manage networks; ICT generic 
skills to use such technologies for professional purposes; and ICT complementary skills to 
perform new tasks associated to the use of ICTs at work, e.g.: information-processing, self-
direction, problem-solving and communication. Foundation skills, digital literacies as well as 
social and emotional skills are crucial to enable effective use of digital technologies by all 
individuals in their daily lives.  
In its 2018 report The Future of Education and Skills: Education 2030, the OECD (2018, p.4) argues 
that ‘education needs to aim to do more than prepare young people for the world of work; it needs to 
equip students with the skills they need to become active, responsible and engaged citizens’. The 
OECD’s Andreas Schleicher (2018, p.2) suggests that, in a context of unprecedented social, economic 
and environmental challenges – changes which are ‘driven by accelerating globalisation and a faster 
rate of technological developments’ and which encompass such things as climate change and the 
depletion of natural resources, digital disruption and the creation of new, algorithmically-energised, 
global value chains – schools must be able to prepare young people ‘for jobs that have not yet been 
created, for technologies that have not yet been invented, to solve problems that have not yet been 
anticipated’. ‘Curiosity, imagination, resilience and self-regulation’ are the qualities that young people 
will need to develop to successfully navigate these uncertain futures, Schleicher (2018, p.2) suggests:  
They will need to respect and appreciate the ideas, perspectives and values of others; and they 
will need to cope with failure and rejection, and to move forward in the face of adversity. 
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Their motivation will be more than getting a good job and a high income; they will also need 
to care about the well-being of their friends and families, their communities and the planet. 
 
While a reformed schooling system can and should equip young people with the attributes and skills 
that will make them ‘future-ready’, the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor’s Youth Entrepreneurship in 
Asia and the Pacific 2018-19 report suggests that it is participation in higher education, in particular, 
that can provide young people with the opportunities and mindsets that will allow them to become 
future agents of change (Guelich & Bosma 2019). These privileged ‘change agents’ are understood as 
those with the vision and drive to develop the kinds of social enterprises that are increasingly central 
to efforts to address the complex and intractable social and environmental problems of the 21st 
century.  
 
In Australia, a 2017 report by education policy think tank the Mitchell Institute asserts that ‘education 
systems have not been designed to foster the types of capabilities needed to navigate complex 
environments and multiple careers. The basic model of education has been largely static in the face of 
changes in the broader economy’ (Torii & O’Connell 2017, p.3). The Review to Achieve Educational 
Excellence in Australian Schools (or ‘Gonski 2.0’ as it is also known) suggests that since 2000, 
Australia’s academic performance has declined when compared to other OECD countries (Gonski et 
al. 2018, p.viii). This is concerning, Gonski et al. (2018, p.ix) maintain, because ‘as routine manual 
and administrative activities are increasingly automated’ and the school system is increasingly called 
on to ‘prepare students for a complex and rapidly changing world’, Australia still has an industrial 
model of school education that is not sufficiently innovative to meet these new challenges. Australia’s 
Chief Scientist, Alan Finkel, advocates for school-industry partnerships to play a greater role in 
developing Australia’s future STEM workforce on the basis that they can contribute to the formation 
of the kinds of ‘T-shaped individuals’ that employers are looking for. Finkel (2018, p.6) claims that:  
 
Employers with the vision to invest in the future have the insight to look for T-shaped 
individuals, those who have deep specialty skills (the vertical pole of the T) and broad 
enterprise skills (the horizontal bar of the T). Take away the horizontal bar and you are left 
with an ‘I’ – lots of discipline knowledge but lacking the collaborative skills to contribute that 
knowledge effectively. Take away the vertical pole and you are left with a dash – possibly 
smart but always rushing off for the answers instead of being able to contribute to the 
discussion.  
 
While there are a variety of agencies and actors crowding into the debate around reform of education 
and training systems, I want to suggest that, in this context, the work of the FYA emerges as 
particularly influential because it, in the jargon of platform capitalism, has immense ‘retweet value’. 
The FYA’s analyses and prescriptions are so compelling because they suggest that it is simply a 
matter of diagnosing the problem (young people’s deficient skills and mindsets) and providing the 
solution (enterprise skills) – an assessment that is presented in neatly packaged and easily 
comprehensible ways. The FYA’s enterprise skills agenda promises to render complex 21st century 
problems, such as digital disruption and youth unemployment and underemployment, knowable and 
manageable in ways that do not represent any fundamental challenge to existing social and economic 
orders.  
 
Before I move to a detailed examination of the ways in which the FYA develops the concept of 
‘enterprise skills’, I will offer some brief comments on the aesthetic dimensions of the representations 
of youth enterprise in the New Work Order series. In fact, what I want to suggest here is that, in this 
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report series, there is an aestheticisation of youth enterprise and a privileging of the kinds of 
intellectual labour that take place in technologised, 21st century corporate workplaces. The visual 
representations of youth enterprise in the New Work Order report series are carefully gender-balanced 
and deliberately multicultural. The report series features a signature design, with key pieces of data 
and analysis presented in the form of sleek and vibrant infographics. The report text is interspersed 
with large photographs of young people who appear cheerful and engaged as they interact, 
collaborate, and apply themselves to a particular task or problem (see Figure 16 below). In the image 
shown bottom right, the gaze of a young Indigenous woman is cast down to her mobile phone. In fact, 
the relaxed atmosphere evoked in many of these images is suggestive of a blurring of the distinction 
between work and leisure. The young people in these images appear in casual attire, with laptops, 
pens and post-it notes as their tools of the trade, and these representations play into the perception 
that, for these young ‘knowledge’ workers, work can occur anywhere and at any time, in the digitised, 
diffuse and portable workspaces of the 21st century. 
 
These representations are congruent with the overarching policy vision of the Turnbull Liberal-
National Coalition Government’s 2015 National Innovation and Science Agenda, which ascribes an 
enhanced role to the innovators and ‘disruptors’ who are leading the way in the Science, Technology, 
Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) fields that the Agenda suggests will form the backbone of an 
‘agile’ and dynamic Australian economy (Australian Government 2016a; Turnbull 2015). While the 
surface characteristics of the New Work Order exude a spirit of inclusion and diversity, the series 
nonetheless privileges intellectual labour to the exclusion of other forms of enterprise. Absent is the 
enterprise of young people whose manual skills and capacities, in the long-established, perhaps 
relatively unglamorous fields of hospitality and construction, for example, will likely remain 
economically necessary and relevant in the labour markets of the future.  
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Figure 16: A selection of images that appear in the Foundation for Young Australians’ New Work Order report 
series 
 
In the first, eponymous report in the New Work Order series, the FYA (2015a) contends that 
automation, globalisation and collaboration are the three predominant forces shaping the future of 
work. The FYA (2015a, p.4) maintains that the rapid pace of technological change is such that 
between 60 and 70 percent of students are being trained in occupations where the vast majority of jobs 
will be radically affected by automation in the next 10-15 years. Technology is also enabling new 
collaborative, flexible and remote working arrangements, in digital workplaces that operate cross-
nationally and globally (FYA 2015a, p.7). ‘Digital literacy’ and technical skills such as ‘coding’ are 
therefore becoming key skill requirements. The proliferation of computer programming clubs for 
young people, for example (such as Coder Dojo, which is open to those aged seven to 17), reflects 
efforts to complement and extend the basic computer literacy skills developed in school-based 
learning (Thompson, Hichens & Hoyt 2016; Coder Dojo n.d.).  
It is ‘enterprise skills’ that employers increasingly demand in employees, and that ‘have been found to 
be a powerful predictor of long term job success’, the FYA (2016a, p.5) argues in The New Basics, the 
second report in the series. Enterprise skills include such things as problem solving, presentation skills 
and communication skills, and are also known variously as generic, soft, or 21st century skills (FYA 
140 
 
2016a, p.5), indicating that this concept shares a very similar set of concerns with that of 
employability skills. These insights were made possible by the ‘advent of Big Data’, the FYA (2016a, 
p.7) explains: ‘we analysed 4.2 million online jobs postings over 2012 to 2015 in Australia from more 
than 6000 sources to definitively uncover what employers want’. With employer demand for key 
enterprise skills such as creativity, problem solving and digital literacy growing exponentially in 
recent years, the FYA (2016a, p.12) suggests that young people in possession of these scarce and in-
demand skills can expect to receive higher wages:  
Compared with early-career jobs that do not list these skills, on average jobs that requested 
presentation skills paid an additional $8,853 per year, digital literacy an additional $8,648, 
problem solving an additional $7,745, financial literacy an additional $5,224 and creativity an 
additional $3,129.  
 
According to estimates by McCrindle Research (2014, cited in FYA 2016b, p.6), in the future of work 
Australians will make an average of 17 changes in employers across five different careers (more on 
McCrindle’s ‘17 jobs and 5 careers’ prediction later). If young people are to successfully navigate this 
almost constant change, then it is portable skills that they must seek to acquire. To this end, in its 
2016 report The New Work Mindset the FYA proposes the ‘job cluster’ as a collection of occupations 
related in their skills, training and experience prerequisites (FYA 2016b, p.4). The seven new job 
clusters the FYA has identified in the Australian economy include ‘The Artisans’, ‘The Coordinators’, 
‘The Generators’, ‘The Designers’, ‘The Carers’, ‘The Informers’ and ‘The Technologists’ (FYA 
2016b, p.7). The latter three clusters – ‘The Carers’, ‘The Informers’ and ‘The Technologists’ – are 
considered least vulnerable to automation, and are based on future sectors of economic growth, 
including healthcare, knowledge, and digital technology, respectively.  
The FYA’s 2017 report, The New Work Smarts, asserts that by 2030 there will be a reduction in the 
proportion of jobs requiring routine, manual tasks, in favour of jobs that demand an ‘entrepreneurial 
mindset’, the ability to work autonomously, and which utilise skills in critical and creative thinking 
and problem solving (FYA 2017b, p.4). The New Work Reality, released the following year, suggests 
that although twenty-five-year-olds today ‘are more educated than ever before’, with nearly 60 
percent holding a post school qualification, 50 percent of young people are ‘stuck in transition’, 
unable to secure full time work (FYA 2018, p.10; Owen 2018). According to the FYA (2018, p.8), the 
key barriers that young people perceive are holding them back from securing full time work include: 
their lack of work experience; a lack of appropriate education affording them the technical skills 
needed to gain a full-time job; a lack of the necessary interview and job application skills; and finally, 
the perception that there are insufficient full-time job opportunities in the labour market. The New 
Work Reality compared the journeys of young people who have secured full-time work against those 
who have not, in order to identify what it suggests are the four most significant factors supporting 
young people to secure full-time work faster (see Figure 17 below where these are represented in 
infographic form). As Jan Owen (2018) explains, these four factors include:  
Courses teaching enterprise skills like problem solving, teamwork and communication. This 
can increase the speed of entry to working full-time hours by 17 months; relevant paid work 
experience. This can speed up the transition to full-time work by up to 12 months; 
employment within an area of work which has strong future growth prospects can speed up 
the transition by 5 months; [and finally,] an optimistic mindset and strong well-being by age 
18. This can accelerate the transition by up to two months faster than a young person who is 
unhappy or not confident with their career prospects before leaving school.  
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Figure 17: The four most significant factors that the FYA (2018, p.18) suggests can accelerate the young 
person’s transition from full-time education to full-time work. 
 
While The New Basics (FYA 2016a, p.16) suggests that more than 90 percent of Australia’s 
workforce will need to possess at least a basic level of competence in the use of digital technology ‘to 
function in a digitally-enabled workforce over the next 2-5 years’, the report notes with concern that 
‘Australian students have a significantly less positive attitude towards computers than on average 
across the OECD’ (Thomson & De Bortoli 2012, cited in FYA 2016a, p.17). The performance of 
Australian 15-year-olds on PISA testing (Programme for International Student Assessment testing 
conducted by the OECD) of key 21st century skills suggests that there is significant room for 
improvement, and particularly in the case of Indigenous students and students from a low 
socioeconomic background. The FYA (2016a, p.18) claims that the weaker performance of these 
groups in the areas of problem solving and digital literacy ‘raises a serious equity challenge’:  
Given that these skills are increasingly demanded by employers, receive higher salaries and 
will be demanded in the jobs of the future, the association between disadvantage and lower 
performance in these skill areas implies that labour market disadvantage will be further 
entrenched. This is data worthy of serious consideration in attempts to close the gap and 
tackle equity in education. 
The New Basics proposes that enterprise skills can be built into education and training systems 
through reforms across five key areas: ‘Setting the scene with curriculum’; ‘Rethinking teaching 
methods’; ‘Developing teachers’; ‘Partnering with employers’; and ‘Providing a clear picture with 
live labour market data’ (FYA 2016a, p.19). However, the report shies away from engaging with the 
role that factors such as class, ethnicity, and geography play in shaping the differential access of 
particular population groups to an education that builds enterprise skills. Specific proposals for 
addressing the disadvantage that young people of Indigenous and low socioeconomic backgrounds 
face in acquiring enterprise skills are noticeably absent. Indeed, the FYA (2016a, p.17) suggests that 
the barriers holding these groups back from developing greater capability in the area of digital literacy 
are, in large part, attitudinal in nature: ‘unfortunately, low socio-economic and Indigenous 
students…report lower levels of belief in the importance of working with computers, signalling 
weaker understanding of the workforce of the future’.  
The FYA has recently put its support behind ‘micro-credentials’, which it regards as promising new 
educational products that offer a method of ‘just-in-time’ upskilling. Typically targeted at current 
university students or recent graduates and intended as an ‘add-on’ to a degree program, micro-
credentials are short packages of learning that can earn the graduate a ‘digital badge’ on completion of 
the package. These digital badges can then be shared with potential employers to demonstrate the 
graduate’s enterprise or ‘soft’ skills and experiences, helping graduates to ‘stand out from the crowd’ 
(RMIT University n.d.-a). A number of Australian tertiary education institutions are making forays 
into the micro-credentials market, working with industry to co-design relevant credentials. ‘Becoming 
a leader’, ‘lifelong digital learning’ and ‘networking is working’ are some examples of the packages 
available in RMIT University’s (n.d.-b) digital credentials portfolio29. These digital credentials, the 
 
29 In 2018, I attended an information session at RMIT University on enterprise skills and micro-credentials that 
was delivered by a representative of FYA to an audience of vocational education professionals working in the 
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FYA (2017c, p.7) claims, ‘will provide greater industry and job relevance for young people, and build 
confidence in employers that students will leave their post school training “work ready”’. The 
enthusiasm surrounding micro-credentials is of a similar pitch to that associated with the concept of 
‘competencies’ in an earlier era:  
Microcredentials still have a way to go, including developing a common understanding of 
what they are, but they show great promise in providing a solution that gives our current and 
emerging workforce more responsive training and opportunities to develop the skills needed 
for the future of work just in time. (Fawcett 2018, emphases added) 
It is interesting to note that all reports in the New Work Order series were prepared for FYA by 
AlphaBeta, the organisation responsible for the Automation Advantage report that, as I noted in 
Chapter 2, portrays processes of automation in overwhelmingly positive terms. The recognition that 
AlphaBeta forms a central link between these two bodies of work helps to explain the similarities in 
perspective and tone that are apparent here. Across these two bodies of work, the complex, contested 
issues of automation and youth unemployment and transitions are treated as essentially technical 
problems. Both The Automation Advantage and the New Work Order series are dominated by data-
related, data-driven forms of truth telling: 62 percent of low-skilled workers will experience improved 
satisfaction at work by 2030… we analysed 4.2 million online jobs postings from more than 6000 
sources to definitively uncover what employers want…enterprise skills can increase the speed of entry 
to full-time work by 17 months. The implication here is that these technical problems and their likely 
impacts can best be understood and addressed through the application of statistical, algorithmic 
frameworks that are reassuring in their mathematical precision and apparent objectivity. This is 
perhaps the appeal of such an approach for policymakers, education practitioners, and the many other 
stakeholders whose work is influenced by the FYA’s prescriptions.30  
The underlying premise of the New Work Order series is that if current and future generations of 
workers are to remain employable in rapidly changing labour markets, they must gain transferable, in-
demand skills that are least likely to be displaced by automation. FYA mirrors, here, the ‘upskilling 
orthodoxy’ that persists in policy circles. This orthodoxy finds its expression in, for example, the view 
of Brendan O’Connor, the Shadow Federal Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations, that 
young people are ‘not acquiring skills in areas of emerging demand’ and that government and industry 
investment in skills and education must enable them to do so (Lane 2017). This orthodoxy has been 
 
higher education sector. At this session it was suggested that micro-credentials were intended as portable sets of 
credentials that a worker can take with them through the gig economy, offering ‘global recognition and seamless 
transferability’. It was suggested that the benefits of micro-credentials would flow to three key groups: for 
students, micro-credentials would offer a sense of agency, with the ability to articulate ‘these are my skills, these 
are my career goals’. For the education provider, micro-credentials would enable a ‘whole of institution’ aligned 
curriculum and the ability to ‘build customer loyalty’. Another key beneficiary would be industry, with 
employers assured that graduates are in possession of ‘work ready’ skills. It was also noted that the rapid pace of 
change in the world of work is such that some micro-credentials have a two-year expiry.  
 
30 Conducting an ‘allintext’ Google Search provides a means to trace some of the ways in which the FYA’s 
work is cited, utilised and translated by other organisations. For example, a search that I conducted on 31 
October 2019 using the terms ‘allintext: “new work order report series”’ revealed that schools, LLENs, and 
business groups are among those engaging most heavily with the New Work Order report series. The results of 
this search can be viewed here: 
https://www.google.com.au/search?q=allintext:++%22new+work+order+report+series%22&lr=&hl=
en&as_qdr=all&ei=N1a6XcG_Bdbf9QO72LSADw&start=30&sa=N&ved=0ahUKEwiBt6iwyMXlA
hXWb30KHTssDfA4KBDx0wMIdw&biw=1920&bih=944  
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extensively critiqued by youth sociologists and other scholars for its problematic assumption that 
youth unemployment and underemployment is a product, by and large, of the low skills and 
aspirations of individual young people (see for example, MacDonald 2011).  
 
As Morgan and Nelligan (2018, p.26) point out, qualifications ‘bracket creep’, and ‘credentialism’ 
emerge as troubling phenomena in the context of the shortage of secure and meaningful employment 
for young people, and involve the ‘introduction of mandatory qualifications for vocations that 
formerly did not demand such things’. While young people are exhorted to ‘earn or learn’ by 
politicians and to ‘future-proof [their] career in a changing world’ by corporatised tertiary education 
institutions (as Deakin University suggested in a 2017 advertising campaign [Deakin University 
2017]), the attainment of an undergraduate degree or higher level of education provides no guarantee 
that the young person will find secure, relatively well-remunerated employment (Morgan & Nelligan 
2018, pp.26-27). The upskilling orthodoxy continues to individualise and responsibilise young people 
for managing the contradictions of precarious, globalised labour markets. As Kelly, Campbell and 
Howie argue in their book Rethinking Young People’s Marginalisation: Beyond Neo-liberal Futures? 
(2018, pp.74-75):  
 
FYA presents a largely orthodox rendering of labour market changes that is long on 
description, and a little short on critical analysis…In imagining [unemployment, inequality 
and insecurity] as risks, and, at the same time, glossing over them to suggest that these are 
inevitable aspects of life in 21st century capitalism, FYA makes explicit that it does not 
imagine that its research and advocacy agenda on behalf of young people involves any 
serious, critical encounter with a political economy of neo-Liberal capitalism. 
 
In recent years, a range of business lobby groups have weighed into the debates around digital 
disruption and the education and skills needs of the future workforce. Two of the most prominent 
examples include the Australian Industry Group’s (AIG) 2016 position paper on the gig economy, 
Thought Leader Paper: The Emergence of the Gig Economy, and the Business Council of Australia’s 
(BCA) 2017 report, Future Proof, subtitled ‘Protecting Australians through education and skills’. In 
the AIG’s (2016, p.19) estimation, the increased availability of ‘on-demand labour’ that the recent rise 
of the ‘gig economy’ has made possible is an opportunity that Australian industry should embrace 
enthusiastically. While the rise of these new working arrangements will require some adjustment on 
the part of industry – ‘new tools, systems and processes to respond and adjust to the complexities of 
this 21st century workstream’ will be required – the AIG (2016, p.19) suggests that the benefits 
flowing to Australian businesses will be immense: ‘the ability to swiftly scale the workforce up and 
down in response to changing workloads, access to a wider pool of hyper-specialised talent, and 
increased productivity can help companies reach KPIs and boost the bottom line’. The BCA’s Future 
Proof report argues that, with automation and AI fundamentally reshaping the future of work, it is the 
task of education and training systems to foster ‘a culture of lifelong learning that encourages people 
to use qualifications to build a strong foundation, and then dip in and out of short, accredited modules 
to effectively create their own “credentials” that allow them to upskill and retrain throughout their 
lives’ (BCA n.d.; BCA 2017). The solutions and recommendations being advocated here are basically 
identical to those supported by FYA, suggesting which interests might stand to benefit from the 
entrenchment of the enterprise skills agenda.   
 
The prediction that today’s young people will, on average, move through 17 different jobs across five 
different industries in their lifetime appears in almost every piece of communication issued by the 
FYA. This prediction is not a product of the FYA’s own calculations, but rather can be traced back to 
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a blog post published by Australian market research company McCrindle Research in 2014. The 
McCrindle Blog (2014) claims that ‘today the national average tenure in a job is 3 years and 4 months, 
based on voluntary turnover of around 15% per annum’. These calculations are based on an analysis 
of HILDA and Department of Employment data. ‘If this plays out consistently in the life of a school 
leaver today,’ McCrindle Research (2014) continues, ‘and assuming they start their working life aged 
18 (in a part-time role) and are retired from all work by 75, they will have 17 different employers in 
their lifetime. Based on 3 jobs before upskilling or career changing, this means that they will also 
have 5 separate careers in their lifetime’. The blog post concludes with the assertion that: 
In an era where job opportunity matters more than job security and where flexibility and 
mobility matter more than stability and job loyalty, the trends which have created shorter job 
tenure are here to stay. In an era of employment flexibility and empowered workers, 
employers can no longer rely on job salary and security to attract top performers and retain 
the emerging generation of leaders. (McCrindle Research 2014) 
This statement elevates the problematic concepts of ‘personal choice’ and ‘employee-driven 
flexibility’, and is revealing of some of the biases and interests that emerge in McCrindle’s analysis. 
McCrindle’s references to ‘top performers’ and ‘the emerging generation of leaders’ in the final 
sentence of the blog post is suggestive of a number of things. It perhaps betrays McCrindle’s belief 
that it is only among the elite echelons of the workforce that employee-driven flexibility can become a 
reality. At the very least, it reveals that these are really the only segments of the workforce that matter 
to organisations such as McCrindle Research. While the FYA (2017a, p.1) has stated that its analyses 
and prescriptions are ‘informed by strong evidence, research and evaluation’, it is worth noting the 
absences, biases and assumptions that are embedded in McCrindle Research’s projections. 
Particularly when those projections are taken for granted, and continuously re-stated as constituting a 
key characteristic of the ‘truths’ of youth transitions and the future of work, by the FYA and all of the 
various agencies whose work is influenced by it. Before I turn to consider the influence of the FYA’s 
work on approaches to the problem of youth unemployment in the ‘Rust Belt’ city of Geelong, in the 
following section of the chapter I will examine how processes of economic and spatial transformation 
were taking shape in Geelong in the second decade of the 21st century.  
‘Silicon Bay’: a ‘Rust Belt’ city prepares for its entrepreneurial ‘pivot’  
In the second decade of the 21st century, the city of Geelong entered a period of reflection and 
transition as many of the stalwarts of its manufacturing sector finally reached the end of the line. The 
Alcoa aluminium smelter closed at the end of 2014, after operating at its Point Henry site for 51 years. 
The Ford Motor Company ceased production at its Geelong plant in October 2016, marking the end of 
the company’s 91-year tenure in Geelong. As had occurred in the climate of innovation surrounding 
Geelong’s ‘Guggenheim dreaming’ roughly a decade prior, local politicians, businesspeople and other 
stakeholders perceived this transitional phase as a critical moment in shaping the future of the city. 
The turn of the century period had given birth to the ‘Geelong: Smart Move’ campaign, and this next 
episode in Geelong’s history similarly called for a rethink and modernisation of city branding 
strategies. As an example, the City of Greater Geelong’s Economic Development Unit was rebadged 
as ‘Enterprise Geelong’ in an attempt to capture the new zeitgeist (Dundas 2015). 
Business and civic leaders understood the importance of cultivating a mood of confidence in 
Geelong’s ‘post-industrial’ economic recovery, seeking to allay community concerns over job losses 
running into the thousands. In addition to the roughly 2000 workers affected by the closure of Alcoa 
and Ford, there were large numbers of retrenchments at Boral Cement, Target, and Qantas’ 
maintenance facility at Avalon airport (Paul 2014), and a spike in the local youth unemployment rate 
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following the 2007-08 Global Financial Crisis. With the city’s youth unemployment rate hovering 
above 17 percent for much of 2014 and 2015, Geelong was named as one of 20 national youth 
unemployment ‘hotspots’ by the Brotherhood of St Laurence (2016, p.3).  
Across the pages of the local daily newspaper, the Geelong Advertiser, business magnates sketched 
their visions for the future of the city, while also taking advantage of new outlets for their views. 
Glossy magazine Business Life, for example, was launched in February 2016. Editor Jon Zabiegala 
(2016, p.7) writes that the magazine ‘is here to offer a forum for businesses to reclaim a voice of 
positivity’. ‘From Here to Diversity’ the front cover proclaims, displaying a black and white image of 
derelict industrial buildings on the other side of a chain-link fence. This symbol of the hum-drum, 
monotone certainties of the past contrasts with the vibrant potentialities and dynamism of Geelong’s 
future, this image appears to suggest. Inside the cover, a range of local business and civic leaders, 
including Rebecca Casson, Committee for Geelong chief executive, and Matt Fletcher, president of 
Entrepreneurs Geelong, ponder the identity of the ‘New Geelong’ (Belmont 2016, pp.16-23). A key 
prediction is that, where large multinational companies facilitated much of Geelong’s growth in the 
past, the activities of small and medium-sized businesses will drive the city’s economic development 
into the future (Belmont 2016). Elaine Carbines, CEO of G21, and Bernadette Uzelac, CEO of the 
Geelong Chamber of Commerce, also contribute opinion pieces which seek to highlight the unique 
capabilities and achievements of the region. Carbines (2016, pp.24-25) suggests Geelong is ‘poised to 
embrace the “ideas boom”’: the city is an exemplar of many of the initiatives promoted by the 
National Innovation and Science Agenda that was announced by the Turnbull Liberal-National 
Coalition Government in 2015.  
In Geelong, as in many other 21st century ‘Rust Belt’ places, ‘diversification’ is the watchword 
underpinning economic growth strategies. The move towards advanced manufacturing, the 
establishment of a local ‘social insurance cluster’, as well as efforts to reimagine Geelong as a 
globally-connected ‘knowledge city’ are emerging as key strands in this diversification. The G21, the 
‘formal alliance of government, business and community organisations working together to improve 
people’s lives in the Geelong region’, has championed the city’s developing credentials in advanced 
manufacturing (G21 2014, p.2). The G21 (2013, p.8) argues that despite the move away from heavy 
industry in Geelong, manufacturing still constitutes a major proportion of the region’s value-added 
production. With the financial assistance of the GRIIF (the Geelong Region Innovation and 
Investment Fund, one of two local assistance packages established jointly by the Victorian and 
Federal governments in anticipation of the closure of the car manufacturing industry), Carbon 
Revolution, a manufacturer of carbon fibre automotive components, commenced operations in 
Geelong (Australian Government n.d.). A carbon fibre research and development facility has also 
been established at Deakin University’s Waurn Ponds campus, and these developments may herald 
the beginnings of a regional specialisation in carbon fibre technologies (G21 n.d.).  
According to Rebecca Casson (2016), the CEO of the Committee for Geelong, the relocation of 
several State and Federal government agencies to Geelong, including the Transport Accident 
Commission, WorkSafe, and the National Disability Insurance Agency, is significant not only 
nationally, but has the potential to establish Geelong as ‘a global hub for social insurance’. The 
Committee for Geelong suggests that Geelong’s developing ‘social insurance cluster’ is a successful 
example of a ‘smart specialisation’ strategy, a place-based strategy for innovation and economic 
growth that utilises existing regional assets and capabilities. The smart specialisation model has the 
backing of agencies such as the European Commission (2012, p.11), which suggests that such a 
strategy can assist regions to ‘become – and remain – competitive in the global economy’. Correia and 
Denham (2016, p.10), in their report on the findings of an international study tour of successful 
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‘Second Cities’ conducted by the Committee for Geelong, suggest that while ‘diversification provides 
a more stable and sustainable economy in the longer term, specialisation may be a path to short-term 
growth’. Correia and Denham (2016, p.10) explain that in the ‘smart specialisation’ strategy for 
economic growth, Second Cities identify and support those industry sectors in which they possess 
advantages given their resources, infrastructure and knowledge base, so as to ‘complement the 
economies of capital cities, rather than compete with them’. The example that they highlight is the de-
industrialising US city of Cleveland, which has developed a regional specialisation in the form of a 
‘Health Tech Corridor based on shared industry, hospital and university specialisations’ (Correia & 
Denham 2016, p.2). Correia and Denham (2016, p.2) report that Cleveland’s ‘Health Tech Corridor’, 
which ‘has flourished through specialisation in knowledge clusters in cardiac care, cancer research 
and general healthcare’, is able to ‘differentiate Cleveland from other cities and medical clusters’. 
Correia and Denham (2016, p.43) further note that ‘Cleveland, and other cities, do not have the 
“Social Insurance” (SI) cluster that Geelong has. This SI cluster could partner with existing Education 
and Medicine (Eds & Meds) research clusters to form a unique EMSI cluster’. 
A number of recent developments are claimed to have also boosted Geelong’s credentials as a city of 
design and creativity. Perhaps in recognition of Geelong’s history of invention and innovation 
(Geelong is said to be the birthplace of such iconic domestic devices as the Hills Hoist, the modern 
refrigerator, and the Ford ute), in 2017, the city was recognised as a United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) City of Design, becoming one of 31 cities around the 
world, and the only city in Australia, to earn this designation (COGG 2017a; Mills 2018). Also in 
2017, a community consultation initiative led by the City of Greater Geelong (2017b) saw the city’s 
residents vote in support of ‘a clever and creative city’ as the preferred vision of Geelong’s future. 
Although the political and business establishment points to the ongoing influence of Deakin 
University in stimulating innovation locally, Geelong ranked number 18 on a 2017 index of 25 
knowledge cities. The Knowledge Cities Index was developed by a team of researchers in the Faculty 
of Business, Government and Law at the University of Canberra, to predict which Australian cities 
will be most resilient in the face of technologically-driven labour market and economic change 
(Pratchett et al. 2017). This result suggests that Geelong still has some way to go before its credentials 
as a ‘knowledge city’ are recognised on a national or international stage.  
In these local discourses of economic transformation and renewal, Geelong’s new generation of 
entrepreneurial leaders have claimed an authoritative voice, advocating a vision of the Geelong region 
as ‘Silicon Bay’. The particular formula for innovation and economic growth that they favour is one 
in which technology start-up companies play a major role. A key figure is Nick Stanley, the founder 
of start-up ‘accelerator’ Runway, who suggests that Geelong already has many of the makings of the 
‘ecosystem’ required for start-ups to rise and thrive (Cannon 2016, p.32). It is claimed that the region 
is brimming with the kinds of opportunities and supports that enable start-ups to ‘scale up’, as the 
Geelong Entrepreneurial Ecosystem Map (‘GEEMap’), a joint initiative of local government, business 
and education institutions, aims to illustrate (see Figure 18 below).  
 
<Image removed due to copyright restrictions> 
Figure 18: GEEMap, the Geelong Entrepreneurial Ecosystem Map (Entrepreneurs Geelong et al. 2016) 
 
 
Figure 19 (below) depicts a section of the GEEMap in closer detail, where the resources for 
‘Education & Learning’ in the ecosystem are displayed. As is shown here, among the ‘organisations 
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that provide access to entrepreneurial and related education and skills development’ are the GRLLEN, 
Upstart Entrepreneurial Challenge, Deakin University’s ‘Spark’ program, the Gordon Institute of 
TAFE, and Newcomb Secondary College’s P-TECH program (which provides students with the 
opportunity to gain work skills and qualifications through school-industry partnerships) 
(Entrepreneurs Geelong et al. 2016). In a post on the Geelong Startups blog, titled ‘The rise of social 
enterprise in regional Victoria’, Stanley’s colleague at Runway, Leighton Wells (2017), observes that 
‘for people in and around the Geelong region, there is a clear entrepreneurship pathway that takes you 
all the way from school – through to launching your business on a global stage’. Wells (2017) 
suggests that the Upstart Entrepreneurial Challenge, an entrepreneurial education program targeted at 
secondary school students, and the Spark program supporting emerging entrepreneurs at Deakin 
University are the key elements making this pathway possible. 
 
 
<Image removed due to copyright restrictions> 
 
Figure 19: A selection of the GEEMap in closer detail (Entrepreneurs Geelong et al. 2016) 
 
With the redevelopment of the Federal Mills buildings in North Geelong to form a tech innovation 
precinct and co-working space, many of Geelong’s start-up businesses operate from the same physical 
spaces in which, one hundred years prior, the city’s textile workers laboured.31 Since 2015, Geelong’s 
tech influencers and aspiring entrepreneurs have convened annually at the Pivot Summit, which 
describes itself as a ‘one-day Summit of game-changing insights into emerging technology, start-ups 
and social enterprise’ (Pivot Summit 2018). ‘Pivot’ is a nod to Geelong’s heritage as the ‘Pivot City’, 
as well as a reference to ‘the critical moment in a young business’s lifecycle when it either “pivots” to 
respond to market forces / to capture that essential niche / to seize an opportunity – or it stands still 
and fails’ (Pivot Summit 2018). The 2017 Summit made the symbolic link with California’s Silicon 
Valley explicit, bringing the co-founder of Apple Computers, Steve Wozniak, to Geelong to share his 
insights on tech innovation and building a business empire.  
The GRLLEN and the ‘gig economy’: embodying enterprise  
The FYA’s enterprise skills agenda is translated into the Geelong context through the work of 
organisations such as the Geelong Region Local Learning and Employment Network (GRLLEN), and 
it is a key influence on approaches to the problem of youth unemployment in this de-industrialising 
locale. In the second decade of the 21st century, a large number of the workforce development 
practices and programs that the GRLLEN conducts as a non-profit community service organisation 
are energised and underpinned by a focus on such key concepts as ‘trending industries’ and ‘portfolio 
careers’ (in a ‘portfolio career’, multiple part-time, contract, self-employment, and/or freelancing 
‘gigs’ are combined to form the equivalent of a full-time position). Geelong Careers, for example, is 
‘an online, one-stop labour market hub’ developed by the GRLLEN (2017, p.11) ‘as a community 
resource to support [Geelong] residents to make informed career decisions linked to the regional 
 
31 As I noted in Chapter 3, across Geelong a number of sites have been transformed as part of efforts to revive 
and repurpose these disused industrial spaces, with art, crafts and artisanal production emerging as key elements 
in this creative revitalisation. This arts- and culture-led program of urban renewal is not unique to Geelong, but 
rather appears in a range of ‘Rust Belt’, or otherwise economically marginal, places, the regional Victorian city 
of Ballarat among them. An ABC News report from 22 September 2018 highlights Ballarat’s efforts to recast 
itself as the ‘Venice of Australian art’ through hosting the inaugural Biennale of Australian Art on the site of a 
former meatworks. With the Biennale attracting many thousands of tourists to Ballarat, the event’s artistic 
director suggests that ‘I think we’re going to see a Ballarat renaissance’ (ABC News 2018). 
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economy’. The Geelong Careers website is structured according to the eight key ‘trending industries’ 
in the local labour market in which the GRLLEN observes there are existing skill shortages or areas of 
new growth and demand. The GRLLEN (2017, pp.20-21) understands the purpose of Geelong 
Careers as connecting local job-seekers, and particularly young job-seekers, with the kinds of 
information - in the form of ‘research and the latest data’ – that will enable them to tailor their skills 
development and career planning strategies to areas of emerging labour market demand.  
 
The GRLLEN understands the task of preparing the Geelong region for the coming of the ‘gig 
economy’ as a strategic imperative.32 In recent years, the terms ‘gig economy’, ‘sharing economy’, 
‘collaborative economy’, and ‘on-demand economy’ (among others) have emerged to describe the 
range of new service economy businesses operating across digital platforms, prominent examples of 
which include ride-hailing service Uber, food delivery service Deliveroo, and freelance services 
platform Airtasker. While the gig economy has been touted as enabling a ‘peer-to-peer’ transactional 
model, a more accurate description of the business model utilised by companies such as Uber is that it 
allows the company to extract profit from its role as a digital intermediary, or ‘platform’, across which 
producers and consumers can connect and exchange goods and services (Stanford 2017a). Digital 
platform businesses occupy an emergent niche which has been made possible by more than three 
decades of labour market deregulation (or ‘re-regulation’), de-industrialisation and de-unionisation, 
and in which these employers seek to classify, in ways that are legally contested in a number of 
jurisdictions, the workers they engage as ‘independent contractors’. Gig workers are generally not 
eligible for the holiday or sick pay, superannuation, protection from unfair dismissal, or other 
entitlements that would be their due if they were classified as ‘employees’ under Australia’s labour 
market laws and regulations (and those of many other jurisdictions). As I noted previously, the 
Australian Industry Group (2016) has looked on these developments with enthusiasm, suggesting that 
the rise of these temporary, task-by-task forms of employment may represent a new era in 
employment relations. According to the AIG and a range of other employer and industry groups, the 
many workers now embracing the flexibility inherent in the gig economy are typically doing so not 
out of necessity or desperation but out of a personal preference to top-up their earnings or to build a 
professional portfolio of diverse skills and experience.  
In industrialised democracies such as the UK and Australia, the number of workers seeking 
employment in the ‘gig economy’ has risen steeply in recent years. In the UK, a 2019 study conducted 
by the Trade Union Congress and researchers at the University of Hertfordshire has found that, with 
the fear of unemployment widespread, and almost all new jobs created after the 2008 Global Financial 
Crisis precarious in nature, as many as one in 10 working age adults now work on gig economy 
platforms, up from one in 20 as recently as 2016 (Partington 2019). ‘Younger workers are most likely 
to work via platforms’, the study found, ‘with nearly two-thirds of those working once a week being 
aged between 16 and 34’ (Partington 2019). The study also found that men are more likely than 
women to undertake gig work, and that most workers use more than one platform to earn a living 
(Partington 2019).  
The findings of a national survey commissioned by the Victorian Department of Premier and 
Cabinet have been able to shed light on the extent and impact of digital platform work in Australia. As 
 
32 For a portion of my candidature, I was engaged as a ‘researcher in residence’ at the Geelong Region Local 
Learning and Employment Network. As part of my work on the Expansive Learning Network project, I assisted 
with the design and organisation of the GRLLEN’s 2017-18 Gig Economy seminar series. I also delivered a 
presentation on ‘The Gig Economy and the Future of Work’ at the first event in the series. The presentation can 
be viewed here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ze_bcPxGbnE  
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in the UK, young people (aged 18-34) and males are more likely than other demographic groups to 
seek employment on digital platforms (McDonald et al. 2019, p.3). Digital platform workers are more 
likely to live in a major city than in a regional or remote area, to identify as living with a disability, to 
be a temporary resident, and to speak a language other than English at home (McDonald et al. 2019, 
p.3). While ‘current platform workers are commonly paid per completed task or job (59.0%), rather 
than for the time or hours they work (22%)’, the researchers found that workers spent an average of 
4.9 hours per week on unpaid activities necessary to obtain work and manage work flows (McDonald 
et al. 2019, p.5). The study also highlighted gig workers’ lack of awareness of their basic conditions 
of employment, and inability to secure protections and entitlements of the kind enjoyed by workers in 
‘standard’ forms of employment. For example, McDonald et al. (2019, p.4) note that over 30 percent 
of respondents do not know if the main platform on which they work has a dispute resolution process, 
and ‘over 20% of current platform workers do not know if their platform provides them with 
insurance or requires them to take out their own’ (in the vast majority of cases, gig workers are 
responsible for obtaining their own work-related insurance). Indeed, a full 40 percent of the gig 
workers surveyed ‘did not know how much they earned per hour’ (McDonald et al. 2019, p.5).  
In common with the Australian Industry Group, the GRLLEN anticipates that gig employment will 
become the predominant mode of labour market participation in the future, and it seeks to mobilise a 
diverse array of local stakeholders around this emerging phenomenon. The GRLLEN’s 2017-18 Gig 
Economy seminar series, the aim of which is to ‘prepar[e] Geelong for a rapidly changing 
employment future’ (see Figure 20 below), is an important local reverberation of the Foundation for 
Young Australians’ concerns to foster in young people the types of capabilities, skills and dispositions 
that will allow them to navigate future labour markets characterised by almost constant churn and 
change. In this seminar series we see a crystallisation, not only of the FYA’s influential work, but of a 
range of contemporary social, political, economic, and governmental changes and challenges, 
including: the changes to local labour markets wrought by de-industrialisation and ‘neoliberal’ 
globalisation; the emerging threat of technological unemployment brought about by the advance of 
automation, robotics and AI; and the risk that rising unemployment and underemployment will make 
‘precarity’ an increasingly mainstream experience for young people.  
 
<Image removed due to copyright restrictions> 
 
Figure 20: Flyer for the first event in the Geelong Region Local Learning and Employment Network’s Gig 
Economy seminar series 
The GRLLEN adopts a broad definition of the ‘gig economy’, pointing to research published by the 
Grattan Institute (Minifie 2016, p.35) which suggests that a third of Australian workers are operating 
in non-traditional types of work. On this basis, the GRLLEN goes beyond a narrow focus on the 
digital platform businesses, collecting a range of quite different working arrangements and 
employment types – from working mothers employed casually or part-time, to semi-retired 
professionals dabbling in consultancy gigs, for example – under the banner of the gig economy.  As 
the flyer for ‘Exploring the Gig Economy’, the first event in the series, reads: ‘if you are a parent, 
teacher, student, job seeker, an employee or employer - this affects you!’ (see Figure 20). This way of 
framing the emergence of the gig economy serves to cultivate a sense of shared ownership and 
responsibility among the various community stakeholders – from unions, industry, and education and 
training organisations to future gig workers themselves - who must prepare for the coming of the gig 
economy era.  
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The GRLLEN’s proposed schedule for the seminar series included as many as eight events, to run 
across 2017 and 2018, covering the various impacts and implications of the gig economy for the 
Geelong region.33 The proposed event themes included: education and training for the gig economy; 
the impact of new technologies on the future of work; the social infrastructure needed to support gig 
workers (a discussion of the ways in which institutions and services such as superannuation and 
financial services could and should evolve to meet the needs of this emerging cohort of workers); 
Geelong in a hypothetical ‘post-employment’ future (and the significance of a universal basic income 
scheme within this); and a special case study event on gig work in the creative industries. While 
workers, employers, and entrepreneurs, among other players in the local education and employment 
ecosystem, would be invited to share their insights on the gig economy and portfolio careers, ‘experts’ 
and thought leaders from further afield were also canvassed as potential guest speakers (the longlist 
included a representative from the Foundation for Young Australians, and US author, consultant and 
speaker on the future of work and the future of learning, Heather McGowan).  
It was hoped that the seminar series would appeal to a broad array of stakeholders in the local 
community. Despite extensive efforts to stimulate interest in the series, including promotional 
campaigns across social media, and appeals to contacts such as the Geelong Careers Teachers 
Association to spread the word within schools, there were very few young people in attendance at the 
first event. Attendees were overwhelmingly drawn from the clique of local bodies and groups that the 
GRLLEN consults with or connects to in its day-to-day operations: other community service 
organisations, local government, political and business groups, bureaucrats in the Department of 
Education, and public and private education and training providers.  
Conclusion  
What I have sought to do in this chapter is to trouble and unsettle the notion that, in the 21st century, 
the problem of youth unemployment can be ‘solved’ through young people developing and exercising 
their capacities for ‘enterprise’. Particularly when the responsibility for dealing with that problem is 
understood as resting primarily with the individual young person. I have also attempted to make 
problematic the assumption that the emergence of the ‘gig economy’ is the natural and inevitable 
outcome of processes of technological change. The particular ways in which organisations such as the 
GRLLEN understand the trajectories of the ‘gig economy’ and future labour market transformation 
are typically ‘technologically determinist’ in orientation. Such a perspective fails to recognise the 
ways in which processes of technological change are mediated by social, economic, cultural, and 
political factors. As I argued above, digital platform businesses have emerged with the intention to 
exploit a grey area in labour law, a grey area that has been made possible by more than three decades 
of labour market deregulation (or ‘re-regulation’), de-industrialisation and de-unionisation. Economist 
Jim Stanford (2017a) places the rise of these digitally-mediated forms of employment in historical 
perspective. The major features of gig work, Stanford (2017a, pp.382-384) argues, including irregular 
on-call scheduling, working from home with one’s own tools and equipment, and piece work 
compensation, have a long history in capitalism. However, these features became less prominent, for a 
time, with the rise of the ‘standard employment relationship’ in the 20th century. In the interests of 
challenging the ‘technologically determinist’ perspective, Stanford (2017b) poses a series of 
provocations: Is the ‘gig’ economy really driven by the inexorable, autonomous force of technology? 
Why must processes of ‘disruption’ necessarily involve the further erosion of labour laws and 
regulations? Taking Uber’s ‘disruption’ of the taxi industry as an example, why not use the new 
 
33 At the time of writing just two events in the series had been successfully convened, in part due to budgetary 
limitations. 
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technology (a clever dispatch system) to improve taxi service in such a way that employees’ working 
conditions and entitlements are preserved?  
In a similar vein, Mazzotti (2017) observes that processes of technological change are ‘never neutral, 
let alone natural. To say a mechanized procedure is more “efficient” than its predecessor is not an 
adequate historical explanation for its success’. There is a rich tradition of critique which understands 
that advances in automation and technological innovation do not occur along a natural or inevitable 
trajectory, but rather, the direction taken is but one of a number of possible paths. As an example of 
this critique, Mazzotti highlights the work of Marxist scholar Harry Braverman. In his 1974 book, 
Labor and Monopoly Capital: the Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century, Braverman argues 
that: 
The capacity of humans to control the labor process through machinery is seized upon by 
management from the beginning of capitalism as the prime means whereby production may 
be controlled not by the direct producer but by the owners and representatives of 
capital…The fact that many machines may be paced and controlled according to centralized 
decisions, and that these controls may thus be in the hands of management, removed from the 
site of production to the office – these technical possibilities are of just as great interest to 
management as the fact that the machine multiplies the productivity of labor. (Braverman 
1974, pp.193-195, emphasis in original). 
In the industrialised countries in the mid 20th century, automation of the production process was 
taking place through the introduction of numerical control machinery. Braverman observed that, in 
reconfiguring the relationship between human workers and the instruments of production, these 
processes of technological innovation involved a progressive de-skilling of occupations. Where once 
the occupation of machinist was understood as a skilled role, the introduction of numerical control 
technology saw this role divided among three separate operatives, ‘each representing far less in terms 
of training, abilities, and hourly labor costs than does the competent machinist’, and each of whom ‘is 
required to know and understand not more than did the single worker of before, but much less’ 
(Braverman 1974, p.200, emphasis in original). ‘The process has become more complex’, Braverman 
(1974, p.200) remarked, ‘but this is lost to the workers, who do not rise with the process but sink 
beneath it’. As Mazzotti argues, the value of Braverman’s critique is in its suggestion that ‘other kinds 
of automation were possible…but were not pursued because they would not have had the same social 
effects’ (Mazzotti 2017, emphasis added). This is not to suggest that processes of automation, such as 
those Braverman observed, were and are pursued by management with the intention of eroding the 
skill base of occupations, but rather, in the context of a capitalist economic system oriented to the 
objective of profitability, the imperative of securing and maintaining those conditions that are most 
conducive to continued capitalist accumulation emerges as particularly influential where the 
trajectories of technological innovation are concerned.  
A critique of this kind is missing from the mainstream, contemporary discourses around young 
people’s ‘enterprise’. These discourses form powerful orthodoxies through which the complex 
problems of youth unemployment and labour market transitions are made knowable and (supposedly) 
manageable in the 21st century. As George Morgan and Pariece Nelligan (2018) highlight, 
participation in the globalised, precarious labour markets of contemporary capitalism involves a form 
of entrepreneurial selfhood that they term the ‘just-in-time self’. Just-in-time workers, Morgan and 
Nelligan (2018, p.ix) maintain, ‘accept the challenge of dancing on the hot coals of new capitalism, 
responding enthusiastically to its random gyrations, and reinventing themselves to fit the emergent 
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vocational niches’. The work of the Foundation for Young Australians and the Geelong Region Local 
Learning and Employment Network, with its focus on ‘enterprise skills’, the ‘gig economy’, and 
‘portfolio careers’, has a key role in fostering the kinds of individuals who can adapt to the emerging 
skill and occupational requirements just-in-time. The following chapter builds on many of the 
concerns and themes that I have introduced here. In that chapter I will take the analysis of young 
people’s enterprise in a de-industrialising city in a slightly different direction, to consider the 
representations of young people’s enterprise in GT Magazine, and their gendered, classed, and 
aesthetic dimensions. 
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Chapter Seven 
GT Magazine and the Figure of the Enterprising Young Person: The 
Gendered, Classed and Aesthetic Dimensions of Enterprise in a De-
Industrialising City 
Introduction  
In earlier chapters I problematised the concepts of ‘employability skills’, ‘innovation’ and 
‘enterprise’, identifying and analysing the ‘conditions of possibility’ which enabled these complex, 
contested, often ambiguous concepts to emerge, at different moments since the 1980s, as promising a 
‘solution’ to the problem of youth unemployment. While this chapter continues the work that I have 
been doing in problematising representations of young people’s ‘employability skills’, ‘innovation’ 
and ‘enterprise’, the analysis that I will develop in this chapter is a ‘step sideways’ in some respects. It 
is not a genealogy, but it is informed by the genealogical work that I have undertaken in earlier 
chapters. The methods of data collection and analysis that I will employ here are content analysis and 
discourse analysis. As I outlined in Chapter 1, content analysis is a method of textual analysis that 
‘consists of breaking down or fragmenting the text into pertinent units of information for their 
subsequent coding and categorisation’ (Ruiz Ruiz 2009, p.7). Discourse analysis is a method of 
qualitative data collection and analysis in the tradition of Foucauldian critiques of language (Wodak 
2001). The practice of discourse analysis, Gee (2014, p.20) suggests, examines ‘how speakers and 
writers use clues or cues (namely, syntax and discourse) to shape the interpretations and actions of 
listeners and readers’. Discourse analysis can also have a political dimension, insofar as it is an 
inquiry into the ‘relations between discourse and other elements of the social process’, into the ways 
in which systems of meaning are shaped by, and in turn shape, relations of power (Fairclough 2010, 
pp.8-10). 
The ‘archive’ of texts that I will analyse in this chapter is comprised of a selection of issues of one 
particular publication: GT Magazine. GT Magazine is a weekly, large circulation magazine in 
Geelong with a significant focus on the activities and aspirations of enterprising young people. As an 
‘urban lifestyle magazine’ – a consumer magazine that seeks to fuse the identity and consumption 
habits of its readers with the branded ‘lifestyle’ of a given locale (Greenberg 2000, p.231) – GT 
Magazine plays a key role in the re-imaging and reimagining of the ‘post-industrial’ city of Geelong 
in the 21st century.  
In this chapter I will focus in on the ‘figure’ of the ‘enterprising young person’ as it is represented in 
GT Magazine, analysing the gendered, classed and aesthetic dimensions of this figure.34 Feminist 
theorist of techno-science Donna Haraway (2008, p.4) argues that, ‘figures are not representations or 
didactic illustrations, but rather material–semiotic nodes or knots in which diverse bodies and 
meanings coshape one another’. Recent work in the sociology of youth has demonstrated that a focus 
on ‘figures’ can open up new analytic possibilities for exploring the ways in which ‘youth’ are 
represented and governed in neoliberal arts of government. As I will explore further below, youth 
studies researchers Peter Kelly and Steven Threadgold have made some productive contributions to 
this emerging field of inquiry. Kelly (2015) puts Haraway’s concept of figure to work in seeking to 
‘re-enchant the sociological imagination’. Kelly (2015, pp.617-619) argues that the analysis of figures 
 
34 In collaboration with one of my supervisors (Peter Kelly), I developed a version of this chapter into a journal 
article, ‘Young people and the gendered and aesthetic dimensions of “enterprise”: Stories from a “Rust Belt” 
city’, which was published in the Journal of Youth Studies (Noonan & Kelly 2019).  
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of youth appearing, for example, in works of contemporary fiction and entertainment media can open 
up a space for embracing and appreciating the ambivalence and irony ‘that characterise all our lives at 
different times and in different spaces and places’ and yet that are all too frequently ‘written out’ of 
what he suggests is an increasingly ‘governmentalised’ youth studies. Threadgold (2019, p.3) suggests 
that ‘figures of youth can illustrate how one thing can be used as a stereotype, cliché, meme, target, 
scapegoat, folk devil, stigma, discourse, and signifier. A figure can be all these things, sometimes at 
once’. He suggests that, just as politicians or business advisors are concerned to construct or invoke 
particular representations of young people in order to advance a particular agenda, similarly, in 
researching and writing about young people, youth studies researchers, whether intentionally or not, 
are responsible for bringing into being particular figures of youth (Threadgold 2019, p.2). Threadgold 
(2019, p.3) seeks to trace how figures of youth ‘are positioned across different discursive and 
ontological spaces’ in order to stimulate youth researchers to be reflexive about how their own work 
may be implicated in processes of governmentalisation.  
 
The analysis that I will outline in this chapter reveals a preoccupation in GT Magazine with the 
aesthetics of youth, gender, class and race, a preoccupation that serves to highlight particular kinds of 
industry and enterprise, and particular kinds of enterprising selves, as more desirable and appealing 
than others. Youth, gender and aesthetics converge in the figure of the confident, empowered ‘Can-Do 
Girl’, an ideal that, youth studies researcher Anita Harris (2004) suggests, is considered most capable 
of transforming the opportunities in precarious, globalised labour markets to her advantage. As will be 
examined below, the story of 24-year-old Geelong businesswoman Mia features elements of the 
ambitious Can-Do Girl. As Mia says, ‘I’m meant to own millions and millions of dollars’ worth of 
companies one day, I just know that’ (King 2016c, p.6). An examination of the gendered, classed and 
aesthetic dimensions of enterprise is significant not only for understanding the nature of 21st century 
labour markets and the demands they place on those who participate in them, but also for making 
sense of the ‘post-industrial’ economic trajectories of ‘Rust Belt’ locales such as Geelong. As cities 
seek to position themselves in the globalised, technologised, knowledge economy, urban 
redevelopment and place marketing become central strategies in the rebranding and marketing of 
these places as centres for economic investment, production and consumption that appeal particularly 
to members of the ‘creative class’ (Florida 2005, 2014).  
To begin, the chapter will consider how the gendered, classed and aesthetic dimensions of 21st century 
youth labour markets have been theorised by a range of scholars. There are three key strands of 
scholarship that are particularly relevant here, the first of which explores the emergence of the 
imperative to imagine the self as an enterprise, against a background of labour markets that are 
increasingly globalised and precarious; second, the elevation of young women as privileged subjects 
of educational and labour market capacity (and the significance of class and race within these 
representations); and third, the growing body of scholarship that considers the significance of 
‘aesthetic labour’ and ‘affective labour’ in contemporary labour markets. Following this discussion, I 
will offer some general comments on the nature and content of GT Magazine, including an analysis of 
people featured on the cover (hereafter, ‘cover stars’) for the 2016 period by gender, race, and type of 
industry. I will then examine how the discourse of the ‘enterprising young person’ is represented in 
GT Magazine, outlining a selection of themes that emerged as significant in my analysis. I will also 
examine in detail two stories, those of Chris and Georgia, and Mia, taking an in-depth focus on the 
visual and textual aspects of their representation in GT Magazine as exemplars of enterprising young 
people. In the discussion section towards the conclusion of the chapter, my aim is to unravel and untie 
some of the key threads in the material-semiotic knot that is the figure of the ‘enterprising young 
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person’, in order to explore the complex entanglements of gender, class and aesthetics in GT 
Magazine’s representation of this figure.   
Theorising the gendered, classed and aesthetic dimensions of 21st century youth 
labour markets  
The challenges and opportunities encountered by young people in the globalised, precarious labour 
markets of the 21st century have been shaped by a fundamental shift, a shift that has been conceived 
variously as the move from a ‘Fordist’ to a ‘Post-Fordist’ mode of production (Bauman 2012, pp.56-
59; Kenway, Kraack & Hickey-Moody 2006, p.62), from the ‘first modernity’ to the ‘second 
modernity’ (Beck 2000), from ‘heavy modernity’ to ‘liquid modernity’ (Bauman 2012). A major 
feature of this transition has been the increasing ‘informalisation’ of employment relations, a process 
which Beck (2000, p.50) suggests women are disproportionately affected by, and which includes 
‘more part-time work, fluid boundaries between the formal and informal sectors, home-based work, a 
lack of legal regulation’. The ‘Brazilianisation’ thesis that Beck (2000, p.2) outlines in his book The 
Brave New World of Work suggests that the ‘nomadic multi-activity’ that is the characteristic form of 
labour market participation in South American countries is now a ‘rapidly-spreading variant’ in the 
so-called highly developed economies. In analysing the impact of processes of Brazilianisation on 
youth labour markets in Australia and the UK, Furlong and Kelly (2005, p.213) suggest that while 
‘there is some evidence to suggest an increase in precarious forms of employment for young people’, 
these processes impact on particular populations of young people more heavily than others. The effect 
of ‘entrenched structured inequalities’ is such that ‘less advantaged young people are over-represented 
in insecure forms of employment’ (Furlong & Kelly 2005, p.213). 
In what he identifies as the time of ‘heavy modernity’, Bauman (2012, p.116) argues that, ‘the frozen 
time of factory routine, together with the bricks and mortar of factory walls, immobilized capital as 
effectively as it bound the labour it employed’. In the era of ‘light’ or ‘liquid’ modernity, access to the 
means of movement, of lightness, is distributed unevenly, and ‘keeping fluids in shape requires a lot 
of attention, constant vigilance and perpetual effort – and even then the success of the effort is 
anything but a foregone conclusion’ (Bauman 2012, p.8, 20). Neoliberal governmentalities and 24/7, 
flexible capitalism, Kelly (2006, 2013) argues, require all (would be) labour market participants to 
imagine the self as an enterprise - as an active, self-creating, economically-rational individual - and to 
carry the responsibilities for the consequences of their differing abilities to be ‘enterprising’. At first 
glance, Kelly (2013, p.15) observes, ‘the self as enterprise does not have a gender, or an ethnic 
background, or a particular age, or a specific geographic location. Though this may not be entirely 
accurate’: 
It is possibly more accurate to imagine that gender neutrality assumes masculinity. That no 
ethnic background assumes ‘whiteness’. That no age barrier means a productive, enterprising 
adulthood that runs from the mid-20s to the mid-40s. That having no place in effect means 
that cosmopolitan, post-industrial urban geography is what makes enterprise understandable, 
thinkable, possible. (Kelly 2013, p.15)  
However, as researchers studying the construction of ‘girlhood’ and femininities in the contemporary 
period have noted, in the neoliberal, ‘post-feminist’ contexts of the 21st century, young women 
emerge as sites of ‘luminosity’; they are conceived as a symbol of immense educational and labour 
market capacity, of confidence and ambition, as a subject worthy of investment and governmental 
attention (McRobbie 2009, p.54; Harris 2004). In the UK, McRobbie (2009, p.54) notes that in the 
context of the competitive, individualistic values promoted by New Labour, the young woman who 
has benefited from the equal opportunities now available to her ‘can be mobilised as the embodiment 
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of the values of the new meritocracy’. Harris (2004) identifies the ‘Can-Do Girl’ and its counterpoint, 
the ‘At-Risk Girl’, as two key subject positions that have a particular significance in contemporary 
risk society. Alongside the triumph of the Can-Do Girl, a self-made, confident young woman who is 
‘flush with the gains of feminism [and] embarking on new education and career paths’, there persists 
‘a concern, even a moral panic’ that at least some young women are not succeeding as they should be 
(Harris 2004, pp.15,44). It is this idea, Harris (2004, p.16) observes, ‘that good choices, effort, and 
ambition alone are responsible for success that has come to separate the can-dos from the at-risks’. 
McRobbie (2009, p.54) writes that ‘the attribution of both freedom and success to young women, as a 
series of interpellative processes, take different forms across the boundaries of class, ethnicity and 
sexuality, producing a range of entanglements of racialised and classified configurations of youthful 
femininity’. The rising educational attainment and professional achievement of young women 
throughout the 20th and 21st centuries have been abetted and celebrated by a decentralised ‘confidence 
movement’: a range of corporate and non-profit, often transnational, organisations, whose professed 
mandate is the empowerment of girls and women (Banet-Weiser 2017, p.265). In the emergent 
cultural genre of ‘confidence chic’, young women are enjoined to ‘empower oneself’ through their 
consumption choices (Favaro 2017; Banet-Weiser 2017, p.268). However, persistent class and racial 
inequalities remain significant in the production of the differential education and career outcomes of 
young women; the ‘Can-Do Girl’ is in fact a class elite (McRobbie 2009, p.68; Harris 2004, p.44). 
According to McRobbie (2007a, p.727), a growing body of evidence reveals the inequities newly 
generated by ‘changes to welfare regimes, the decline in state funding of education, and the 
emergence of competitive meritocratic systems of reward’, evidence which indicates that:  
 
Middle-class white girls and those from well-off, or privileged Asian and black families, 
become part of the new competitive elite, that lower middle-class girls and some of their 
working-class counterparts are now expected to gain degree level qualifications so as to 
position themselves at certain levels of competence and capacity within the flexible labour 
market. It also suggests that 2 percent of girls who leave school with no qualifications are 
now singled out more forcefully as educational failures and that, for these, there are now 
fewer routes back into formal education as post-school learning is now based on fees, loans 
and parental support. (McRobbie 2007a, p.727) 
 
Weis’ (1990, 2004) studies of processes of identity formation among young men and women in a de-
industrialising, working-class US community (a town she termed ‘Freeway’), revealed the impact of 
economic restructuring in precipitating a moment of critique and upheaval of the traditional gender 
relations that predominated in the local community. This moment of rupture allowed new forms of 
subjectivity and selfhood to emerge among young Freeway women. In 1985, Weis first observed the 
boys and girls of Freeway in secondary school, at a time when Freeway girls were beginning to 
perceive the instability of the male breadwinner model, as the livelihoods of their fathers’ generation 
were cast into disarray with the wind-down and eventual closure of the local steel mill. As a point of 
historical comparison, Weis drew on a study conducted by McRobbie (2007b) in 1975, less than ten 
years earlier, among a group of 14-16-year-old girls in a working-class community in the UK. These 
young women, McRobbie (2007b, p.97) found, constructed their femininity in much the same ways 
that their mothers did in relation to particular understandings of home, and reproductive labour. Weis’ 
work offers critical insights into the ways that emerging ideas of female independence, self-definition 
and enterprise are translated and adopted in a de-industrialising, working-class context in the late 20th 
century, and more broadly for understanding the shaping of masculine and feminine working-class 
157 
 
subjectivities in the context of transformations in the production model and changing social 
institutions.   
Butler’s (2006) ground-breaking work on gender performativity troubles and unsettles the categories 
of ‘male’ and ‘female’, ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’, and also provides a productive springboard for 
thinking about the ways in which contemporary labour markets, which typically feature a high 
proportion of service sector employment, demand of workers the production and performance of 
stylised presentations of self. Gender, Butler (2006, p.191) contends, ‘ought not to be construed as a 
stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts follow’. Rather, it is constituted through 
repetitive acts of discourse: ‘the effect of gender is produced through…bodily gestures, movements 
and styles of various kinds [which] constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self’. The ‘cultural 
feminisation of labour’, Adkins (2001, pp.669, 674) asserts, is bound up with a broader 
‘aestheticisation’ of economic life in late capitalism, including the stylisation of work, workplace 
identities, production processes and products. This cultural feminisation of labour is such that ‘in a 
range of jobs both women and men increasingly perform the aesthetics of femininity’ (Adkins 2001, 
p.674). The desegregation of occupations in terms of gender has occurred against the background of 
the political-economic shifts associated with de-industrialisation, and calls into question the easy 
association, made in early discussions of feminisation, between service occupations and women 
(Adkins 2001, p.673). Contemporary analyses of the gendering of jobs question these assumptions ‘by 
stressing that such gendering is by no means fixed but rather is continuously made, remade, and 
contested’ (Adkins 2001, p.672).   
There is now a growing body of scholarship that considers the significance of ‘aesthetic labour’ and 
‘affective labour’ in contemporary labour markets (Petersson McIntyre 2014; Williams & Connell 
2010; Ball, Maguire & MacRae 2000). Aesthetic labour is, in essence, ‘employment based on 
“looking good” and/or “sounding right”’; the concept describes the employment of workers with 
certain embodied capacities and attributes that favourably appeal to customers and which can be 
mobilised, developed and commodified by employers for commercial benefit (Warhurst & Nickson 
2007, pp.104, 107). Farrugia, Threadgold and Coffey (2018, p.273) explore the ways in which young 
people performing ‘front of house’ bar work in Melbourne’s night-time economy engage in ‘affective 
labour’, suggesting that this labour involves the creation of ‘affects’, ‘embodied sensations that are 
shared between workers and clientele within the “affective atmosphere” of a bar’. Farrugia, 
Threadgold and Coffey (2018, p.273) observe that in performing affective labour, the young worker 
draws on their own sense of gendered embodiment, as well as on their own consumer tastes, 
‘mobilising these in order to provide the sensations and experiences offered to clientele of the bars in 
which they work’. 
Against this theoretical background, this chapter explores the gendered, classed and aesthetic 
dimensions of enterprise in a de-industrialising city, through a focus on the ways in which the figure 
of the ‘enterprising young person’ is represented in the textual and visual content of GT Magazine. It 
is to a description of the content of this magazine that I now turn.  
Young people’s employability skills, innovation and enterprise in GT Magazine 
GT Magazine is a glossy, full-colour magazine supplement published with the Saturday edition of the 
Geelong Advertiser. This newspaper is owned by News Corp Australia and is printed and published 
from offices in central Geelong. The circulation of the Geelong Advertiser in the 12 months to March 
2016 was an average of 18,574 on weekdays and 32,489 on Saturday (Geelong Advertiser Group 
2016, p.4). GT Magazine is primarily a vehicle for property listings, and discussions of trends in 
fashion and home decorating. The magazine can be situated within the genre of the ‘urban lifestyle 
158 
 
magazine’, a type of consumer magazine that Greenberg (2000, p.231) suggests seeks to fuse the 
identity and consumption habits of its readers with the branded ‘lifestyle’ of a given locale. Greenberg 
(2000, p.231) observes that, like its 19th-century mass media predecessors, which arose with the 
industrial metropolis, the ‘urban lifestyle magazine’ emerges as a ‘panoramic navigational tool’ for a 
landscape of equally monumental flux: the post-industrial city. In the restructured post-industrial city, 
economies of scale based in manufacturing have shifted to economies of scope geared toward high- 
and low-end services, toward the production of commodities that are ‘heavily semiotic’ and design-
intensive in nature (Greenberg 2000, p.231; Lash & Urry 2002, p.194).  
The post-industrial city, Greenberg (2000, p.231) argues, is ‘a divided city increasingly fractured by 
lines of class, education, race, and ethnicity’. And the class fraction which assumes importance  
in the eyes of the new cultural producers and commentators is the entrepreneurial ‘new urban middle 
class,’ a group that both produces and consumes sophisticated, contemporary fashions and tastes as it 
embodies a middle-class habitus (Greenberg 2000, p.231; Bourdieu 2010). In this sense the ‘urban 
lifestyle magazine’ can be understood as playing a key role in re-imaging and reimagining the ‘post-
industrial’ city. As Greenberg (2000, p.228) argues, ‘the space of the city is produced not only 
materially and geographically but also in the social imagination and through changing modes of 
cultural representation’. 
The sample of texts to be analysed consists of all issues of GT Magazine published in 2016, a total of 
50 issues. A breakdown in content of the March 5, 2016 issue, as an indicative example, reveals that 
out of the total of 96 pages, the ‘Real Estate’ section comprises 57 pages, and the ‘Lifestyle’ and 
‘Home’ sections 20 and 13 pages, respectively. An analysis of the dedicated advertising spaces in this 
issue (not including those located in the ‘Real Estate’ section, nor any endorsements of products or 
services incorporated in the journalistic content of the magazine) found that the largest proportion of 
advertisements (eleven out of a total of 24) were related to building, maintaining or decorating a 
home, offering either property development, property services, or home furnishings.  
In 2016, almost 90 percent of cover stars were female, and out of the seven male cover stars in this 
period, five appeared with a female business partner. There was also a significant emphasis on young 
adulthood, with 63 percent of cover stars aged in their 20s. In terms of visible markers of ethnicity, 
the sample displays a lack of diversity: all 65 cover stars in 2016 were white (on the basis of their 
appearance, however, none of the stories in which they were featured indicated any particular ethnic 
identities other than white). Figure 21 below provides a breakdown of the cover stars by type of 
industry. The overwhelming majority of cover stars were drawn from industries based on the 
aesthetics of fashion and style. At 19 out of the total of 65 cover stars, ‘modelling and celebrity’ was 
the industry most commonly represented on the covers of GT Magazine. Fashion, including design, 
retail and styling services, was the second highest category, with 15 cover stars. The cover stars 
collected under ‘Other industry’ included a high-profile political adviser, two women involved in 
fundraising/charity, two young women who were developing a youth mentoring program, and an 
entrepreneur in the tourism sector. The category ‘Not enterprise related’ included two young girls 
aged seven and fourteen who were featured on the cover as a medical ‘human interest’ story.  
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Figure 21: GT Magazine cover stars by type of industry 
In each of the 50 magazine issues published in 2016, I analysed the cover stories and any other 
articles in the magazine which featured a discussion of the employability skills, innovation and/or 
enterprise of young people. All articles in the sample were authored by women.35 These media stories 
profile artists and designers who are inspired by local landscapes and lifestyles, and baristas and cafe 
owners who aspire to be part of the region’s burgeoning cafe culture. My analysis considered the 
stories of young people who are engaged in a variety of artistic, creative and/or entrepreneurial 
pursuits, examining the risks, opportunities and challenges they encounter, as they are described both 
in their own words and in the words of reporters, as well as the images and stylistic elements which 
accompanied these stories. This particular sample of magazine issues, drawn from the year 2016, has 
been selected for two key reasons. First, in 2016 I entered the first year of my PhD research; this was 
a year in which I formulated my research interest in questions of young people’s ‘employability 
skills’, ‘innovation’ and ‘enterprise’, and became particularly alert to the ways in which issues 
concerning young people, employment/unemployment, and enterprise were represented in local 
media. Second, in 2016, the city of Geelong was in the midst of a period of reflection and transition as 
many of the stalwarts of its manufacturing sector were finally reaching the end of the line (after a 91-
year tenure, the Ford Motor Company ceased production at its Geelong plant in October 2016, for 
instance). In the years between 2014 and 2016 especially, the legacies of Geelong’s industrial era and 
future directions of economic growth were questions attracting much commentary and debate across 
local media and other sites.  
In the following section I will outline four themes that emerged as significant in my analysis of the 
discourse of the ‘enterprising young person’ in GT Magazine, which include ‘We’ve got that young 
drive’, ‘The juggling act’, ‘Sacrificing stability’, and ‘Making a difference’. I will then proceed to a 
 
35 The gender composition of the journalism profession has been interrogated by Franks (2013), who suggests 
that although women substantially outnumber men in journalism training and enter the profession in slightly 
greater numbers, there is a gender division by subject matter (not to mention a significant pay gap between male 
and female journalists, and a relative absence of women at the higher echelons of the profession). Female 
journalists predominate on ‘softer’ lifestyle features, while sport, politics, and business are typically the domain 
of male journalists (Franks 2013, pp. vii-viii). 
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detailed focus on two particular stories – those of Chris and Georgia, and Mia - analysing the 
particular aspects of their representation in GT Magazine, and their experiences of enterprise. The 
themes that are present in the stories of Chris and Georgia, and Mia, run through those of many other 
young entrepreneurs featured in GT Magazine. I have selected these two stories for deeper analysis 
not because they are representative of any particular thing, but because they are ‘figures’ that are 
illustrative of a variety of themes and elements that I will analyse in greater detail in the discussion 
that follows. Following Haraway (2008, p.4), I understand ‘figures’ as ‘material–semiotic nodes or 
knots in which diverse bodies and meanings coshape one another’. My aim is to unravel and untie 
some of the key threads in those knots in order to explore some of the complex entanglements of 
gender, class and aesthetics in representations of young people’s enterprise in GT Magazine. 
‘We’ve got that young drive’ 
From a stage show performer reflecting on the athleticism entailed in ‘giving her all’ eight times a 
week, to the group of ‘four mates’ behind the restoration of an ‘historic Geelong pub’, the youthful 
energy and enthusiasm that these enterprising young people brought to their endeavours was 
highlighted in a large number of stories.  
Shaun, Thomas, Daniel and Ian, a group of ‘four mates …aged in their late 20s and early 30s’, have 
restored ‘Aberdeen Street icon’ Irish Murphy’s. ‘The new publicans claim they are the youngest in 
Geelong’, reporter Meagan Rooth (2016a, p.12) writes, ‘and with that comes boyish enthusiasm and 
energy to burn. “The locals want to see us succeed,” Shaun says, smiling. “We’ve got that young 
drive so we’re just having a crack”’. Former regulars of the pub volunteered their time to the 
restoration effort by scrubbing floors and polishing signage, and ‘some even shed a tear on re-opening 
night’, Rooth (2016a, p.12) notes, affirming that the young men have the backing of ‘the locals’.  
‘Indie surfwear designers’ Emma, 31, and Jodie, 27, have developed a range of women’s surfwear 
inspired by the ‘cold, dark tones reflective of wild Bells Beach swell’ (Rooth 2016b, p.6). While this 
duo is portrayed as shrewd and driven in their approach to business - ‘“We have big plans in the 
works,” says Emma... “Our motto is keep hassling, stay curious and always chase your dream”’ - they 
also seek to embody the surf lifestyle: Emma’s day ‘is sometimes broken up by surfs before work, on 
her lunch break and in the evening’ (Rooth 2016b, p.6).  
Dancer and entertainer Kyla, 23, is the February 6 cover star, and inside this issue she describes the 
challenge of touring with a stage show for twelve months. The ‘physically gruelling’ experience of 
performing several shows a week ‘challenged her to push beyond her comfort zone’ (Coffey 2016, 
p.5). ‘I’ve learnt a lot about my body and how to look after myself as an athlete who is doing an 
intense dance show eight times a week’, she says (Coffey 2016, p.5).  
Hairstylist Josiah, 24, runs his own salon. ‘Josiah, although young, has always been driven to succeed, 
and has never wasted time’, reporter Stephanie Azzopardi (2016a, p.13) observes. ‘My whole life to 
this day has gone fast’, Josiah says (Azzopardi 2016a, p.13). ‘I left school in Year 9, qualified in 
hairdressing at 17, had my daughter Zara at 18, then got engaged to my beautiful fiancé, had my son 
Judah at 21 then started my business at 22’ (Azzopardi 2016a, p.13). And it appears that Josiah’s 
unstoppable momentum continues: ‘I’m in the process of hiring staff and I am excited to see where a 
team of talented barbers will take us. The dream is to extend the brand worldwide’ (Azzopardi 2016a, 
p.13). 
Breanna, 32, is a trade jeweller with several years experience, and for the past few years she has been 
creating designs under her own label. In her interview with GT Magazine, she reflects on the 
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persistence that got her where she is today. When she discovered her passion for making jewellery, 
‘Breanna dropped out of her photography course at university and enrolled in a jewellery course. 
“Once that was over I wrote 200 letters to as many jewellers in Melbourne as I could find asking for 
an apprenticeship,” she explains. “I got one reply and then got the job”’ (Azzopardi 2016b, p.10).  
The juggling act 
In GT Magazine, the work of crafting or consolidating a career in the public eye is regarded as a 
particularly glamorous prospect for young women, if at times it is hectic and demanding. As they 
combine and coordinate multiple ‘gigs’, these models and celebrities demonstrate the importance of 
multitasking skills in the work of building a professional reputation and personal ‘brand’. Further, it is 
suggested that this must be balanced with the essential behind-the-scenes work of maintaining a 
‘healthy lifestyle’ and a youthful, aesthetically-pleasing body. Fiona, 33, got her start on a reality 
television program and is now a model and an ambassador for various brands (King 2016a, pp.6-7). 
Emerging model Ellie, 20, has already worked with several major brands, and juggles modelling 
engagements with a full-time traineeship in sports development (Azzopardi 2016c, p.6). In the 
February 13 issue of the magazine, local media celebrity and fiancé (now wife) of Geelong footballer 
Tom Hawkins, Emma Clapham is ‘on a mission to restore balance in her life this year’, after a hectic 
2015: 
One minute she was blogging on her lifestyle website and the next snapping a selfie in the car 
on the way to a hosting gig at a champagne luncheon. Days later, she was promoting a 
skincare collaboration before moonlighting as a food stylist and sidling up next to Tom in VIP 
seats at a sporting event. The creative busy bee found herself dreaming of wearing trackpants 
on the couch in front of Netflix or watching the sunset from water tanks on the family farm in 
Deniliquin instead of getting changed on the run and fixing her make-up at traffic lights. 
 (Rooth 2016c, p.8) 
 
Some of the entrepreneurs regarded their business as an adjunct, a side project or a space in which to 
indulge a hobby, rather than a full-time career. Young couple Rachel and Trav, both 23, are each 
working full-time in established careers, but together they have launched furniture business Into the 
Woods. The idea for the business ‘started when the high school sweethearts were renovating their own 
house in Corio’, and saw a niche in the market for custom-made furniture at affordable prices 
(Hayward 2016, p.14). ‘If it goes really well we might think about doing it full-time but at the 
moment we are just enjoying it’, Rachel says of the business (Hayward 2016, p.15).  
Sacrificing stability 
A number of stories were structured by the theme of ‘sacrifice’. For example, the need for 
perseverance when self-sacrifice appears to generate little reward, or the sacrificing of a stable career 
in order to pursue a passion. Brodie, 27, has worked hard to establish not one, but two businesses: a 
beauty therapy business and a clothing label, only a year apart (Azzopardi 2016d, p.16). Although she 
enjoys the sense of autonomy that comes with being self-employed, she emphasises the need for 
perseverance when starting a business: ‘Be prepared to put in the long hours, countless hours where 
you won’t make any money and the feeling of taking three steps forward and then another two back...I 
always like to say “business isn’t easy otherwise everyone would be doing it”’ (Azzopardi 2016d, 
p.16). 
Holly, Nicki and Kate initially pursued careers in teaching, healthcare, and the corporate world, 
respectively, before ‘making the break’ to seek an outlet for their creative talents and passions. 24-
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year-old Holly initially ‘pursued physical education teaching as a “safe” career path’, but after her 
fashion blog took off, decided to put her teaching career on hold (Rooth 2016d, pp.4-5). Nicki, also 
24, trained as a physiotherapist after completing school because she wanted to help people, she says, 
but ‘she has not looked back’ after taking the plunge into becoming a full-time artist (Azzopardi 
2016e, p.8). Moving from Melbourne to Geelong with her boyfriend, she has found artistic inspiration 
in the seaside landscape, and now earns a living selling artworks on her website (Azzopardi 2016e, 
pp.8-9).  
30-year-old Kate took her career in a completely different direction after she experienced an epiphany 
in her 20s. ‘I found myself questioning the idea of “success” around my mid-20s, which saw me 
working in Melbourne as a corporate contractor manager’, Kate says (King 2016b, p.15). ‘It was 
around this time that I decided that the corporate world wasn’t for me and that I would focus on my 
passions – health and wellness’ (King 2016b, p.15). She is now a certified holistic health coach and 
personal trainer, and her business, Retreat Yourself Box, offers a package of health and wellness 
products, available by subscription (King 2016b, p.15).  
Making a difference 
The entrepreneurial inclinations of several young people were informed by an ethical commitment to 
‘give back’ and make a difference in their local community, and beyond. The radiant smile of portrait 
photographer Stevie, 25, beams out from the cover of the February 20 issue of GT Magazine, as she 
cradles her SLR camera. Stevie’s creative journey commenced at the age of 17 when she began to 
take self-portraits with a small camera, as a way of rebuilding her confidence and identity after 
experiencing personal trauma, Meagan Rooth (2016e, p.4) reports. She now uses her craft with the 
aim of empowering other women. In her Body Love series of portraits, Stevie seeks to capture ‘a 
pictorial glimpse into soul, strength, love and vulnerability’ (Rooth 2016e, p.5). ‘I believe every 
woman should have a beautiful photograph of herself, loving the skin she’s in’, she explains (Rooth 
2016e, p.5).  
‘Fashion-forward’, ‘Bell Post Hill duo’ Monique and Marko have brought together their passions for 
style and fashion, and helping others, in an innovative concept called Time IV Change – a range of six 
eco-friendly, vegan watches, in which different colour bands represent different social or 
environmental causes (Rooth 2016f, pp.8-9). The couple wants to offer a product that is both 
fashionable and cruelty-free: ‘“We wanted to create something that would allow us to give back and 
help those without a voice,” Marko explains. “I hope we can create a ripple effect on a global scale,” 
adds Monique’ (Rooth 2016f, p.8).  
25-year-old Aimee is the cover star of the April 23 issue of GT Magazine, and the wife of Geelong 
footballer Zac Smith. Aimee describes herself as ‘a passionate people-person’, reporter Meagan Rooth 
(2016g, p.9) notes, and, in conjunction with other young football wives, is volunteering on a local 
initiative that provides makeover and mentoring services to assist young disabled women to prepare 
for employment. Aimee’s ‘endearing motherly nature’ makes her a natural fit for this role, Rooth 
(2016g, p.9) indicates, and it appears that her desire to ‘make a difference’ in the local community is 
informed by her religious faith:  
Aimee – who has volunteered as a Red Frog during schoolies since 2008, worked as a 
missionary overseas, mentored youth at her church and helped restore a run-down property to 
create a safe house for homeless mums on the Gold Coast – is in her element. She has a big 
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heart and believes in the power of women supporting women. ‘Giving back is something 
that’s really important to Zac and I,’ she says. (Rooth 2016g, p.9) 
 
We’re rolling up our sleeves and ‘giving it a go’: Chris and Georgia’s story 
On the cover of the March 5 issue of GT Magazine, attractive young couple Chris, 28, and Georgia, 
20, pose for the camera inside their new café (see Figure 22). The caption attached to the magazine 
cover image introduces Chris and Georgia as ‘young hearts’, inviting readers to ‘meet the ambitious 
couple putting a fresh twist on the traditional corner shop concept’.  
 
<Image removed due to copyright restrictions> 
Figure 22: Chris and Georgia on the cover of the March 5 issue of GT Magazine. 
Chris and Georgia have breathed new life into a former milk bar located only a few blocks from the 
Geelong CBD, and adjacent to Eastern Park, in which the Geelong Botanic Gardens is situated. The 
café’s garden-themed interior design, with floral and green touches, has introduced a ‘natural, breezy 
ease to the space’, reporter Meagan Rooth (2016h, p.5) notes approvingly. Chris and Georgia have 
utilised existing features of this ‘old weatherboard shopfront’ while also seeking to make their own 
imprint on the space. ‘Tired decorations and advertising material [were] removed from the windows 
to reveal the gardens out the front and streetscape to the side’, but they ‘decided to stick with the 
exterior paint colour, already familiar to locals. “Everyone knows it as ‘that yellow place’, so we 
didn’t want to change that,” Chris says’ (Rooth 2016h, p.5). The representation of Chris and Georgia 
emphasises the bonds of affection and commitment that underpin the couple’s new project. For these 
partners in both life and business (‘We spend so much time together,’ Chris says), these bonds extend 
to a beloved former pet that is the creative inspiration behind their business concept. The memory of 
their ‘happy, excitable rescue puppy’, it is suggested, fires the couple to make their joint venture a 
success: 
The staffy cross bull terrier cross Alaskan malamute is the inspiration behind the name and 
character of new East Geelong cafe Winifred’s Corner Shop. ‘She was such a happy dog – so 
content and loved to give,’ Georgia remembers, shifting her focus to the window to hide the 
tears in her eyes. ‘We want this place to have that kind of energy.’ (Rooth 2016h, p.5) 
‘The couple’s fondness for the corner shop almost rivals their fondness of each other’, reporter 
Meagan Rooth (2016h, p.5) observes. ‘Georgia, 20, is from Ocean Grove while Chris, 28, is originally 
from the Clifton Springs area. Full of youth and genuine warmth, they laugh and bounce off each 
other’ (Rooth 2016h, p.5). These references to the sense of energy, love and affection that the couple 
appreciate in each other and in their beloved former pet appear to indicate that Chris and Georgia each 
have a significant personal, emotional stake in the business venture, in a project that is the product of 
not only their passions, but of their shared history.  
However, while Georgia ‘has a modelling background’, Chris previously ‘owned Groove Café’ in 
Ocean Grove, and it is hinted that the couple have some previous experience and awareness of the 
demands and personal costs of self-employment. This awareness has informed the couple’s desire to 
practice self-care and to strive for a degree of ‘work-life balance’, reporter Meagan Rooth suggests: 
The shop is closed on Saturdays to give the pair time to recuperate and spend time with their 
animals – some of which are fostered. ‘We’re very aware of burnout,’ says Chris, who 
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remembers working 30 days in a row without a day off in his previous job. ‘We always want 
to put our best foot forward.’ (Rooth 2016h, p.5) 
The couple’s decision to pursue their hospitality venture was not only informed by their passion for 
good food, but was made after a lengthy process of careful thought, planning and preparation:    
The entrepreneurial duo has moved into town from Ocean Grove, where Chris owned Groove 
Café. They took nine months to determine their next move together, during which Chris learnt 
the ropes of short-order cooking at Mr Grubb at Oakdene in Wallington. ‘We took time off to 
see what we wanted to do,’ he says. ‘We realised we’re really happy around coffee and we 
like good, simple food that’s fresh and tasty’ (Rooth 2016h, p.5). 
They apply this deliberative approach to the design and delivery of the menu. In fact, their attention to 
detail is explicitly stated: ‘We know the toasted ciabatta rolls are as good as they can possibly be. 
We’ve put a lot of work into perfecting them’, and ‘we’re really focused on the coffee’ (Rooth 2016h, 
p.5). Reporter Meagan Rooth comments approvingly on the selection of cakes on offer: ‘When gt 
visits, there’s…pistachio and raspberry friands, pistachio yoyos, florentines and apple crumble’ 
(Rooth 2016h, p.5) and a corresponding photograph depicts this display of sweet treats (see Figure 23 
below). In another image, Georgia wears a look of concentration as she prepares a coffee behind the 
counter. These images, in combination with the couple’s stated emphasis on attention to detail, give 
the sense that Chris and Georgia are proudly striving for continuous improvement, for perfection.  
<Image removed due to copyright restrictions> 
Figure 23: ‘Outside influences’ cover story featuring Chris and Georgia (Rooth 2016h, pp.4-5) 
So, while Chris and Georgia are conscious of the dangers of burnout, they are nonetheless concerned 
to demonstrate their enthusiastic commitment to seeing their business venture succeed, by ‘putting 
their best foot forward’: ‘We’re extremely passionate about hospitality,’ says Georgia, ‘I don’t think 
we could do anything else’ (Rooth 2016h, p.5). In both the magazine cover image (see Figure 22 
above) and main image accompanying the cover story (Figure 23 above), Chris and Georgia regard 
the camera with bright white smiles and glowing skin. In both portraits, as she stands beside her 
partner, Georgia is depicted with her hand resting on a nearby bench or chair, indicating not only an 
ease in front of the camera, but a sense of ownership and pride in her surroundings. Much like the 
design elements utilised in the renovation and decoration of the café, the couple’s clothing and 
presentation contains both old and new, ‘classic’ and ‘modern’ elements. Alongside the retro stylings 
of Georgia’s hair wrap and Chris’ moustache, their clothing also communicates a more casual, 
perhaps gender-neutral emphasis on the practical function and comfort of shirts and jeans. They are 
‘rolling up their sleeves’ – literally and metaphorically – taking a very hands-on role in the renovation 
of the café and its day-to-day operation as a business enterprise: ‘The couple jokes that they now 
smell of aromatic coffee and muffins, which is an improvement on the odour of dirt and woodchips 
during the renovation over Christmas’ (Rooth 2016h, p.5).  
Having cultivated a warm, welcoming space that has been designed with fellow dog lovers in mind 
(‘Hitching posts and water bowls encourage four-legged companions to be included in the 
experience’, reporter Meagan Rooth [2016h, p.5] observes), Chris and Georgia, it appears, are entitled 
to feel a sense of pride in their efforts. Their representation in GT Magazine draws on notions of youth 
as a symbol of energy, optimism and renewal – as the magazine cover suggests, they are the ‘young 
hearts’ breathing new life into a dilapidated corner shop – and emphasises their relatability as ‘just a 
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couple of kids giving it a go’. A relatability that might just establish their legitimacy in the eyes of 
locals as the new caretakers of ‘that yellow place’.  
Driven to succeed: Mia’s story 
24-year-old businesswoman Mia is the cover star of the November 12 issue of GT Magazine. At the 
time of her interview with the magazine, Mia was rebuilding her career, after a major business setback 
and a whirlwind 12 months. Having started her first business the previous year and ‘quickly turn[ing] 
$1000 into $1 million’, she ‘lost it all’ six months later, and, in her words, hit ‘rock bottom’ (King 
2016c, p.6). Like Chris and Georgia, Mia has learnt from her previous mistakes in the world of 
business and this time is determined to ‘put her best foot forward’. She is now ‘confidently hitting the 
market’ with her two, relaunched, companies, offering teeth whitening products and cold-pressed 
juices (King 2016c, p.6). Mia presents a picture of unwavering self-belief in the face of significant 
setbacks: 
When her first two businesses did not turn out as she had planned, Mia had to return her new 
car, she was removed from her rental property and forced to move into her grandparents’ 
house in Drysdale. Some of her friends and family begged her to give in and ‘just get a 
normal job’. She says she was no less determined, a ‘regular’ job was not for her. Her stars 
aligned when she was put in the path of some wonderful mentors and future business partners. 
(King 2016c, p.7) 
This time around, Mia has been careful to build connections with supportive business partners, 
mentors and clients, garnering an endorsement of her pressed juices from ‘celebrity paleo chef’ Pete 
Evans (King 2016c, p.7). With Mia’s fortunes again on the rise, she is able to enjoy some of the 
trappings of success, reporter Abbey King indicates as she ‘sets the scene’ for her interview with Mia:  
 
When gt visits, Mia’s new glistening white BMW is sitting in the driveway of her recently 
acquired Newtown home. She and her one-year-old puppy, Honey, are busy unpacking. A 
large portrait of Bondi Beach [her line of teeth-whitening products is called Bondi Smile] 
takes pride of place on the living room wall and the space is dotted with custom-made 
furniture, including homemade concrete stools and pots, made by Mia herself. (King 2016c, 
p.6) 
<Image removed due to copyright restrictions> 
Figure 24: Mia on the cover of the November 12 issue of GT Magazine. 
The images of Mia that are presented in GT Magazine emphasise her confidence and competence as a 
successful entrepreneur. In the magazine cover image (see Figure 24 above), Mia regards the camera 
confidently and directly, with an understated smile, while her clothing and presentation features an 
interesting mix of masculine and feminine elements. Appearing in ripped jeans, and with a black 
leather biker jacket slung across her shoulders, the presentation of Mia also contains some ‘feminine’ 
touches, such as her red nail varnish and wavy blonde hair cascading across her shoulder. Inside the 
magazine, there are more images of Mia across the pages of the cover story (see Figure 25 below). In 
these images she appears to confidently handle the gadgetry and accoutrements associated with a 
modern business enterprise: a laptop slung under her arm, a mobile phone (which bears her initials on 
its cover). A freshly-made cappuccino is within reach as she types on her laptop and checks her 
phone, indicating that she has the freedom and autonomy to make a café her place of work for the day. 
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Her attire of glasses, a black jacket, and ‘smart’ wristwatch are signifiers of intelligence and 
sophistication. Offstage are those elements that reporter Abbey King (2016c, p.6) has brought to our 
attention – a new home in the leafy suburb of Newtown that she shares with her puppy, the ‘new 
glistening white BMW’ sitting in the driveway – that further enhance the aura of independence, 
determination and success that constructs our sense of Mia. The caption adjoining the magazine cover 
image - ‘young and driven: meet the 24-year-old who is determined to succeed in the world of 
business’ - characterises Mia’s story as one of perseverance, youthful drive and ambition.  
 
<Image removed due to copyright restrictions> 
Figure 25: ‘Driven to succeed’ cover story featuring Mia (King 2016c, pp.6-7) 
In contrast to café operators Chris and Georgia, who bore an apparent emotional connection to a 
business concept that was inspired by a beloved former pet, Mia appears to have little in the way of a 
personal, emotional investment in the products that she offers. For Mia, teeth-whitening products and 
pressed juices represent a means of wealth generation. As Mia reflects on the growth of her previous 
businesses throughout the interview, she speaks of ‘taking millions of dollars of revenue’, and ‘we 
turned over nearly $2 million in revenue’ (King 2016c, p.6), indicating that monetary gain is her main 
barometer of fulfillment and success. She seeks to embody the qualities of a ‘true entrepreneur’, a 
persona curated by the producers of her GT Magazine story, and one that she herself cultivates. Mia 
has learnt to ‘talk the talk’ of a ‘true entrepreneur’, presenting a picture of unwavering confidence and 
conviction, and espousing the qualities of risk-tolerance, pluck and resilience – qualities that, like the 
figure of the entrepreneur more generally, have traditionally been regarded as masculine (Bruni, 
Gherardi & Poggio 2004). ‘I think it’s really important in business that you have to hit rock bottom 
once’, she contends, ‘for one, you get more credibility from people and, two, if you can earn millions, 
lose millions and earn millions again, that shows you are a true entrepreneur’ (King 2016c, p.7). It 
becomes clear that Mia regards herself as a visionary, a maverick, someone whose unique talents are 
not likely to be recognised or supported in a conventional career pathway: 
Mia has always known her place is in the business world. She never liked school and wanted 
to march to the beat of her own drum. She became a personal trainer for three years but found 
the work to be too repetitive and realised she couldn’t do it anymore. Enrolling in exercise 
science at Deakin University, because she was told it was ‘the right thing to do’, she lasted 
just one year. That is when she began to search for her first big break in business. ‘I could 
name 20 businesses I have tried to start up in the past, even things like the pot,’ says Mia, 
pointing to the homemade concrete pot.  (King 2016c, p.6) 
 
She speaks of her entrepreneurial career as a calling, as something she was born to do: ‘I have so 
many ideas and I’ve been very blessed when it comes to business. That’s just me, I’m meant to be an 
entrepreneur. I’m meant to own millions and millions of dollars’ worth of companies one day, I just 
know that’ (King 2016c, p.6). While particular elements of her presentation and persona carry 
traditionally ‘masculine’ connotations, Mia says she is motivated by a desire to empower other 
women, and to lift expectations of what a ‘young blonde woman in business’ is likely to be capable 
of: 
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Currently halfway through writing her first book, Mia wants to share her experience with 
other women to encourage them to never give up. She has also started doing some business 
coaching… ‘My main goal is to inspire women. I want to be able to help show them they can 
live their dream,’ she explains. ‘I never really had someone I looked up to in business and I 
think in this generation we’re taking the leap and taking risks. There’s little businesses 
popping up everywhere – I absolutely love it, love, love, love it. Making concrete pots or 
sewing cushions, I love the creativity. Fifty years ago, a woman in business would have been 
frowned upon – so that’s now definitely my mission to inspire women to follow their dreams 
and make it happen.’ (King 2016c, p.7) 
The Young Entrepreneur: A classed and gendered ‘figure’  
The foregoing analysis raises significant questions about the ‘aesthetic’ dimensions of the figure of 
the ‘enterprising young person’, and the ways in which this figure produces and reproduces gendered, 
classed and racialised understandings of young people, work and enterprise. Up to this point, I have 
engaged with the stories of Chris and Georgia, Mia, and the many other young people featuring in the 
pages of GT Magazine as vignettes, and these brief stories are illustrative of a variety of themes and 
elements that I will analyse in greater detail in the discussion that follows. I understand these 
enterprising young people as ‘figures’, in the sense developed by Donna Haraway (2008, p.4):  
Figures are not representations or didactic illustrations, but rather material–semiotic nodes or 
knots in which diverse bodies and meanings coshape one another. For me, figures have 
always been where the biological and literary or artistic come together with all of the force of 
lived reality. My body itself is just such a figure, literally. 
In what follows I will unravel and untie some of the key threads in those knots in order to explore 
some of the complex entanglements of gender, class and aesthetics in contemporary representations of 
young people’s enterprise. In adopting such an approach, my thinking is shaped by recent work in the 
sociology of youth, in particular that of Peter Kelly and Steven Threadgold, which has illustrated the 
analytic possibilities that a focus on ‘figures’ can enable. Kelly (2015) has put Haraway’s concept of 
the figure to work in thinking about ways to re-enchant a sociological imagination. He analyses three 
figures of young people appearing in works of contemporary fiction and entertainment media: Plum 
and Pikelet, the respective protagonists of Sonya Hartnett’s Butterfly and Tim Winton’s Breath, and 
Michael, the young apprentice chef appearing in reality television program Jamie’s Kitchen. ‘These 
figures of Plum, Pikelet and Michael’, Kelly (2015, p.619) suggests, ‘are marked and shaped and 
confronted with the often cruel, sometimes pleasurable, ambivalence and irony that characterise all 
our lives at different times and in different spaces and places’. And yet, this ambivalence and irony is 
all too frequently ‘written out’ of what Kelly (2015, p.617, emphasis in original) argues is an 
increasingly governmentalised youth studies that must ‘conform to the rule-bound, institutionalised 
and evidence-based knowledge practices that institutions, government departments, corporations, and 
NGOs understand as being capable of telling truths about young people’.  
Kelly, following Zygmunt Bauman (1997, cited in Kelly 2015, p.620), is concerned to ‘re-enchant’ 
the sociological imagination, an imagination that embraces a ‘tolerance and equanimity towards the 
wayward, the contingent, the not-wholly determined, the not-wholly understood and the not wholly 
predictable’. Bauman’s sociologies of ‘liquid life’ encourage an approach to the practise of youth 
studies that is deliberately provocative and unconventional in looking to texts, ideas and sources 
outside of what might be called mainstream sociology for what they can reveal about the messy 
complexities of young people’s lives, and for stimulating new ways of thinking (Kelly 2015, pp.620-
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621). It is the task of a critical youth studies, Kelly (2015, p.627) argues, to trouble and unsettle the 
received wisdom about what counts as ‘knowledge’ in the social sciences:  
We need to foster a sociological imagination capable of unsettling both the ways that we 
imagine these issues, and the institutionalised intellectual knowledge practices that shape such 
an imagination. Such an imagination should not only recognise the ambivalence and irony 
that are fundamental elements of many young people’s experience of an uncertain, often 
dangerous 21st Century. Such an imagination should, also, in modest, but always provocative 
and untimely ways, challenge and trouble any governmentalised attempts to exterminate that 
ambivalence. 
Threadgold (2018) draws not on Haraway but the work of Bourdieu to analyse the figures of ‘hipster’ 
and ‘bogan’ in an exploration of how, in contemporary Australia, class is made in and through forms 
of media and popular culture, from news and opinion, to parody and satire. In doing so, Threadgold 
draws on Tyler’s (2013, cited in Threadgold 2018, p.95) conception of ‘figure’, understood ‘as both a 
theoretical concept and as a method’ that allows the researcher to interrogate the ‘governmentalised 
use and abuse of nationally abject figures’ and to track their construction, usage and repetition across 
multiple forms of media and popular culture. As Threadgold (2018, p.75) argues, ‘the affective space 
between Bourdieu’s two objective social orders – the material order and the symbolic order – is one 
where class classifications are made and remade’:  
Much of this representational work, this struggle, is done by middle class professionals 
working in the creative and media industries. The mental constructs of the hipster and bogan 
evolve from attempts to map and represent class anxieties around taste, morals and values 
from a privileged position in social space. Once created and disseminated, they then work to 
patrol and enforce those very qualities. 
For Threadgold (2018, pp.76, 82), the figures of ‘hipster’ and ‘bogan’ are ‘indicative of how class 
“haunts” our media consumption’; they are figures that cause and delineate class-based anxieties:  
Depending on where you look, the hipster is either an economic saviour or responsible for a 
decline in productivity. Bogans are either ugly and daggy or driving fashion poverty chic. 
Hipster and bogan style and behaviour can be attributed to both the poor and to billionaires. 
These categorisations capture both the making of, and struggles over, class boundaries and 
their symbolically blurry nature. 
Importantly, Threadgold (2018, p.96, emphasis added) notes that ‘as figures [the hipster and bogan] 
are utilised in struggles over class inequalities and taste in the field of representation, all the while 
obfuscating the legitimacy of class as a way of understanding these very struggles’. This insight is 
particularly pertinent to the analysis that I would like to develop here, of the class dimensions of GT 
Magazine’s representation of the figure of the ‘enterprising young person’.  
In GT Magazine, particular dimensions of the figure of the ‘enterprising young person’ are 
foregrounded and made ‘present’ (femininity, whiteness, middle-classness, and what we might 
tentatively say is a presumed heterosexuality, though a more detailed analysis of this is beyond the 
scope of this chapter), while others are made ‘manifestly absent’ (Law 2004) – the enterprise of young 
people of indigenous or non-Anglo-Celtic backgrounds, or from disadvantaged or ‘poor’ 
backgrounds, for example. As a generation ‘coming of age’ in the second decade of the 21st century, 
the young people that appear in the pages of GT Magazine confront a world of work that is shaped by 
processes of de-industrialisation, globalisation, deregulation (or ‘re-regulation’) and de-unionisation, 
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which are signature features of what I have identified in earlier chapters as a ‘neoliberal’ form of 
capitalism. Previous studies of youth enterprise (MacDonald & Coffield 1991) have highlighted that, 
typically, there are various ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors that inform a young person’s decision to pursue 
self-employment; they are ‘pushed’ by the previous experience of the deprivations associated with 
unemployment and/or precarious work, are ‘pulled’ by the appeal of being one’s own boss, or perhaps 
a combination of the two.  
Yet, GT Magazine has very little to say about the influence of factors which might push the 
‘enterprising young person’ in the direction of self-employment, nor of their access to the necessary 
resources - financial, social, psychological - which make self-enterprise thinkable, doable and 
achievable. The entrepreneurial success of these young people is understood as almost solely the 
product of their own hard work and determination. The previous experience of burnout or business 
failure does not appear to spark disillusionment, only a drive to get it right the next time. The story of 
24-year-old Mia, for example, does not illuminate the conditions which allowed the young 
businesswoman to ‘earn millions, lose millions and earn millions again’, other than vague references 
to the assistance she received from ‘supportive business partners and mentors’, and her need to ‘move 
into her grandparents’ house’ at a time of hardship (King 2016c). In GT Magazine, the aesthetic 
dimensions of class are pushed to the fore: the ‘enterprising young person’ is constructed as a 
discerning producer and consumer of middle-class lifestyles and cultural tastes for high-end, bespoke 
homewares, fashion, and health and beauty products. Yet the class aspect receiving considerably less 
attention in the magazine is the access of these young people to the key forms of capital – what 
Bourdieu (1986, cited in Threadgold 2018, p.44) understands as ‘economic’, ‘social’ and ‘cultural’ 
capital, in the form of financial resources, networks, and educational and occupational credentials, for 
example – making their entrepreneurial endeavours possible.  
While GT Magazine shies away from a fuller discussion of factors which might confer a ‘head-start’ 
in the world of business, in their profiles of Geelong’s enterprising young people, reporters are, 
whether consciously or unconsciously, utilising places of residence and of education as markers of 
status. In the absence of any overt references to the socioeconomic background of these young people, 
these categories serve as proxies for class.  
Taking the 50 cover stories published in GT Magazine in 2016 as my sample, I analysed the most 
common places of residence among the 65 cover stars that were featured in this period. In the 
majority of articles, the cover star’s suburb of residence was not indicated (n=24). Seven cover stars 
were not a current resident of Geelong. Among those articles which did indicate the subject’s place of 
residence, this was most commonly Torquay and the Surf Coast (n=9), followed by Geelong West 
(n=3), Highton (n=2), and Newtown (n=2). The median weekly household income in 2016 for the 
suburb of ‘Torquay Jan-Juc’ was $1,799 (Surf Coast Shire 2016). For the Surf Coast Shire more 
generally, it was $1,568 (Surf Coast Shire 2016). Geelong West, Highton and Newtown are also high 
socioeconomic suburbs, with median weekly incomes of $1,430, $1,607 and $1,658, respectively (as a 
point of comparison, the median weekly household income for the City of Greater Geelong as a whole 
was $1,242) (COGG 2016c). One particular cover story stands out as an exception to this high 
socioeconomic bias: that featuring Ellie, a 20-year-old model and resident of Newcomb, a suburb 
which in 2016 had a median weekly household income of $994 (COGG 2016c).  
Reporters made reference to the subject’s former school in ten out of the 50 cover stories. These 
schools included Sacred Heart College, Geelong College, St Joseph’s College, Kardinia International 
College, Christian College, and Lorne High School (which is now known as Lorne P-12 College). 
With the exception of Lorne P-12 College, these are all private schools that are located in 
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predominantly high socioeconomic suburbs and which charge significant attendance fees and/or 
boarding fees. Data from the My School website illustrate the relative privilege of these schools. In 
2016, Sacred Heart College, a prestigious, Catholic secondary school for girls, had an Index of 
Community Socio-Educational Advantage (ICSEA) value of 1084 (Australian Curriculum, 
Assessment and Reporting Authority 2016). A value on the index corresponds to the average level of 
educational advantage of the school’s student population relative to those of other schools (ACARA 
2015) 36. An analysis of the distribution of Sacred Heart College students across the four ‘Socio-
Educational Advantage’ (SEA) quarters reveals that, in 2016, 29 percent of Sacred Heart College 
students were relatively disadvantaged, while 71 percent were relatively advantaged (ACARA 
2016b).37  
Coeducational school Geelong College, and boys’ secondary school St Joseph’s College, join Sacred 
Heart College in the leafy suburb of Newtown. Geelong College is perhaps the second-most 
prestigious educational institution in Geelong, after Geelong Grammar School. The latter is 
Australia’s most expensive school, charging more than $40,000 for year 12 day-boarding fees (Shying 
2019, p.24). Geelong College is the Geelong region’s second most expensive institution, charging 
$29,284 for year 12 tuition in 2019 (Shying 2019, p.24). The ICSEA value of Geelong College was 
1146 in 2016, and a full 91 percent of its students were relatively advantaged (ACARA 2016b). St 
Joseph’s College had an ICSEA value of 1065, with 36 percent of students sitting at the 
disadvantaged end of the spectrum, and 64 percent at the advantaged end.38 As a point of comparison 
for these scores, the ICSEA of Geelong’s largest school, Northern Bay P-12 College, located in the 
low socioeconomic suburb of Corio, was 875 in 2016, and 95 percent of its student population was 
relatively disadvantaged (ACARA 2016b).  
The work of Kenway and colleagues, on the role of class in the reproduction of social, spatial and 
educational inequalities, provides some key points of reference for making sense of these findings. 
Kenway and Fahey (2015) highlight that there are particular class sensibilities inherent in the ethic of 
‘giving back’, in the shaping of the philanthropic inclinations of the upper middle class. Utilising a 
methodological approach they term ‘multi-sited global ethnography’, Kenway and Fahey (2014) 
examine the globalising practices of elite schools. Such schools provide students with the opportunity 
to participate in global youth leadership programmes that encourage the students to imagine 
themselves as global leaders in various fields (Kenway & Fahey 2014, p.191). The elite school’s 
global and regional networks and partnerships allow students to mix with what the school regards as 
the most desirable reference groups, while also providing students with ‘opportunities to build their 
own global and regional networks consisting of people who are like them in social class terms even if 
 
36 The Index of Community Socio-Educational Advantage (ICSEA) was developed by the Australian 
Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority (2015) to allow meaningful comparisons of NAPLAN test 
achievement by students in schools across Australia. As ACARA (2013, p.1) explains, ‘ICSEA values are 
calculated on a scale which has a median of 1000 and a standard deviation of 100. ICSEA values typically range 
from approximately 500 (representing extremely educationally disadvantaged backgrounds) to about 1300 
(representing schools with students with very educationally advantaged backgrounds)’. 
37 In 2016, the distribution of Sacred Heart College students across the four ‘Socio-Educational Advantage’ 
(SEA) quarters was: 6 percent in the bottom quarter, 23 percent and 35 percent in the middle quarters, and 36 
percent in the top quarter (ACARA 2016b). In calculating the proportion of students who are ‘relatively 
disadvantaged’ I refer to those in the bottom quarter and low middle quarter, and similarly, to determine the 
proportion of ‘relatively advantaged’ students, I refer to those in the high middle quarter and top quarter.  
 
38 I calculated the proportions of relatively advantaged and disadvantaged students at Geelong College and St 
Joseph’s College in the same way as I did for Sacred Heart College, in reference to the distribution of students 
on the Socio-Educational Advantage (SEA) index.  
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they differ according to nation, culture and religion’ (Kenway & Fahey 2014, p.191). These globally 
‘integrative’ practices, Kenway and Fahey (2014, pp.191-192) suggest, have ‘the potential to produce 
transnational class imaginations in students’, offering ‘a vision of the world in which students, of a 
certain calibre and social standing, can always move freely and are free to imagine a world in which 
they are always on the move’. 
In Geelong, as in other cities, schools are implicated in the production and reproduction of a ‘social 
class divide’, Kenway (2013, p.303) argues, which sees the continued funnelling of a disproportionate 
percentage of students from the ‘independent’ school sector into mental labour and a disproportionate 
percentage of students from the government sector into manual labour. In ‘Rust Belt’ places, these 
processes of educational segregation intersect with the dynamics of de-industrialisation and what 
Bakker (1996, cited in Kenway, Kraack & Hickey-Moody 2006, p.64) terms the ‘gender paradox of 
restructuring’, which involves the ‘contradictory effects of the dual process of gender erosion and 
intensification’. Kenway, Kraack and Hickey-Moody are concerned to explore the implications of this 
‘gender paradox of restructuring’ for understanding local masculinities. Many of Australia’s regional 
towns and cities, they argue, ‘have historically developed their self-concept around a particularly 
place-based version of “hegemonic industrial working-class masculinity” that is central to the manner 
in which identities, work and all relationships are valued’ (Kenway, Kraack & Hickey-Moody 2006, 
p.66).  
Even in the places hardest hit by the effects of economic restructuring, a significant number of young 
men continue to aim for an apprenticeship in the trades despite the almost complete collapse of the 
routes to industrial employment, and ‘many fathers cannot unlearn the attitudes associated with 
regular skilled manual employment and local hegemonic working-class masculinity’ (Kenway, 
Kraack & Hickey-Moody 2006, p.69, emphasis in original). Kenway, Kraack and Hickey-Moody 
(2006, p.68) observe that ‘such deeply entrenched ways of being male are not at all easily disposed of 
by the males themselves’. In a similar vein, Morgan and Nelligan (2018, p.85), in their study of 
young, aspirant ‘creative economy’ workers, suggest there are entrenched gendered subjectivities and 
expectations which, in different ways, limit the ability of men and women to embody the requirements 
of globalised, precarious labour markets for ‘labile labour’, in other words, workers who are ‘mobile, 
spontaneous, malleable and capable of being aroused by new vocational possibilities’. The difficulty 
of adapting to the demands of creative flexibility can be particularly acute for young men from 
working class and minority backgrounds, who are more likely to have inherited the ‘values and habits 
associated with what we might call Fordist masculinity’ - habits associated with the masculine trade 
and apprenticeship traditions (Morgan & Nelligan 2018, pp.85-86). At the same time, Morgan and 
Nelligan (2018, pp.85-86) highlight that ‘the gig economy throws up tripwires for women…for 
women who are primary carers or who shoulder an unequal burden of domestic labour, the uncertain 
rhythms of precarious work – subcontracting, “permalancing” and casual employment – are far from 
ideal’.  
GT Magazine does not, cannot, is incapable (because of its genre and format) of examining some of 
the many contradictions, ambiguities and tensions that inhere in processes of de-industrialisation and 
associated social change. Nor does it concern itself with the achievements of young men and women 
who, in large numbers, continue to pursue the technical and vocational pathways associated with 
‘traditional’ employment. The growing number of young women who are challenging the entrenched 
gender bias that predominates in many of the skilled trades, or who are taking advantage of the 
various initiatives designed to encourage their participation in STEM/STEAM (which key policy 
documents, such as the National Innovation and Science Agenda, suggest are the skills that young 
people need for the ‘jobs of tomorrow’ [Australian Government 2016a]), apparently do not qualify for 
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inclusion in the glossy pages of the magazine. The particular incarnation of the ‘enterprising young 
person’ that is privileged in the urban lifestyle media of the de-industrialising city of Geelong, is one 
that pushes the aesthetics of femininity, whiteness and middle-classness to the fore.  
Conclusion  
In GT Magazine, the qualities of class, gender and race are implicated in the privileging of particular 
types of industry (the fields of fashion and design, for example) and particular kinds of young people 
(female, white, middle-class and attractive) as the contemporary exemplars of enterprise. The 
heightened salience of particular aestheticised, feminised understandings of enterprise that we observe 
in the 21st century can be understood as the outcome of a series of political, economic, governmental, 
social, and cultural changes that began in the late 20th century. At the same time as the industrialised 
democracies were moving from a production model based on heavy industry to one based around 
services and information, neoliberal governmentalities sought to make and remake young people as 
reflexive, adaptable, self-creating individuals, who must survive and thrive in contemporary risk 
society. It is in these contexts that the figure of the ‘Can-Do Girl’ (Harris 2004), having been made 
possible by the gains of feminism, and by the rising educational attainment of women through the 20th 
century, is considered uniquely positioned to turn the opportunities in precarious, globalised labour 
markets to her advantage - is considered the ‘enterprising young person’ par excellence. Although the 
figure of the ‘enterprising young person’ produces and reproduces gendered, classed and racialised 
understandings of young people, work and enterprise, the figure encapsulates the qualities of 
resilience, flexibility and determination that all young people, from the privileged to the 
disadvantaged and ‘at-risk’, are encouraged to embody. 
However, the representations of young people’s enterprise offered in GT Magazine are as notable for 
what they ‘leave out’ as for what they ‘leave in’. A key way in which enterprise is aestheticised in GT 
Magazine is through the magazine’s normalisation of class privilege. The young people featured in 
the pages of GT Magazine are fortunate to have access to the means of movement, of lightness - 
qualities that Bauman (2012) suggests are particularly valued in the era of ‘liquid modernity’, and 
which make the entrepreneurial dispositions and endeavours of these young people possible. 
However, as Bauman argues, and as the work of Kenway and colleagues, and Morgan and Nelligan 
illustrates, access to the means of movement, lightness and flexibility is distributed unevenly – often 
along lines of class, gender and race. The young entrepreneurs featured in GT Magazine, many of 
whom are alumni of prestigious local schools, and with ready access to reserves of economic, social 
and cultural capital, are ‘free to imagine a world in which they are always on the move’ (Kenway & 
Fahey 2014, p.192). On the other hand, young people of working class and minority backgrounds 
typically encounter various ‘road blocks’, in the form of entrenched class and gender differentials and 
prejudices that limit their ability to enact the forms of flexible selfhood that are understood as 
increasingly necessary in contemporary labour markets. These are just some of the many 
contradictions, ambiguities and tensions that emerge in processes of de-industrialisation and 
associated social change, contradictions and nuances that a publication such as GT Magazine does not 
have scope to recognise and examine, but which are illuminated through a critical engagement with 
‘figures’ of enterprise.  
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Concluding Remarks  
 
I would like…to resituate the production of true and false at the heart of historical analysis and 
political critique.  
Michel Foucault (1991, p.79) 
 
A history of the present is, however, more interested in the future. Calling into question self-
evidences of the present by exposing the various ways they were constructed in the past, such 
histories shatter certain stabilities and help us detach ourselves from our ‘truths’ and seek 
alternative ways of existence. In order for such transgressions to occur, however, effective 
histories should also break with our current systems of rationalisation and show that there is no 
truth but truths, no reason but rationalities, no knowledge but knowledges of the ways people have 
come to understand themselves and the world. As Rajchman (1985) has commented, by using 
history to problematise the subject, Foucault raises the question of freedom, not as a normative 
category, but as a ‘real’ situation of being, our possibility of questioning ourselves and modifying 
the politics of our existence. 
Maria Tamboukou (1999, pp.210-211) 
 
The work that I have done in this thesis attempts to unsettle and make problematic, using methods of 
‘critical and effective history’, the ways in which, at various points in Australia’s policy history over 
the last 30-40 years, ideas of ‘employability skills’, ‘innovation’ and ‘enterprise’ have been made to 
function as ‘truths’ in relation to problems of youth employment and unemployment. Each of these 
discourses have featured the assumption that the responsibility for managing the problem of 
unemployment should rest primarily with the individual young person. On the cusp of the third 
decade of the 21st century, we now find ourselves in a period of human history in which there are new 
and re-emerging crises of various kinds, and these crises require that we problematise, then change 
how we understand problems such as youth unemployment.  
In this concluding chapter, I will identify and discuss four significant themes that have emerged as a 
consequence of the genealogical work that I have done. These include: ‘Human capital and the 
“purposes” of education’; ‘Gender, class, bodies and the self as enterprise’; ‘Youth labour markets: 
Pasts, presents, futures?’; and ‘What is ‘place’ in the Anthropocene?’. I want to suggest that these 
issues will have continuing impact on the ways in which young people engage with education, 
training and work. They also emerge from, and shape, the ways in which policymakers, politicians 
and commentators continue to think about the challenges and possibilities of young people entering 
the labour market – as labour markets themselves continue to change. I want to develop some of the 
discussion that follows with reference to Employable Me, a documentary series airing on Australian 
television in recent years. In order to do this, I will begin the chapter by briefly introducing the stories 
of some of the young people featured in Employable Me. In highlighting the immense challenges that 
young people with disabilities can experience in securing employment, Employable Me illustrates 
some of the limitations of the individualising, ‘human capital’ discourses of ‘employability skills’, 
‘innovation’ and ‘enterprise’ for young people with disabilities, and for a range of social groups who 
constitute contemporary Australia in all its diversity.  
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Employable Me? 
The Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s Employable Me documentary series, the second season of 
which aired in 2019, has focused a spotlight on the difficulties that young Australians with disabilities 
encounter in securing employment. Employable Me follows the stories of young Australians with 
disabilities such as autism, Tourette’s syndrome, cerebral palsy, Down syndrome and dwarfism as 
they navigate the world of job applications, interviews, job coach appointments and work trials.  
Eric, Kathleen and Paul are among the young job-seekers who feature in Season Two of the series. 
Eric has cerebral palsy that affects his speech, movement and balance. He is a determined young man 
who wishes to pursue employment in health administration. When asked ‘what do you want to 
achieve in life?’, Eric lists his goals as: secure, long-term employment, a girlfriend/partner, a society 
in which people see disability as a normal part of life, and for people ‘to not be afraid of getting to 
know someone with a disability’. Although Eric has a voice assistive device that helps him to 
communicate, he prefers to talk to potential employers himself rather than rely on his job coach or 
device to do the talking for him. Eric’s mum Karen suggests that her son loves talking to people over 
the phone despite his pronounced speech impediment, and explains that it is common for people to 
hang up on Eric, believing it to be a hoax call. Eric, however, is ‘annoyingly persistent’ and will keep 
ringing back.  
Kathleen is a confident, vibrant young woman with autism spectrum disorder. She is searching for her 
first paid job after finishing school a few years ago. Kathleen explains that, ‘when I was at school, I 
was a bit of an oddball…my nickname when I was a teenager was Molly…people call me “the female 
Molly” [after Australian music journalist Molly Meldrum]’. Kathleen has a vast knowledge of popular 
culture and music, with a particular interest in 1980s retro pop and rock. A clinical psychologist 
assesses Kathleen and suggests that, unlike some other people on the autism spectrum, Kathleen’s 
ability to read the emotions of other people is quite developed, which makes her suitable for a role in 
customer service. After a successful work trial at Madame Tussaud’s, Kathleen applies for a casual 
position there, as a guest service host.  
Paul has autism spectrum disorder and has been looking for work after being made redundant from his 
job as a kitchen hand 18 months ago. He lives in supported accommodation with his cat, Zara. Paul’s 
hobby and passion is trains, and when he is not looking for work, he channels his energy into updating 
his train vlog. He is pursuing employment with his local council, and has been invited to attend an 
assessment centre for a business administration traineeship position. Employable Me, alongside 
initiatives such as the Remove the Barrier campaign, aims to draw attention to, and dismantle, the 
unconscious bias that makes it especially difficult for people with disabilities to get a job. Remove the 
Barrier, launched in July 2019 by Australian sportsperson and television personality Dylan Alcott, has 
highlighted that the unemployment rate among Australians with disabilities is climbing, and currently 
sits at twice that of the general population (Remove the Barrier 2019). Remove the Barrier seeks to 
reframe the dominant perceptions that employers have of people with disabilities, citing research 
which suggests that, by hiring people with disabilities, employers will be rewarded with employees 
who are more productive, loyal to the company, and typically take less leave than other workers 
(Remove the Barrier 2019). The campaign also highlights the importance of employers asking 
questions and having conversations with job applicants. Rather than the employer making 
assumptions about what a young person with a disability can and cannot do, it is important to open up 
a conversation about what they are capable of, and their particular accessibility and support 
requirements in the workplace (Remove the Barrier 2019; Afshariyan 2019).  
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Human capital and the ‘purposes’ of education 
One of the key themes to emerge from the genealogical work that I have done in this thesis is that, 
particularly over the last 30-40 years in industrialised countries such as Australia, young people’s 
engagement in education and training has been redefined narrowly around the need to develop their 
‘human capital’. Even as ‘human capital’ has been talked about in different ways at different times. 
For example, as ‘employability skills’ from the 1980s onwards, and more recently, as ‘21st century 
skills’ or ‘enterprise skills’. As I discussed in Chapter 4, human capital theory assumes that the 
investments of governments and individuals in education will, in the aggregate, enchance productivity 
and contribute to national economic growth, and that the individual bearer of human capital can 
accrue economic rewards in the labour market. Human capital discourses, such as an ‘employability 
skills’ discourse, seek the production of ‘docile’, productive individuals who, through cultivating the 
self as an enterprise, can secure less parlous participation in globalised, precarious labour markets 
(Kelly 2013; Kelly & Harrison 2009). The value of a program such as Employable Me for the present 
discussion is its ability to illustrate the limits of the ‘self as enterprise’ and ‘human capital’ models, 
models which now have so much influence in shaping how problems of youth employment and 
unemployment are understood and addressed. 
Employable Me understands ‘employability’ according to the narrow, ‘supply side’ definition that I 
explored in the Introduction to this thesis. That is, employability is determined primarily by the skills 
and attributes possessed by the individual. As the narration at the beginning of the program 
announces, ‘with the help of psychologists, job coaches and their families, [these young people] will 
find their unique skills and talents’. The ‘activation’ policies which represent the predominant policy 
approach to the problem of youth unemployment in the industrialised democracies since the late 20th 
century elide the many ‘context’ factors impacting on the experiences of job seekers, such as the 
geography of labour markets, issues surrounding travel to work, demand within local economies, and 
employer attitudes and behaviour (McQuaid & Lindsay 2005, p.205). In the case of young people 
living with a disability, the latter factor is particularly significant. As the Remove the Barrier 
campaign, and the experiences of the young people featured on Employable Me highlight, many 
employers continue to harbour discriminatory and biased attitudes towards young people with 
disabilities. Oliver Hunter, a young man featured in the Remove the Barrier campaign, suggests that 
in the eyes of employers, people with disabilities ‘have to be extraordinary to be ordinary’ (Remove 
the Barrier 2019).  
Yet, Kathleen, Eric, Paul and the many other young people who feature in the Employable Me series 
have internalised the message that to not have a job is, in some fundamental way, to have failed as a 
human being. As they each reflect on what having a job might mean to them, it becomes apparent that 
being an active, productive, enterprising member of society is something that Kathleen, Eric and Paul 
equate almost exclusively with participation in the labour market. In this understanding, the difficulty 
that they experience in securing employment reflects an individual-level failure to effectively identify 
their ‘unique skills and talents’ and market these to employers.  
Kathleen suggests that ‘everyone wants and needs a job, so they wouldn’t sit on their butts all day. No 
offense to those who are unable to work, sorry’. Paul expresses his desire to be financially 
independent ‘rather than rot away on the pension’. We witness Paul’s despair as he is knocked back 
for the business administration traineeship position, and again a short time later, when his application 
for his ‘dream job’ as a cleaner with Sydney Trains is unsuccessful. Eric’s mother Karen suggests that 
‘he wants to work because he wants to feel like an everyday human being with a job’. When asked, 
‘what would having a job mean for you?’, Eric replies: ‘everything’.  
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The Foundation for Young Australians’ 2018 report, The New Work Reality, argues that: 
An education that builds enterprise skills, being able to undertake relevant paid work 
experience, finding paid employment in a sector which is growing and an optimistic mindset 
are the four most significant factors that can accelerate the transition from full-time education 
to full-time work. (FYA 2018, p.18) 
For the young people featured in Employable Me, many of whom have applied for hundreds of jobs, 
qualifications, experience, and the right ‘mindset’ do not automatically add up to employment. They 
typically have spent a great deal of time engaged in short-term voluntary and unpaid roles, often in the 
form of ‘training’ and ‘employability’ programs or placements, in the (mostly unrealised) hope that 
this will provide a stepping stone to secure, paid employment. This is not to discount that there are 
success stories featured in Employable Me. Eric, for example, has established himself as a serious 
contender for a paid position in health administration, with a Certificate III in Health Administration, 
and six weeks’ work experience under his belt. His initiative, determination and tenacity finally pays 
off when he is offered a position as an Administration Officer with his preferred employer. To be 
clear, I am not suggesting here that a focus on the individual is necessarily always ‘bad’ or ‘wrong’. 
There are individual lives here that can be transformed and changed. As we witness Eric’s joy at 
receiving an offer of employment, and relief that the pattern of seemingly endless knock backs and 
disappointment has been broken, we are able to sense the magnitude of this event for Eric. Rather, 
what I have argued is that, when the ‘truth’ of the problem of youth employment and unemployment 
is understood in terms of supply-side employability, ‘human capital’ and/or ‘enterprise skills’, then 
there are particular consequences that flow from thinking about the problem in those terms. What 
would it mean to think otherwise?  
In a written submission to the Australia 2030: Prosperity Through Innovation inquiry conducted in 
2017 by Innovation and Science Australia39, the FYA (2017a, p.3) argues that ‘the type of human 
capital needed for Australia’s future prosperity is best developed in a culture that encourages 
entrepreneurship and supports young people to collaborate and take a risk with a new idea’. In this 
context, the FYA (2017a, p.3) suggests that it is particularly concerning that ‘Australia remains one of 
the only advanced economies without dedicated youth entrepreneurship initiatives supported by the 
government’. Australia’s budding young entrepreneurs are the kinds of ‘change agents’ with the 
vision and drive to ‘become job creators, not just job seekers’ and with the creative capacity to 
‘develop solutions to societal issues through social innovation and entrepreneurship’ (FYA 2017a, 
p.2). Crucially, the FYA (2017a, p.3) argues that ‘we need an entrepreneurial ecosystem which 
includes people of a broad range of ages, genders, cultural, geographic and socioeconomic 
backgrounds, including Aboriginal people, people who are culturally and linguistically diverse 
(CALD) and people with a disability’. However, as I will argue in the following section, organisations 
such as the FYA are silent on the specific measures that would be required to allow a range of social 
groups to participate in this ‘entrepreneurial ecosystem’ on more equal terms, and more broadly, to 
develop the kinds of ‘enterprise skills’ that are understood as increasingly necessary for successful 
labour market participation in the 21st century.  
 
39 Innovation and Science Australia is an independent statutory authority that was established to advise the 
Australian Government on matters of innovation, research and science (Australian Government 2019). 
177 
 
Gender, class, bodies and the self as enterprise 
My analysis of the key concepts of ‘employability skills’, ‘innovation’ and ‘enterprise’ has revealed 
that the figure of youth that is found in these discourses is an abstraction: this figure is of no particular 
gender, from no particular class background, and is not encumbered with a physical body.  
As my analysis in Chapter 4 highlighted, in Australia, the ‘employability skills’ paradigm that 
emerged out of three key 1990s policy documents - the Finn, Mayer and Carmichael Reports - was 
explicitly framed by ‘human capital’ concerns that sought to articulate various reforms of education 
and training systems much more firmly to the imperatives of national economic recovery and 
reconstruction. However, this paradigm tended to view ‘young people’ in the abstract: disembodied, 
of no particular gender or socioeconomic background, and from no particular place. This shortcoming 
stemmed from the failure of these major policy reviews to engage, in any meaningful and thorough 
way, with the particular needs of the various groups – people with disabilities, people of low 
socioeconomic status, Indigenous Australians, and non-English speaking background migrants, 
among others - that they identify as being at significant risk of not making effective transitions to the 
world of work and ‘adult independence’ (ESFC 1992, p.96). In the intervening decades, as many of 
the concerns of ‘employability skills’ have been carried through into the ‘enterprise skills’ paradigm, 
these issues remain. As I argued in Chapter 6, while the FYA’s 2016 report The New Basics (FYA 
2016a, p.18) identifies that the weaker performance of young Australians of Indigenous and low 
socioeconomic backgrounds on key 21st century skills ‘raises a serious equity challenge’, specific 
proposals for addressing the disadvantage that these groups face in acquiring enterprise skills are 
noticeably absent from the New Work Order report series. Indeed, the FYA (2016a, p.17) suggests 
that the barriers holding these groups back from developing greater capability in the area of digital 
literacy are, in large part, attitudinal in nature: ‘unfortunately, low socio-economic and Indigenous 
students…report lower levels of belief in the importance of working with computers, signalling 
weaker understanding of the workforce of the future’.  
The analysis of Employable Me also highlights that there are important aesthetic and affective 
dimensions of the employability equation and of the ‘self as enterprise’. In Chapter 7 I pointed to the 
growing body of scholarship exploring the significance of ‘aesthetic labour’ and ‘affective labour’ in 
contemporary youth labour markets. Peter Kelly (2013, p.15) suggests that ‘the expectations and 
norms of the self as enterprise take on particular limits and possibilities in different labour markets’, 
and that there are powerful ‘demands to imagine and practise the self in ways that conform, more or 
less, to the norms that give shape to these fields’. In globalised, flexibilised capitalism, there emerge 
powerful pressures that the self as enterprise conform to a particular normative ideal. At first glance, 
Kelly (2013, p.15) observes:  
The self as enterprise does not have a gender, or an ethnic background, or a particular age, or 
a specific geographic location. Though this may not be entirely accurate. It is possibly more 
accurate to imagine that gender neutrality assumes masculinity. That no ethnic background 
assumes ‘whiteness’. That no age barrier means a productive, enterprising adulthood that runs 
from the mid-20s to the mid-40s. That having no place in effect means that cosmopolitan, 
post-industrial urban geography is what makes enterprise understandable, thinkable, possible.  
Linda McDowell (2009, cited in Farrugia, Threadgold & Coffey 2018, p.274) observes that in the 
customer-facing, relationship-focused service industries that are increasingly dominant in advanced 
industrial societies, the ‘idealised white, slim, young, unwrinkled, typically heterosexualised body’ is 
the key figure. And my analysis of GT Magazine suggests that particular dimensions of the figure of 
the ‘enterprising young person’, as it is represented in this prominent, place-based ‘lifestyle’ 
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magazine, are foregrounded and ‘made present’: a hetero-normative version of femininity, 
‘whiteness’, and ‘middle-classness’ emerges as the ideal. Other possibilities of/for enterprise are made 
‘manifestly absent’ (Law 2004) – for example, the enterprise of young people of indigenous or ethnic 
backgrounds, or from poor, marginalised, ‘deprived’ and ‘working class’ backgrounds. 
Employable Me suggests a number of additional points that further develop this line of analysis. The 
experiences of the young job-seekers featured in the documentary series indicate that the ability to 
‘look good and sound right’ (Williams & Connell 2010) is increasingly regarded by employers as an 
essential prerequisite for employment generally, rather than only a requirement for customer-facing 
roles in the retail and hospitality sectors. This requirement applies not only in the day-to-day 
embodied performances of labouring subjects, but also at the point of entry to the labour market. It is 
frequently the case that young people with disabilities do not meet these normative requirements, and 
sometimes this comes down to a subtle, barely perceptible difference in their personality or 
appearance. It may be that an employer perceives that a young person with autism spectrum disorder, 
for example, speaks a little too loudly or enthusiastically in their interactions with colleagues or 
customers. Or that he or she demonstrates a style of bodily comportment that the employer deems 
unfavourable. In the context of an increasingly precarious, risky and competitive labour market, these 
differences provide employers with yet another reason to discriminate against, and exclude from 
consideration, young job-seekers with disabilities.  
In this sense, can a discourse such as ‘employability skills’ or ‘enterprise skills’ ever be relevant or 
generalisable to young people with disabilities, if their particular needs in education, training and the 
labour market were not considered from the beginning? This points to a larger problem: that the 
dominant discourses around young people’s ‘employability skills’, ‘innovation’ and ‘enterprise’ 
continue to marginalise the various social groups and different populations who in fact constitute 
contemporary Australia in all its diversity. As Carol Bacchi (2009) has argued, the implications and 
consequences that flow from particular problem representations are not limited to the realm of 
discourse: they also have material impacts on bodies and lives. A failure to properly acknowledge and 
respond to the particular needs of marginalised populations in education, training and the labour 
market will have significant material impacts on the bodies and lives of young people with 
disabilities, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, and migrant populations, among others.  
Youth labour markets: Pasts, presents, futures? 
A key theme to emerge from the genealogical investigations that I have conducted in this thesis is that 
the changing structural character of labour markets over the last 30-40 years has emerged as a key 
factor shaping the challenges and opportunities that young people experience in the labour market. 
Yet, policymakers and other stakeholders are often reluctant to acknowledge these structural labour 
market changes, preferring to remain focused on the question of young people’s capabilities. Where 
these structural changes are acknowledged, they are often understood as the taken-for-granted 
background about which nothing can be done. The genealogical work that I have done in this thesis 
has served to highlight that a confluence of forces – de-industrialisation, globalisation, the emergence 
of a ‘neoliberal’ form of capitalism, and processes of ‘digital disruption’ and technological change – 
have shaped the ways in which young people engage with education, training and the labour market, 
and the discourses through which that participation is framed and understood. Contemporary 
populations of young people confront a world of work that is, in many respects, individualised, de-
industrialised, deregulated, and de-unionised. However, the emergence of this state of affairs was by 
no means inevitable. At various historical junctures, for example, policymakers made decisions about 
the directions in which reform of economic, industry and labour policies should proceed. And they 
made these decisions in fields in which the interests of capital, workers, communities and of different 
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populations were contested and debated. As I noted in Chapter 6, the ways in which organisations 
such as the FYA and the Geelong Region Local Learning and Employment Network understand the 
trajectories of the ‘gig economy’ and future labour market transformation are typically 
‘technologically determinist’ in orientation, and do not adequately account for the range of social, 
economic, cultural and political factors that mediate processes of technological change. In that chapter 
I offered a series of provocations that sought to problematise the notion that processes of automation 
and technological innovation occur along a ‘natural’ or ‘inevitable’ trajectory.  
There is growing evidence to suggest that processes of casualisation, precarisation and technological 
unemployment will only intensify into the future. A 2019 ABC News report, for example, notes that 
‘the OECD’s latest Employment Outlook estimates that across its 34 member countries, 14 per cent of 
existing jobs could disappear over the next 15 to 20 years, and 32 per cent are likely to change 
radically’ (Khadem 2019). The report also notes that Australia’s rate of casualisation is currently one 
of the highest in the OECD (Khadem 2019). Even as Australia was sheltered from some of the worst 
impacts of the Global Financial Crisis, the economic conditions which have prevailed in the post-GFC 
period have had particularly harsh impacts on young people in this country. Australia has ‘witnessed 
one of the largest increases in underemployment across OECD countries since 2007’, with the OECD 
Employment Outlook observing that ‘young people with medium- and high-level education have seen 
increases in their probability of low-paid employment in Australia since 2006’ (Khadem 2019). But 
these challenges pale in comparison to the planetary crisis looming on the horizon, even as they are 
caught up in the same causes – the inability of capitalism to achieve growth in ways that are socially 
and environmentally sustainable and just. If anthropogenic climate change is not averted, then it 
appears increasingly likely that processes of dispossession, displacement and extinction on a massive 
scale – of humans and non-human species alike – will prove catastrophic for the future of the planet.  
In response to these unfolding crises, a range of solutions have been proposed. A Full Employment 
Guarantee, Youth Guarantee and a Universal Basic Income (UBI) are some of the most prominent 
examples to emerge in recent years (see for example, Smith 2017; Jackson 2019; Standing 2014; 
Roxburgh 2019). Under a Full Employment Guarantee, for example, ‘the government would offer a 
job, at the minimum wage, to anyone who wanted one, up to 35 hours of employment’ (Smith 2017, 
p.34). Advocates of a Full Employment scheme suggest that governments can and should use their 
fiscal capacity to maintain conditions of full employment, as Federal and State governments did in 
Australia in the aftermath of the Great Depression of the 1930s (Smith 2017, p.12). In a similar vein 
to the Full Employment proposal, the Youth Guarantee aims to guarantee all young people under the 
age of 25 a place in education, training or employment (Jackson 2019). As Jackson (2019) explains, 
the scheme ‘would involve a complex mix of active labour market policies (ALMPs), which are a 
cluster of measures designed to get unemployed people back into work, preferably into industries 
experiencing labour shortages’. 
However, what I want to suggest is that these ‘solutions’, alone or in combination, should always be 
understood and analysed as problematic. For one thing, in the case of a Full Employment scheme, we 
cannot ‘go back’ to a putative ‘golden age’ of full employment, to a mid-20th century industrial 
capitalism featuring a high proportion of ‘standard’ jobs. As many have demonstrated, it never was a 
‘golden age’ for all those who were locked out of ‘standard’ forms of employment – women, 
Indigenous populations, CALD populations, and LGBTIQ populations, for example (Massey 1994; 
Weis 1990). 
More importantly, these ‘solutions’ are problematic in the sense that they do not contribute to a 
rethinking of the problems of youth employment and unemployment beyond a focus on young 
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people’s capabilities. In the context of the genealogy that I have offered in this thesis, I want to 
suggest that policy responses that claim to be solutions to the problem of youth unemployment should 
be examined and critiqued for their unexamined, taken-for-granted assumptions. We should always 
approach proposals for a UBI or a Youth Guarantee with caution. This is not to suggest that we should 
always proceed with cynicism. The point is not to categorise these various schemes as either ‘bad’ or 
‘good’. Rather, these promised ‘solutions’ should always be subjected to critique and discussion, and 
particularly in a time of danger, uncertainty and crisis on a planetary scale.  
What is ‘place’ in the Anthropocene? 
In this thesis I have done the work of identifying the various dimensions of the ways in which the 
problem of youth unemployment has been understood at various points in time. And I have identified 
and analysed the various solutions that have been offered to the problem of youth unemployment, in a 
global and national sense but also in the particular place of Geelong. Throughout this thesis I have 
illustrated, in considerable detail, the ways in which processes of de-industrialisation, globalisation 
and economic restructuring made their impacts in the particular place of Geelong, shaping the 
character of this regional city, and the opportunities and life chances available to those young people 
who call this place home. Place is important, for as Donna Haraway (2016, p.31) observes, we all 
come from some place: ‘Nobody lives everywhere; everybody lives somewhere. Nothing is connected 
to everything; everything is connected to something’. 
Place is a key factor influencing the possibilities of, and for, employability skills, innovation and 
enterprise, and of meaningful labour market participation more broadly. This was so during the height 
of industrial capitalism. As commentators Cowie and Heathcott (2003, cited in Strangleman & 
Rhodes 2014, p.417) observe, industrial labour was ‘tough work that people did because it paid well 
and it was located in their communities’. And it remains so in 21st century work contexts reshaped by 
processes of globalisation, de-industrialisation and digital disruption. The analysis that I presented in 
Chapter 7, of the stories of some of the young entrepreneurs featured in GT Magazine, illustrated the 
significance of place, in combination with class, gender and race, as key factors influencing the ability 
of these young people to enact the forms of movement, lightness and flexibility that are particularly 
prized in the era of ‘liquid modernity’ (Bauman 2012). The young entrepreneurs featured in GT 
Magazine, many of whom are alumni of prestigious local schools, and with ready access to reserves 
of economic, social and cultural capital, are ‘free to imagine a world in which they are always on the 
move’ (Kenway & Fahey 2014, p.192). Young people of working class and minority backgrounds, on 
the other hand, typically encounter various ‘road blocks’, in the form of entrenched class and gender 
differentials and prejudices that constrain their ability to transcend the limitations of the particular 
‘places’ in which they are situated, and to enact the forms of enterprising, flexible selfhood that are 
understood as increasingly necessary in contemporary labour markets. 
As we move further into the 21st century, however, there are emerging crises that threaten to transform 
‘place’ and ‘places’ in unprecedented ways. The idea of the Anthropocene seeks to conceptualise the 
period of geological time in which we are living as one in which the Earth’s natural systems have 
been fundamentally transformed by human activity (Moore 2016, p.3). But more than that, the 
discourse of the Anthropocene opens up a space for examining and critiquing how such a state of 
affairs came to be. Jason Moore (2016, p.4) suggests that the concepts and tools that we so often reach 
for to describe and make sense of processes of change – what Moore refers to as the ‘concepts of “big 
history” – imperialism, capitalism, industrialization, commercialization, patriarchy, racial formations’ 
– are concepts which describe fundamentally social processes. In critiquing those discourses that 
regard ‘nature’ as an abstraction and that continually place humans at the centre of the universe, the 
Anthropocene is a call to rethink dominant understandings of the place of humans in the world, and of 
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humans in ‘place’. This is a call that young people, in large numbers across the world, are responding 
to. Beginning as a solo protest staged by then-15-year-old student Greta Thunberg outside the 
Swedish parliament, the School Strike for Climate has rapidly grown to encompass hundreds of 
thousands of young people in more than 100 countries.   
These young people are exercising their ‘creativity’, ‘critical thinking’ and ‘enterprise’ in ways that 
seek to challenge and disrupt the business-as-usual trajectories of government, business and 
community (in)action on climate change. Their protests have also attracted the ire, the anger, even 
hate, of conservative commentators and politicians, in Australia and a range of locations (The Sydney 
Morning Herald 2018; Laville 2019; Taylor et al. 2019). Significantly, young Indigenous climate 
activists have been among those protesting most vocally against the destruction of their lands and 
natural systems (Jenkins & Hocking 2019; The Canadian Press 2019). Through their connection to an 
ancient, place-based culture and cosmology, many young Indigenous people are able to develop an 
understanding of nature, and of humans-in-nature, through lenses other than those of 
Anthropocentrism and Eurocentrism. Perhaps it is the powerful connection to country that their 
culture affords that drives these young people to defend the environment so staunchly.  
The individualising discourses of ‘employability skills’, ‘innovation’ and ‘enterprise’ are an 
impoverished basis from which to build the collective forms of action and capability that will be 
necessary to address the major planetary crises that are imminent. Planetary crises that are placing the 
futures of this generation of young people, and all subsequent generations, in jeopardy. In her 
impassioned address to the UN Climate Action Summit held in New York in September 2019, Greta 
Thunberg did not hold back in castigating world leaders for their inaction on climate change: 
This is all wrong. I shouldn’t be up here. I should be back in school on the other side of the 
ocean. Yet you all come to us young people for hope. How dare you! You have stolen my 
dreams and my childhood with your empty words. And yet I’m one of the lucky ones. People 
are suffering. People are dying. Entire ecosystems are collapsing. We are in the beginning of 
a mass extinction, and all you can talk about is money and fairy tales of eternal economic 
growth. How dare you! 
And this is the challenge that I would like to end on. With capitalism in crisis, and planetary systems 
in crisis, how should we imagine problems of youth employment and unemployment going forward? 
In terms of ‘employability skills’ or ‘enterprise skills’? Possibly we need to do a little better than that. 
Indeed, the scale of the challenges facing humanity and the planet demand that we rethink problems 
of youth employment and unemployment beyond a focus on the capabilities of the individual young 
person.  
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